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THE WORKS

OF

JONATHAN EDWARDS, D. D.

LATE PRESIDENT OF UNION COLLEGE.

WITH A

MEMOIR OF HIS LIFE AND CHARACTER,

BY

TRYON EDWARDS.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

BOSTON:
PUBLISHED BY JOHN P. JEWETT & CO.
CLEVELAND, OHIO: JEWETT, PROCTOR & WORTHINGTON.
NEW YORK: SHELDON, LAMPORT & BLAKEMAN.
1854.

C1193.10 [(1)]

1859, July 18.
Gift of the
Cong. Board of Publication.
Boston.

Entered according to act of Congress, in the year 1842, by
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In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of Massachusetts.

PREFACE.

Most of the works of Dr. Edwards included in these volumes, have before been published separately; and some of them, several times. But all of them have long since been out of print, so that a copy could rarely be found. At the suggestion and earnest request of many of the ablest living theologians of our country, an attempt has now been made to collect in a uniform edition all the most valuable of his writings heretofore published, with the addition of quite a number that are now for the first time edited from his manuscripts. The works which Dr. Edwards himself published in his life time, have long since placed him in the highest rank of profound reasoners and able theologians; and it is believed that those now for the first time given to the public, will not diminish, but rather add to his reputation.

It may be noticed by some that the volumes are not punctuated with entire uniformity. The explanation of this is, that in reprinting from those already published, the punctuation of the former editions was mainly followed; so that the work, in this respect, is not as uniform as though it were now published entire for the first time. It should also be mentioned, that the editor residing at a distance from the place of publication, has not been able to superintend the press. This department of the work, however, has been faithfully attended to by the publishers, so that the references, etc. are probably given as accurately as they could have been under the eye of any editor whatever.

For the memoir it is to be regretted that the materials were not

more abundant. For those made use of, in addition to private papers and the authorities referred to in the notes, acknowledgments are due to Dwight's life of the elder President Edwards, to the American Quarterly Register for May 1836, and to several friends and correspondents who have furnished many facts and incidents hitherto unpublished. The statements, and even the language of these, have been used whenever they were to the purpose. It is to be hoped that the entire work may not be unworthy of the memory and reputation of the author; and that it may prove a valuable addition to the theological literature of our country.

Rochester, N. Y.
Feb. 1842.

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MEMOIR.

It is a thought of the profound and striking Pascal,* "that there are three very different orbits in which great men move and shine." There are those who as heroes aim successfully at military renown. The world is filled with the story of their exploits; they are hailed by the plaudits of the multitude, honored when living, and eulogized and remembered when dead. Their fame, however, is, in reality, of the lowest grade; for it is written in the sufferings and blood of their fellow men. Their memory shall last, comparatively, but a little while; or if they *are* remembered, it will be, in proportion as just views prevail, with disapprobation, and possibly with execration—like the incendiary of Diana's temple, "whose name has been transferred from oblivion to infamy." They have woven their garlands from human sufferings, and it may be that every leaf is to scorch and burn their names, and their memories, as with living fire!

A second class is higher in the scale. It consists of those who by splendor of imagination, or vigor of intellect, attain to a more quiet and a purer fame;—a fame, indeed, which is appreciated by comparatively few, and yet which shall never die. But a third, and a far higher class than either of the former, includes those, whose lofty intellects have been consecrated to the service of their great Author;—who have employed their talents in the elucidation and defence of divine truth, in opposing error, in blessing their fellow-men, and in honoring God. Their names and memories will ever glow with the richest and noblest lustre. Instead of being dimmed, they shall grow brighter and brighter with the lapse of ages, down to the end of time; till at last they

* As quoted in the life of Henry Martyn.

shall "shine as the brightness of the firmament, and as the stars forever and ever!" Of the last of these classes, was the subject of this memoir, the younger JONATHAN EDWARDS.

The two families from which he was immediately descended, are those of *Edwards* and *Pierrepont*. The family of EDWARDS is of Welsh origin. The Rev. Richard Edwards, the earliest known ancestor, was a clergyman in London, in the time of Queen Elizabeth. He came, according to family tradition, from Wales to the metropolis, and was of the established church; but of what individual church in London he was the minister, is not now known. His wife was Mrs. Anne Edwards, who, after the death of her husband, married Mr. James Coles, and with him and her son William Edwards, then young and unmarried, came to Hartford, Conn. about the year 1640, where they all lived and died. William Edwards, the great-great-grandfather, resided in Hartford, and is supposed to have been a merchant. His wife whose christian name was Agnes, came with her parents from England, (where her connections were of the highest respectability*), to America, and was married to him about 1645. So far as can now be ascertained, their only son was Richard Edwards, the great-grandfather, who was born in Hartford in 1647, and resided in that town during his life. He also was a merchant, and a man of wealth and of the highest respectability and influence. At an early age he became a communicant in the Congregational church, and adorned his profession by a long life of the most exemplary piety, and unusual devotedness to the interests of religion. He married Elizabeth Tuthill, the daughter of a merchant of New Haven, who was one of the proprietors of the colony attempted on Delaware Bay. By this connection he had seven children, the eldest of whom was the Rev. Timothy Edwards, who was born at Hartford in 1669; graduated with distinguished honors at Harvard College in 1691; and was, for more than sixty-three years, the able and successful minister of the church in East Windsor, Conn. His wife was Esther Stoddard, the second child of the Rev. Solomon Stoddard of Northampton, Mass., a lady of an unusually strong and well cultivated

* One of her brothers was mayor of Exeter, and another of Barnstable.

mind, and of high accomplishments and piety. Their fifth child and only son, was the Rev. Jonathan Edwards, long the minister of Northampton, and afterward President of the College at Princeton, New Jersey. He was born at East Windsor in 1703; and his life and character are so well known, as to require, here, no further notice.

The family of PIERREPONT is of English descent. John Pierrepont, Esq., the maternal great-grandfather of the subject of this memoir, was a younger branch of a most distinguished family in England;* and coming from that country settled in Roxbury, Mass. His son, the Rev. James Pierrepont, was an eminently pious and useful Congregational minister in New Haven, Conn. He married Mary, daughter of the Rev. Samuel Hooker of Farmington, who was a son of the Rev. Thomas Hooker, familiarly denominated "the father of the Connecticut churches," and "who was well known in the churches of England for his distinguished talents and ardent piety." Mr. Pierrepont was one of the principal founders and trustees of Yale College, and for some time its acting professor of moral philosophy. He is said to have been the author of the well known "Saybrook Platform," adopted by the Connecticut churches in 1708.

His daughter, Miss Sarah Pierrepont, the wife of the elder Jonathan Edwards, and mother of the younger, was born in 1710, and was married at the age of eighteen. She was a lady of uncommon personal beauty: her portrait by an eminent English artist, while it presents a form and features not often rivalled, exhibits that peculiar loveliness of expression which is the combined result of intelligence, cheerfulness and benevolence. The native powers of her mind were of a superior order, and her education, for which she enjoyed every advantage, was at the same time thorough and polished. In her manners she was gentle and courteous, in her deportment amiable, and in all her conversation and conduct most kind and attractive. She was also a rare example of early piety; having exhibited, in a remarkable manner, the life and power of religion when only five years old. And what is far more, the fond hopes that were thus excited, she ful-

* The Earls of Kingston.

ly confirmed by the uniform and increasing excellence of her character as she grew up to youth and maturer years. Such, indeed, was the devotedness of her piety, and so warm and animated her religious feelings in every period of her life, that they might perhaps have been regarded as enthusiastic, had they not been ever controlled by her true delicacy and sound discretion. By one who knew her well, she is described, before her marriage, as having "a strange sweetness in her mind, and a singular purity in her affections; as most just and conscientious in all her conduct; as of a wonderful sweetness, and calmness, and universal benevolence." And in after life, as a christian and a christian mother, she is represented as being as near a perfect model as is often seen on earth.

As a christian, "she was," says Dr. Hopkins, "eminent for her piety and for experimental religion. Religious conversation was her delight; and as far as propriety permitted, she promoted it in all companies. Her manner of conducting it, showed, at once, her clear comprehension of spiritual and divine things, and the deep impression they had made upon her mind." "It was not merely conversation *about* religion, but religion itself, abounding in the heart, and flowing forth spontaneously in the daily conversation and life." The most intelligent and devoted christians were her chosen friends and associates. She was sacredly faithful to secret prayer and all the more private and spiritual duties of religion; ever attended and most highly prized the social and public worship of God; and in all circumstances sought and found her highest happiness in the great truths and duties of Christianity, making her religion the great aim and business of life. As a christian mother, from their earliest years, she endeavored to train up her children for God. She regularly and earnestly prayed with them and for them, and faithfully instructed them in the great doctrines and duties of the Bible, and by example and precept made it her chief object to prepare them for excellence and usefulness on earth, and endless happiness in heaven.

Jonathan Edwards, the second son and ninth child of these parents, was born at Northampton, Mass., on the twenty-sixth day of May, 1745. Of his childhood, but little is now known, ex-

cept that he very early gave evidence of more than ordinary powers of mind, of great decision and perseverance of character, and of a deliberate yet earnest desire of knowledge and improvement. His ambition of excelling was, however, held for a season in check by an inflammatory weakness of the eyes, which prevented his learning to read until a much later period than is common in New England. He was also subjected to the inconveniences resulting from the unhappy difficulty between his father and the church and society in Northampton, which terminated in the dismission of Mr. Edwards, and his removal with his family to Stockbridge. This was in 1751, when this son was but six years old; and it was, with its attendant circumstances, perhaps, the greatest impediment to his early education.

The circumstances of his situation at Stockbridge are thus stated by himself, in the preface to his observations on the language of the Muhhekaneew Indians, published in 1788. "When I was but six years of age, my father removed with his family to Stockbridge, which at that time was inhabited by Indians almost solely; as there were in the town but twelve families of whites or Anglo-Americans, and perhaps one hundred and fifty families of Indians. The Indians being the nearest neighbors, I constantly associated with them; their boys were my daily schoolmates and play-fellows. Out of my father's house, I seldom heard any language spoken beside the Indian. By these means I acquired the knowledge of that language, and a great facility in speaking it. It became more familiar to me than my mother tongue. I knew the names of some things in Indian that I did not know in English. Even all my thoughts ran in Indian;* and though the true pronunciation of the language is extremely difficult to all but themselves, they acknowledged that I had acquired it perfectly, which, as they said, never had been done before by any Anglo-American. On account of my skill in their language in general, I received from them many compliments applauding my superior wisdom. This skill in their language, I have in a good measure retained to this day."

* Both at this time, and in after life, he was so familiar with the Indian language *that he often dreamed in it.*

When he was in his tenth year, his father who had early consecrated him to God's service, and who was doubtless encouraged to the step by his rapid progress in the language just mentioned, sent him among the Six Nations, that he might also learn *their* language, and thus become qualified to become a missionary among them. He went, with the Rev. Gideon Hawley, to Oughquauga on the Susquehannah river, to acquire the language of the Oneida tribe. Though the point to be reached was more than a hundred miles from any English settlement, and the distance to be traversed directly through a howling wilderness, yet his courage, though he was still but a child, shrunk not from the undertaking, nor at the prospect of exchanging the comforts of a parent's house for the abodes of the savage. Mr. Hawley, and his young charge, set out on their journey in April, 1755. On their way they passed through Canajoharie, where they visited the castle of Hendrick, the famous chief of the Mohawks, and thence proceeded through the wilderness to the place of their destination. Here his pupil remained until August, when he returned to Stockbridge; and at the last place he continued until the October following, when he again went to Oughquauga. While with the Oneidas he made rapid progress in acquiring their language, and by this and by his general deportment, so gained upon their affections as to become a great favorite with them. On account of the war with France, then in progress, he remained with this tribe, in all only about six months. It was during his last visit to them, and when the men of the tribe were out upon their fall hunting expedition, that the Tiogas, instigated by the French, often approached their settlement, (as the Oneidas were friendly to the English) and alarmed them with the prospect of an attack. These alarms, frequently rousing them at the dead of night, finally rendered it unsafe for their missionary longer to remain among them. The warriors were called in from hunting for the work of defence; and as Mr. Hawley had decided on leaving them, some of them took his young pupil upon their shoulders, and carried him for miles through the woods to a place of safety. Mr. Hawley and he were now obliged to return to Massachusetts in the depths of winter; and on their way

they had several times to sleep on the ground in the open air, and to endure many other privations well calculated to try the fortitude of both. At last, however, they reached Stockbridge in safety, in January, 1756; and here, for the next two years, young Edwards enjoyed the society of his father's family, and the instructions and example of both his excellent parents.

But these privileges were not long to be continued. His father's removal to Princeton in January, 1758, to assume the Presidency of the college at that place, and his sudden death in the March following, cut off at once the earthly dependence of the family, and clouded the prospects of this son then in the thirteenth year of his age. His mother also, who was far better calculated than most women to superintend the education of her children, was removed by death in October of the same year. At this time his education was scarcely begun, and the small property left as his inheritance, was inadequate to afford him the full benefits of such a liberal education as he had fondly hoped to obtain. Still, with his accustomed firmness, he determined to persevere in his proposed plans; and accordingly, in February, 1760, aided somewhat by family friends, he entered the grammar school at Princeton, where he commenced the study of the Latin language. So rapid was his progress in his studies, that in September of the following year he was admitted a member of the college in the same place, from which he was graduated in September, 1765, with the usual degree of Bachelor of Arts.

In the summer of 1763, and while he was at college, there was a season of general awakening and attention to religion in Princeton. At this time he became deeply impressed with a sense of his lost condition as a sinner, and his need of salvation through a crucified Redeemer; and finally obtained a hope of his reconciliation to God through Jesus Christ. This was during the presidency, and under the impressive preaching of the Rev. Dr. Finley. At this time he commenced, and for a few years continued, a diary of his spiritual state, which shows his constant watchfulness against every sin, and his earnest desire and care to be holy, and ever to be advancing in the divine life. In September of this year, he made a public profession of his faith in Christ—

that faith which was manifested in all his subsequent life, which was his support under every trial, and the anchor of his soul in the hour of death. The following dedication of himself and his all to God, with its solemn covenant and prayer, was written the day before his public union with the church of Christ. It shows his deep sense of the nature and solemnity of that interesting and most momentous transaction.

Nassau Hall, Sept. 17, 1763.

"I Jonathan Edwards, student of the college in New Jersey, on this seventeenth day of September, 1763, it being the day before the first time I propose to draw near to the Lord's table, after much thought and due consideration, as well as prayer to Almighty God for his assistance, have resolved in the grace of God to enter into an express act of self-dedication to the service of God; as being a thing highly reasonable in its own nature, and that might be of eminent service to keep me steady in my christian course, to rouse me out of sloth and indolence, and uphold me in the day of temptation.

Eternal and ever blessed God! I desire, with the deepest humiliation and abasement of soul, to come in the name and for the sake of Jesus Christ, and present myself before thee, sensible of my infinite unworthiness to appear before thee on such an occasion as this, to enter into covenant with thee. But notwithstanding my sins have made such a separation between thee and my soul, I beseech thee through Christ thy Son, to vouchsafe thy presence with me, and thine acceptance of the best sacrifice which I can make.

I do, O Lord, in hopes of thine assisting grace, solemnly make an entire and perpetual surrender of all that I am and have unto thee, being determined, in thy strength, to renounce all former lords who have had dominion over me, every lust of the eye, of the flesh, of the mind, and to live entirely devoted to thee and thy service. To thee do I consecrate the powers of my mind, with whatever improvements thou hast already, or shalt be pleased hereafter to grant me in the literary way; purposing, if it be thy good pleasure, to pursue my studies assiduously, that I may be

better prepared to act in any sphere of life in which thou shalt place me. I do also solemnly dedicate all my possessions, my time, my talents, my influence over others, to be all used for thy glory. To thy direction I resign myself, and all that I have, trusting all future contingencies in thine hands; and may thy will in all things and not mine be done. Use me, O Lord, as an instrument of thy service! I beseech thee, number me among thy people! May I be clothed with the righteousness of thy Son! Ever impart to me, through him, all needful supplies of thy purifying and cheering spirit! I beseech thee, O Lord, that thou would'st enable me to live according to this my vow, constantly avoiding all sin; and when I shall come to die, in that solemn and awful hour, may I remember this my covenant, and do thou, O Lord, remember it too, and give my departing spirit an abundant admittance into the realms of bliss! And if when I am laid in the dust, any surviving friend should meet with this memorial, may it be a means of good to him, and do thou admit him to partake of the blessings of thy covenant of grace, through Jesus, the great Mediator, to whom with thee, O Father, and thine Holy Spirit, be everlasting praises ascribed by saints and angels!—Amen. JONATHAN EDWARDS."

While at college, Mr. Edwards was unusually diligent in his studies, and at all times moral and correct in his conduct; and after his public profession of religion, exemplarily consistent as a christian. In the exact sciences, he was already accurately and extensively learned; and in classical studies he here took the stand and laid the foundation which afterward gave him the deserved reputation of being one of the first scholars of the age. But he early devoted his chief attention to the study of moral philosophy and theology. These were his favorite pursuits, to which he attended both by a sense of duty and also by inclination. Soon after leaving college, he entered on the study of divinity with the Rev. Joseph Bellamy, D. D., the friend and correspondent of his father; and in October, 1766, he was examined and licensed, by the Congregational Association of Litchfield county, as a preacher of the gospel. After preaching for a sea-

son as a candidate for the ministry, though in what towns is not now known, he was in 1767, appointed to the office of tutor in the college of which he was a graduate. This office he accepted, and continued in the discharge of its duties for the two succeeding years. A few months after his election to it, he was chosen Professor of Languages and Logic in the same institution, but for some reason saw fit to decline the appointment. One* who knew him well, writing in reference to this period of his life, says, "The name of Jonathan Edwards was associated with great literary and religious attainments in the estimation of those who in his day had been connected with the college in New Jersey, either as students or managers of its interests. His diligence and proficiency while a pupil in the institution, and his industry and fidelity when called to take a part in its instructions and government, secured to him the esteem and affection of his contemporaries."

While a tutor at Princeton, he occasionally preached to the society of White Haven, in the town of New Haven, Conn.—and subsequently, after supplying their pulpit for a season, he was invited to settle with them as their pastor. This invitation he accepted, and was on the fifth day of January, 1769, ordained to the pastoral charge of that church and society, where he continued till May 19th, 1795. Connected with this event an incident is related, which is of interest as illustrative of the times in which it occurred, and also in reference to the pastor elect. The day of the ordination had arrived; the hour was fixed for its public services; and the ordaining Council was assembled for the examination of the candidate, which was ordinarily but a brief and a somewhat formal work. But as the examination of Mr. Edwards went on, they were so much interested and profited by it, that they felt it alike their duty and privilege to continue the questions long after the time appointed for divine service at the church, so that, in consequence, they deferred the ordination services several hours, merely for the privilege of continuing the ex-

* Rev. Dr. Andrew Yates, who was a Professor in Union College, during the Presidency of Dr. Edwards. His language in this, as also in other quotations in this memoir, is somewhat abridged.

amination, and of hearing his answers which were so ready, pertinent and instructive. The incident shows the respect and deference which they paid to the man, and also the practical influence of the clergy of that day over the people, in thus deferring divine service from ten o'clock in the morning, until late in the afternoon or evening.

The time and circumstances of Mr. Edwards' settlement, were in several respects unfavorable. The age was in very many things most adverse to the prosperity of religion. The "religious commotion," as President Edwards calls it, or more correctly the extravagance of action and opinion into which the great revival of his day degenerated under the wildness of Davenport and others, was followed by a lamentable reaction and decline of vital piety. It was also the period of the Revolution. Wars and rumors of wars were the one absorbing theme. The long continued excitement, and anxiety and alarm filled all men's thoughts and hearts, so that no one who knows the nature of man, and the methods in which God ordinarily dispenses his grace, could expect religion to be prosperous. The society over which he was settled, had some time before broken off, in not the most pleasant circumstances, from the first ecclesiastical society in the town. In consequence of the dismission of its former pastor, the Rev. Mr. Bird, it was already in a divided state; and the settlement of Mr. Edwards, "instead of putting an end to the contentions previously existing, gave rise to a new division. A very considerable minority protested against his ordination; but their objections were overruled by the ordaining council, it being hoped that the great talents of the pastor would unite the congregation. The opposition, however, instead of diminishing, increased; and about two years after the ordination of Mr. Edwards, another church was formed by secession from his."* One great cause of this opposition and secession was this; that many in the society were strong advocates of what was known as "the half-way-covenant," while Dr. Edwards was decidedly and strongly opposed to it. At the

* Rev. Leonard Bacon; to whose able and interesting "Historical Discourses," I am indebted for several facts as to this period of Dr. Edward's life.

time of his settlement as their pastor, the church, at his suggestion voted, "that the qualifications for baptism, and for offering children for baptism, are and shall be with this church, the same as the qualifications for full communion." And a memorandum made at the time informs us, that as a consequence of this action of the church, "a form of covenant which had before been wont to be owned by persons who offered their children for baptism, and which contained a promise of certain external morality, but fell far short of the covenant of grace, was laid aside. At this vote of the church, and at the preaching of their pastor, several members of the church have taken such dissatisfaction, that they have since absented themselves from our communion and worship, and have sent in the request that they be dismissed as in good standing, and be recommended to the churches in general. The church certifying the facts as they are, declare that they cannot approve of this the conduct of these individuals, nor can they think it regular, or conducive to the good order and welfare of the churches; and they also declare that they have nothing else to allege against the aforesaid members, and that as to any other offence, they are, so far as known, entirely clear. This being the state of things, at their own request, and with this certificate of facts, they are dismissed from this church." It was the body thus dismissed that formed the nucleus of the seceding church, already alluded to. The difficulties from this source, however, soon died away, and for years Mr. Edwards continued his labors with unwearied diligence and much success.

After a time, however, and for several years previous to his dismission, an uneasiness had arisen in the society from another cause. Several members of the church, of considerable influence, had adopted certain principles, (by themselves deemed liberal, but now understood to have been of the school of Dr. Priestley,) on some of the most important doctrines of religion. These views were widely different from those of Dr. Edwards, and of the church at the time of his ordination, and widely different also from what had been professed by the very persons who now held them in their original covenant with the church. This diversity of opinion was undoubtedly the *principal* cause of the separation

between him and his people, though others of less moment, and arising from this, had also their influence. The *ostensible* reason, however, assigned by the society was that they were unable to support their minister. He was accordingly dismissed by an ecclesiastical council, at the mutual request both of the society and himself. All parties, however, the church, the society and the council, united in the most ample testimonials to his faithfulness and his abilities. He left them, after a settlement of more than twenty-five years, earnestly and tenderly "commending" them, in his farewell discourse, "to God and to the word of his grace."

In January of the following year, (1796,) he was again settled, in Colebrook, Conn., where he continued to preach to a very affectionate and united people, till he was called to the Presidency of Union College. His numerous parochial duties, his many public calls and services, and his close application to study at New Haven, had much impaired his health, and rendered relaxation and rest indispensibly necessary to him. At Colebrook his labors were less arduous, and his residence was rendered most pleasant by the uninterrupted harmony and affection that subsisted between himself and the people; and as a consequence of both, his health became more firmly established than it had been for years. Here his time was devoted as usual to his favorite studies, to a somewhat extensive correspondence which he had long carried on with learned men both in this country and in Europe, and to his ministerial duties. His recreation was the superintendence of a small farm. Here he expected and intended to have spent the remainder of his days; but an unexpected call of Providence broke in upon his plans, and led him away from his pleasant and favorite abode to new scenes of duty and usefulness.

In May, 1799, he was elected President of Union College, at Schenectady, N. Y. This institution, then but recently founded, had been amply endowed with funds by the Legislature of the State. John Blair Smith, D. D., who had been called to its presidency, and had accepted it in the hope of benefiting his health, having found that expectation vain was now about to return to

the people of his former charge in Philadelphia. In looking for some one whom he might recommend to the Trustees as his successor, he fixed upon Dr. Edwards. "In the state of Connecticut, where the latter was settled, says Dr. Yates, "his extensive reading and investigations of truth, his critical studies and comprehensive mind, gave him a prominent standing among the first divines in the science of theology. Such eminence could not well escape the notice of President Smith, who was about to resign his office, and also was looking for a gentleman whom he could recommend as a successor. The Rev. Dr. Theodorick Romeyn also, who had been a class-mate of Dr. Edwards at Princeton, and had a great respect for him both as a scholar and a divine, readily and warmly advocated his call according to the recommendation of Dr. Smith ;—and the call was made with great unanimity and high expectations." When the appointment was made known to Dr. Edwards, it was received with not a little perplexity and doubt as to the course of his duty ; and the propriety of accepting it and of leaving his people was referred to an ecclesiastical council. By them, after much and prayerful deliberation, he was dismissed from his pastoral charge, though with the deep regrets of his warmly attached people.

His acceptance of the presidency and his arrival in Schenectady in July, 1799, were celebrated by both the students and citizens with unusual expressions of joy. He entered upon his new office with a deep sense of its responsibility, with clear and comprehensive views of the nature and extent of its duties, and with earnest desires to be faithful to both. His inaugural address on the "Necessity and Advantages of Education," is full of sound and admirable thoughts, far in advance of the time at which they were delivered. Its views of "classical studies," of the "proportion of intellectual character," and of "the bearings of collegiate on popular education," are most excellent and just. Acting on the principle of this address that "Education is an arduous work," he gave himself with unwearied diligence to the instruction of the students, and to all that concerned the prosperity and welfare of this infant seminary of learning, occasionally preaching in destitute places, and as his services might be requested.

His presidency, however, was short. In July, 1801, after much fatigue from preaching and his other labors, he was seized with an intermitting fever then prevalent in the place. At first there seemed to be no danger in the attack; but about eight days before his death, nervous symptoms appeared, which soon deprived him of speech, at intervals of reason, and finally of life, on the first day of August, 1801. The effects of his disease were such as prevented him from expressing his feelings in the near prospect of eternity; but in its early stages, and from the moment it assumed a dangerous aspect, he was full of composure and peace, and expressed his entire and most cheerful resignation to the will of God. "From the little that dropped occasionally from his lips, it was easy to collect the leading subject of his thoughts, the great burden of his soul, *eternity—the blood of Christ—submission to the will of God.* Said he, but a few days before his death, "From my uneasy feelings in this burning fever during the last night, my mind has been led to reflect on the miseries of those wretched souls who are doomed forever to devouring fire, and everlasting burnings:—if I feel so restless under this malady of body, what must be their sufferings!" On its being intimated that he doubtless enjoyed the supports of that religion which he had loved, and which he had long professed; "yes," rejoined he, "the blood of Christ is my only ground of hope." At another time, with resignation depicted on his countenance, and with a voice almost lost in death, he said, "It becomes us cheerfully to submit to the will of God. He is wise and gracious. He orders everything for the best."*

Such was the end of this great and good man. His peace was made with God through Jesus Christ; and when called home by his heavenly Father, he had nothing to do but cheerfully to obey the summons. He had made it the great business of life to prepare for the future world; and now, as the King of Terrors comes, he falls asleep in Jesus, to awake to the full and unclouded and glorious vision of God. "He died," says Dr. Yates, "in the enjoyment of high esteem and great respect from the people generally, not only in Schenectady, and the adjoining towns, but

* See, in the Appendix, the discourse preached at his funeral.

in all the extent of his acquaintance. He had the confidence and affection of learned men, and the warmest friendship of those who were admitted to the greater intimacies of friends and counsellors. His loss was severely felt in the city of Schenectady, and spread a gloom over the institution which had been under his care. Although the period of his labors was short, affording hardly an opportunity to enter on the duties of his office, still less for the development of his qualifications for the calling he had consented to undertake; yet enough appeared of his intellectual and religious character, and of his ability to teach and to preside over the interests of the college, to gratify the trustees with reasonable evidence of their happy selection, and to promise his pupils the most valuable opportunities for solid and extensive mental improvement." His remains were interred in the Scotch Presbyterian church-yard at Schenectady. His funeral, according to his own desire, was conducted with as little parade and expense as was decent, and the expenditure which would have been required by custom and fashion on the occasion, was by his direction given to the poor.

The year after Dr. Edwards was settled at New Haven, he was married to Miss Mary Porter, daughter of the Hon. Eleazar, and Mrs. Sarah Porter of Hadley, Mass. She was a lady every way worthy of his highest confidence and friendship, and of his warmest affection. By her he had four children, three of whom survived him, and two of whom are still living. Mrs. Edwards was drowned in June, 1782. She was out with her husband in a chaise, several miles from home, when he left her to give directions to some laborers in his employ at a little distance; she riding forward alone, and intending on her return to call for him. But on coming back she allowed the horse to drink at a watering place by the road side, on the margin of a small river; and he pressing forward into the deep water, drew the chaise suddenly down a steep precipice. Mrs. Edwards was thrown out of the carriage, and remained under water more than an hour before she was discovered. Every effort was made to resuscitate her, but without success. She was universally beloved in life, and lamented in death by all her acquaintance. The second

wife of Dr. Edwards, was Miss Mercy Sabin, daughter of Mr. Hezekiah and Mrs. Mercy Sabin of New Haven. He was married to her Dec. 18, 1783, and she survived him quite a number of years.

In person Dr. Edwards was slender, erect, and somewhat above the ordinary stature. His complexion was rather dark; his features bold and prominent; his hair raven black; his eye keen, piercing and intelligent to a remarkable degree;* his expression usually thoughtful and serious; and his countenance and entire appearance, such as at once to command the highest respect of every one in his presence.

By nature he had a firm constitution, but habitual and close application to study made his bodily frame less robust as his mind by constant discipline and exertion became more and more vigorous. He was temperate in his diet, regular and systematic in all his habits, and his appetites and passions which were naturally very strong, were kept in perfect subjection. Though keenly sensitive to injury, he never allowed himself in resentment, and was ever ready freely to forgive. He was extremely exact in all his business transactions; in his dealings with mankind, discreet; punctual in the performance of his promises; prudent and economical; in prosperity but little elated, and in adversity not much cast down; deliberate in devising plans of conduct, prompt to enter upon their execution, and resolute and unwearied in surmounting all obstacles to their completion.

As a child he was singularly affectionate and dutiful and conscientious; and the same spirit was discernible in all his subsequent life. Brought up amid the high intelligence, refinement and piety of his father's house, he was surrounded with unusual advantages in these and in all respects, and he seems to have endeavored faithfully to improve them. From his youth he was remarkably intelligent, and fond of acquiring knowledge. His conversational powers were great; and though from long cherished

* One individual who remembers him, says of his eye, "that it seemed as if it would look him through and through—as if it could absolutely read his thoughts;" and another, "that after he first saw it, its calm and intensely penetrating look haunted him for weeks."

habits of close study and deep thought he sometimes appeared unsocial and reserved, yet when he was animated by the subject or chose to exert himself, he was to all classes a most interesting and instructive companion. "In conversational debate," said one* who knew him well, "he was, decidedly and without exception, the most able and overpowering of any man I have ever met." And one reason of his ability and success in this respect was, that he uniformly made his opponent define his terms, and then abide by his own definitions—a course, which if uniformly adopted, would prevent or speedily terminate many a long discussion. No man better knew how to ask a question; or how *by* a question, to raise a doubt, or overturn an argument, or end a debate. In narration he adhered exactly to the truth, without the least coloring or exaggeration.

In the private and domestic relations of life, he was faithful and exemplary. As a son, he was worthy of his parents. As a brother, he merited and received the high respect and warm affection of his brothers and sisters. As a husband and father, he was most kind and faithful and affectionate. He was very fond of his children; strict in watching over, and diligent in instructing them; very attentive to their manners; and careful to correct their errors before they should become confirmed habits, and this, not by corporal punishment, which he rarely resorted to, but by pointing out the dangerous consequences of their errors in a way that could not fail to convince them that he was seeking their good, and not merely aiming to establish his own authority. By precept and example, and through the strong and never ceasing influence of consistent family religion, he endeavored to train up his household for heaven, to "allure to brighter worlds and lead the way."

As a christian, as we have seen, he made a public profession of religion while at college. From his diary it appears that he early determined constantly to strive against sin and temptation, to live in a manner becoming his holy profession, and to devote himself wholly to God's service. By nature he was of an ardent and irritable disposition; and being conscious of this propensity,

* The late Rev. Dr. Spring, of Newburyport.

he very early formed the resolution ever to watch against and resist it. This he faithfully did; and the result of his vigilance, firmness and prayer was, that he gained an unusual command over his passions and feelings, so as to pass through some of the most trying circumstances with uncommon patience and equanimity. Like Paul, he knew what it was to be abased, and what to abound; and in prosperity and adversity he appeared the same. His fortitude under trials was great; it was founded, not on the insensibility and indifference of the Stoic, but in the constant recognition of God's providence, and in the habit of reliance, and of submissive and unwavering trust in him. He was diligently faithful to the more private duties of religion, to his closet and the word of divine truth. The latter he *studied*, laboriously and prayerfully in its original tongues, searching it as for hid treasures. He indeed made it the man of his counsel and the guide of his life, and the blessed result was, that his path shone brighter and brighter to the perfect day. His conduct and conversation were marked by a sacred reverence for God, for his truth, and for all his institutions. In both, he was grave and serious, avoiding even the least degree of levity and trifling, and discountenancing it in others. But while serious, he was at the same time affable and cheerful; his religion had nothing of that austerity or gloominess which sometimes unfits for acceptable and profitable intercourse with the world. His christian character was marked by humility and simplicity. The language of passion or slander never fell from his lips, and was never uttered in his presence without rebuke. His conversation was generally on some topic of religion, some doubtful question in theology, or some subject in science; and with the members of his family, his own and their death, and a future state, were the very frequent themes. To the poor and unfortunate, he was always kind and benevolent, and really though not ostentatiously charitable. His sympathies for the afflicted and suffering were strong, and at times deeply excited.* His christian experience was deep, and

* Such an occasion, with its influence on his feelings, was witnessed at a communion season in the church at Schenectady. In that city were many Africans, both slaves and freemen, a number of whom were profes-

clear, and evangelical; and his uniform consistency as a servant of Christ, such as to command, from every class, the highest respect and confidence. His light indeed shone. His example was healthful in all things; and his influence for good was deeply and unceasingly felt on every side, down to the close of his life. In the circle to which he was introduced by his relation to Union College, he found some customs which were not only new, but as he thought wrong. Respecting these his opinion was expressed with great kindness and prudence, but with unhesitating decision when occasion called for it.—For the welfare of the community around him, as a man and a christian he felt great solicitude, and in various ways was ever active to be useful to all.

As a student it was his custom to rise very early, usually at four o'clock, to begin his studies; and to retire rather early in the evening; and his first and last hours in the day were always given to communion with his own soul and with God. He wasted no part of his time in idleness, but improved in study every moment that was not required for some necessary duty or business. These habits he continued, with great uniformity through life. He studied by subjects, diligently, patiently and thoroughly; was intensely fond of investigation, and honestly sought the truth, both for its own sake and that he might extend it. In exact, patient, vigorous and independent thinking, he was almost a model. "In this respect," says another, "as well as in his character as a theologian, he was not a whit inferior to his father; he had all his acumen, and more than his literature." Walking, riding, conversation and reading were the only amusements in which he indulged himself, and he endeavored as much a possible to make his business serve as recreation from study. "Endowed by nature," says the writer of a former biographical sketch,* "with strong powers of mind, he had cultivated and improved them by constant exercise and study. He had no brilliancy of wit, or

sors of religion. They usually came to the Lord's table *after* the other members. This, to Dr. Edwards, was novel; and to one that had taken the stand that he had in favor of the colored race, and who felt much in their behalf, the spectacle excited feelings that found relief only in tears.

* Connecticut Evangelical Magazine, July, 1809.

quickness at repartee; but he had a mind clear and discriminating, adapted to profound and patient investigation, and of resources almost inexhaustible. His conceptions of things were strong, and he considered and studied every subject to which he turned his attention in all its relations and bearings, viewing it on every side, and dissecting it at every possible division, till he was completely master of the whole subject. As a metaphysician, he was profoundly skilled in the philosophy of the human mind. As a logician and reasoner, the premises he assumed were always clear and generally self-evident, and his conclusions irresistible. Every objection was anticipated, fairly stated, and fully met, so that the fortress which he defended was impregnable. He was cautious in admitting the premises of his opponents, and acute in detecting their sophistry. In short he was a champion with whom but few could contend. As he contended not for victory but truth, he was ever ready to follow where truth led, to detect the errors that might have insinuated themselves into his own reasoning, and to abandon the conclusion unless it could be supported by other and substantial arguments."

The intellect of Dr. Edwards was characterized by great strength, clearness and penetration. "He was distinguished," says Dr. Yates, "for accurate discrimination and great comprehension. This was so thoroughly understood and acknowledged in the circle of his literary and especially his theological intercourse, that when he had studied a subject and professed to comprehend it, his exposition of it was eagerly read, and that rather with a desire to know and receive his opinion than to question, or even suspiciously examine its correctness. He had a strong predilection for the philosophy of the mind, and for metaphysics generally. This branch of education in Union College, belonged to the president's department, and though he had only a second class for instruction in it, the critical notes he had made and given to his pupils, and his observations during recitation, furnished rich treasures of knowledge. The notes were highly esteemed by the students for the assistance and encouragement they afforded; and though necessarily imperfect, because made only occasionally and on detached parts of the science, they were retained

on account of their value. The science of mathematics seemed to be peculiarly suited to his taste. Whether for the sake of mental discipline he had given himself to their study, is not known; but his familiarity with them, and his well disciplined mind render it probable that he had. In the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew languages, he was rather an able, critical scholar, than a man of taste and refinement. His knowledge of these was rather the result of intellectual effort, than of that reading which is prompted by a cherished fondness for fine writing. It was fitted for the investigation of truth and for thought, more than for the indulgence of the imagination. As president of the college, his attention was directed to the course of education, with great solicitude to have it thorough in its plan, and fair in its conduct. On this principle, he insisted that the works of an author on any subject should be read entire if possible, and that all examinations should so be conducted as to furnish a fair exhibition of the proficiency or academic standing of the scholar. Intelligence simply, the extension of his knowledge, the increase of his usefulness, and thus of happiness to himself and others, seemed to influence him in every effort he made, both mental and physical. He was a scholar who had laboriously and successfully made himself such, for purposes of the highest usefulness. In the management of the college his requirements were reasonable, and his discipline mild and affectionately parental. Such a character in government, some had hardly expected of him, as, to strangers there was an apparent austerity and reserve in his manner, arising from the retirement of study and habits of close thought. But in his intercourse with his friends, though he was strict and prompt in his duties and always acted with decision, he was mild and affectionate. And the same spirit characterized his government of the college; and as a consequence, his pupils, like a well regulated family under kind and faithful discipline, were respectfully and warmly attached to him."

As a pastor, he visited but little except the sick and poor of his flock, and such as might send for him. To these his visits were most acceptable and useful. As a preacher, his delivery was rather rapid, and yet perfectly clear and distinct. His manner was bold,

dignified, solemn, earnest, always impressive, and when he was roused, powerfully eloquent.* Most of his sermons were preached from short notes; † they were plain, direct, peculiarly appropriate to the circumstances of his people, and some of them remarkably pointed.‡ And as in their delivery his clear and searching eye fixed upon the various parts of his audience, they were always listened to with deep attention. He addressed himself more to the understanding and conscience than to the passions; and yet all who heard him acknowledge that in his own mode he was rarely if ever excelled. As to subjects, he dwelt largely on the doctrines of grace, the great evangelical truths of the gospel, and their bearing on the heart and life. Duty he ever rested on doctrine, and doctrine he ever applied to duty. A large proportion of his sermons are on the total depravity of the human heart, justification by faith, regeneration by the Holy Spirit, and the kindred topics. Many of them are on the controverted points of the christian system, and on the questions and objections of deism; and on these, as in several of his published works, his reasonings are strong, original, conclusive, closely confined to the subject, and often almost as rigid in their demonstrations as the pure mathematics.§ In his preaching, as in his conversation and writings, he was remarkable for always expressing precisely what he intended and wished. So highly were his services as a preacher appreciated that probably no man of his day was more sent for on public occasions than himself. But far from aiming at such times to display himself, his great object, as in all his ministry, seems to have been to do good. A correspondent writes, that "once Dr. Edwards was to preach on the evening of the commencement of Yale College, and that all were expecting a profound metaphys-

* Of a sermon that he preached, in strongly exciting circumstances, on "Madness is in their hearts while they live," etc., the late President Dwight remarked, that it was perhaps the most able and powerfully eloquent discourse to which he ever listened. The manuscript has not been found among his papers, or it would have been published in these volumes.

† Most of those written out in full, were either prepared in the earlier years of his ministry, or for public and special occasions.

‡ See for example the close of the fourteenth sermon of the second volume.

§ See for example the fifteenth sermon of Vol. II.

ical discussion. He gave them, however a very plain and excellent practical discourse; thus evincing his good sense in not fatiguing an audience already worn out by the commencement exercises, and also his piety in the true spirit of his office in preaching a practical discourse to an audience who were expecting a profound discussion from the first divine in America."* Many of his sermons preached during the revolution, show the intelligent and warm interest which he, in common with the great body of the New England ministers, felt in the welfare of his country, and in her success in that eventful struggle. In the later periods of his ministry, and especially after he left New Haven, his preaching became less metaphysical and argumentative, and more experimental and tender. As one of several illustrations of this, soon after he went to Schenectady he was heard by a very intelligent and pious lady of far more than ordinary experience as a christian. On returning home she remarked to a friend, "Well, I have been to hear the great Dr. Edwards preach, and I expected to hear something very deep, and not a little that I could not understand; but he preached over my own experience so clearly, and with such childlike simplicity, that it was just talking over the very language of Canaan."

"The views of the truth held by Dr. Edwards," says Dr. Yates, "were strictly Calvinistic; and as held by him they were pre-eminent for their correct, extensive and well digested principles, and for their strictness and consistency. In his preaching, as in his conversation, his exhibition of truth was destitute of ornament. He obviously sought nothing but truth itself undisguised, and he presented it to the minds of others luminously and with great simplicity. Though he always regarded the opinions of his fellow men with due respect, yet he investigated for himself, and yielded ultimately and implicitly to none but the Father of spirits, speaking in his written word. In his opinions he had great decision and firmness, because they were deliberately formed after patient and thorough investigation. The unyielding tena-

* As another evidence that he was actuated by the true spirit of his office, and of that gospel which was to be "preached to the poor," many of his sermons are marked, "Preached to the negroes"—a class in whose welfare he seems always to have felt a deep interest.

city with which he held and defended what in his opinion was revealed truth, might have left the impression of obstinacy on the minds of errorists and superficial judges. But candid and observing men would always discover in his writings, sufficient cause for unyielding firmness, so clear, comprehensive and unanswerable were his exhibitions of truth. In theology, as in everything else, whatever he undertook to do, he did thoroughly and perspicaciously." "Few men," says a writer in the American Review and Literary Journal for 1801, "were more fitted or disposed to be useful than Dr. Edwards. Endowed with an active and penetrating mind, he consecrated his powers to the promotion of human happiness. And in taking a retrospect of his character and deportment, it is difficult to say whether he was most distinguished for his talents, his learning, his piety, or that unassuming modesty which is not always a concomitant of genius and erudition. In his pulpit performances he never failed to discover that good sense, acuteness, and unaffected piety which interest and instruct the more enlightened class of hearers."

While a minister in Connecticut, he superintended the theological studies of a number of young men. They were thoroughly instructed and guided by a clear and well digested system of truth. Some of them afterward attained to the highest standing in their Master's service;* and by all of them Dr. Edwards was ever regarded and spoken of with the highest respect and affection. He merited and possessed also the esteem and affection of an extensive literary and ministerial acquaintance, who looked upon him, under God, as one of the firmest pillars and strongest defenders of the church in a day of declension and infidelity, and as one of the ablest expounders of evangelical truth.

Such is a brief memoir of the life and character of this great and good man. Like his venerable father in the structure of his mind, and in his professional pursuits, he resembled him also in

* Among them were the late Presidents Dwight and Griffin, of Yale and Williams Colleges. Dr. Dwight, on the occasion of Dr. Edwards' death, preached in New Haven, an eloquent and masterly discourse, giving, it is said, a most able and discriminating view of the life and character of Dr. Edwards. It is much to be regretted that the discourse has probably been lost or destroyed with other papers.

all the excellent qualities of his heart, and in a remarkable series of the actions and events of his life. The name, education, and early employments of both were alike. Both were pious in their youth; were distinguished scholars; and were tutors for equal periods in the colleges where they were respectively educated. Both were settled in the ministry as successors to their maternal grandfathers; were dismissed on account of their religious opinions, and were again settled in retired country towns, over congregations singularly attached to them, where they had leisure to pursue their favorite studies, and to prepare and publish their valuable works. Both were removed from these stations to become presidents of colleges; and both died shortly after their respective inaugurations, the one in the fifty-sixth and the other in the fifty-seventh year of his age, each having preached on the first sabbath of the year of his death, on the text, "This year thou shalt die."

Perhaps this brief memoir cannot be closed in a more interesting manner, than by carrying out this parallel in the language of another and an able writer.* "If," says he, "in making out a catalogue of the most distinguished American divines, we were required to arrange them according to our best judgment, we should certainly assign the first and highest place to JONATHAN EDWARDS the *elder*; and then leaving a blank space, as is sometimes done in the English universities to indicate the comparative standing of candidates for academical honors, we should not know what name to insert next in preference to that of JONATHAN EDWARDS the *younger*. Few and far between, in any part of the world, have such sentinels appeared on Zion's watch towers. Rarely, indeed, has the church been blessed with champions so highly gifted by nature, so well furnished with "the whole armor of God," so skilful in wielding the "sword of the spirit," and so triumphant in every quarter. It is but seldom that a son has such a father; and it is still more rare that such a father leaves behind him a son so worthy of his lineage."

"A parallel drawn by the hand of a master, between these two

* Christian Spectator for January, 1823.

great men, would not fail of being highly interesting and instructive. For such a parallel as might be furnished from the ample materials which they have left behind them, we have not room in the present article, even if we possessed the ability of doing full justice to the subject. But we cannot let the opportunity pass, without inviting the attention of our readers to the following brief and imperfect sketch."

After giving in substance the coincidences in their *lives* which have already been mentioned, the writer proceeds: "But the parallel is far more deeply interesting in other particulars. The talent of the first President Edwards for philosophical and metaphysical disquisition, was of the very highest order. There was no subject within the legitimate range of human investigation which was too high or too deep for his powers. He saw those relations of things that lie far beyond the ken of ordinary minds, with a clearness that has excited the admiration of the most distinguished metaphysicians of a later age; and in tracing out remote analogies; in straightening and shedding light upon dark and intricate paths; in putting his finger at once upon the sophistry of an argument, and foiling his opponents with their own weapons; in striking out new trains of thought and following them up to the point of complete moral demonstration; in anticipating, inventing and answering objections; and in all that pertains to what we shall venture to call the pure *algebra* of mental philosophy and metaphysical science,—few men have ever equalled, and perhaps, all things considered, none have gone before him."

"Others have been greatly his superiors both in learning and eloquence—have had much more of what is loosely styled 'genius'—have lived much longer, and moved in far higher spheres. For a century to come, Locke and Reid, Stewart and Brown, may possibly be more extensively known and admired than Edwards. But to say nothing here of his heavenly crown, he has taken his place *permanently* in the very *first* rank of intellectual greatness. It can hardly be necessary to add, that among the righteous, he will be 'held in everlasting remembrance.' In the unclouded brightness of that sun, which will not go down for a thousand years, his name will shine with a new and increasing lustre."

"If Dr. Edwards was not in all respects equal to his honored father, there was, nevertheless, a striking similarity in the structure of their minds—a strong intellectual resemblance, which is very observable in their writings. Thoughts and not words, arguments and not ornaments, were the things that engaged their most earnest attention. Neither of them borrowed his pen from the wing of the eagle; nor did father or son, so far as we know, ever spend an hour in wishful gazing at the heights of Parnassus. It was the 'hill of Zion,' which they loved. It was the holy 'mount of God,' towards which their kindling eyes were oft directed; and it was to sit down there, and shout redeeming love, that they ardently aspired. It was not to make a vain parade of their prowess that they engaged in controversy, but to defend what they believed to be important truth; and they never entered the field, till they had carefully reconnoitered every position and thoroughly proved their own armor. The first advances of both were slow, but direct and sure. Neither of them ever attempted to frighten or trample down his antagonist by a furious onset, nor to carry a strong place by assault. Everything of this kind was entirely foreign from the temperament of these two distinguished champions of the truth. But when they had once buckled on their armor, neither of them ever thought of putting it off, till the enemy should be effectually discomfited."

"In managing a controversy, the method of each was nearly the same. The point in dispute was first clearly stated; the thing to be proved or disproved was placed by itself in a strong light, and then the principal terms to be used were carefully defined. After that, the opponent was generally met on his own ground. His statements and arguments were compared and analyzed. He was often proved to be unacquainted with his subject —inconclusive and even absurd in his reasoning, and palpably inconsistent with himself. This being done, the next step with the Edwardses was, to bring out their own strength, and to show by many separate and almost independent trains of argument, that the scheme which they were opposing was contrary to reason, at war with common sense, and above all, contradictory to the plainest declarations of Scripture. For the correctness of this

statement we need only refer to the treatises of President Edwards on the 'Will,' and 'Original Sin;' to that of Dr. Edwards on 'Liberty and Necessity,' and to his answer to Dr. Chauncy's book on Universal Salvation."

"Moreover, neither father nor son was scarcely ever satisfied with merely proving his point; so that often when it would seem as if every one must be already convinced, we find from five to fifteen strong reasons still to be adduced, besides hints at many others which might be brought forward in case of need. And what must have been extremely mortifying, not to say *provoking* to an opponent in the writings of the Edwardses, is, that they would anticipate more objections than he ever dreamed of himself, and then answer them in such a way as to discourage every attempt at reply. We have often, from our very hearts, pitied the prostrate theologian; and have been ready to sue for quarter in his behalf, when we found that he was too far gone to speak for himself."

"Neither of the Edwardses appears to have relied at all upon his genius; but they were both indefatigable in their studies. In these too, and in their exercise and rest, they were as *systematic* as possible. They rose early and lived by rule, as every man must, who would enjoy a clear mind, and accomplish much in a little time. They were not afraid to let it be known that they had their hours sacred to study and meditation. In this way they avoided needless interruptions, as most other men in the sacred office might do, and thus bring much more to pass than is generally accomplished. In looking over the controversial writings of the times in which they lived, and thence passing down to the present hour, it is curious to observe how few attempts have been made formally to answer any of those larger works in which they put forth their strength. Nibbling enough about the points of their arguments, there certainly has been, but for the most part it has been extremely chary; and we suspect that the few who have taken hold in earnest, have in the end, found pretty good reason to repent of their temerity. Or to change the figure, it is quite amusing when some slight impression is made upon an Edwardean outpost, to hear the shouts of victory, as if the cita-

del itself had been carried by storm. To forget, has been found vastly easier than to answer."

"We have said, that in our opinion, the first President Edwards was a greater man than the second; but if the father had higher powers of invention, the son was perhaps the most acute and dexterous as a logician. If the former could dive deeper, and bring up more pearls from the bottom, he could not arrange them when procured with greater skill and advantage than the latter. If his eye was more excursive, it was not keener. If he could lift the telescope easier, we doubt whether he could manage the microscope quite so well." * * * * * "We cannot take leave of Dr. Edwards, without once more expressing the high opinion which we have formed of his talents, nor without offering hearty thanks to God for giving him such powers, and disposing him to consecrate them to the service of Christ, and to the best good of his fellow men, both in the life that now is, and in that which is to come."

The works of Dr. Edwards which were published in his life time, are the following:

1. "The Salvation of all men strictly examined," etc. This work was in reply to Dr. Chauncy. Several editions of it have been published; one with an appendix by the late Rev. Dr. Emmons* of Franklin, Mass. Respecting it, a distinguished living theologian has often remarked, "that it is a perfect answer to Universalism, as it *was, is*, or *ever will be*." Another has called it "the great store-house of arguments to all who have written on this subject since." Of this and the next mentioned work a writer in the American Review says, "They will both do lasting honor to the memory of Dr. Edwards, both as a divine and philosopher." It was first published in 1789.

2. "A dissertation concerning Liberty and Necessity," etc. in reply to the Rev. Dr. Samuel West. Of this work the following anecdote is told by one now living who personally remembers the incident. Dr. West, after the publication of his work, was often remarking, somewhat boastfully, that no one had answered it.

* Dr. Emmons was accustomed to say that the senior President had more *reason* than his son; but the son was a better *reasoner* than his father.

Soon after Dr. Edwards' work made its appearance, Dr. West was at a meeting of ministers, when one of them said to him, "Well, Dr. West, I congratulate you." "Congratulate me?" said Dr. W. "for what?" "Why, I *congratulate* you that you have at last got an answer to your book; and I *condole* with you that it is an answer that cannot be answered." An able writer in the New York Theological Magazine, remarks: "From the high reputation of Dr. Edwards, as an indefatigable student and close reasoner on subjects of an abstruse and metaphysical nature, I was led to enter on the perusal of this book with uncommon avidity. My curiosity was heightened by the frequent intimations I had received, that Dr. West's performances were viewed by his friends as an unanswerable vindication of the Arminian scheme of self-determination and contingence, in opposition to the scheme of moral necessity as maintained by president Edwards. The perusal I finished without the least disappointment. Few productions, I believe, on subjects of this nature, contain, in so small a compass, more instruction or less superfluous matter. The distinctions made are clear, and the arguments cogent. Not only the outworks, but the strong hold of Dr. West seems to me to be utterly demolished." The dissertation is divided into eight chapters. It was written and published while he was at Colebrook.

3. "Observations on the language of the Muhhekaneew Indians," etc. This was communicated to the Connecticut Society of Arts and Sciences, and first published at their request in 1788. It has since been several times republished, both in this country and in Europe. Of this treatise, the Hon. John Pickering, who edited one of the editions, remarks as follows: "The work has been for some time well known in Europe, where it has undoubtedly contributed to the diffusion of more just ideas, than once prevailed, respecting the structure of the Indian languages, and has served to correct some of the errors into which learned men had been led by placing too implicit confidence in the accounts of hasty travellers and blundering interpreters. In the Mithridates, that immortal monument of philological research, professor Vater refers to it for the information he has given upon the Mohegan language, and he has published large extracts from

it. To a perfect familiarity with the Muhhekaneew dialect, Dr. Edwards united a stock of grammatical and other learning, which well qualified him for the task of reducing an unwritten language to the rules of grammar."

4. "Brief remarks on the doctrine of Universal Salvation." This was first published at New Haven, and is supposed to have had reference to the public statements of a celebrated preacher of Universalism who was then in the place, and with whom Dr. Edwards had held a public discussion.

5. A number of occasional sermons; among which are the very able sermons on the Atonement, which may perhaps be said to have laid the foundation of the views on that subject, now generally held by the evangelical divines of New England.

6. A large number of articles in the New York Theological Magazine, over the signatures I, O, IOTA, EPSILON, and one piece signed N, vol. I. p. 196.

7. He edited from the MSS. of his father, the "History of the work of Redemption," two volumes of sermons, and two volumes of "Observations" on important theological subjects. He also wrote out a statement of what he considered the "Improvements in theology, made by President Edwards, and those who have followed his course of thought."

All these have been collected, and republished in this work. The remaining matter is now edited from his manuscripts.

THE

SALVATION OF ALL MEN STRICTLY EXAMINED;

AND THE

ENDLESS PUNISHMENT

OF THOSE WHO DIE IMPENITENT, ARGUED AND DEFENDED AGAINST THE OBJECTIONS AND REASONINGS OF THE LATE

REV. DOCTOR CHAUNCY, OF BOSTON,

IN HIS BOOK ENTITLED

"THE SALVATION OF ALL MEN," ETC.

"Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord."—Isa. 1: 18.
"Is not my way equal? Are not your ways unequal?"—Ezek. 18: 25.

PREFACE.

It is to be hoped, that no man, who believes in a future state of existence, will grudge the time and pains which are necessary to obtain satisfactory evidence concerning the nature of that state. A mistake here may be fatal. If the doctrine advanced in the following pages be true, it is a most important, a most interesting doctrine. However contrary to the wishes of any, however mortifying to their feelings, however dreadful, it is by all means necessary to be known. Surely no man would wish "to flatter himself in his own eyes, till his iniquity be found to be hateful." To a rational and scriptural view of the truth in this case, and to a satisfactory solution of the difficulties which have been objected to it, great attention and close examination are necessary. And whether both our duty and interest require us to subject ourselves to the labor of this attention and examination, rather than to sit down at ease in the expectation "of peace and safety, till sudden destruction come upon us;" no rational man can hesitate.

If any object to the size of my book, my apologies are, the size of that to which it is intended as an answer, and the extent and importance of the subject.

Doctor Chauncy's book is indeed anonymous. Yet, as I am informed that he and his most intimate friends have made no secret of the author's name, I presume I need not apologize for using the same.

I am sensible of the prejudice of many against controversy on religious subjects. But is it possible in all cases to avoid it? Besides, what is controversy properly managed, but rational or argumentative discussion? And is there to be no rational discussion of the subjects of religion? Heat and personal invective

in such disquisitions are both impertinent and hurtful. But a cool discussion of the doctrines of religion, on the ground of reason and revelation, is undoubtedly one of the best means of investigating truth, of diffusing the knowledge of it, and of obtaining and giving satisfaction with regard to the difficulties which attend many moral and religious subjects. This is the mode of discussion, which I have endeavored to observe in the following pages. To point out the inconsistency and absurdity of an erroneous system, and even to set them in the most glaring light, is not at all inconsistent with this mode of discussion. If in any instances I have deviated from this mode, and instead of adhering closely to the argument, have descended to personalities, and have endeavored to bear hard on Dr. Chauncy, otherwise than by showing the weakness and inconsistency of his arguments; for every such instance I ask pardon of the reader, and allow it is of no advantage to the cause which I espouse. That cause must be a bad one indeed, which cannot be supported without the aid of personal reflections.

New Haven, June 29, A. D. 1789.

UNIVERSAL SALVATION EXAMINED.

CHAPTER I.

IN WHICH THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF DR. CHAUNCY'S SYSTEM CONCERNING FUTURE PUNISHMENT ARE POINTED OUT AND COMPARED WITH EACH OTHER.

SECTION I.

In which the fundamental principles, etc. are pointed out, etc.

BEFORE we enter into the consideration of the particular arguments of Dr. Chauncy, it may be proper to give some account of the fundamental principles of his system.

Beside the doctrine of the salvation of all men, to establish which is the design of his whole book; there are several other doctrines, which may be considered as fundamental to his system. He does not deny all future punishment of the wicked; but allows that they will be punished according to their demerits, or according to strict justice. Thus he allows that "many men will be miserable in the next state of existence, in proportion to the moral depravity they have contracted in this. There is no room for debate here."* "They must be unavoidably miserable in proportion to the number and greatness of their vices."† "For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord; i. e. if men continue the servants of sin, the wages they shall receive, before the gift through Christ is conferred on them, will be the second death."‡ If some men suffer that punishment which is the wages of sin, they doubtless suffer all which they deserve. No man deserves more than his *wages*. "In the collective sense, they will be tormented for ages of ages; though some of them only should be tormented through the whole of that period; *the rest* variously as to time, *in proportion to their deserts*."§ "There shall be a difference in the punishment of wicked men, *according to* the difference there has been *in the nature and number of their evil*

* Page 9. † p. 10. ‡ p. 90. § p. 307.

deeds."* He speaks of the wicked as liable "to positive torments awfully great in degree, and long in continuance, *in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes.*"† "The pardonableness of all other sins and blasphemies," [except that against the Holy Ghost] "lies in this, its being possible for men, to escape the torments of hell, though they should have been guilty of those sins. Accordingly the unpardonableness of the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, must consist in the reverse of the pardonableness of other sins—in the impossibility of their escaping the torments of hell, who are chargeable with this sin. This now being the meaning of the unpardonableness of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, it is quite easy to perceive, that even these blasphemers, notwithstanding the unpardonableness of the sin they have committed, may finally be saved—For if they are not saved till after they have passed through these torments, they have never been forgiven—*The divine law has taken its course;* nor has any intervening pardon prevented *the full execution of the threatened penalty on them.* Forgiveness, strictly and literally speaking, has not been granted them."‡ "This kind of sinners being absolutely excluded from the privilege of forgiveness, must, as has been said, suffer the torments of another world, before they can be saved."§

In these passages concerning the blasphemers of the Holy Ghost, the author plainly supposes, that not only those of that character, but all who suffer the torments of hell are finally saved without forgiveness, having satisfied by their own sufferings the utmost demands of strict justice. He who is delivered from further punishment in consequence of having suffered a punishment however great in degree and long in duration, but not equal to that, to which he is liable by strict justice, is the subject of forgiveness. Just so much punishment is forgiven him, as is lacking to make the punishment, which he hath suffered, equal to that, to which he is liable by strict justice. Now our author, in the passages just quoted, supposes that both the blasphemers of the Holy Ghost and all others who pass through the torments of hell, are finally delivered, not in consequence of a punishment inferior in degree or duration, to that which may be inflicted on them, according to strict justice; as in that case they would be the subjects of forgiveness; but in consequence of that punishment, which is according to strict justice, and therefore they are delivered without forgiveness. He says, "The pardonableness of all other sins, lies in the possibility, that those who have been

* Page 320. † p. 350, 351. ‡ p. 335, etc. § p. 340.

guilty of them, should escape the torments of hell." Those therefore who actually pass through the torments of hell receive no forgiveness; but are liberated on the footing of strict justice. If pardonableness, or which is the same, a possibility of pardon consist in a possibility of escaping the torments of hell; then actual pardon consists in an actual escape from those torments. Of course they who do not escape them, but pass through them, receive no pardon.

Again; the only observation made by Dr. C. to show, that the blasphemers of the Holy Ghost are not forgiven; or the only respect in which he asserts, that they are not forgiven, is, that they pass through the torments of hell. But as this holds good with regard to all the damned, it equally proves, that none of them are forgiven; and that the divine law takes its course on them all; and that no intervening pardon will ever prevent the full execution of the threatened penalty on them. Now if the divine law take its course on the damned, and the penalty threatened in the law, be fully executed on them, they are undoubtedly punished according to their demerits, or according to strict justice; and if after all, they be liberated from punishment, they are liberated not in the way of forgiveness, nor on the footing of grace or favor; but on the footing of strict justice.

But if this conclusion concerning all the damned be denied; yet as the blasphemers of the Holy Ghost are some of mankind, *some* of mankind at least, if not all the damned, will be saved on the footing of strict justice, and without forgiveness.

The same observations for substance, may be made on the other quotations above. If the damned suffer "a misery in proportion to the number and greatness of their vices;" if "they receive the wages of sin;" if they be "tormented variously as to time, in proportion to their deserts;" and "according to the difference there has been in the nature and number of their evil deeds;" if they suffer "positive torments awfully great in degree and long in continuance, in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes;" they are punished to the utmost extent of justice. To punish them any further would be excessive, injurious and oppressive. To exempt them from punishment, is so far from an act of grace or favor, that it is an act called for by the most rigorous justice.

By these quotations, and by the observations on them, it appears, that our author holds, that the damned suffer a punishment properly and strictly vindictive, and vindictive to the highest degree, and to the utmost extent to which vengeance in any just government can proceed. Indeed speaking of the destruction of

Sodom and Gomorrah, he plainly asserts a vindictive punishment both of those cities, and of the damned; he says,* that "the destruction of those cities" was "for a public example of the divine vengeance to after ages. And the fire of hell is doubtless called everlasting for the like reason;" i. e. because it will last, till it shall have accomplished the design of heaven in the destruction of the damned, for a public example of the divine vengeance. In his *Five Dissertations*, p. 110, he speaks of the labor, sorrow and death which men suffer in this world, as "testimonies of God's *vengeance*—as *judgments* on his part, and *real evils* on theirs." By vindictive punishment is meant, that which is sufficient to support and vindicate the authority of the divine law, or which is sufficient to satisfy the justice of God. But no advocate for vindictive punishment ever supposed, that to vindicate the authority of the law and to satisfy the justice of God, a greater punishment is necessary, than is according to justice or according to the desert, or the nature and number of the sins, the vices, the crimes of the person punished; or that to those ends, a greater punishment is necessary, than is inflicted, when "the divine law takes its course;" or than is implied "in the full execution of the threatened penalty." A punishment greater than that which answers those descriptions, would be so far from satisfying justice, that it would be positively *unjust;* it would be so far from supporting the authority of the divine law, that it would bring it into contempt by violating it. If that positive torment, which in degree and continuance is according to the desert and the nature and number of the evil deeds of the sinner, be not sufficient to satisfy the justice of God, I wish to be informed what would satisfy it. But Dr. C. himself holds, that the punishment which satisfies the justice of God, is vindictive and opposed to that which is disciplinary and medicinal: "If the next state is a state of punishment not intended for the cure of the patients themselves, but to satisfy the justice of God, and give warning to others; it is impossible all men should be finally saved."† So that I am perfectly agreed with Dr. C. in his idea of a vindictive punishment, and whether he do not hold such punishment in the utmost extent, I appeal to every candid reader, who shall have perused the forecited quotations, or the pages from which they are taken.

Yet Dr. C. is a great enemy to vindictive punishment, and it is a fundamental principle of his book, that the future punishment of the wicked is *disciplinary* and intended for the good, the repentance and reformation of the patients, and not to satisfy

* Page 274. † p. 11.

the justice of God. This appears from the quotation just now made from page 11th; and by innumerable other passages, some of which I shall now recite. "The wicked shall be sent to a place of weeping, and wailing, and gnashing of teeth; not to continue there always, but till the rebellion of their hearts is subdued, and they are wrought upon to become the willing and obedient subjects of God."* "For ages of ages, the wicked shall be miserable—as a mean to destroy the enmity of their hearts and make them God's willing and obedient people."†

"The rest '[the wicked]' shall have their portion in the place of blackness of darkness, as a suitable and necessary discipline, in order to their being reduced under moral subjection to Christ."‡ "The other '[the wicked]' shall be banished to dwell in unspeakable torment, till they repent of their folly, and yield themselves up to God as his obedient servants."§ He "considers the many dispensations," through which he supposes the wicked will pass, "as variously adapted for the discipline of stubborn and rebellious creatures."‖ "Is it not far more reasonable to suppose, that the miseries of the other world are *a proper discipline*, in order to accomplish the end" of the recovery of the damned, "than that they should be final and vindictive only."¶ "The consideration of hell as a purging fire, is *that only*, which can make the matter sit easy on one's mind."** With approbation he quotes from Mr. Hartley these words: "The doctrine of purgatory, as now taught by the Papists, seems to be a corruption of a genuine doctrine held by the ancient fathers, concerning a purifying fire."†† He considers the misery of hell as "intended for the good of the patients themselves;"‡‡—for "their benefit;"§§ as "a discipline by which is to be effected the *personal good* of wicked men."‖‖ He says, "The reason why the wicked suffer the torments of the next state, is that they might be made the willing people of God."¶¶

As this is his idea of the nature and end of the future punishment of the wicked, he often rejects with abhorrence the idea, that they are to be punished for any other end exclusive of their own personal good. What he says in p. 325, implies, that unless we believe, that the future punishment of the wicked is intended for their personal good, we must believe that "the character of God, as the Father of mercies, and the God of pity, is limited to this world only;" that he is not the "same good Being in the other world that he is in this;" and that on that supposition, "we

* Page 220. † p. 221. ‡ p. 221. § p. 224. ‖ p. 309.
¶ p. 322. ** p. 324. †† p. 324. ‡‡ p. 325. §§ p. 326.
‖‖ p. 328. ¶¶ p. 343.

shall say that of our Father in heaven, which we cannot suppose of any father on earth, till we have first divested him of the heart of a father."* And in page 11th, before quoted, he absolutely rejects all punishment which is not disciplinary.

But how these two fundamental parts of Dr. C's system can be consistent with each other, is difficult to be conceived. Is that punishment which is according to the deserts of the sinner; that which in degree and continuance is according to the nature and number of his evil deeds; in which the divine law takes its course upon him, and in which the penalty threatened in the law is fully executed; is this punishment no more than a suitable and necessary discipline to the sinner; necessary "to reduce him to a moral subjection to Christ;" necessary "to his personal good," "his benefit," etc.? If so, then that punishment which is according to strict justice and "satisfies the justice of God," and that which is a mere merciful and beneficial discipline, are one and the same. The damned sinner suffers no more punishment than is necessary for his good, nor can without injury and oppression be made to suffer more; and all ground of distinction between vindictive and disciplinary punishment entirely vanishes. But if any man should avow this sentiment, that such punishment only, as is necessary and conducive to the sinner's personal good, can consistently with justice be inflicted; I beg leave to refer him to the next chapter, in which the subject is considered at large.

In the meantime, it may be proper to observe, that Dr. C. could not consistently adopt the sentiment just mentioned; because he in page 11th, before quoted, distinguishes expressly between that punishment, which is intended for the cure of the patients, and that which is intended to satisfy the justice of God; and asserts that the latter is inconsistent with the salvation of all men. His words are, "If the next state is a state of punishment, not intended for the cure of the patients themselves, but to satisfy the justice of God—'tis impossible all men should be finally saved." On this notable passage, I observe, 1. That Dr. C. here, as every where else through his book, distinguishes between a vindictive and disciplinary punishment; or between that punishment which is conducive to the sinner's good, and that which satisfies divine justice. It cannot therefore be said, that according to Dr. C. a punishment conducive to the sinner's good, is all that can in strict justice be inflicted on him. 2. He asserts, that if future punishment be intended to satisfy divine justice, it is impossible

* Page 327.

all men should be saved. Yet he himself, in holding that the wicked will be punished according to their deserts, and in degree and continuance according to the nature and number of their sins, crimes and evil deeds; and that the divine law will take its course on them, the whole threatened penalty be inflicted, and they never be forgiven; holds that punishment, which entirely satisfies the justice of God. Therefore, as he also holds that such future punishment as satisfies the justice of God, is inconsistent with the salvation of all men; to be consistent, he must give up the doctrine of the salvation of all men, to prove which, he wrote his whole book.

Another fundamental principle of Dr. C's book, is, that all men, both those who are saved immediately from this life, and those who are saved after they have suffered the pains of hell; are saved by the mere *mercy, compassion, grace* or *favor* of *God, through Christ.* He allows, that the Apostle's doctrine of justification stands "upon the foot of grace through Christ," and "that mankind have universally sinned and consequently cannot be justified upon any claim founded on *mere law.*"* "The gift by Christ takes rise from the many offences, which mankind commit in their own persons, and finally terminates in opposition to the power and demerit of them all, in their being restored, not simply to life, but to reign in it forever."† "As mankind universally are subjected to damage through the lapse of Adam; so they shall as *universally* be *delivered from it,* through *the gift by Christ.*"‡ "The *gift on* Christ's part,—ought to be taken in its abounding sense."§ "The plain truth is, final everlasting salvation is absolutely the *free gift of God* to *all* men, *through Jesus Christ*—he has absolutely and unconditionally determined of his *rich mercy,* through the intervening mediation of his son Jesus Christ; that all men, the whole race of lapsed Adam shall reign in life."‖ He speaks of God as exercising *pity, tender compassion* and *grace,* towards the damned; and speaking of the disciplinary punishment of the damned, he says, "that, God, in the other world, as well as this, must be disposed to make it evident, that he is a being of *boundless and inexhaustible goodness.*"¶ He speaks of the doctrine of universal salvation, as "the gospel plan of mercy *extensively benevolent;* and a wonderful design of mercy"** as "the scripture scheme of mercy," and of the vilest of the human race as "the objects of *mercy.*"†† He quotes with approbation, from Mr. Whiston, "That there may be in the *utmost bowels of the di-*

* Page 43. † p. 56. ‡ p. 62. § p. 75. ‖ p. 86.
¶ p. 326. ** p. 360. †† p. 365.

vine compassion, another time of trial allotted" to the damned, "in which many or all of them may be saved, by the *infinite indulgence* and *love* of their Creator."*

Our author abundantly declares also, that this *rich mercy*, this *free gift*, this *tender compassion and grace*, this *infinite indulgence* and *love* of their Creator, this *boundless* and *inexhaustible goodness*, in the salvation of all men, is exercised *through Christ* only, and *for his sake*. "*Jesus Christ* is the person *through whom* and *upon whose account*, happiness is attainable by any of the human race."† "The obedience of Christ, and eminently his obedience *unto death*, is *the ground* or *reason*, upon which it hath pleased God to make happiness attainable by any of the human race."‡ "It was *with a view to* the obedience and death of Christ, *upon this account*, *upon this ground*, *for this reason*, that God was pleased to make the gospel promise of a glorious immortality to the sons of men."§ "Christ died not for a select number of men only, but for mankind universally and without exception or limitation."‖

Now, how can this part of Dr. C's system be reconciled with that part, in which he holds, that all the damned will be punished *according to their deserts*? Can those who are punished *according to their deserts*, after that be saved *on the foot of grace through Christ*? Can those who are punished according to the nature and number of their evil deeds; in degree and continuance, in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes; in whose punishment the divine law takes its course, and the threatened penalty is fully executed; can these persons be saved by *a gift*? by a gift taken *in the abounding sense*? *by the free gift of God through Christ*? by *rich mercy*? by *pity*, *tender compassion* and *grace*? by *mercy extensively benevolent*? by a *wonderful* design of *mercy*? by *boundless* and *inexhaustible goodness*? by the *utmost bowels of the divine compassion*? by the *infinite indulgence and love of their Creator*? Is the man who by his crimes has, according to law, exposed himself to the pillory, or to be cropt and branded, and on whom the law has taken its course, and the threatened penalty has been fully executed; is he after all delivered from further suffering by *grace*, by *pity*, by *tender compassion*, by *indulgence and love*, by the *utmost bowels of compassion*?—No; he has a right on the foot of *mere law*, and of *the most rigorous justice*, to subsequent impunity, with respect to the crime or crimes, for which he has been thus punished; and to tell him after he is thus punished,

* Page 405. † p. 17. ‡ p. 19. § p. 20. ‖ p. 20.

that he is now released by grace, by pity, by utmost compassion, by indulgence and love, would be the grossest insult.

Again; how can those who have been punished according to their deserts, be saved *through Christ*, or *on his account*? How can the obedience and death of Christ be the *ground* or *reason* of their salvation? Having suffered the full penalty threatened in the law, they have a right to demand future impunity on account of their own sufferings. What need then have they of Christ, of his obedience and death, or of his mediatorial intervention, to be brought into the account? Dr. C. speaks of the "deliverance" or "the redemption which Christ has purchased" for all men.* But what need is there, that Christ should purchase deliverance for those, who purchase it for themselves, by their own personal sufferings? Nay, what justice would there be in refusing deliverance to a man, unless it be purchased for him by another, when he hath fully purchased it for himself? What if the person before described to have suffered some corporeal punishment according to the strictness of law, should be told at his release, that he is delivered from further punishment, not on account of his own sufferings; but *on account* of some other person? *on the ground*, and *for the reason* of the obedience or merit of that other person? Might he not with just indignation reply: Wherein hath that other person afforded me any relief? I have suffered all that could be inflicted on me consistently with law and justice; and let the merit of that other person be what it may, I thank him for nothing; his merit hath benefited me nothing. As little benefit from Christ does he derive towards his deliverance, who suffers according to his deserts; and with as little propriety can it be said, that he is redeemed or delivered *through Christ*, or *on his account*.

On the whole, Dr. C's scheme comes to this: That not bare goodness, but that goodness, which is boundless and inexhaustible; not bare compassion, but the utmost bowels of the divine compassion; not bare indulgence and love, but the infinite indulgence and love of our Creator, will grant to his creatures of mankind, just so much relief from misery, as they are entitled to, by the most rigorous justice.

Nor did Dr. C. fall into these inconsistences, by mere inattention; he was driven to them by dire necessity, provided it was necessary for him, to adopt his favorite doctrine of the salvation of all men. Every one of the forementioned principles is essential to his system, and can by no means be spared.

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* Pages 153, 154.

1. That the damned are punished according to their deserts, is manifestly essential to his system. For if in ages of ages they do not suffer a punishment which is according to their deserts, they do not suffer that which might justly be inflicted upon them; or, which is the same thing, that punishment which is denounced in the divine law: and according both to justice and the divine law, the damned might be made to suffer a greater punishment, than that which is for ages of ages; or than the longest punishment, which any of them will in fact suffer. But as nobody pretends there is any greater punishment threatened in the law, or in any part of scripture, than that which in scriptural language is said to be for ever and ever, which Dr. C. supposes to be for ages of ages only, and to be actually suffered by some men at least; he was necessitated to hold, that some suffer the utmost punishment threatened in the law, and of course the utmost which they deserve.

Beside; if he had allowed, that the damned do not suffer so long a punishment, as they deserve, or as is threatened in the law; he might have been asked, how much longer that punishment is, which is threatened in the law, than that which they actually suffer. And the answer must have been, either that it is a longer temporary punishment; or that it is an endless punishment. But whichever answer should have been given, inexplicable difficulties would have followed. If he should have answered, that the punishment threatened in the law, and which the sinner justly deserves, is a longer temporary punishment, than that which the damned actually suffer, he might have been challenged to point it out, as contained in the law, or in any part of scripture; and it is presumed, that he would not have been able to do it.

But if he should have answered, that the punishment threatened in the law, and which the sinner justly deserves, is an *endless* punishment, he must at once have given up all arguments in favor of universal salvation, and against endless punishment, drawn from the *justice* of God. Surely the justice of God does not oppose that which is just, and which the sinner deserves; or that which the just law of God threatens. He must also have acknowledged the infinite evil of sin, which seems to have been a most grievous eye-sore to him. For nothing more is meant by the infinite evil of sin, than that on the account of sin, the sinner deserves an endless punishment.

Again; Dr. C. could not assert, that the damned do not suffer all the punishment, which they deserve, without contradicting apparently at least, many clear and positive declarations of scrip-

ture: such as, That God will render to every man according to his deeds, and according as his work shall be; That every one shall receive according to the things done in the body; That the wicked shall not come out of the place of punishment, till they shall have paid the uttermost farthing, and the very last mite; That he shall have judgment without mercy, that showed no mercy, etc.

2. It was equally necessary, that he should hold that the punishment of the damned is a discipline, necessary and happily conducive to lead them to repentance, and to promote their good. Otherwise he must have holden, that future punishment is vindictive and intended to satisfy the justice of God; which kind of punishment is, according to his own account, inconsistent with the salvation of all men.* And otherwise he must have given up all his arguments from the divine goodness, mercy, compassion and grace, which are the arguments on which he himself depended most for the support of his cause, and which are the most popular, and the most persuasive to the majority of his readers. Otherwise too, he could not have pretended, that his scheme of universal salvation is a scheme of such benevolence, of such boundless and inexhaustible goodness, of such tender compassion and grace, of such infinite indulgence and love; and must have given up all the principal texts of scripture from which he argues universal salvation; as they are inconsistent with the idea, that the damned will be finally admitted to happiness, having previously suffered the whole punishment, which they deserve.

3. Nor could he make out his scheme of universal salvation, unless he held, that all men are saved in the way of mere grace and favor through Christ. If he had not holden this, what I observed under the last article, would be observable under this too, that he must have given up all arguments drawn from the divine goodness; and also all arguments drawn from what the scriptures say of the extent of Christ's redemption; particularly those texts from which Dr. C. chiefly argues in support of his scheme. Every one of those texts holds forth that all who are saved, are saved *by grace, through Christ.* He must also have given up all arguments from scripture. The scripture knows of no salvation, but that which is founded on the mere favor of God forgiving the sins of men, according to the riches of his grace, and justifying them freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ.

Thus Dr. C. was compelled by necessity to associate in his scheme, principles which will wage eternal war with each other.

* Page 11.

SECTION II.

In which objections to the preceding reasoning are considered.

I. If to some part of the preceding reasoning, it should be objected, that though the sinner, having suffered a punishment according to his deserts, has a right on the footing of justice to subsequent impunity, and therefore cannot be *delivered from further punishment* by grace, or through Christ; yet, as he has no right on the footing of justice, to *the positive happiness* of heaven, he may be admitted to this, entirely by grace, and through Christ; this would by no means be sufficient to reconcile the forementioned inconsistences; as may appear by the following observations.

1. That Dr. C. asserts, not only that all men will be admitted *to the positive happiness* of heaven, by free grace; but that they will in the same way *be delivered from the pains of hell.* As in these instances: "*The gift through the one man Jesus Christ,* takes rise from the many sins which men commit, in the course of their lives, and proceeds in opposition to the power and demerit of them all, so as finally to terminate in justification,—justification including in it *deliverance from sin,* as well as *from death,* their being made righteous, as well as reigning in life."* "By the righteousness of the one man *Jesus Christ* the opposite advantageous gift is come upon all men, which *delivers them from death,* to reign in life forever."† "It seemed agreeable to the infinite wisdom and grace of God, that this *damage should be repaired,* and mankind *rescued from the state of sin and death*—by the obedience of one man."‡ "Salvation *from wrath* is one thing *essentially* included in that justification which is the result of true faith."§ He speaks to the same effect in many other places. Indeed he never gives the least hint implying, that he imagined, that the introduction of the sinner to the positive happiness of heaven is more an act of grace, than his *deliverance from the pains of hell;* but all that he says on the subject, implies the contrary. Nor do I state this objection, because I find it in his book; but lest some of his admirers should start it, and should suppose that it relieves the difficulties before pressed upon him.

As Dr. C. allows, that the deliverance of sinners from the pains of hell, in all instances, is as really an act of grace, and as really through Christ, as their admission to the joys of heaven;

* Pages 25, 26. † p. 27. ‡ p. 30. § p. 37.

so the scriptures are very clear as to the same matter. Gal. 3: 13, "Christ hath redeemed us *from the curse of the law*, being made a curse for us." Rom. 5: 9, "We shall be saved *from wrath* through him." 1 Thess. 1: 10, "Jesus which *delivered us from the wrath to come*." And pardon or forgiveness, which is a discharge from deserved punishment, is, in its very nature, an act of grace, and is, in scripture, always spoken of as such, and as dispensed through Christ only. Nor is anything more clear from the scriptures, than that every person, who is saved, is saved in the way of *forgiveness*.

2. There would be no propriety in saying, that a person who has suffered all the punishment which he justly deserves, who is on the footing of law and justice released from all further punishment, and is placed in a state of mediocrity in which he is the subject of no misery; is admitted to the positive happiness of heaven, by *mercy*, by *pity* or *compassion*; much less by "*tender* compassion," and "*wonderful* mercy," and by the "*utmost bowels* of the divine compassion." A being who has by his personal sufferings, satisfied the law, stands as right with respect to that law, as if he had never transgressed it; or as another person, who retains his original innocence. Now, does any man suppose, that Gabriel was admitted to celestial happiness, in the way of *mercy*, *pity* or *tender compassion*?—That he was admitted to it in the exercise of *goodness*, is granted. The same may be said of his creation, and of the creation of every being rational and animal. But no being is created *out of compassion*. With no more propriety can it be said, that an innocent being, or, which is the same as to the present purpose, that a being who has indeed transgressed, but has in his own person made satisfaction for his transgression, and on that footing is delivered from all punishment and misery, is admitted to high positive happiness, by mercy, pity or compassion. And how much more improperly are the strong epithets used by Dr. C. applied in this case? Is it an instance of *tender* pity, of *wonderful* mercy, of the *utmost bowels* of the divine compassion, to admit to the happiness of heaven, an *innocent* creature, or one who, in his own person, stands perfectly right with respect to the divine law, and is not the subject of any misery?

3. To grant that those who shall have suffered a punishment according to their deserts, will on the footing of justice, be delivered from further wrath or punishment, and yet to insist that their admission to high positive happiness, is truly and properly an act of *grace*; would be only to raise a dispute concerning the proper meaning of the word *grace*, and at the same time to grant,

that the deliverance of the sinner from wrath, is no fruit of *forgiveness*, or of *grace*, even in the very sense in which the objector uses the word *grace*. It is no act of favor, or of *goodness*, as distinguished from *justice*, to deliver a person from wrath, who is innocent, or who in his own person has satisfied the law, and therefore now stands right with respect to it. But the idea of delivering a sinner from wrath, without forgiveness, and without grace, is as foreign from the scriptures, as that of the admission of a sinner, without grace, to the positive joys of heaven.

II. Perhaps it may be objected to part of the preceding section, that by punishment "in proportion to their deserts," and "according to their evil deeds," etc. Dr. C. meant not a punishment *equal* to strict justice, or *satisfactory* to the justice of God; but one in which a due proportion to the deserts of the various persons, with respect to one another, who are the subjects of the punishment, is observed. But to this it may be answered, Dr. C. doubtless meant to use the expressions, "in proportion to their deserts," "according to their evil deeds," etc. in the same sense in which the scriptures say, "according to their works;" "according to the fruit of their doings," etc. This is manifest not only by the similarity of the expressions, but by his own reference to those phrases in scripture, as in the following passages: "Which is plainly inconsistent with that difference *the scripture* often *declares* there shall be, in the punishment of wicked men, according to the difference there has been in the nature and number of their evil deeds."* "Under the prospect of being condemned *by the righteous Judge* of all the earth—to positive torments awfully great in degree, and long in continuance, in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes."† Here he undoubtedly refers to those passages in which the scriptures assure us, that the judge "will render to every man according to his deeds;" "according as his work shall be," etc. Now these phrases of scripture are clearly explained to us, by those representations, in which the punishment of the wicked is illustrated by the imprisonment of a debtor, till he shall have paid the uttermost farthing, the very last mite, etc. and by the passages, in which it is declared, that the wicked shall have *judgment without mercy*; that God will *not pity*, *nor spare* them, etc. Whereas, if they suffer less than they deserve according to strict justice; so far they are the objects of *mercy* and *pity*; so far God does *spare* them; so far they have *mercy mixed with judgment*. Nor can it be said, that they pay the *uttermost farthing* of the debt.

Again; Dr. C. allows, that the wicked will in the second death

* Page 320. † p. 350.

receive the wages of sin. But the wages of a man are not merely a part, or a certain proportion of what he deserves, or has earned, but the whole. No man who has faithfully done the work, which he contracted to do for ten pounds, will allow, that five pounds are his wages for that work.

III. It may also be objected to a part of the former section, that though "the law shall have its course" on some men, and "the full penalty threatened in the law, be executed on them;" still this does not imply a punishment equal or satisfactory to strict justice; as the divine law itself does not, nor ever did threaten all that punishment, which is deserved according to strict justice; and therefore, though the damned shall suffer all which is threatened in the law, yet they will not suffer a vindictive punishment, a punishment which shall "satisfy the justice of God."—Concerning this objection it may be observed:

1. That by *the law* is meant, to use Dr. C's own words, "the moral law," "the law of nature, the law of *reason*, which is the law of God;" and to say that this law does not threaten a penalty adequate to the demands of justice, is to say, that it does not threaten a penalty adequate to the demands of reason. If so, it is not the law of reason; which is contrary to the supposition. Therefore to say, that the law of reason does not threaten a penalty adequate to the demands of justice, is a real contradiction.

2. That Dr. C. neither does nor could consistently make this objection; because if the objection were just, men might be justified, "on a claim founded on *mere law*." On the principle of the objection, the law threatens a punishment far less than we deserve; and a man having suffered this punishment, may be justified on the foundation of mere law;—the law would be satisfied, and the man would stand right with respect to it, nor would it have any further claim on him, in the way of punishment, more than on a person who had never transgressed. Therefore he thenceforward obeying the law, might as truly be justified on the foot of *mere law*, as if he had rendered the same obedience, without ever transgressing.

But Dr. C. holds, "that mankind universally have sinned, and consequently cannot be justified upon a claim founded on *mere law*."* And that "the whole world had become guilty before God, and were therefore incapable of being justified upon the foot of mere law."† That all men are "incapable of justification upon the foot of mere law, as having become guilty before God."‡ To the same effect in various other passages. So that according to Dr. C. if future punishment be intended to satisfy *the law*, it

* Page 43. † p. 34. ‡ p. 36.

is equally impossible, that all men should be saved, as it is on the supposition, that future punishment is intended to satisfy *justice.*

3. Dr. C. allows, that a man having suffered the penalty of the law, is not, and cannot be, the object of forgiveness. "If they are not saved, till after they have passed through these torments, they have never been forgiven—the divine law has taken its course; nor has any intervening pardon prevented the full execution of the threatened penalty on them. Forgiveness strictly and literally speaking, has not been granted to them."* But if those who suffer the penalty of the law, are not, in their subsequent exemption from punishment, the objects of forgiveness, they suffer all they *deserve.* So far as they are exempted from *deserved* punishment, they are forgiven. Forgiveness means nothing else than an exemption from deserved punishment.

4. Dr. C. says, that Adam (and for the same reason doubtless men in general) "must have rendered himself obnoxious to the *righteous resentment* of his God and King, had he expressed a disregard to any command"† of the moral law, the law of which the Doctor is speaking in that passage. But the righteous resentment of God for transgression is a just punishment of transgression; and a just punishment is any punishment which is not unjust. And it is impossible that Adam should be obnoxious to such a punishment, if the law, the most strict rule of God's proceedings with his creatures, had not threatened it. Thus Dr. C. himself grants, that the punishment threatened in the law is the same which is deserved according to strict justice.

The Doctor every where holds, that "the law of God is a perfect rule of righteousness."‡ But if the law do not threaten all the punishment which is justly deserved by sin, it is no more truly a perfect rule of righteousness, than the gospel is. Again; "Is the law that rule of right, which God knows to be the measure of men's duty to him, and of what it is fit he should do for, or inflict upon them, as they are either obedient, or disobedient? There is, without all doubt, such a rule of men's duty towards God, and of God's conduct towards men, in a way of reward or punishment, according to their works."§ There could scarcely be a more explicit concession, that the divine law threatens all that punishment, which is according to justice. It is declared to be, not only the *rule of right*, but the *measure of what is fit in punishment*, as well as of duty. Indeed Dr. C. never once, so far as I have noticed, suggests the idea, that the divine law does not threaten all that punishment, which is deserved by sin.

* Page 336.
† 5 Dissertations, p. 55.
‡ Particularly 12 Sermons, p. 36.
§ Ibid. p. 39.

5. According to this objection, the moral law is a dispensation of grace, as truly as the gospel. But how does this accord with the scripture? That declares, that "the *law* was given by Moses, but *grace* and truth," or the gracious truth, "came by Jesus Christ," John 1: 17. "If they which are of the law be heirs, faith is made void, and the promise made of none effect. Because the law worketh *wrath*. Therefore it is of faith, that it might be by *grace*," Rom. 4: 14. "The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law," 1 Cor. 15: 56. As in the objection now under consideration, the law is supposed to be as really a dispensation of grace, as the gospel; we may say, The strength of sin is the *gospel*, as truly as, The strength of sin is the *law*. Beside; if the law be a dispensation of grace, how can it be said to be the *strength* of sin? It threatens a part only of the punishment deserved by sin; and therefore it neither points out, how strong sin is, to bring into condemnation, nor does it give to sin its proper force to terrify and torment the sinner, by exhibiting the whole punishment deserved by sin. On the ground of this objection, the strength of sin consists in the rule of strict justice, not in the law.

6. The apostle tells us, that "by the law is the knowledge of sin." But the knowledge of the evil or demerit of sin is obtained by the knowledge of the *threatening* of the law only. If the law do not threaten all that punishment, which sin deserves, we know not by the law, what sin deserves, or how evil it is. And if we know not this by the law, neither do we know it by any other part of scripture, nor by any other means whatever. Nor do we know our own demerit, nor our own proper characters as sinners; nor are we in any capacity to judge concerning our obligation to gratitude for the redemption of Christ, or for salvation through him; nor have we the proper motive to repentance set before us, in all the scriptures. The proper motive to repentance is the evil of sin. And if we have not the knowledge of the evil of sin, it is impossible we should know the grace of pardon, or of salvation from that punishment which is justly deserved by sin.

7. The apostle declares, as we have seen, that "by the law is the knowledge of *sin*," and that "the law worketh *wrath*." But on the principle of this objection, by the law is the knowledge of *grace*, and the law worketh *grace*; and God without any atonement did grant to sinners some remission or mitigation of deserved punishment. Why then could not complete remission or pardon have been granted in the same way? What need was there of Christ and his death? Yet Dr. C. holds, that it was with a view to the obedience and death of Christ, "*upon this account*,

upon this ground, for this reason, that God was pleased to make the gospel promise of a glorious immortality to the miserable sons of men."

8. If the full punishment to which the sinner justly exposes himself by sin, be not pointed out in the law; it is not a good law, as it does not teach the subject of the law the truth in this matter; but it is a deceitful law, or is directly calculated to deceive. It threatens a punishment, which the subject would naturally believe to be the whole punishment to which he is exposed by transgression, or which can be justly inflicted on him. But this, if the objection be well grounded, is by no means the case. Thus the law would naturally tend to deceive fatally all its subjects.

9. From what is granted by Dr. C. it certainly follows, that the threatening of the law is all that can be inflicted consistently with justice, and that the punishment threatened in the law, and that which is allowed by strict justice, is one and the same. He says, "Whatever sin may in its own nature, be supposed to deserve; it is not reasonable to suppose, that it should be universally reckoned to death, when no law is in being that makes death the special penalty of transgression."* "Sin is not reckoned, brought to account, *ought* not to be looked upon as being taxed with the forfeiture of life, when there is no law in being, with death as its affixed sanction."† Therefore whatever sin may be supposed to deserve, it is not *reasonable*, that it should be reckoned, it *ought not* to be reckoned, or which is the same thing, it is *not just*, that it should be reckoned to any punishment whatever, when there is no law in being, which makes that punishment the special penalty of transgression. Therefore, as I said, the punishment threatened in the law, is all which can be inflicted consistently with justice; and the punishment threatened in the law, and that which is allowed by strict justice, are one and the same.

10. If the law do not threaten all that punishment which is just, we cannot possibly tell what is a just punishment, or what justice threatens or admits with regard to punishment, and what it does not admit. If once we give up the law and the testimony, we are left to our own imaginations. Dr. C. holds, that the wages of sin are the second death, and that this death is a punishment which shall last, according to the language of scripture, *forever and ever*. Are these wages, and this punishment which shall continue *forever and ever*, adequate to the demand of justice or not? If they are, then the law threatens all which justice requires.

* Page 23. † p. 47.

If they are not; then the wages of sin, and the punishment forever and ever, are a *gracious* punishment, and sinners *deserve* a longer punishment. But how do we know, that sinners deserve a longer punishment, than this? No longer punishment is threatened in the law, or in any part of scripture.

11. If sin deserve a longer punishment, than that which is threatened in the law, it deserves either an endless punishment, or a temporary punishment longer than that which is threatened in the law. But if sin deserve an endless punishment, it is an *infinite evil.* If it deserve a temporary punishment though longer than that which is threatened in the law, all men may finally be saved, even though the state of future punishment be intended to satisfy the divine justice; the contrary of which however is asserted by Dr. C.

12. If the damned, though they shall be punished according to law, will not be punished as much as they deserve; what shall we make of the scriptures, which declare; that they shall have judgment without mercy; that God will not spare, nor pity them; that wrath shall be poured upon them without mixture? etc.

I now appeal to the reader, whether, notwithstanding this objection, the damned, in suffering the whole penalty threatened in the divine law, do not suffer as much as they deserve according to strict justice, and therefore suffer a penalty to the highest degree vindictive.

IV. If it should be further objected, that there is no inconsistency in representing future punishment to be fully adequate to the demerit of sin; and yet to represent it as disciplinary, and adapted to the repentance and personal good of the patient; as both the ends of the personal good of the patient, and of the satisfaction of justice, are answered by it; it is to be noticed:

1. If this objection mean, that the punishment which is merely adapted to the personal good of the patient, be all which is deserved by sin; I beg leave to refer the objector to the next chapter.

2. If it mean, that though sin do deserve, and the damned will suffer, more punishment, than that which is conducive to the personal good of the patient—even all that punishment which is according to strict justice—yet all will be saved finally; then it will follow that an endless punishment is not deserved by sin. In this case, I beg leave to refer the objector to chapter VI.

3. Still on the foundation of this objection, the damned, as they will have previously suffered all that they deserve, will finally be delivered from further suffering of wrath, not by forgiveness, not by grace, nor through Christ; but entirely on the footing of strict justice, as having suffered the full penalty of the law.

4. Dr. C. could not consistently make this objection. The objection holds, that the damned do suffer a punishment entirely satisfactory to justice; and Dr. C. allows, that if the punishment of the wicked be intended to "satisfy the justice of God, and give warning to others, 'tis impossible all men should be saved."*

Having in this first chapter, so far attended to Dr. C's system concerning future punishment, as to find, that it appears to be a combination of the most jarring principles; and having particularly pointed out the mutual discordance of those principles; I might spare myself the labor of a further examination of his book; until at least it should be made to appear, that those principles do in reality harmonize with each other. But as some may entertain the opinion, that though there be inconsistences in the book, yet the general doctrine of universal salvation is true, and is defensible, if not on all the grounds, on which Dr. C. has undertaken the defence of it, yet on some of them at least; therefore I have determined to proceed to a more particular examination of this doctrine, and of the arguments brought by Dr. C. in support of it.

CHAPTER II.

WHETHER THE DAMNED DESERVE ANY OTHER PUNISHMENT, THAN THAT WHICH IS CONDUCIVE TO THEIR PERSONAL GOOD.

On the supposition, that future punishment is a mere discipline necessary and happily conducive to the repentance and good of the damned; it may be asked, whether such discipline be all which they *deserve*, and which can consistently with strict justice be inflicted; or whether they do indeed deserve a greater degree or duration of punishment, than that which is sufficient to lead them to repentance, and that additional punishment be by grace remitted to them. Let us consider both these hypotheses.

The *first* is, that the wicked deserve, according to strict justice, no more punishment, than is necessary to lead them to repentance, and to prepare them for happiness. That this is not a mere hypothesis made by an opponent of Dr. C. but is a doctrine *implied* at least, if not expressly asserted in his book, may appear by the following quotations. "Is it not far more *reason-*

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* Page 11.

able to suppose, that the miseries of the other world, are a proper discipline in order to accomplish this end" [the recovery of sinners] "than that they should be final and vindictive only?"* If a final and vindictive punishment be entirely just, what has reason to object to the infliction of it, in some instances at least? —"The consideration of hell as a purging fire, is that only which can make the matter sit easy on one's mind."† But if hell, though not merely a purging fire, be justly deserved, why does not the thought of it sit easy on one's mind? So that it is manifestly implied in this observation of Dr. C. that no other punishment of the wicked can be reconciled with justice, than that which is adapted to their personal good.

The same is implicitly asserted by other writers on the same side of the question concerning future punishment. Bishop *Newton*, in his *Dissertation on the final state of mankind*, says, "It is *just* and wise and good, and even merciful, to correct a sinner as long as he *deserves* correction; to whip and scourge him, as I may say, out of his faults." Therefore all the punishment of the sinner, which is *just*, and which he *deserves*, is correction, or to be scourged out of his faults. The Chevalier *Ramsay* tells us, that "Justice is that perfection in God, by which he endeavors to make all intelligences just."‡ Vindictive justice is that attribute in God, by which he pursues vice with all sorts of torments, till it be totally extirpated, destroyed and annihilated."§ Therefore, if God inflict any punishment with any other design, than to make the subject of that punishment just, and to extirpate vice from him, he violates even *vindictive* justice. M. *Petitpierre* in a tract lately published in England, and highly applauded by some, declares, that "repentance appeases divine anger, and disarms its justice; because it accomplishes the end infinite goodness has in view, even when arrayed in the awful majesty of avenging justice; which was severe because the moral state of the sinner required such discipline; and which, when that state is reversed by conversion and holiness, will have nothing to bestow suitable to it, but the delightful manifestations of mercy and forgiveness."‖ The honor of the divine law is sufficiently guarded by the punishment of the sinner as long as he remains impenitent, and by the faithful and obedient adherence of the penitent offender. Divine justice is always satisfied when it attains its end; and this end is always attained whenever the

* Pages 321, 322. † p. 324.
‡ Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, Vol. I. p. 432.
§ Ibid. p. 434. ‖ Thoughts on the Divine goodness, p. 110.

sinner is brought to repentance."* So that it is evident, that all these writers implicitly held the proposition now under consideration, which is, that the wicked deserve according to strict justice, no more punishment than is necessary to lead them to repentance, and prepare them for happiness. This is not only a real tenet of those writers, but is most essential and important to their system; for if the contrary can be established, consequences will follow, which will greatly embarrass, if not entirely overthrow that system. I therefore beg the patience of the reader, while I particularly examine that tenet. Concerning it the following observations may be made:

1. It implies that the punishment which is necessary to lead the wicked to repentance is the curse of the divine law. Without doubt that punishment which amounts to the utmost which strict justice admits, includes the penalty or curse of the divine law. The latter does not exceed the former; because the divine law is founded in perfect justice, and whatever is inconsistent with justice, is equally inconsistent with the divine law. If therefore the sinner deserve, according to strict justice, precisely so much punishment as is necessary to lead him to repentance and no more, then this is the true and utmost curse of the divine law. Yet such a punishment as this, is really on the whole no evil, and therefore no curse even to the subject; because by the supposition it is necessary to lead him to repentance, and prepare him for the everlasting joys and glory of heaven.

Dr. C. has given us his idea of a *curse*, in his Five Dissertations,† in the following words: "A testimony of the divine displeasure against man's offence;" "A testimony of the *vengeance* of God which is a *judgment* on his part and *a real evil* on man's part." In the same book,‡ he states his idea of a blessing to a man, to be, "That which is greatly to his advantage." But the pains of hell, if they be absolutely necessary, and most happily conducive to the repentance and endless happiness of the damned, are no *real evil* on their part, nor any *judgment* or testimony of *vengeance* on God's part; and therefore are no curse at all; but are according to the Doctor's own definition a real *blessing*, and a real testimony of the *benevolence* of God to the damned. Surely a medicine of disagreeable taste, but absolutely necessary to preserve the life, or restore the health of a man, and administered with consummate judgment, is no evil or curse to the man to whom it is administered; but is a desirable good, or a blessing to him; and the administration of it, is a full proof of

* Thoughts on the Divine goodness, p. 112.
† pp. 109, 110. ‡ p. 112.

the benevolence of the physician to his patient. A proof equally demonstrative of the divine benevolence to the damned, is the whole of their punishment in hell, if it be designed merely to lead them to repentance and to prepare them for happiness; and this fruit of the divine benevolence can, according to Dr. C's own definition of a curse, be no curse.

It is granted by Dr. C. and in general by other advocates for universal salvation, that the torments of hell are not only wisely adapted, but that they are absolutely necessary to lead the damned to repentance; that no more gentle means would so well answer the proposed end; that therefore the divine goodness and wisdom have chosen and applied those torments, as the means of good to the damned. But certainly that which is on the whole necessary for a person's own good, is to him, on the whole, no real evil, and therefore no curse, but a good, a blessing; a wise man would choose it for himself, as it is, in its connection, really and properly eligible or desirable. If the torments of hell taken in connection with repentance and endless happiness be a curse, then repentance and endless happiness taken in connection with the torments of hell are a curse too. If some bitter pill considered as connected with life be a curse; then life connected with that pill is a curse too. That and that only is a curse to a person, which taken in its proper connections and dependencies, renders him more miserable than he would be without it. On the contrary, that is a blessing to a person, which taken in its proper connection and dependencies, renders him more happy than he would be without it. It is just as great a blessing and just as great a privilege, as happiness itself. And with what propriety this can be called a *curse*, I appeal to every man acquainted with propriety of language to determine. To call this a curse is to confound a curse and a blessing. This being the true idea of a curse and a blessing, it immediately follows on the supposition now under consideration, that the torments of hell are no curse, but a blessing to those on whom they are inflicted; because the very supposition is, that they are necessary to secure and promote their happiness and are inflicted for this end only.

The absurdity then, to which on the whole we are reduced is, that those means, which are the best that infinite wisdom itself could devise and apply, for the salvation of those who die in impenitence, are the curse of the divine law; and that the greatest evil which God can consistently with justice inflict on the greatest and most obdurate enemy of himself, of his Son our glorious Savior, of his law, of his grace, and of mankind, is, to put him

under the best possible advantages to secure and promote his highest everlasting happiness. Which is no more nor less than to say, That the greatest curse which God can consistently with his perfections inflict on the sinner dying in impenitence, is to bestow on him the greatest blessing, which it is in the power of omnipotence and infinite bounty to bestow on him, in his present temper of mind; that the divine law has no curse at all annexed to it; and that the penalty of the law is an inestimable blessing, the blessing of repentance, or of that discipline, which is absolutely necessary, and most wisely adapted to lead to repentance, and to prepare for the greatest happiness.

If on this view of the matter, it should be said, that the punishment of hell is not the greatest blessing which God can bestow on the sinner who dies in impenitence; that it would be a greater blessing, to grant him repentance by immediate efficacious grace, and then receive him to heavenly happiness;—Concerning this I observe, that it gives up the only ground, on which the supposition now under consideration rests, and on which alone it can be supported. The supposition is, that the punishment of hell is inflicted with the sole view of leading the sufferers to repentance, and of promoting their good. But if their good might be as effectually secured and promoted by other means, as is now asserted, then the torments of hell are not inflicted to promote the good of the sufferers. So far as their good is concerned, those torments are needless; nay, they are a wanton exercise of cruelty. But as cruelty cannot be ascribed to *the only wise God*, he must, if this objection be valid, inflict the torments of hell, for some other end, than the final happiness of those who are sent to that world of misery.

Beside; Dr. C. and other opposers of endless punishment, are no friends to the doctrine of *efficacious grace*. According to their system, efficacious grace destroys all liberty and moral agency, and reduces men to mere machines. Therefore in their view, to be led to repentance by efficacious grace, is not a greater blessing, than to be led to repentance by the torments of hell; because it is not a greater blessing to be a watch or a windmill than to be a rational moral agent. Nay, according to their system, there is no possibility of leading by efficacious grace any man to a repentance which is of a holy or of a moral nature; because, according to their system, a necessary holiness is no holiness, and a necessary repentance is no more of a moral nature, than the working of a machine.

2. If all who are saved, be delivered from wrath on account of the merit of Christ in any sense, then that punishment, which

leads to repentance, is not the curse of the law, or is not all the punishment which justice admits. They who suffer the curse of the law, satisfy the law, and therefore stand in no need of the merit of Christ to satisfy the law or to deliver them from the curse of it. They can no longer consistently with justice be holden under that curse. To hold such persons still under the curse of the law, unless they can obtain an interest in the merit of Christ, can never be reconciled with the moral perfection of God. Yet this is the very fact, if that punishment which leads to repentance be the curse of the law and at the same time, as Dr. C. abundantly holds, salvation in the deliverance from wrath, as well as in the bestowment of positive happiness, be granted to no man, but on account of the merit of Christ.

3. On this hypothesis, our Lord Jesus Christ will not save all men, nor will all men be saved, whether by Christ, or without him. Deliverance from the curse of the law is essential to salvation. But if the curse of the law be that punishment, which is necessary to lead to repentance; and if, as the advocates for universal salvation hold, a great part of mankind will suffer this punishment; it follows, that a great part of mankind will not be saved. For to be saved, and yet to suffer the curse of the law, is a direct contradiction. To suffer the curse of the law is to be damned, and is all the damnation to which any sinner is exposed, and to which justice, the most strict and rigorous justice, can doom him. If then any man have suffered this damnation, from what is he or can he be saved? Certainly from nothing, because he is exposed to nothing; unless we say, that by the *just* law of the God of *perfect justice*, he is exposed to *unjust* punishment.

If to this argument it be objected, that though all men are not saved from the curse of the law, whether by Christ, or without him; yet all are finally admitted to happiness; those who repent in this life, are admitted to happiness through the merits of Christ; those who die impenitent, are admitted to the same, in consequence of enduring in their own persons, the curse of the law; and that this is all which is intended by the salvation of all men;—With respect to this I observe:

(1) This is no proper *salvation*, which in its primary meaning signifies a deliverance from evil. But according to the case now stated, some men are not delivered from any evil, to which they ever were exposed, but suffer it all. Therefore they are not saved.

(2) That this objection entirely sets aside, with regard to a great part of mankind, salvation in the way of forgiveness of sin,

and the free grace of God in the pardon of the sinner, which is contrary to the whole gospel.

But to proceed; as Christ, on the present hypothesis, doth not in fact save all men; so it would be no favor to them, for him to attempt the salvation of all those who die impenitent. An attempt to deliver them from the curse of the law, would be an attempt to deprive them of the most necessary, wise, desirable and merciful means of grace, on which their eternal happiness depends; an attempt not to deliver them from anything which on the whole is an evil, a disadvantage even to themselves; but to deprive them of that on which their supreme interest depends; of that which is in fact the greatest good, which they, in their present temper can enjoy, and the greatest blessing which at present God can possibly bestow on them. Now to deprive them of this, is certainly no favor, nor any fruit of grace, mercy or goodness to them personally. Even to take them to heaven, before they have passed through this discipline, would by no means be so great a favor to them, as to cause them to pass through this discipline; as it would be to take them to heaven before they were prepared for it, or could enjoy happiness in it.

Further; if the curse of the law be that punishment, which is necessary to lead to repentance, then Christ came not to deliver from the curse of the law, all who are to be finally happy, but to inflict that curse on a part of them. Christ is exalted to be a prince and a Savior to give repentance and forgiveness of sins. It is a part of his office, to bring men to repentance by all wise and proper means. Dr. C. and other advocates for universal salvation suppose, that hell torments are the means, and most wise, proper and necessary means too, by which Christ will execute the work of giving repentance to all the damned. Therefore his work as a Savior, so far as respects *them*, is, on Dr. C's plan, not to deliver them from the curse of the law, but to inflict that curse on them. But who is not struck with the contrariety of this idea, to the constant, uniform declarations of scripture, that Christ came to redeem us from the curse of the law, to save us from wrath, to deliver us from the wrath to come, etc.?

Will it be said in opposition to the last observation, that those who die in impenitence, are not saved in any sense by or through Christ, whether by his atonement, or by him as God's prime minister, in the fulness of times bringing all to repentance; and that therefore Christ is not come to inflict the curse of the law on any who shall be finally happy? Then let it never more be pleaded, that Christ is the Savior of all men; that he gave himself a ransom for all; that he tasted death for every man; that the grace

of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto the many, (meaning all men); that by the righteousness of one the free gift shall come upon all men to justification of life; that Christ must reign, till he shall have put all enemies under his feet, in genuine repentance; that peace being made by the blood of the cross, it pleased the father *by Christ* to reconcile all things to himself. For if Christ shall not finally have saved all men by his merit, nor shall have led them to repentance in the execution of the scheme of providence; in what sense can the salvation of all men be ascribed to Christ? In what conceivable sense can he be called the Savior of all men? Therefore if any adopt the idea of the objection just stated, let them never more plead in favor of the salvation of all men, any of those passages of scripture referred to above, nor any passage, which relates to salvation by Christ.

Beside; if the damned be led to repentance by the torments of hell, by whom are those torments inflicted? Not by Christ it seems, because that would imply, that Christ came not to deliver all who shall be finally happy, from the curse of the law; but to inflict that curse on a part of them. By whom then will those torments, those most excellent means of grace, be administered? Is not Christ the judge of all men? The father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the son. We must all stand at his judgment seat and receive according to that which we shall have done in the body whether good or evil; and he will say, Depart, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels.

4. If the penalty of the law consist in that punishment, which is necessary to lead to repentance, then all the damned, if brought to repentance at all, are delivered out of hell, not on the footing of *grace* and *mercy*, or of *favor* and *goodness;* but on the footing of the strictest justice; not on the footing of the gospel, but of the rigor of law. By the present hypothesis, the damned all suffer that punishment, which is necessary to lead them to repentance, and therein suffer the curse of the law, or all that punishment which the utmost rigor of law and justice denounces or can inflict. If the Deity himself were to proceed in punishing one step beyond this line, he would exceed the bounds of justice, would rise in opposition to his own perfections, would deny himself; in short, would no longer be God. Therefore as soon as a sinner in hell is brought to repentance, he must be immediately released. Nor is he under obligation to plead for grace or favor; he may demand release on the footing of personal justice. He is under no necessity to have recourse to the gospel,

he may insist on his personal right on the footing of the law. He hath satisfied the law; he hath satisfied the justice of God; it hath taken its course on him; he hath nothing more to fear from it; and he must be delivered from further punishment or else he is injured, he is oppressed.

Nay; to plead for mercy or favor in order to his deliverance, is not merely needless; it is out of character, it is degrading himself who stands right with respect to the law, to the place of one who is obnoxious to still further punishment. It implies that he is ignorant of his own character and relation to the Deity and his law. Equally out of character would he act, if on his deliverance, he should render praise or thanks, either to God the father, or to his son Jesus Christ. Surely a man condemned by a civil judge, to receive forty stripes save one, after he has received them, is under no obligation to render praise or thanks for his release, either to the judge or to the executive officer.

But how are these things reconcilable with the Scriptures? Surely these consequences fairly deducible from the hypothesis under consideration, are entirely inconsistent with the gospel; and the hypothesis itself cannot consistently be embraced by any believer in the New Testament.

Particularly; this hypothesis precludes all possibility of *forgiveness* of the damned, even on the supposition that they are finally to be admitted to heavenly happiness. Forgiveness implies, that the sinner forgiven is not punished in his own person, according to law and justice. But on the hypothesis under consideration in this chapter, all the damned are in their own persons punished according to law and justice, in that they suffer that punishment which is necessary to lead them to repentance. Who would think of telling a man, who has in his own person received the corporal punishment, to which he had been condemned, that the crime for which he received that punishment, is freely forgiven him? This would be adding insult to the rigor of justice. But according to the scriptures, it seems there is no salvation on the footing of the law, or without forgiveness. Therefore either it must be made to appear, that the scriptures do admit the idea, that some men will be received to heaven on the footing of law, and without forgiveness of sins; or the hypothesis, that the punishment which is sufficient to lead to repentance, is the curse of the law, must be renounced.

5. All men who are by any means brought to repentance, whether by the torment of hell or any other cause, are on the footing of justice entitled to perfect subsequent impunity. By the supposition, the sole just end of all the punishment inflicted

by the Deity, is the repentance of the sinner. But this end is already obtained in all who are the subjects of repentance. Therefore to punish them is to inflict pain or misery for no just end whatever. But that the Deity should inflict misery for no just end, is for him to commit injustice and wanton cruelty, which is impossible. What then is become of the curse or penalty of the divine law? The apostle declares, "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them." This seems to import, that every transgressor is exposed to a curse. But he who transgresses in ever so many instances, and then whether sooner or later repents, whether his repentance be effected by mercies, or by judgments, or by any other cause, is exposed to no curse, no punishment whatever; nor can without injustice be made the subject of any. On this scheme, if there be any curse in the law, it must be *repentance itself*. By the curse of the law, is doubtless meant the ill consequence, to which the sinner is by law and justice subjected, on account of his transgression. But according to the scheme now before us, repentance, whensoever and by what cause soever it may exist in a sinner, is all the ill consequence (if it may be so called) to which he is by law and justice subjected on account of any sin or sins. This therefore with respect to him is the whole curse of the law, and can this be true? "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." But hath Christ redeemed us from *repentance*? and did he effect that redemption by becoming himself a penitent?

6. On the hypothesis, that no man can be justly punished for any other end than his own personal good; no man commits any sin or moral evil, by any damage which he does, or can do, to any being beside himself; and the whole evil of sin consists in this, that by it a man does more or less damage to himself; but he never does, nor can possibly commit sin, by dishonoring or doing damage to any other being created or divine, only so far as, in the same action, he does damage to himself personally considered. If God never do nor can justly punish a sinner, for any other end, than to lead him to repentance and to promote his good; and if all just punishment be a mere discipline necessary and wholesome to the recipient; then punishment inflicted for any other end is unjust. It is unjust to punish a sinner on account of any contempt of the Deity, any opposition to his designs, to his cause or kingdom in the world, or on account of any abuses of any man or men, excepting so far as he damages himself at the same time. If it be just to punish a sinner for any of those sins, further, or in any other respect, than as he

damages himself; it is just to punish him for other end or ends than his own personal good; which is contrary to the supposition. But if it be unjust to punish for actions in any other respect than as in those actions a man damages himself or his own interest; it must be because there is no moral evil in those actions, on any other account, or in any other view of them, than that by them he does a damage to himself, and the whole evil of sin must consist in this, that it is disadvantageous to the sinner's own interest or happiness. The end of all punishment is the removal or prevention of evil; and the evil to be removed or prevented by punishment, and which is the only ground of punishment, is the only evil of sin. But the hypothesis which we are opposing throughout this chapter is, that the only just ends of punishment, are the repentance and good of the sinner himself; that is, the removal or prevention of personal evil to the sinner, is the only just end of punishing him. Of course this personal evil to the sinner, is the only just ground of punishing him, and is the whole evil of sin.

Now if this be the whole evil of sin, and it deserve punishment on no other account than this; no wonder there is such opposition made to the doctrine of endless punishment. For truly, if the nature and evil of sin be such, as hath been just now stated, not only the *endless* punishment of it is unjust, but any punishment of however short duration is unjust; because sin carries its own full punishment in itself. All that punishment which it deserves, is either contained in sin at the time it is committed, or it follows afterward, as a natural and necessary consequence, without any pain inflicted by the Deity; and to inflict any the least pain on the sinner, as a punishment of his sin, is manifestly unjust and absurd. If a child, in consequence of thrusting its finger into a candle, should suffer great pain, surely it would not, beside that pain, deserve chastisement; because all the evil of its imprudence consists in bringing on itself that pain, and that pain itself is the full punishment of the imprudence. Therefore, to inflict any further punishment must be unjust and cruel. To apply this; all the moral evil of which the sinner is guilty, consists in bringing pain or loss on himself, and to punish him for this, is as absurd, as to punish the child just supposed; or to punish a man because he will walk with pebbles in his shoes, will whip himself, or will bring on himself the pain of hunger, by going without his ordinary meal.

7. On this hypothesis, he that repenteth, shall be saved from what? from that wise, wholesome and necessary discipline, which cannot be justly inflicted after he becomes a penitent; or in

other words, he shall be saved from a punishment which is entirely unjust. Therefore the promises of salvation to those who repent, amount to nothing more than assurances, that God will not abuse, injure or rob them of their *personal* rights. But do we want so many "exceeding great and precious promises," to assure us of this? Or are those promises so exceeding great and precious, as it seems they were in the judgment of an apostle? Have we not abundant evidence of the same truth, from the moral rectitude of the Deity, without the aid of even a single promise?

8. If the sinner deserve no more punishment than is necessary to lead to repentance, then he experiences much more of the grace and mercy of God, while he is *in hell*, than he does while he is on earth, or than he does in his deliverance *from* hell. In hell he enjoys those means of grace which are far better and more wisely and effectually calculated to secure his everlasting happiness, than those means which he enjoys on earth. In hell he receives real and demonstrative tokens of the divine grace and mercy in that discipline which is so necessary and so happily conducive to his everlasting happiness. But in deliverance from hell on his repentance, he receives *no favor;* his deliverance is a mere act of justice which cannot be denied him.

9. On the same hypothesis, the curse of the law, and the greatest, most necessary and most desirable mean of grace with respect to the impenitent, are one and the same thing. This is so plain, that not a word need be said to elucidate it. Therefore if Christ were to save any man from the curse of the law, he would deprive him of the best mean of grace, which he does or can enjoy; and this salvation itself, so far from a blessing to the sinner, would be an infinitely greater curse, than the curse of the law; because it would deprive him of a necessary and most excellent mean of grace, the punishment which is necessary to lead him to repentance. Nor would the gift of Christ himself, his incarnation, sufferings, death, atonement, or anything which he hath done, or can possibly do, to save us from the curse of the law, be any favor or blessing to the person to be saved, but utterly the reverse. It is evidently no blessing to any man personally, but the reverse, that any measures should be taken to deprive him of the best and most necessary mean of grace, without which he would not be prepared for heaven, and could not be admitted to it.

10. The doctrine that the sinner deserves no more punishment than is necessary to lead to repentance, confutes itself in this respect; that while it holds forth, that no punishment can

justly be inflicted on the sinner, but that which is merely *disciplinary*, at the same time it supposes, that such a punishment is in fact inflicted on all the damned, as is to the highest degree *vindictive*. What is a proper vindictive punishment, but that which satisfies the demands of law and *justice?* But that such a punishment is inflicted on all the damned, is supposed by all who espouse the principle, which I am now opposing. Therefore in that very doctrine, in which they mean to oppose all vindictive punishment, they in the fullest sense hold it, by holding that such punishment as is conducive to the good of the sufferer, is all which justice admits.

If they should say, that the punishment of the damned is not *merely* vindictive, but at the same time disciplinary too, and therefore just; though if it were *merely* vindictive, it would be *unjust*;—I answer, the present question entirely respects punishment which is *merely* disciplinary. Therefore to allow, that the punishment of the damned is partly vindictive, is to give up this question, and to substitute another. Beside; if a vindictive punishment be unjust, how can it become just by being connected with a punishment which is just? To correct a child, to gratify a malicious temper, is doubtless unjust. Now, if a man correct his child from two motives, partly from malice, and partly from a view to the good of the child; the justice of his conduct, so far as he is influenced by the latter motive, can never render his conduct just, so far as it proceeds from the former.

A vindictive punishment is that which is inflicted with a design to support the authority of a broken law, and of a despised government; and if the punishment be just, it is at the same time according to the conduct or demerit of the transgressor. This is demanded by every law; and if the law be just, it is justly demanded. Or in other words, such a punishment of the transgression of a just law, as is sufficient to support the authority of that law, is a just punishment. At the same time it is a punishment as truly, and to as high a degree vindictive, as justice will admit. Now if that punishment which is necessary to lead the sinner to repentance, be sufficient thus to support the authority and dignity of the divine law and government, and be inflicted for this end; it is to the highest degree vindictive, and designedly vindictive. If it be not sufficient to answer those ends, it is not the whole punishment, which the divine law and justice demand. For as I have before observed, every just and wise law demands that punishment which is necessary to its own support or existence, and justice and wisdom enforce this demand.

Therefore let the advocates for universal salvation make their

choice. If they shall choose to hold agreeably to the present supposition, that such punishment as is necessary to lead to repentance, is all that can justly be inflicted on the sinner, and that therefore it is sufficient to support the authority and dignity of the divine law and government; they stand convicted of holding, that the punishment of the damned is by no means merely disciplinary, but to the highest degree vindictive. If on the other hand, they choose to hold, that the punishment which is necessary to lead the sinner to repentance, is not adequate to the purposes before mentioned; then they must renounce the principle, which we have been so long considering, and allow that the divine law does denounce a further punishment, than that which is necessary to lead the sinner to repentance, and is a mere discipline. Because the divine law being perfectly just, does justly, and must necessarily admit of that punishment, which is sufficient to its own support or existence. Thus on either supposition, they must renounce a very favorite tenet.

11. With what propriety can we talk of satisfying the law by repentance, or by that punishment, which is necessary to lead to repentance, when the law says not a word expressly concerning repentance, either in consequence of punishment, or without it? By the law is the knowledge of sin; but by it we know nothing of any good, to be obtained by repentance, whether in the way of favor, or in the way of justice. The doctrine of any advantage to be obtained by repentance, is a doctrine of the gospel only, not of the law. Yet if it be unjust to punish a sinner with any other view, than to lead him to repentance, this doctrine would undoubtedly be found in the law. The voice of the law is not, cursed is every one that transgresseth, and doth not repent; but, cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them.

12. From the principle, that sin deserves no other punishment, than that which is subservient to the good of the sinner, it will follow, that what we call sin, is no *moral evil.*

It seems to be a dictate of reason and the common sense of mankind, that moral evil should be followed, or deserves to be followed, with natural evil or with pain and shame; and that this natural evil be a real evil to the sinner, an evil to him on the whole. But that evil which is necessary and subservient to a man's personal good, is to him no real evil; but on the whole, is even to him personally, a good, a blessing and not a curse. Now it is not a dictate of reason and common sense, that moral evil deserves a blessing. That which deserves a blessing and no curse, is no moral evil. Therefore if sin deserve no other pun-

ishment than that which is subservient to the personal good of the sinner, it is no moral evil.

If it be said to be no dictate of common sense, that moral evil should be followed with natural evil; it may be answered, that surely it is not a dictate of common sense, that it be followed with natural good. This would imply, that it deserves a reward. Nor is it a dictate of common sense, that it be followed with neither natural good nor natural evil. This would imply, that it is worthy of neither praise nor blame, reward nor punishment; and therefore is neither a moral good nor a moral evil. Both which conclusions are absurd. Therefore it remains, that it is a dictate of reason and common sense, that moral evil be followed with natural evil. Or if it be further urged, that it is a dictate of common sense, that moral evil considering the *infinite goodness and mercy of God*, should be followed with no natural evil; it is to be observed, that this is giving up the ground of justice, and going on that of goodness and mercy, which is entirely foreign to the subject of this chapter. The inquiry of this chapter is what sin deserves *on the footing of justice*, not what it will actually suffer on the footing of the divine infinite *goodness* and *mercy*. This latter inquiry shall be carefully attended to in its place, chapter VIII.

Again; moral evil is in itself, or in its own nature, odious and the proper object of disapprobation and abhorrence. By its own nature I mean its tendency to evil, the dishonor of the Deity, and the misery or diminution of the happiness of the created system. Therefore it is not injurious to the person who perpetrates moral evil, to disapprove, hate and abhor it in itself, aside from all consideration of the consequences of such disapprobation, whether such consequences be to the perpetrator personally good or bad. Hence it follows, that it is not injurious to the perpetrator of moral evil, to manifest disapprobation of his conduct, so far as morally evil, whether such manifestation be subservient to his good or not. And if *sin* be a moral evil, it is not injurious to the sinner, both to disapprove and to manifest disapprobation of sin, whether such manifestation be subservient to his good or not. But this directly contradicts the principle, that sin deserves no other punishment, than that which is subservient to the good of the sinner. For what is punishment, but a manifestation of disapprobation, which a person vested with authority has, of the conduct of a subject? And if it be not injurious to the sinner, to disapprove his sin, and to manifest that disapprobation, whether it subserve his good or not; then his sin, or he on account of his sin, deserves both disapprobation, and the manifestation of

disapprobation, though that manifestation be not subservient to his personal good; which is the same thing as to say, that the sinner deserves punishment, whether that punishment subserve his own good or not. On the other hand, if it be not just to manifest disapprobation of sin, it is not just to disapprove sin. If it be not just to disapprove or to hate sin, aside from the consideration, that the disapprobation is conducive to the personal good of the sinner; then sin is not in itself, or in its own nature and tendency, hateful or odious, but becomes odious then only, when the hatred of it conduces to the personal good of the sinner. But if sin be not in itself odious, it is not a moral evil; which was the thing to be proved.

There seems to be no way to avoid this consequence but by holding, that *moral evil* is not in itself odious and abominable, but that it becomes odious then only, when the disapprobation of it subserves the personal good of the perpetrator; which is the same as to hold, that moral evil, as such, is not at all odious, but is odious in this particular case only, when the disapprobation of it subserves the good of the perpetrator; but in all other cases, it is a matter of indifferency at least, if not an object of cordial complacency; and therefore in all other cases is no moral evil.

On the supposition which I am now opposing, when a man sins and immediately repents, he deserves no punishment, because the end of all punishment is already obtained by his repentance, and a tendency of punishment to the repentance of the sinner, which is the only circumstance, on the present hypothesis, which can justify his punishment, cannot now be pretended as a reason for his punishment. Therefore any punishment after repentance, must be undeserved and unjust. But if sin be a moral evil or a crime, it is in its own nature displeasing to God, and he may justly both be displeased at it, and manifest his displeasure; that is, he may punish it, whether the sinner repent or not. Repentance though it is a renunciation of sin in future, makes no alteration in the nature of the sin which is past; nor is it any satisfaction for that sin. If it were, it would be either *the curse of the law*, or such a meritorious act of virtue, as to balance the demerit of sin; neither of which will be pretended. But if the only reason why it is, or can be just for God to show displeasure at sin, be, that the sinner may thereby be led to repentance; then sin itself, or the proper nature of sin, is not a just reason, why God should either be displeased, or show displeasure at it. Impenitence or the repetition of sin or the continuance of the sinner in it, is on this supposition, the only just

reason or ground of either displeasure, or of any manifestation of displeasure at sin. Therefore sin in general, or sin as such, deserves no displeasure or manifestation of displeasure; but sin in some particular case only, as when it is persisted in or repeated. If we should hold, that sins committed in the day time, do not deserve punishment; but that those which are committed in the night, do deserve punishment, I think it would be manifest to every man, that we denied, that sin as such, and by the general nature common to all sins, deserves punishment; and that we confined the desert of punishment to something which is merely accidental, and not at all essential to sin. And is it not manifest, that the desert of punishment is as really not extended to the general nature of sin, but is confined to something merely accidental, when it is asserted, that sin deserves no punishment, unless it be followed with impenitence? or unless it be persisted in? or, which is the same thing, that no punishment is just, except that which is designed to lead the sinner to repentance.

If sin do not by its general nature deserve punishment, it does not by its general nature deserve the manifestation of divine displeasure; because all manifestation of divine displeasure at sin, is punishment. Again, if sin do not by its general nature deserve the manifestation of divine displeasure, it does not by its general nature deserve displeasure itself; and if so, it is not by its general nature a moral evil.

It appears then, that on the hypothesis now under consideration, sin deserves neither punishment nor hatred, and is no moral evil, unless it be followed with impenitence; or unless it be persisted in, for at least some time. The first act of sin is no moral evil. But if the first act be not a moral evil, why is the second, the third, or any subsequent act? Impenitence is nothing but a repetition or perseverance in acts the same or similar to that of which we do not repent. But if the first act abstracted from the subsequent, be not a moral evil, what reason can be assigned, why the subsequent should be a moral evil? Thus the principle, that sin deserves punishment so far only, as the punishment of it tends to the repentance and good of the sinner, implies, that there is no moral evil in the universe, either in the first sin, or in any which follow; none even in impenitence itself. On the other hand, if sin in all instances be a moral evil, it is justly to be abhorred by the Deity, whether repentance succeed or not; and if it may justly be abhorred by the Deity, he may justly manifest his abhorrence of it, whether repentance succeed or not. But to allow this, is to give up the principle, that sin deserves no other punishment, than that which is subservient to the repentance and good of the sinner.

Punishment is a proper manifestation of displeasure, made by a person in authority, at some crime or moral evil. If sin, though repented of, be still a moral evil, and the just object of the divine displeasure; why is it not just, that this displeasure should be manifested? But the manifestation of the divine displeasure at moral evil, is punishment. If on the other hand, it be an injurious treatment of a sinner, that the Deity should, after repentance, manifest his displeasure at him, on account of his sin; then doubtless it is injurious in the Deity to be displeased with him on account of his sin, of which he has repented. Again; if it be injurious in the Deity to be displeased with a man on account of his sin, after he has desisted from it in repentance, why is it not injurious to be displeased with him, on account of his past sin, though he is still persisting in sin? If one act of murder be not the proper object of the abhorrence of all holy intelligences, creator and creatures, why are two or one hundred acts of murder proper objects of abhorrence. Add nought to itself as often as you please, you can never make it something. So that by this principle we seem to be necessarily led to this conclusion, that no man on account of any sin whatever, whether repented of or not, can consistently with justice be made the object of divine abhorrence or displeasure, and consequently that sin in no instance whatever is a moral evil.

On the principle which I am now opposing, whenever a man commits any sin, for instance murder, neither God, nor man hath any right to *manifest* displeasure at his conduct, or even to be displeased with it, till two things are fully known; first whether the murderer do or do not repent; secondly, whether displeasure in this case, or the manifestation of displeasure, will conduce to the happiness of the murderer. If he do repent, no intelligent being hath a right, on the footing of justice, to be displeased; nor even if he be impenitent, unless it be known for a certainty, that the displeasure of the person, who is inquiring whether he have a right to be displeased or not, will conduce to the repentance and good of the murderer. To say otherwise; to say that we have a right in justice to be displeased with the conduct of a murderer, though he does repent, or though such displeasure does not conduce to his repentance and happiness, is to give up the principle in question. For if we may justly be displeased with his conduct, though he is penitent, or though our displeasure does not conduce to his personal happiness; we may justly manifest our displeasure. But manifestation of displeasure, especially by a ruler at the misconduct of a subject, is punishment.

Once more; on the supposition that we have no right to be

displeased with murder, unless our displeasure conduce to the good of the murderer; if there be any moral evil or turpitude in murder, it consists not in the murder itself, or in the malicious action of murder; but wholly in this circumstance attending it, that displeasure at it, conduces to the personal good of the murderer.

Perhaps it may be objected to the reasoning in the last argument, that if it prove anything, it proves too much, and therefore really proves nothing; that if sin, or any crime, do in all cases, and on account of its own nature and turpitude, deserve disapprobation and punishment, it will follow, that it deserves the same, even after it has been punished according to strict distributive justice; that after such punishment the nature of the crime is the same which it was before; that the crime therefore is still the proper object of disapprobation, and of the manifestation of disapprobation; and on the ground of the preceding reasoning, deserves an additional punishment, after it has been once punished according to strict distributive justice, which is absurd.

To this it may be answered, that a crime considered in connection with its just and full punishment, is not that crime considered, *in itself*, or *in its own nature merely*. Water mingled with wine, and thus become a compound substance, is no longer mere water. The preceding reasoning supposes, that a crime in its own nature and tendency deserves disapprobation and the manifestation of disapprobation. But a crime taken with the full punishment of it which is according to strict distributive justice, and considered in this complex view, or that crime and the just punishment of it considered as one complex object, is not that crime considered *in itself* and *in its own nature merely*. Therefore although the crime considered in itself deserves punishment, yet considered in the complex view just stated, it deserves not additional punishment. And whereas it is implied in the objection now under consideration, that a crime even after it has been punished according to strict distributive justice, is still the just object of disapprobation, and therefore that disapprobation may justly be manifested even by the magistrate, or the crime may be punished; it is to be observed, that the whole force of this reasoning depends on the meaning of the expression, *a crime even after it has been punished according to strict distributive justice, is still the just object of disapprobation*. If the meaning of that expression be, that the crime considered in its own nature and tendency, and as abstracted from the punishment or anything done to prevent the ill effect of the crime, is a proper object of disapprobation, and is an event most ardently to be

deprecated, or it is most ardently to be wished, that it might never have come into existence, and in this sense, it is the just object of disapprobation and of the manifestation of disapprobation; this is undoubtedly true, and no ill consequence to the preceding reasoning will follow. But if the meaning of that expression be, that a crime considered in connection with its just punishment and the good effects of that punishment, as one complex object, is a proper object of disapprobation, so that it is proper to wish, that this complex object had not come into existence; it is not true that in this sense a crime after it has been punished according to strict distributive justice, is still the just object of disapprobation. There have doubtless been many instances of crimes in civil society, which taken with the just punishments inflicted on them, have been on the whole the occasion of great good to society, have established government and preserved the peace of society longer and more effectually, than would have been the case, had no such crimes been committed. Therefore the existence of those crimes taken with the punishments, as one complex object, is no proper object of disapprobation or deprecation, but of acquiescence and joy; because in this connection they tend not to impair, but establish and promote the general good. In this sense any crime or any sin, after it has been punished according to strict distributive justice, is not the just object of disapprobation, and therefore not of the manifestation of disapprobation or of punishment. So that the foregoing reasoning will not prove that a sin or crime, once punished according to strict distributive justice, deserves an additional punishment.

The essence of moral evil is, that it tends to impair the good and happiness of the universe; in that the odiousness of sin or of moral evil consists. And a punishment in the distributive sense just, is that punishment inflicted on the person of the sinner, which effectually prevents any ill consequence to the good of the universe, of the sin or crime punished. Now therefore sin taken with the just punishment of it, no more tends to impair the good of the universe, than poison taken with an effectual antidote, tends to destroy the life of him who takes it.

Objection 1. If sin taken with its just punishment, do not tend to impair the good of the universe, and if the essence of moral evil consist in its tendency to impair the good of the universe, it seems that sin taken with its just punishment is no sin at all. *Answer*. It is indeed not *mere* sin. It is no more sin, than poison taken with its antidote, is poison. That poison which is mixed with the antidote, if it were separated from the

antidote, would produce the same effects, is of the same tendency, and consequently of the same nature, as before the mixture. Yet the compound made by the mixture, produces no such effects, is of no such tendency, and consequently is of a very different nature. So any sin which is punished according to strict justice, abstracted from the punishment, is of the same tendency and nature, of which it was before the punishment. Yet that sin taken with its full and just punishment, as one complex object, is of a very different tendency and nature, and will be followed with no such effects as would have followed from it, had it not been punished. In this sense, sin taken with its full and just punishment, is indeed no sin at all.

Objection 2. If the sinner do not deserve punishment, when the ill consequences of his sin are prevented by his personal punishment; why does he deserve punishment, when the ill consequences are prevented by the sufferings of his substitute? *Answer.* Desert and ill-desert are according to the character of the person himself, and not according to that of his representative or substitute. Now satisfaction for a crime by personal suffering is as really a part of the criminal's personal character, as the crime itself. But satisfaction by the suffering of another, is no part of the personal character of the criminal.

If then on the whole, it be an established point, that on the supposition that no other punishment can be justly inflicted on the sinner, than that which is necessary for his repentance and happiness, sin is no moral evil; this will be attended with many other consequences equally, or if possible, still more absurd:

1. That sin deserves no punishment at all. Surely nothing but moral evil deserves punishment.

2. That neither sin itself, nor we as sinners are the objects of the divine disapprobation.

3. That neither ought we to disapprove it, whether in ourselves or others.

4. That repentance is no duty of any man; yea, it is positively wrong. Shall we repent of an innocent action?

5. That the calamities which God brings on men in this life, are not reconcilable with justice. That these calamities in general are punishments or demonstrations of God's displeasure at the sins of mankind, is manifest from the scriptures. This is especially manifest concerning the most extraordinary and unusual calamities which in scripture are mentioned to have befallen communities or individuals; as the flood of Noah, the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah, the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple by the Chaldeans, and afterwards by the Romans, the death

of Korah, Dathan and Abiram, of Nadab and Abihu, of Uzzah, etc. But all these punishments were unjust, if sin be no moral evil.

6. That there is no foundation in any human actions or characters, for praise or blame, reward or punishment. If sin be no moral evil, it is not blamable; and if sin or vice do not deserve blame or punishment, virtue, which is the opposite, does not deserve praise or reward; and all moral distinctions are groundless, as in a moral view there is no difference between virtue and vice, sin and holiness. Therefore there is no moral government in the universe, nor any foundation for it.

I now appeal to the reader, with regard to the propriety of the preceding remarks, and whether the absurdities before mentioned, be not indeed implied in the hypothesis, that the sinner can, consistently with justice, be made to suffer no other punishment, than that which is disciplinary or conducive to the good of the sufferer, by leading him to repentance and preparing him for happiness. If those absurdities justly follow, not the least doubt can remain, but that the principle from which they follow, is absurd and false.

CHAPTER III.

WHETHER THE DAMNED WILL, IN FACT, SUFFER ANY OTHER PUNISHMENT THAN THAT WHICH IS CONDUCIVE TO THEIR PERSONAL GOOD.

In the last chapter the subject of inquiry was, whether the damned sinner *deserve*, according to strict justice and the law of God, any other punishment, than that which is necessary to lead to repentance and prepare for happiness. But though it should be granted, that he does indeed deserve a further or greater punishment, than that which is sufficient for the ends just mentioned; yet it may be pleaded, that in fact he never will suffer any other punishment; that in hell the damned are punished with the sole design of leading them to repentance; that when this design shall have been accomplished, whatever further punishment they may deserve, will be graciously remitted, and they immediately received to celestial felicity. Whether this be indeed the truth, is the subject of our present inquiry. With regard to this subject, I have to propose the following considerations.

1. If the damned do indeed deserve more punishment, than is

sufficient barely to lead them to repentance; then they may, consistently with justice, be made in fact to suffer more. That they may consistently with justice be made to suffer according to their demerits, is a self-evident proposition. To punish them so far, is not at all inconsistent with the justice of God, therefore the objection drawn from the justice of God against vindictive punishment as opposed to mere discipline, must be wholly relinquished. A merely disciplinary punishment is one which is suited and designed to lead the sinner to repentance only. A vindictive punishment is one which is designed to be a testimony of the displeasure of God at the conduct of the sinner, and by that testimony, to support the authority of the divine law, subserve the general good, and thus satisfy justice; and it must be no more than adequate to the demerit of the sinner. I do not find that Dr. C. has in his whole book, given us a definition of a vindictive punishment, as he ought most certainly to have done. According to Chevalier *Ramsay's* definition of divine vindictive justice, vindictive punishment is, "That dispensation of God, by which he pursues vice with all sorts of torments, till it is totally extirpated, destroyed and annihilated."* What then is a disciplinary punishment? This definition perfectly confounds disciplinary and vindictive punishment.

If it be just to punish a sinner according to his demerit, as it certainly is by the very terms; and if such a punishment be greater than is sufficient to lead him to repentance merely, as is now supposed; then all objections drawn from the justice of God, against a vindictive punishment, and all arguments from the same topic, in favor of a punishment merely disciplinary, are perfectly groundless and futile. The sinner lies at mercy; and if he be released on his repentance, it is an act of grace, and not of justice.

2. If the damned *do deserve* more punishment than is sufficient barely to lead them to repentance, they will *in fact* suffer more. As it is just, so justice will be executed. That they will be punished according to their demerits, is capable of clear proof, both by the authority of scripture, and by that of Dr. C.

(1) By the authority of scripture. This assures us, that God will "render to every man *according to his deeds;* to them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish upon every soul that doeth evil," Rom. 2: 6, etc. "For the work of a man, shall he render unto him, and cause every man to find according to his ways," Job 34: 2. "Thou renderest to every

* Principles, Vol. I. p. 434.

man according to his work," Psal. 62: 12. "I the Lord search the heart, I try the reins, even to give every man according to his ways, and according to the *fruit* of his doings," Jer. 17: 10. See also Chap. 32: 19. "For the Son of man shall come in the glory of his father, with his angels; and then he shall reward every man according to his works," Matt. 16: 27. "For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad," 2 Cor. 5: 10. "Behold I come quickly; and my reward is with me, to give every man according as his work shall be," Rev. 22: 12. "Agree with thine adversary quickly, whiles thou art in the way with him; lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, Thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing," Matt. 5: 25, 26. In the parallel text in Luke, it is thus expressed, "I tell thee, thou shalt not depart thence till thou hast paid the very last mite." James 2: 13, "He shall have judgment without mercy, that hath shewed no mercy." Rev. 14: 10, "The same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God, which is poured out without mixture, into the cup of his indignation; and he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels and in the presence of the Lamb; and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever and ever."

These texts, it is presumed, sufficiently show, that we have the authority of scripture to prove, that in the future world, the wicked will be punished according to their demerits, and that no mercy will be shown them.

(2) The same truth is evidently holden by Dr. C. He asserts, that "there will be no salvation for those in the next state, who habitually indulge to lust in this; but they must be unavoidably miserable, notwithstanding the infinite benevolence of the Deity, and to a great degree, God only knows how long, *in proportion to the number and greatness of their vices.*"* That "some of them" [the damned] "shall be tormented for ages of ages, the rest variously, as to time, *in proportion to their deserts;*"† That they will suffer "positive torments *in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes;*"‡ That "there will be a difference in the punishment of wicked men, according to the difference there has been in the nature and number of their evil deeds;"§ That "if they" [the blasphemers of the Holy Ghost] "are not saved till after they have passed

* Page 10. † p. 307. ‡ p. 350. § p. 320.

through these torments" [of hell] "they have never been forgiven. The divine *law has taken its course;* nor has any intervening pardon prevented the *full execution of the threatened penalty.*"* Some observations have been already made† on these passages concerning the blasphemers of the Holy Ghost, to show, that on Dr. C's plan they equally prove, that all the damned are saved without forgiveness; that the divine law has its course on them all; that they all suffer the full threatened penalty, and of course they suffer all that punishment which they deserve.

The other quotations set this matter in a light equally clear. If the wicked shall be punished in proportion to the number and greatness of their vices; in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes; according to the nature and number of their evil deeds; in proportion to their deserts; they will most certainly receive the full punishment due to them according to their demerits, and nothing will be remitted to them.

Thus it appears both by the authority of scripture and also by that of Dr. C. that the damned will actually suffer all that punishment which they deserve. And as it is now supposed to be proved in the preceding chapter, that the damned deserve a further punishment than that which is conducive to their repentance and personal good; of course it follows, that they will in fact suffer such further punishment.

Objection. The argument from the scriptural declarations, that the wicked shall be punished according to their works, etc., to prove, that they will suffer all which they justly deserve, is not conclusive; because the same expressions are used concerning the righteous, setting forth, *that they shall be rewarded according to their works,* etc. Yet it is granted on all hands, that their reward is not merely such as they deserve, or is not strictly according to justice.

Answer. The reward of the righteous is indeed not merely such as they deserve, but infinitely exceeds their deserts. It is therefore at least equal to their deserts; or it falls not short of them. If this be allowed concerning the punishment of the wicked, it is sufficient for every purpose of the preceding argument. If the wicked suffer a punishment at least equal to their demerits; then no part of the punishment deserved by them, is remitted to them. Beside; the declarations of scripture are, that the wicked shall pay the uttermost farthing, the very last mite; that they shall have judgment without mercy, wrath without mixture, etc., which are as strong and determinate expressions, to

* Page 336. † p. 2, etc.

represent that they will be punished to the full extent of justice, as can be conceived.

3. Although Dr. C. is so great an enemy to vindictive punishment; yet he himself holds that men do even in this life suffer such punishment. "But do those testimonies of his *vengeance* lose their nature as *judgments* on his part, and *real evils* on theirs, because they may be an occasion of that repentance which shall issue in their salvation? When God threatened the Jewish nation, in case they would not do his commandments, with famine, the pestilence, the sword, and a dispersion into all parts of the earth; did he threaten them with a *benefit*? And when those threatenings were for their sins carried into execution, did he inflict a *blessing* on them? When he threatened in particular, that if they were disobedient, they should be *cursed* in the field, Deut. 28: 16, did he hereby intend, that the *field* should be cursed; but that he meant thereby *a real benefit* to *them*?"* If vindictive punishment be inflicted even in this life, much more may we conclude that it is inflicted in hell, the proper place of retribution to the wicked.

4. If the punishment of hell be a mere discipline happily conducive to the good of the sufferers, there is no forgiveness in the preservation of a man from it. It is no forgiveness for a parent to give his child a license to tarry from school; or for a physician to allow his patient to desist from the cold bath, which he had prescribed. Or if a parent, to inure his child to hunger and cold, have kept him for some time on a scanty diet, and have clothed him but thinly; it is no act of forgiveness, to allow the child in future a full diet, or warm clothing. Forgiveness is to remit a *deserved penalty*, or to exempt from *penal* evil; not to deprive of a benefit, or of anything which is absolutely necessary to our happiness, and which is therefore on the whole no real evil, but a real good. If therefore there be nothing more *penal* or *vindictive* in the punishment of hell, than in the cold bath, or in the scanty diet and thin clothing just mentioned; there is no more of forgiveness in exemption from the former, than in exemption from the latter. Thus the scheme of disciplinary punishment in hell leads to a conclusion utterly inconsistent with the whole tenor of scripture, and of the writings of Dr. C.

5. All those texts which speak of the divine *vengeance*, *fury*, *wrath*, *indignation*, *fiery* indignation, etc. hold forth some other punishment, than that which is merely disciplinary. The texts to which I refer are such as these: Deut. 32: 41, "If I whet

* 5 Dissertations, p. 110.

my glittering sword and mine hand take hold on judgment; I will render *vengeance* to mine enemies, and will *reward* them that hate me." Rom. 3: 5, 6, "Is God unrighteous, who taketh *vengeance?* God forbid." Chap. 12: 19, "*Vengeance* is mine; I will *repay* saith the Lord." Luke 21: 22, "These be the days of *vengeance*." 2 Thess. 1: 8, "In flaming fire taking *vengeance* of them, that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ." Jude 7, "Suffering the *vengeance* of eternal fire." Job 20: 23, "When he is about to fill his belly, God shall cast the *fury* of his wrath upon him." Isa. 51: 17, "Awake, awake, stand up O Jerusalem, which hast drunk at the hand of the Lord, the cup of his *fury;* thou hast drunken the dregs of the cup of trembling, and wrung them out." Chap. 59: 18, "According to their deeds, accordingly he will repay *fury* to his adversaries, *recompense* to his enemies," etc. Instances of the denunciation of *wrath* against the wicked, are noted in the margin.* Rom. 2: 8, 9, "*Indignation* and *wrath*, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil." Heb. 10: 27, "A certain fearful looking for of *judgment*, and *fiery indignation*, which shall devour the adversaries." See also Ps. 50: 22. Heb. 12: 29. Luke 12: 46. Rev. 14: 10, "Shall drink of the wine of the *wrath* of God poured out *without mixture*, into the cup of his *indignation*." Therefore in the punishment of the wicked there will be no mixture of mercy or forgiveness.

It is of no importance, that in some of the texts now quoted, a reference is not had to the punishments of the future world, but to those of this life. If God can consistently with his perfections inflict a partial vengeance, why not the whole of that which is justly due? If he can and does inflict vengeance in this life, why not in the future too, provided, as is now granted, it be just?

That the passages now quoted, do indeed speak of a punishment more than merely disciplinary, is manifest by the very terms of the passages themselves. To say that *vengeance, wrath, fury, indignation, fiery indignation, wrath without mixture,* mean a mere wholesome, fatherly discipline, designed for the good only of the subjects, is to say that the inspired writers were grossly ignorant of the proper and common use of language; and particularly that they were wholly ignorant of that important distinction between vindictive and disciplinary punishment, on which Dr. C. and other writers of his class so much insist. If vengeance mean fatherly discipline, what is proper vengeance?

* Matt. 3: 7. Luke 3: 7. 21: 23. John 3: 36. Rom. 4: 15. 5: 9. 9: 22. 1 Thess. 1: 10. 5: 9.

If it be proper to call fatherly chastisement, vengeance, wrath, fury, fiery indignation, wrath without mixture; by what name is it proper to call a punishment really vindictive?

6. The same may be argued from various other passages of scripture, some of which I shall now cite. 1 Cor. 16: 22, "If any man love not our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema maranatha." It is absurd to suppose, that this curse means a discipline designed for the good only of the patients. Such a discipline is so far from a curse, that it is a very great blessing. Deut. 27: 26, compared with Gal. 3: 10, "*Cursed* be he that confirmeth not all the words of this law, to do them." Deut. 29: 19, "And it come to pass, when he heareth the words of this *curse*, that he bless himself in his heart, saying, I shall have peace, though I walk in the imagination of my heart, to add drunkenness to thirst. The Lord will *not spare* him, but the *anger* of the Lord and his *jealousy* shall *smoke* against that man, and all the *curses that are written in this book*, shall lie upon him, and the Lord will *blot out his name from under heaven.* And the Lord shall separate him *unto evil*, out of all the tribes of Israel, according to *all the curses* of the covenant, that are written in this book of the law." This text seems to be in several respects inconsistent with the idea, that the future punishment of the sinner is merely disciplinary. It declares, that "the Lord will not *spare* him." But to inflict that punishment only, which is far less than the sinner deserves, and which is not at all vindictive, but wholly conducive to his good, is very greatly to *spare* him. It is further said, that the "*anger* of the Lord and his *jealousy* shall *smoke* against him;" which is not an expression properly and naturally representing the discipline, which proceeds from parental affection seeking the good only of the child. The same may be observed of this expression, "The Lord shall *blot out* his name from under heaven." It is added, "*All the curses* that are written *in this book* shall lie upon him." "And the Lord shall separate him unto *evil*—according to *all the curses* of the covenant, which are written in this book of the *law*." These last expressions seem to be very determinate. *Curses* are not blessings; but that discipline which is subservient to the good of the subject is a blessing. The curses here mentioned are all the curses written in this book of Moses, or the book of the Law. Therefore some men will suffer the curse of the law, even the whole curse of the law, or all the curses mentioned in the law; which, by what has come up to our view in the last chapter, appears to be more than a discipline promoting the good of the subject.

Again; Deut. 11: 26—29, "Behold I set before you this day a *blessing* and a *curse*. A blessing, if ye will obey the commandments of the Lord your God, which I command you this day; and a *curse*, if ye will not obey the commandments of the Lord your God." Prov. 3: 33, "The *curse* of the Lord is in the house of the wicked; but he *blesseth* the habitation of the just." Job 24: 18, "Their portion is *cursed* in the earth." Ps. 37: 22, "They that be *cursed* of him, shall be cut off." Ps. 119: 21, "Thou hast rebuked the proud, that are *accursed*." Jer. 11: 3, "*Cursed* be the man that obeyeth not the words of this covenant." Chap. 17: 5, "*Cursed* be the man, that trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm." Mal. 1: 14, "*Cursed* be the deceiver," etc. Chap. 3: 9, "Ye are *cursed* with a curse." 2 Pet. 2: 14, "*Cursed* children."

By all these texts it appears, that some men do or shall suffer the curse of God. Whether all these texts refer to a curse to be inflicted after death, does not for reasons already given materially affect the present argument. A curse is undoubtedly a punishment which does not promote the good of the subject; otherwise a curse and a blessing are perfectly confounded.

If it shall still be insisted, that the curse so often mentioned, means that punishment only, which is conducive to the good of the subject; it may be answered, then there would be no impropriety in calling the present afflictions of the real disciples of Christ, by the name of a curse. Why then are they not so called in scripture? Why are not the real children of God, even the most virtuous and pious of them, said to be cursed by God, etc.? And why are not the curses of the wicked, as well as the afflictions of the righteous, said to work together for their good, and to work out for them a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory? Dr. C. loves to illustrate the punishment of hell by the discipline inflicted by fathers on earth with a sole view to the good of their children. But would it be proper to call the necessary, wise and wholesome discipline of earthly parents, by the name of a *curse*? or is it ever so called, either by God or man? Equally absurd is it, to call the punishment of hell by that name, if it be designed for the good only of the patients.

I beseech the reader to consider what a contrast there is between the texts, which have now been quoted, and those in which a punishment really disciplinary is mentioned and described. In the former the punishment is called by the names of *vengeance*, *fury*, *wrath*, *smoking* wrath, *fiery indignation*, wrath *without mixture*, a *curse*, an *anathema*, *all the curses of the law*, *etc.* Whereas the real discipline of God's children is called a *chas-*

tisement, "If ye be without chastisement, then are ye bastards and not sons;" a *correction*, "I will correct thee in measure, and will not leave thee altogether unpunished." This correction is said to be *mingled with pity*. "Like as a father pitieth his children; so the Lord pitieth them that fear him." "I will visit their transgression with the rod, and their iniquity with stripes, nevertheless, my loving kindness will I not utterly take from him." But where in all the scriptures is the punishment of the future state represented to be designed for the good of the subjects? Where is it in scripture called a fatherly chastisement, a correction or discipline, or by any other appellation of the like import? What right then have we to consider it as a mere chastisement? Is not this an idea formed in the fond imagination of those who would fain support a favorite system?

7. If future punishment be merely disciplinary, the discipline will produce its proper effect on some, sooner than on others. Some who shall in this life have contracted a less degree of depravity and hardness of heart, will be more easily and speedily brought to repentance, than others. This on the hypothesis now made, is both agreeable to the dictates of reason, and is the very doctrine expressly and abundantly taught by Dr. C. But how is this to be reconciled with the account of scripture? That informs us, that all those on the left hand of the judge are to be sentenced to everlasting fire, and shall go away into everlasting punishment. The sentence denounced on all is in the same terms, and not the least intimation is given, that some of them shall be punished longer than others; much less that only *some* shall be punished for ages of ages; others released, in a much shorter time. Dr. C. and other writers of his class suppose, that in hell the wicked are put under those means of grace, which are vastly more advantageous, powerful and conducive to the effect of repentance, than those means which are enjoyed in this life. But the same writers will allow, that in many instances, even the means which are enjoyed in this life are followed with the desired effect of repentance, and this within so short a term as threescore years and ten. Therefore we may reasonably conclude that within the like term, many more will be brought to repentance by the vastly more powerful means to be used with the damned; and so on through every successive period of seventy years. I think then an answer to two questions may justly be demanded of any one in Dr. C's scheme.

(1) With what truth or propriety can a sentence of everlasting punishment he pronounced on the whole body of sinners, when some of them shall repent and be saved very soon; others in large

numbers, in every succeeding age, and even every year? As well might a sentence of exclusion from pardon and the favor of God during this life, be pronounced against the whole of every generation of mankind, because some men do indeed continue in that state during this life. Nay, with much greater truth and propriety might this latter sentence be pronounced, than the former; because it is granted by Dr. C. and others, that the *greater* part of men live and die in impenitence and alienation from God. Whereas, allowing that the punishment of the wicked is a mere discipline, we may presume, that very few indeed of the whole number of the damned, will remain in torment, for that duration, which according to the ideas of our opponents, is intended by *everlasting* and *forever and ever*, and which is the longest punishment to be inflicted on any of the human race. This is a punishment reserved for a very few, the most depraved, hardened, abandoned sinners, perhaps one in a thousand or ten thousand. The rest less hardened and more easily wrought on by the powerful means of grace used with the damned, will be brought to repentance by a punishment of shorter continuance.

I know Dr. C. says, that though all the damned shall not, yet as some of them shall, suffer that punishment, which in his sense, is everlasting and forever and ever, therefore everlasting punishment may be truly asserted of them collectively. But the same reason would justify a sentence excluding the whole human race from pardon and the divine favor, during the whole of the present life. God might with the same truth and propriety have said to Adam and all his posterity, even after the revelation of the covenant of grace, I doom you, in righteous judgment, to live and die the objects of my wrath. This latter sentence would, for the reason before assigned, have been not only equally, but much more conformed to truth and fact, than that which shall be pronounced on the wicked at the end of the world; if they shall be delivered out of hell from time to time in every age and perhaps every year. Yet it is presumed, no man will plead for the truth and propriety of the sentence just supposed.

(2) The other question to which an answer may be expected, is, how has it come to pass, that no intimation of a difference in the duration of the punishment of the wicked, is hinted in any part of the scriptures? The difference between a punishment of a few years, and one which is to last for ages of ages, or for such a duration, as may with propriety be called an *eternity*, is very great, and we should think well worthy to be noticed in the scriptures. To say, that it is noticed in those texts, which inform us that the wicked shall be punished *according to their*

works, etc. is to beg a point in dispute; because those who believe endless punishment, believe that the works of all sinners deserve an endless punishment; and though they will suffer different punishments according to their different demerits; yet the difference will not consist in duration, but in degree; as the righteous will be rewarded differently according to their works; yet the reward of every individual of the righteous will be of endless duration.

8. If future punishment be designed as a mere discipline, to lead sinners to repentance, it is inflicted without any necessity, and therefore must be a wanton exercise of cruelty. The repentance of sinners may be easily obtained without those dreadful torments endured for ages of ages. Doubtless that same wisdom and power which leads a goodly number of mankind to repentance in this life, without the help of the torments of hell, might by the like or superior means, produce the like effect on all. The gospel might have been preached to all the heathen, and all those means of grace, which have been successful on some men, might have been used with all. And who will venture to say, that those means and that grace, which effected the repentance of *Saul* the persecutor, of the thief on the cross, of *Mary Magdalene*, and of the old idolatrous *Manasseh*, who had filled Jerusalem with innocent blood; could not have effected the repentance of any, or at least some of those who have been, or shall be, sent into the future state of punishment? How does it appear, that those means and that grace which were sufficient for the conversion of those noted sinners before mentioned, would not, had they been applied, have been sufficient for the conversion of thousands of others, who in fact have not been converted? And how does it appear, but that similar though more powerful grace and means, which are doubtless within the reach of divine power and knowledge, would have been sufficient for the repentance and conversion of all mankind? If so, the repentance of sinners might have been accomplished, at a cheaper rate, and in a way more demonstrative of the divine goodness, than by the awful means of hell-torments. Those torments therefore are inflicted without any real necessity, unless they be inflicted for some other end, than the repentance of the damned.

I am aware, it will be objected, that if God should bring men to repentance by efficacious grace or means, it would be inconsistent with their moral agency, would destroy their liberty, and reduce them to mere machines. But were *Paul*, *Mary Magdalene*, etc. brought to repentance in such a way as to destroy their liberty? It will not be pretended. Neither can it be pretended, that the

same means and grace would have destroyed the liberty of others. This being granted, it necessarily follows, that if repentance be the only end, hell-torments are arbitrarily inflicted on all those, who might have been, or may in future be brought to repentance by those means, and that grace, by which Paul or any other man hath been brought to repentance in this life. I ask, does God in this life, apply all those means and all that grace, to all men, to lead them to repentance, which are consistent with their moral agency? And if he applied to any man, more powerful means, or more efficacious grace, than he does apply to him, would he destroy all his liberty and reduce him to a mere machine? If so, then how are the more powerful means of hell-torments consistent with moral agency or liberty? They, it is said, are more powerful and efficacious means of grace, than any employed in this life; and if in this life the utmost is done to lead sinners to repentance, which is consistent with moral agency; hell-torments must entirely destroy moral agency and reduce poor damned souls to mere machines; and of course they will be no more capable of repentance or salvation, than clocks and watches.

If on the other hand it be said, that the utmost which is consistent with moral agency, is not done in this life, to lead men to repentance; it will follow, that God chooses to inflict hell-torments, not merely as a necessary mean to lead sinners to repentance; to grant which, is to give up the whole idea, that they are merely disciplinary.

Those whom I am now opposing, hold, that God cannot, consistently with their moral agency, bring all men to repentance in this life. How can he, consistently with their moral agency, bring them to repentance in hell? If those means which would be effectual in this life, would be inconsistent with moral agency, why are not hell-torments equally inconsistent with moral agency, since it is allowed that they will be effectual? Or if those means which are barely effectual in hell, be not inconsistent with moral agency, I wish to have a reason assigned, why those means which would be barely effectual in this life, would be any more inconsistent with moral agency.

Dr. C. and others hold, that to say, that God cannot consistently with moral agency, or in a moral way, bring men to repentance in hell, is to limit his power and wisdom. But to say, that God cannot, consistently with moral agency, bring men to repentance in this life, as really implies a limitation of the divine power and wisdom, as to say, that he cannot, consistently with moral agency, bring them to repentance in hell. How is it any more reconcilable with those divine perfections, that he cannot reduce

a sinner to repentance, in threescore years and ten, than that he cannot produce the same effect, throughout eternity? To say, that there is not time in this life, for the sinner to obtain a thorough conviction of the necessity of repentance, affords no relief to the difficulty. For though it should be granted, that there is not time for the sinner to obtain this conviction by experience, which however there seems to be no necessity of granting; yet cannot God exhibit the truth in such a manner, as to produce that conviction? And let a reason be given, why that conviction produced by a clear divine exhibition of truth and a sense of happiness and misery, set in such a light, as to lead to repentance, is more inconsistent with moral agency, than the same conviction obtained by experience, or by the torments of hell.

If hell-torments be necessary to lead sinners to repentance, because they are more painful, than the afflictions or other means used with men in this life; why are not greater afflictions sent on men in this life? It is manifest, that most men might suffer much greater afflictions, than they really do suffer. And if greater pain be all that is wanting to lead them to repentance, it seems that to inflict that, would be the greatest instance of goodness, and might supersede the necessity of hell-torments.

It is granted by Dr. C. and others, that hell-torments will *certainly* lead to repentance all who suffer them. At the same time he objects to the idea of leading sinners to repentance by the efficacious grace of God, that it destroys moral agency. But if there be a certain established, unfailing connection between hell-torments continued for a proper time, and repentance; those torments as effectually overthrow moral agency, as efficacious grace. All that need be intended in this instance, by efficacious grace, is such an exhibition or view of the truth and of motives, as will certainly be attended with repentance. But such an exhibition of the truth as this, is supposed by Dr. C. to be made in hell. And why this exhibition made in hell is more consistent with moral agency, than an exhibition which is no more effectual, powerful or overbearing, made in this life, I wish to be informed.

Perhaps it will be further pleaded, that though it be feasible to lead sinners to repentance in this life; yet it is not wise and best. But why is it not as wise and good, to persuade sinners to repent, without the use of hell-torments, as by those torments? If indeed it be fact, that God does not inflict endless but disciplinary misery on sinners, we may thence conclude, that it is wisely so ordered. But this is not to be taken for granted; it ought to be proved before an inference is drawn from it. It is the great question of this dispute.

9. That future punishment is not merely disciplinary, appears from the various declarations of scripture, that those who die impenitent, are *lost*, are *cast away*, *perish*, suffer *perdition*, are *destroyed*, suffer everlasting *destruction*, etc. as in these texts: John 17: 12, "None of them is *lost* but the son of *perdition*." Luke 9: 25, "What is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and *lose* himself or be *cast away*." Matt. 13: 48, "Gathered the good into vessels, but *cast* the bad (σαπρά, the dead, rotten fish) *away*." 2 Pet. 2: 13, "They shall utterly *perish* in their own corruption." Heb. 10: 39, "We are not of them that draw back unto *perdition*; but of them that believe unto *the saving* of the soul." 2 Pet. 3: 7, "But the heavens and the earth which are now, are reserved unto fire, against the day of judgment, and *perdition* of ungodly men." Matt. 10: 28, "Fear him who is able to *destroy* both soul and body in hell." 2 Thess. 1: 9, "Who shall be punished with everlasting *destruction* from the presence of the Lord and the glory of his power." But what truth or propriety is there in these expressions, if future punishment be a mere discipline? The damned in hell are no more cast away, lost, destroyed; they no more perish, or suffer perdition, than any of God's elect are cast away, etc. while they are in this world. Hell is no more a place of destruction, than this world. The wicked in hell are no more vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, than the saints are in this world. The damned are under discipline; so are even the most virtuous and holy, while in this life. Yet they are not lost, cast away, rejected as reprobate silver, or destroyed by God; but are kept as the apple of his eye. And as the means of grace, under which the damned are placed, are far more adapted certainly to secure and promote their greatest good, than any means which we enjoy in this state; to consider and to speak of them as lost, cast away, destroyed, etc. because they are under those means, is to the highest degree absurd. They are just as much further removed from a state, which can justly be called destruction, perdition, etc. than they were while in this world, as the means of grace which they enjoy in hell are more powerful and effectual to prepare them for happiness, than those means which they enjoyed in this world.

Suppose a man seized with some dangerous disease, and a variety of means is used for his recovery, but in vain. Suppose it appears, that if no more effectual means be employed, he will never be recovered. Suppose further, that at length an entirely different course is taken with him, a course which is not only far more likely than the former to be successful; but concerning

which there is absolute certainty, that it will be successful; I ask, can the man now under the operation of these most excellent and infallible means, with any truth be said to be *lost*, to be *cast away*, to be *destroyed*, etc.? Or if those terms must be applied to one or other of those situations, in which we have supposed him to be at different times; to which of them are they applied with the least truth and reason? This example may illustrate the subject now under consideration.

10. If it be consistent with the divine perfections, to subject a sinner to misery, for the sake of advancing *his own* good, as is implied in the very idea of disciplinary punishment; why is it not equally consistent with the same perfections, to subject a sinner to misery, for the sake of promoting the good of *the system;* provided that misery do not exceed the demerit of the subject? I presume no believer in endless punishment, will plead for any degree or duration of punishment, which is not subservient to the glory of the Deity implying the greatest good of the universe. Therefore, all such punishment, as is not subservient to that end, is foreign to the present question. Further, it is now supposed to be proved, that other punishment than that which is adapted to prepare the sinner for happiness, is justly deserved by the sinner. Now since this is allowed or proved, why is it not consistent with every attribute of the Deity, to inflict that other punishment, provided only it be subservient to the good of the system?

It is holden by our opponents, that the punishment of a sinner may lead him to repentance. So it may lead other sinners to repentance; or it may restrain them from sin, and in a variety of ways may equally subserve the good of those who are not the subjects of the punishment, as it may the good of him who is the subject of it. And that the good of other persons may be of equal worth and importance, nay, of far greater worth to the system, than the good of the transgressor himself, cannot be denied. Therefore, as I said in the beginning of this article, if the personal good of the sinner be a sufficient reason why he should be punished according to justice; why is not the good of others, or the good of the system, a sufficient reason for the same proceeding? And is it not evident, not only that such a punishment is consistent with the perfections of God; but that those perfections, goodness itself not excepted, require it? In this case, to inflict a punishment merely conducive to the good of the person punished, would be no fruit of goodness, but of a contrary principle; and the doctrine of merely disciplinary punishment, if it mean a punishment conducive indeed to the good of

the subject, but destructive to the good of the system, is so far from being built on the divine goodness, as some boast; that it is built on a very different foundation. I am aware, that it is holden by the advocates for universal salvation, that the good of the system cannot be promoted by the endless misery of any individual, but requires the final happiness of every one. Merely to assert this however, as some do very confidently, is perfect impertinence. Let them prove it, and they will do something to the purpose.

11. If none of the damned will be punished for any other end than their own good, and yet they all deserve to be punished more than is subservient to their own good; then some of them deserve to be punished for a longer term, than that which in scripture, according to Dr. C's sense of it, is said to be *forever and ever*. The punishment, which in the language of scripture, is said to be *everlasting*, *forever and ever*, etc. will actually be suffered by some of the damned, as is agreed on all hands. But if none of the damned will suffer any other punishment than that which is conducive to their personal good, then the punishment which in scripture is said to be forever and ever, is conducive to their personal good. They therefore deserve a punishment of greater duration than that which in scripture is said to be *forever and ever;* and of course that more durable punishment is the curse of the divine law, and is threatened in the law. But where in all the law, or in all the scripture, is any punishment threatened, or even hinted at, of greater duration than that which shall last *forever and ever?* So that this scheme of disciplinary punishment necessarily brings us to this absurdity, that the true and real curse of the divine law, is not contained in the law; and that the punishment justly deserved by the sinner, is no where revealed or even hinted at, in all the scripture. Yet the scripture assures us, that some sinners will be in fact punished according to their demerits, so as to pay the uttermost farthing, and to receive judgment without mercy. And no man pretends that any sinner will suffer more than that punishment which in scripture is said to be *forever and ever*. The consequence is, that that punishment which is *forever and ever*, is the whole that the sinner deserves, and therefore is by no means a mere discipline.

12. Our Lord informs us, Matt. 10: 33, That whosoever shall deny him before men, shall be denied by him before his Father. But on the hypothesis now under consideration, this means only, that Christ will deny him till he repents. In Luke 13: 25, etc. we read, that when once the master of the house shall have risen

and shut the door, some will begin to stand without and to knock, saying, Lord, Lord, open to us, and will urge several arguments in favor of their admission; to whom the master will answer, I know you not, whence you are; depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity. But on the present hypothesis, Christ will deny them in no other sense than he denies every real penitent and believer, during the present life. He will deny the wicked after the general judgment no longer than till they shall have been sufficiently disciplined; after that, he will know them, will own them, and receive them to eternal and blissful communion with himself. The same is observable of all his most sincêre disciples in this life. While here, they are under discipline, though not so merciful and gracious a discipline as that with which the damned are favored. However, during the continuance of the discipline of this life, Christ denies and refuses to confer on any of his disciples, an entire exemption from pain, distress, or affliction; and subjects them equally with the rest of the world, to these calamities; so that in this respect all things come alike to all. He does indeed give them assurance of rest and glory after this life. As full assurance of rest and glory after the expiration of the term of their discipline, is, on the present hypothesis, given to all the damned. Also in the prospect of this rest and glory, and in the certain knowledge that they are the objects of his favor, he affords his disciples much relief and comfort under their present trials. The same sources of relief and comfort are afforded to all the damned. So that Christ denies the damned in no other sense, than that in which he denies his most sincere followers, during this life.

The same observations for substance may be made concerning the application of the damned for admission into heaven, after the general judgment, and the answer and treatment which they shall receive on that occasion. The door shall be shut against them no longer than till they shall have been sufficiently disciplined. The same is true of every real christian in this life. The master of the house will answer, *I know you not*, i. e. I do not as yet own you as my friends and disciples, because you have not yet been sufficiently disciplined. The same is true of every real christian in this life. He will tell them, "Depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity." But this means no more, than that they must not be admitted into heaven, till they shall have been sufficiently disciplined. The same is true of all real christians in this life.

13. On the hypothesis now under consideration, what damnation do those in hell suffer, more than real christians suffer in

this life? They are kept in a state of most merciful and gracious discipline, till they are prepared, and then they are taken to heaven. The same is true of every real christian in this life. This difference however is worthy of notice, that the discipline of hell is far more advantageous than that of this life, because more effectual, and likely to fit the subject for heaven more speedily and thoroughly; otherwise it would never have been applied. It is also a more merciful and gracious exhibition of the divine goodness. Doubtless that mean of grace, which is most happily and effectually conducive to the speedy repentance and preparation of the sinner for heaven, is to him the most merciful and gracious exhibition and demonstration of the divine goodness.

It is true, the discipline of hell is attended with more pain than that of this life. So the discipline of this life, with respect to some individuals, is attended with more pain, than it is with respect to others. Yet it doth not hence follow, that some christians suffer damnation in this life; nor will it be pretended, that either the scriptures or common sense would justify the calling of those greater pains of some christians in this life, by the name of damnation, in any other sense, than the less pains or afflictions of other christians, may be called by the same name.

On the whole then, when the scripture says, "He that believeth, and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned;" the whole meaning is, he that believeth, shall be admitted to heaven immediately after death; but he that believeth not, shall not immediately be admitted, merely because he is not yet prepared for it by repentance; but he shall be put under a discipline absolutely necessary for his own good, and the most wise, effectual, merciful and gracious, that divine wisdom and goodness can devise; and as soon as this discipline shall have prepared him for heaven, he shall be admitted without further delay. When the scriptures say, "he that believeth not the Son, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him;" the meaning is, he shall not see life till he is brought to repentance by the merciful discipline just now mentioned; and not the *wrath* of God abideth on him; because he shall be made the subject of nothing wrathful or vindictive; but the *mercy*, or most merciful and benevolent discipline of God abideth on him.

14. If the only end of future punishment be the repentance of the sinner, and if the means used with sinners in hell be so much more powerful and happily adapted to the end, than those used in this life; it is unaccountable, that while so many are led to repentance by the comparatively weak means used with men in this life, and within so short a period as seventy years, the far

more powerful means applied in hell, should not be productive of the same effect, in a single instance, within so long a period as a thousand years. That none are to be delivered out of hell, within a thousand years after the general judgment, is explicitly taught by Dr. C. His words are, "This period," (a thousand years) "must run out, before the wicked dead could *any* of them live as kings and priests with Christ."*

We all doubtless believe, that many sinners die impenitent, who are not the subjects of depravity and hardness of heart vastly greater, than are in some, who are brought to repentance in this life. Now put the case of the class of sinners, who are the subjects of a depravity and hardness of heart, the very next in degree to that of the most depraved of those who are brought to repentance in this life. Is it reasonable to believe, that these cannot be brought to repentance, even by the most powerful means of grace enjoyed in hell, within a less time than a thousand years? If it be not reasonable to believe this, then it is not reasonable to believe Dr. C's scheme of disciplinary punishment.

15. The last *enemy* that shall be destroyed is *death*. This death is understood by Dr. C. and other advocates for universal salvation, to mean the second death. Then the second death is doubtless an *enemy*. But if it consist in a necessary discipline, the most wise and wholesome, the most conducive to the good of the recipients, and to the divine glory, which the wisdom of God can devise; surely it is no enemy either to God or the recipients; but is a perfect friend to both. With what truth then could the apostle call it an enemy?

16. The scripture, so far from declaring those who suffer chastisement and disciplinary pains, *accursed*, merely on that account, expressly declares them *blessed*. Ps. 94: 12, "Blessed is the man whom thou chastenest, O Lord, and teachest him out of thy law; that thou mayest give him rest from the days of adversity." But where are the damned ever said to be blessed? They are constantly declared to be accursed. Heb. 12: 5—9, "Ye have forgotten the exhortation, which speaketh to you, as unto children, my son, despise not thou the chastening of the Lord, nor faint when thou art rebuked of him. For whom the Lord loveth, he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth. If ye endure chastening, God dealeth with you as with sons. For what son is he whom the Father chasteneth not? But if ye be without chastisement, whereof all are partakers, then are ye bastards and not sons." This passage evidently considers those who suffer chastisement from the hand of God, as his chil-

* Page 402.

dren, his sons. If therefore the damned suffer a mere chastisement, they are not accursed, but are the blessed sons or children of God. But are they ever so called in scripture? Beside; this passage evidently supposes, that some men do not suffer fatherly chastisement, of which all the sons or children of God are partakers; and expressly declares, that such as do not suffer it are bastards and not sons; which seems not to agree with the idea, that all the damned, will by fatherly chastisement be brought to final salvation. If no other punishment be inflicted by God, than fatherly chastisement, then there are no bastards in the universe. Yet it is evidently supposed in this text, that there are bastards.

Heb. 10: 28, "He that despised Moses' law *died without mercy*—of how much sorer punishment shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the son of God?" etc. But if all who die impenitent, be sent to a state of discipline most excellently adapted to their good and salvation, no man dies without mercy. This discipline itself is the greatest mercy which can, in their state of mind, be bestowed upon them. With respect to the same subject, it is said, Heb. 2: 2, "That every transgression and disobedience, received *a just recompense* of reward." *A just recompense*, is a punishment adequate to the demands of justice; and this, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, cannot be a mere merciful discipline.

17. If the punishment of hell be a mere wholesome discipline, then what the apostle says of the discipline of christians in this life, may be said with equal truth and propriety of the punishment of the damned; thus, We glory in damnation; knowing that damnation worketh repentance, and repentance salvation.

18. If no other than a disciplinary punishment be consistent with the divine goodness; surely the requirement of an atonement in order to pardon is unaccountable. The doctrine of atonement, and of the necessity of it to pardon and salvation, is abundantly holden by Dr. C. He says, "Jesus Christ is the person *upon whose account* happiness is attainable by the human race."* He speaks of the "*sacrifice* of himself," which Christ "offered up to God to put away sin."† "The obedience of Christ to death, is the *ground* or *reason* upon which it hath pleased God to make happiness attainable by any of the race of Adam."‡ "By thus submitting to die, he" (Jesus) "made *atonement*, not only for the original lapse, but for all the sins this would be introductory to."§ "Christ was sent into the world to make way for the *wise*, *just* and *holy* exercise of mercy towards the sinful sons of men."‖ "The only begotten Son of God both

* Page 17. † p. 18. ‡ p. 19. § 5 Dissertations, p. 245. ‖ Ib. p. 247.

did and suffered everything that was necessary, in order to a righteousness *on account of which* God might, in consistency with the *honor of his perfections*, and the *authority of his law*, make the grant of life. Accordingly this meritorious righteousness is that *for the sake of which, upon the account of which*, this blessing is conferred."* According to Dr. C. then, Christ hath not only made *atonement* by his obedience and death, but that atonement was necessary to the *wise, just* and *holy* exercise of mercy to the sinner; and without that atonement, saving mercy could not have been exercised toward the sinner, in a consistency with wisdom, justice and holiness, or the honor of the divine perfections, or the authority of the divine law and government. The constitution therefore, by which salvation can be obtained in no other way than in consequence and on account of his obedience and death, is not only consistent with wisdom, holiness, justice, yea, all the divine perfections, and the authority of the divine law and government; but it was *required by them all.*

But the sufferings and death of Christ, or his atonement, is no discipline of the sinner. They are as foreign from it as the vindictive punishment of the sinner himself. The atonement, as Dr. C. hath explained it, makes way for the wise, just and holy exercise of mercy toward the sinner. It was therefore designed to *satisfy* the divine *wisdom, justice* and *holiness.* It was designed to make the grant of life to the sinner *consistent with the honor of the divine perfections*, and *the authority of the divine law and government.* And if our Lord Jesus Christ might, in the behalf of the sinner, be made to suffer in order to *satisfy* divine *justice;* why may not the sinner himself be made to suffer for the same end?

If Christ have, on the behalf of sinners, suffered for the end of supporting the authority of the divine law and government; what reason can be assigned, why it should be inconsistent with any attribute of the Deity, that sinners themselves should be made to suffer for the same end? But this would be a proper vindictive punishment. Therefore Dr. C. is entirely inconsistent with himself, in allowing the atonement of Christ, in the terms before quoted; and yet denying the reasonableness of a vindictive punishment, or its consistency with the divine perfections.

19. We are assured, "that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are called according to his purpose," Rom. 8: 28. But this implies, that all things do not work for good, to them who love not God. Yet all things do

* 12 Sermons, p. 334.

work for their good, if they suffer no other than a disciplinary punishment. Concerning those who are Christ's, it is said, that "all things are theirs; whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things *to come*; all are theirs," 1 Cor. 3: 21, 22. But on the supposition, that all punishment is disciplinary, it is equally true concerning all mankind, that all things present and to come are theirs. Yet this is not said, but the contrary is implied in that it is said of those only who are Christ's or are Christians, that all things are theirs.

20. I argue from those words of the wise man, Eccl. 9: 10, "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom in the grave whither thou goest." If future punishment be disciplinary, the damned are in a state of probation, and may and will so exercise their rational powers, as shall finally issue in their salvation. But can this be reconciled with the words of Solomon, that in the future state, there is no work to be done, no device to be invented, no knowledge or wisdom to be exercised by us, to the accomplishment of what we now leave undone? This is manifestly the argument, by which he presses on us the present diligent discharge of our duty; and this argument would be utterly inconclusive, if there were another state, in which what our hand now findeth to do, might be done.

Of similar import is John 9: 4, "I must work the works of him that sent me, while it is day; the night cometh when no man can work. As long as I am *in the world*, I am the light of the world." That our Lord, by *the day*, means this life, is manifest by the last words of the quotation. But if in the future state no man can work, the future state is not a state of probation.

To these I may add, Gen. 6: 3, "My spirit shall not always strive with man—yet his days shall be an hundred and twenty years." As if it had been said, my spirit shall not always strive with man; yet he shall strive with him an hundred and twenty years, and no longer; for so long only shall his days be continued. But how is this consistent with the idea, that God will be striving with man, for ages of ages after his days shall have elapsed?

Objection 1. If to some part of the foregoing reasoning it be objected, that it supposes future punishment to be *merely* disciplinary, and designed to subserve no *other* end, than the repentance of the sinner; whereas it is granted, that God may and will inflict vindictive punishment, but not a punishment *merely* vindictive; that he may take vengeance of the sinner, provided

at the same time he aim at the good of the sinner;—to this I answer:

1. That in this objection it is granted, that God may and will inflict on the damned a punishment properly vindictive, a punishment over and above that which is conducive to the personal good of the sinner. But this is to grant all which is pleaded for in this chapter, and all which at present is attempted to be proved.

2. If the meaning of this objection be, that God may inflict vengeance, provided he do it with a sole view to the good of the sinner, it confutes itself; it seems to grant something, but in reality it grants nothing. It seems to admit a proper vindictive punishment, but really admits no punishment besides that which is merely disciplinary. For to talk of inflicting vengeance with a sole view to the good of the subject, can mean nothing more than to inflict *pain* with a sole view to the good of the subject; and this is nothing more than a punishment merely disciplinary; if God show displeasure with a sole view to the good of the sinner, this is mere discipline.

3. If the meaning of this objection be, that God may consistently with his perfections, inflict a proper vindictive punishment, provided at the same time that he is aiming at a proper vindication of his broken law and despised government, he aim at the good of the sinner also; I answer, if it be right and consistent with the perfections of God, to vindicate his law and government, there is no necessity of bringing in the aid of another motive or design, to make it right or consistent with his perfections. If on the other hand, it be not in itself right to vindicate his law and government, no other affections, views or actions, however right and benevolent, co-existing with the supposed vindication, can atone for it, or make it right.

To illustrate this by an example:—A parent has a disobedient child; and it is become necessary both for the good of the child, and for the support of the parent's authority in his family in general, and over his child in particular, that he be properly punished. Accordingly from both these motives, the good of the child and the support of his own authority, the parent inflicts the proper punishment. This according to the objection now before us is right. But according to the same objection, if the child be desperate and there be no prospect of effecting his good by punishment, it is not consistent with the character of a good parent to inflict the same punishment, from the motives of supporting his own government and the good of the family only. If this action done from these motives only, be a wrong action, it is still

wrong, so far as it proceeds from the same motives, however it may arise in part from the motive of the child's good. To render this still plainer, let us suppose, that a parent inflicts pain on his child merely to afford amusement to his neighbors, as the Romans were wont to exhibit fights of gladiators. It will be agreed on all hands, that this action is abominable. Again, suppose the same pain be inflicted partly from the motive of amusing his neighbors, and partly from a regard to the child's good. I presume all will allow, that so far as the action proceeds from the former motive, it is still abominable, and not sanctified by the co-existent motive of the child's good.

On the whole, we arrive at this conclusion; that if it be consistent with the divine perfections, that God should inflict punishment from the two motives of vindicating his own law and government and benefiting the sinner; it is equally consistent with the divine perfections to inflict punishment from the former motive only. All the vindictive punishment pleaded for, is that which is deserved by the sinner and is necessary to support the divine law and moral government in proper dignity, and thus to promote the general good; and this surely is opposed to no attribute of God, whether justice or goodness.

Objection 2. To the argument drawn from the destruction threatened to the wicked, it may be objected, that this destruction means, that they shall be destroyed *as sinners* only, or shall be brought to repentance and a renunciation of sin. To this it may be answered, that in this sense every one who in this life repents, and believes, is destroyed, and suffers destruction. Yet this is never said in scripture. This sense of the word *destruction* makes the punishment of hell, and the awful curse of the divine law, to consist in *repentance*, which is no punishment or curse, but an inestimable blessing. Besides, that repentance, on which the sinner is forgiven, if it can be called a *destruction* at all, is not an *everlasting* destruction, but an emotion of the heart, which is begun and finished in a very short time. Or if by this everlasting destruction be understood the habitual and persevering repentance of the true convert; then the glorified saints in heaven, are constantly suffering that *destruction* which will be everlasting, and which is the curse of the divine law.

Before this subject is dismissed, proper notice ought to be taken of some arguments urged in favor of the sentiment, that the punishment of hell is merely disciplinary.

1. It is urged,* that the various afflictions of *this life* are designed for the good of the patients; therefore, probably the same

* Pages 324, 325.

end is designed by the sufferings of hell. To this it may be answered, It is by no means granted, that all the afflictions of this life are designed for the good of the patients. It does not appear, that men in general, who are visited with the loss of children, wives, or other dear friends; or with the loss of eyesight, of some other sense, or of a limb; or with distressing pains or incurable diseases; are thereby rendered more happy in this life. If men may be allowed to judge by their own experience, they will in most cases decide the question in the negative. Nor does the decision in many cases appear ill founded to those, who have opportunity to observe persons under those afflictions. To say that men are no proper judges, whether they themselves be, in this life, made more happy or not, by the afflictions which they suffer, is to say, that they are no judges of their own happiness or misery. This being once established, we may assert, that hell-torments though endless promote the happiness of the patients; because being no judges of their own happiness or misery they may be extremely happy, at the very time they judge themselves to be perfectly miserable.

In any case in which calamity proves fatal, it is absurd to pretend, that it promotes, in this life, the happiness of the patient, unless calamity itself be happiness. No man has opportunity in this life to derive any good from the pains of death. Therefore, at least these pains are not designed for the subject's good during his present life.

Here it may be proper to mention several remarkable instances of grievous calamity recorded in scripture: As the instance of the old world, of Sodom and Gomorrah, of Pharaoh, Saul, the house of Eli, Nadab and Abihu, Hiel, etc. It is presumed, Dr. C. himself would not pretend, that these calamities were intended for "the profit of the sufferers themselves" in this life. What right then had he to argue, as in the following passage? "The proper tendency and final cause of evils in the present state, are to do us good. This is the voice of reason confirmed by experience, and scripture concurs herewith."* He then quotes Ps. 89: 31—34, and proceeds: "If evil, punishment or misery in the present life is mercifully intended for the good of the patients themselves, why not in the next life? Is the character of God, as the father of mercies and God of pity, confined to this world only?" The force of all this depends entirely on the supposition, that in all instances of suffering in this life, the end is the sufferer's good during this life.

But this supposition, we see by what has been said already, is

* Pages 324, 325.

by no means true. The superstructure therefore built on this foundation falls entirely to the ground. We all grant, that in some instances afflictions are intended for the good of the sufferers. A proof of this, which needed no proof, Dr. C. has produced out of the eighty-ninth Psalm. On this foundation extended in his own imagination to comprehend all instances of affliction, he built an argument in which he triumphed. Now since there are those several instances of calamity before mentioned, which Dr. C. would not pretend were designed for the sufferer's good in this life; I might as well suppose that no other instances of calamity are designed for the sufferer's good in this life; and then adopt Dr. C's strain of *ardent declamation*, in manner following: If evil punishment or misery in the present life, be not intended for the good of the patients themselves, but to support the authority of the divine law, and thus subserve the general good; why not in the next life? Is the character of God, as a God of perfect purity and strict justice, limited to this world only? Why should it not be supposed, that the infinitely holy God has the same hatred of sin in the other world which he has in this? and that he has in the next state the same intention which he has in this, to vindicate, by punishments, his law and government.

The truth is, that as some of the calamities of this life are intended for the patient's good in this life, and others are as manifestly not intended for his good in this life; nothing certain can be hence concluded concerning the end of the misery of the damned. Nay; if it were certain, that all the calamities of this life are intended for the patient's good in this life, or that they are not intended for his good in this life; yet it could not be certainly thence concluded, that the miseries of the damned are intended for the good of the patients, nor that they are not intended for the good of the patients. But this point must be determined by other evidence, the evidence of revelation.

If it should be said, that though some of the sufferings of this life do not, in this life, produce good to the patients; yet they will produce good to them in future life; it will be sufficient to reply, that this wants proof; that it is a main point in the present dispute; and that it should be taken for granted, is not to be suffered.

2. It is also urged by our author, "That the whole course of nature, and even the revelations of scripture constantly speak of God, as the universal father, as well as governor of men. What now is the temper and conduct of fathers on earth towards their offspring? They readily do them good and chastise them for their profit; but they do not punish their children, having no view

to their advantage." "And shall we say that of our Father in heaven, which we cannot suppose of any father on earth, till we have first divested him of the heart of a father?" He abounds in pathetic discourse of the same strain, which is much more suited to work on the imaginations and passions of mankind, than on their reason. The foundation of all this discourse is, that fathers on earth, acting in character, never punish and never can punish their children but with a design to promote their personal good. But would Dr. C. himself adventure to lay down this position and abide by it? Did never a wise and a good father find it necessary to punish, and even to cast out of his family, a desperate child, to prevent his ruining the rest of the children? Was there never, or can there possibly never be, an instance of this? If such an instance ever has, or ever may occur, the appearance of argument in the forecited passage, vanishes at once. Not only do *fathers* find it necessary to punish desperate children, without any prospect of their personal good; but very frequently do *kings*, governors and chief magistrates find this necessary with regard to their subjects. Now in the scripture, God much oftener illustrates his character, by that of a king, a prince, a sovereign lord, than by that of a father. And as kings, etc. often find it necessary to inflict capital and other punishments, without any view to the personal good of the sufferers; we may hence deduce an argument, that God also will punish many of his rebellious subjects, without any view to their personal good, but to support his moral government, to be an example of terror to others, and thus to secure the general good; and this argument would be at least as strong as that of Dr. C. just cited.

3. It may be pleaded, that though calamities in this life do not always issue in the sufferers good; yet God may compensate them in the future state, for the loss or suffering, of which they are the subjects in this life. Thus our author: "It is possible that the evils which any suffer in this, may be made up to them in another state."* It is granted, that God is able to compensate his creatures for the evils of this life; but that he in fact will do it in all cases, is to be proved. Besides; the very idea of compensation is inconsistent with the idea of disciplinary punishment, and that all the evils of both this life and the future are necessary and are intended for the good of those who suffer them. For if this idea be just, what foundation is there for compensation? Will a father compensate a child for the pain of that discipline which is absolutely necessary for his good, and most wisely adapted to it? No man would ever think of it. Compensation supposes, that the

* Benevolence of the Deity, p. 249.

evil for which compensation is made, has been inflicted from other motives, than a regard to the good of the sufferer. And if evil may in one instance be inflicted from other motives than a regard to the good of the sufferer; it may in any other instance in which justice and wisdom admit of it; and if in this state, in the future too. If the evils of life be intended for the good only of the subjects, we may as well talk of compensating a man for the pain of drawing a tooth which is a perpetual torment to him; or for the disagreeable taste of the dose which cures him of the cholic; as to talk of compensating him for the calamities of life. The saints will indeed be rewarded for their patience under these calamities; and this part of their holiness is doubtless as amiable, and is as properly as any part of their holiness the object of the complacency of the Deity, and of those rewards which are the fruits of that complacency. But those rewards are not to be considered as compensations of losses or of damages. The very idea of compensation implies, that that for which compensation is made, is on the whole an evil to the person compensated. But the very idea that present evils are necessary and conducive to the good of the subjects, implies, that on the whole they are no evils to the subjects.

It is now submitted to the reader, whether the doctrine that the damned will in fact suffer no other punishment than that which is subservient to their personal good, be not in many respects most glaringly inconsistent with the scriptures; and whether it be not equally irreconcilable with their general tenor as with many particular passages, and also with many parts of Dr. C's book.

CHAPTER IV.

CONTAINING AN EXAMINATION OF DR. C'S ARGUMENTS TO PROVE ENDLESS PUNISHMENT INCONSISTENT WITH JUSTICE.

That the endless punishment of the damned is inconsistent with justice, is positively and abundantly asserted by Dr. C. and other advocates for universal salvation. Whether the arguments which the Doctor offers to prove the injustice of endless punishment, be conclusive, is the subject of our inquiry in this chapter.

Before we proceed to this inquiry, it seems necessary to explain the meaning of the proposition—That the endless punishment of the damned is consistent with *justice.*

I do not find that Dr. C. hath anywhere given us a definition of his idea of *justice*, or of a just punishment, which is certainly a great omission. The Chevalier *Ramsay* gives the following definition of the divine justice: "Justice is that perfection of God, by which he endeavors continually to make all intelligences just."* But with the same reason he might have defined the divine mercy to be, not that perfection in God, by which he is himself inclined to the exercise of mercy to the miserable; but that by which he endeavors to make all intelligences merciful; and the divine love to be, not that perfection in God, by which he loves his creatures, but that by which he endeavors to make other intelligences exercise love. By this definition of justice a human judge, who wrongs every man whose cause is brought before him, and yet endeavors to make other men just, is a just judge.

The word *justice* is used in three different senses. Sometimes it means *commutative* justice, sometimes *distributive*, and sometimes *general* or *public* justice. Commutative justice respects property only, and the equal exchange and restitution of it. *Distributive* justice is the equal distribution of rewards and punishments, and it respects the *personal* rights and demerit of the person rewarded or punished. *General* or *public* justice respects what are called the rights of a community, whether a city, state, empire, or the universe. This kind of justice requires the public good; and whenever that is violated or neglected, the public is *injured*. This last use of the word justice, though very frequent, yet is an improper use of it; because to practice justice in this sense, is no other than to act from public spirit, or from love to the community, and with respect to the universe, it is the very same with general benevolence.

Now when we inquire, whether the endless punishment of the wicked be consistent with justice, no man will suppose that the word justice means *commutative* justice; because the inquiry has no respect to *property*. Nor is the word to be understood to mean *general* or *public* justice. It is indeed an important inquiry, whether the endless punishment of a man dying in impenitence, be consistent with the general interest of the universe; but this is not the subject to be considered in this chapter. The question to be considered in this and in one or two succeeding chapters, is, whether to inflict an endless punishment on a man dying in impenitence, be an act of *distributive* justice, or be a treatment of him by his judge, correspondent and no more than

* Principles, Vol. I. p. 432.

correspondent or proportioned to his demerit, to his crimes, or to his moral conduct and personal character. This is a question entirely different from the following: Whether the infliction of an endless punishment on a sinner dying in impenitence, be subservient to the good of the universe? A punishment or calamity inflicted on a person may be subservient to the public good of a community, yet not be deserved by him on account of his personal crimes. It was for the good of the Roman republic, that *Regulus* should return to certain death at Carthage; yet he did not deserve that death; it was not correspondent to his moral character. On the other hand, many a villain has by his atrocious crimes deserved death; yet by reason of his power, his connections, or the peculiar circumstances of the state, it could not, consistently with the public good be inflicted on him. So that in a variety of instances public justice or the public good is promoted by private or distributive injustice; and distributive justice would be productive of public injury or damage. And in some cases the public good may be promoted by a proceeding, which, though not in the distributive sense unjust, yet is not according to distributive justice. An innocent person may choose to be made the subject of sufferings, in the stead of a criminal. Therefore though the sufferings which he chooses to endure, be inflicted on him, no injustice is done him; nor will it be pretended, that this proceeding is according to strict distributive justice, which requires the criminal to be punished and not his substitute. Yet it may promote the good of the community, or secure it from great detriment by a relaxation of its laws and government; as in the well known instance of Zaleucus, who put out one of his own eyes, to support the authority of the law against adultery, which his own son had violated.

On the whole, when we inquire whether the endless punishment of the damned be consistent with justice, the word *justice* means *distributive* justice. This, as has been already observed, respects the personal merit or demerit of the man rewarded or punished. A man suffers distributive injustice when he is not treated as favorably as is correspondent to his personal conduct or character. On the other hand, he has justice done him, when he is treated in a manner correspondent to his personal conduct or character. A just punishment then is that which is proportioned or correspondent to the crime punished. But it may be further inquired, when is a punishment proportioned to the crime punished? To this the answer seems to be, when by the pain or natural evil of the punishment, it exhibits a just idea of the

moral evil or ruinous tendency of the crime, and a proper motive to restrain all intelligent beings from the commission of the crime.

Further to elucidate this matter, let it be observed, that any crime, by relaxing the laws and by weakening the government, is a damage to the community; and deserves just so much punishment, as, by restoring the proper tone of the laws, and proper strength to the government, will repair that damage. The chief evil of any crime, on account of which it principally deserves punishment, consists in the relaxation of the laws and government of the community in which the crime is committed. For example, the chief evil of theft is not that a certain person is clandestinely deprived of his property. His property may be restored and he may in this respect suffer no damage. Still the thief deserves punishment. If a man be defamed, the chief evil is not that the person defamed is injured by the loss of his reputation. His reputation may, by a full confession of the defamer or by other means, be restored. Still the defamer may deserve punishment. If a man be murdered, the chief evil is not that the man is deprived of his life, and his friends and the community are deprived of the benefit of his aid. His life may have been a burden to himself, to his friends and to the community; or he may by divine power be raised from the dead. Still, in either case, the murderer would deserve punishment.

The true reason, why all those criminals would, in all those cases deserve punishment, is, that by their respective crimes they would weaken the laws and government of the community, thereby would break in upon the public peace, good order, safety and happiness; instead of these would introduce confusion and ruin; and thus would do a very great damage to the community. Therefore, they would respectively deserve just so much punishment, as by restoring the tone of the laws and government, would re-establish the peace, good order, safety and happiness of the community, and thus would repair the damage done to the community by their crimes. A punishment adequate to this end exhibits by the natural evil of it, a just idea of the moral evil of the crime, and a proper motive to restrain all from the commission of it; it is therefore duly proportioned to the crime, is correspondent to the conduct of the criminal, and is perfectly just.

The passages in which Dr. C. *declares positively*, that the endless punishment of the wicked would be unjust, are very numerous; but his arguments to prove that it would be unjust, are, so far as I can find, very few. As this is a capital point in the present controversy, it was to be expected, that he would go into a formal consideration of it, and give us his reasons methodically

and distinctly. Instead of this, in all the various parts of his book in which he declaims most vehemently on the subject, there are very few in which I find an attempt to argue. These are as follows: "An eternity of misery swallows up all proportion; or though there should be some difference in the *degree* of pain, it is such a difference, I fear, as will be scarce thought worthy of being brought into the account, when the circumstance of endless duration is annexed to it."* "The smallness of the difference between those in this world, to whom the character of *wicked* belongs in the lowest sense, and those to whom the character of *good* is applicable in the like sense, renders it incredible, that such an amazingly great difference should be made between them in the future. The difference between them, according to the common opinion will be doubly infinite. For the reward and punishment being both eternal, they must at last become infinite in magnitude. How to reconcile this with the absolutely accurate impartiality of God, is, I confess, beyond me."† "It does not appear to me, that it would be honorable to the infinitely righteous and benevolent governor of the world, to make wicked men everlastingly miserable. For in what point of light soever we take a view of sin, it is certainly in its nature a finite evil. It is the fault of a finite creature, and the effect of finite principles, passions and appetites. To say therefore, that the sinner is doomed to infinite misery, for the finite faults of a finite life, looks like a reflection on the infinite justice, as well as goodness of God. I know it has been often urged, that sin is an infinite evil, because committed against an infinite object; for which reason an infinite punishment is no more than its due desert. But this metaphysical nicety proves a great deal too much, if it proves anything at all. For according to this way of arguing, all sinners must suffer the utmost in *degree*, as well as in *duration*; otherwise they will not suffer so much as they might do, and as they ought to do; which is plainly inconsistent with that difference the scripture often declares there shall be in the punishment of wicked men, according to the difference there has been in the nature and number of their evil deeds."‡

These, I think, are the passages in which Dr. C. offers his most plausible and strong, if not his only arguments, to prove that endless punishment is not consistent with justice; and the arguments here offered are these three only: That endless punishment implies such a different treatment of the smallest sinners and smallest saints, as is out of all proportion to their respective characters; it is therefore incredible, and not reconcilable with

* Page 309. † p. 320. ‡ p. 361.

the justice and impartiality of God. That endless punishment is out of all proportion to the demerit of sin, as the latter is finite, the former infinite. That endless punishment, on account of the infinite evil of sin, as committed against a God of infinite glory, implies, that future punishment is infinite in degree too, and therefore that the punishment of all the damned is equal.

I. That endless punishment implies such a different treatment of the smallest sinner and smallest saint, as is out of all proportion to their respective characters; it is therefore incredible, and not reconcilable with the justice and impartiality of God. On this I observe:

1. That there is an infinite difference between the treatment of two persons, one of whom is sent to endless misery, the other not, is readily granted. But that the one, who is sent to such a punishment, is treated unjustly, is not granted; and to assert, that he is treated unjustly, is to *beg* and not to prove the thing in question.

2. That of the two persons now supposed, one should be treated according to his demerits, and the other by the "boundless goodness of God," should be exempted from that punishment, to which, by his demerit, he is justly liable, is nothing incredible or unjust. Surely the gracious exemption of one man from that punishment which he deserves, renders not the punishment of another unjust, which would otherwise be just.

3. As there is no injustice in the case now stated, so neither is there any partiality in it. There is no partiality in the conduct of the Supreme Magistrate, who condemns one criminal according to his demerit, and pardons another criminal equally guilty. But partiality is then practised, when of two real and known criminals, one is condemned by the judge; the other cleared, on the pretence that he is innocent. So that this whole argument from the incredibly different treatment of the smallest sinner and smallest saint, whose characters are so nearly on a level, so far as it supposes the different treatment to be incredible, on account of the endless punishment of the sinner, is a mere begging of the question. It takes for granted, that the sinner does not deserve an endless punishment. So far as it supposes the different treatment to be incredible, on account of the infinite reward or happiness bestowed on the saint, it supposes, that God in his infinite goodness, cannot bestow an infinite good on a creature, who in his own person is entirely unworthy of it. It also supposes, that if ever God pardon any sinner, he must pardon all, whose demerits are no more than that of the man pardoned; otherwise he is partial. And for the same reason, that if ever he con-

demn any sinner, he must condemn all those, whose characters are equally sinful with that of the man condemned. But it is presumed, that these sentiments will be avowed by no man.

II. The next argument is, That endless punishment is out of all proportion to the demerit of sin, as the former is infinite, the latter finite. As this is a matter of great importance in the present dispute, it requires our particular attention. How then does Dr. C. make it appear, that sin is a finite evil? By these several considerations, that it is the fault of a finite creature,—during a finite life,—and the effect of finite principles, passions and appetites; the sum of which is, that it is impossible for a creature, in a finite duration, to commit an infinite crime; or which is the same thing, a crime which shall deserve an endless punishment. As to this let it be observed:

1. That if it be impossible for a creature, in a finite duration, to commit a crime which shall deserve an endless punishment, it is as really against what Dr. C. holds, as against the opposite system. He says, "If the next is a state of punishment intended to satisfy the justice of God, 'tis impossible all men should be finally saved;"* that is, if in the next state a punishment be inflicted, which satisfies justice, all men will not be saved. But a punishment which satisfies justice, is a perfectly just punishment. It is therefore just, that some men should finally not be saved; or it is just, that on account of their sins, they be without end excluded from salvation. And what is the endless exclusion of a sinner from salvation on account of his sins, but an endless punishment inflicted for the fault of a finite creature, committed in a finite life, and the effect of finite principles, passions and appetites? This passage of Dr. C. is a plain and full concession both of the justice of endless punishment, and of the infinite evil of sin.

That sin is an infinite evil, or an evil deserving an endless punishment, is implied in all those passages also, in which Dr. C. asserts, that the salvation of all men, and even of the damned, after they have suffered all which they ever are to suffer, is the fruit of *boundless and inexhaustible goodness, infinite indulgence and love*, etc. In his argument that the punishment of the damned is disciplinary, he says, "That God must in the other world, as well as in this, be disposed to *make it evident*, that he is a being of *boundless* and *inexhaustible* goodness."† It is plain by the connection, that the Doctor means, that the deliverance of the damned, in consequence of a punishment which is conducive to their good, is an act of boundless and inexhaustible goodness.

But that the goodness of that act of deliverance is not greater

* Page 11. † p. 326.

than the evil or punishment from which it delivers, will be conceded by all. There is goodness in delivering a man from the tooth-ache; but no man will pretend, that this is an act of *boundless* and *inexhaustible* goodness. To deliver from the misery of a thousand years torment in hell, is an act of far greater goodness. But this is not an act of *boundless* and *inexhaustible* goodness. Nor is any act of deliverance worthy of these epithets, unless it deliver from an evil, which is boundless and inexhaustible. Doubtless the act of God in delivering a sinner from the punishment of hell is called an act of boundless and inexhaustible goodness with respect to the greatness of the benefit conferred by that deliverance, and not with respect to the inherent and essential goodness of God. If the latter be Doctor C's meaning, what he says is no illustration of the divine goodness in delivering a sinner from the pains of hell; he might have said the same concerning the deliverance of any person guilty or innocent, from the tooth-ache, or from the prick of a pin. He says, that God in the other world, as well as in this, must be disposed *to make it evident*, that he is a being of boundless and inexhaustible goodness. But if the deliverance of a sinner from the pains of hell be not a boundless benefit, it does not make it evident, that God is a being of boundless goodness. If it be a boundless benefit, the evil delivered from is boundless. If therefore the deliverance of the damned from the torments of hell, be an act and a proof of boundless and inexhaustible goodness, as the Doctor holds, the evil from which they are delivered, and to which they are exposed by the divine law, is boundless and inexhaustible. But they are not by the divine law exposed to a greater punishment than they justly deserve; therefore they justly deserve a boundless or inexhaustible punishment: of consequence sin, by which they deserve this punishment, is a boundless and inexhaustible or an infinite evil.

Again, Dr. C. in the words of Mr. *Whiston*, says, "Many, or all of them," [the damned] "may possibly be recovered and saved at last, by the infinite indulgence and love of their creator."* The same observations, which were made in the preceding paragraph, are applicable here. It cannot be the meaning of Dr. C. that the recovery of the damned is in no other sense a fruit or proof of the infinite indulgence and love of their Creator, than the recovery of a person in this life from the smallest disease or calamity; or the deliverance of even an innocent being from some slight evil. A less degree of indulgence and love, than that which is infinite, would be sufficient for these recoveries, or deliverances. And if nothing short of infinite indulgence and love

* Page 405.

can recover the damned, then their recovery is a proof of infinite love. Now what can be a proof of infinite love, but the bestowment of an infinite benefit? And no benefit consisting in recovery from evil is infinite, unless the evil, from which the recovery is made, be infinite. But if the evil from which the damned are supposed to be recovered, be infinite, sin, by which they are exposed to that evil, must itself be an infinite evil.

If here it should be objected, that the damned are not indeed *delivered from wrath*, by boundless goodness and infinite love; but that boundless goodness and infinite love are exercised in their admission to the positive happiness of heaven only; I entreat the reader to observe, that in the former of the two passages last quoted, Dr. C. is speaking of God's *making evident* his boundless and inexhaustible goodness, by pitying sinners, and punishing them in order to their benefit, or by the *deliverance* of the damned, in consequence of a disciplinary punishment. In the other, he is speaking in the words of Mr. Whiston, concerning the *recovery* of the damned. But for a more full answer I beg leave to refer the reader to page 16, where this same objection has been stated and considered.

That sin is an infinite evil, is implied in what Dr. C. holds concerning annihilation. He says, "If the foregoing scheme should be found to have no truth in it—the second death ought to be considered as that which will put an end to their existence both in soul and body, so that they shall be no more in the creation of God." By this it appears that the Doctor held, that endless annihilation would be no unjust punishment of sin. But endless annihilation is an *endless* or *infinite* punishment. It is an endless loss of not only all the good which the man at present enjoys; but of all that good which he would have enjoyed throughout eternity, in the state of bliss to which he would have been admitted, if he had never sinned. This in an endless duration would amount to an infinite quantity of good. Annihilation therefore is an infinite punishment both as it is endless, and as the quantity of good lost is infinite; and Dr. C. in allowing that endless annihilation would be no more than a just punishment of sin, allows, that sin deserves an infinite punishment, or that it is an infinite evil, though it is the fault of a finite creature, in a finite life, and the effect of finite principles, passions and appetites. If therefore it be a difficulty hard to be solved, that a finite creature in a finite life, should commit an infinite evil, meaning a crime which may be justly punished with an endless punishment; it is a difficulty that equally concerned Dr. C. as myself; and it was absurd for him to object that to others, which lay equally in his own way.

It may be objected to these observations, that endless annihilation is not an infinite punishment, because it may be inflicted on even an innocent person. God having once communicated existence is under no obligation to perpetuate it; but for wise ends may without injury suffer even the most holy of his creatures, after the enjoyment of existence and of good for a season, to drop into their original nothing. To this it may be answered; that this objection equally proves, that annihilation is no punishment at all, as that it is not an *infinite* punishment. When an innocent creature is suffered in sovereign wisdom to drop into non-existence, this is not only not an infinite punishment, but is no punishment at all. A punishment is some evil brought on a person, in testimony that his conduct is disapproved by the author of that evil. This is not the case in the annihilation of the innocent person now supposed. Therefore it equally follows from the possible annihilation of an innocent creature, that the annihilation of the wicked would be no punishment at all, as that it would not be an infinite punishment. Annihilation is an infinite loss, and in that sense, an infinite evil, to an innocent person, as well as to one ever so guilty. But as it is not inflicted on the innocent, in testimony of disapprobation, it is not a punishment. On the other hand, if it be inflicted at all on the wicked, it is inflicted in express testimony of the divine abhorrence of their conduct, and therefore is a punishment; and any punishment, which is an infinite evil, is an infinite punishment.

To illustrate this, let the following example be taken. A parent having begun the most liberal and advantageous education of his son, may for wise reasons, entirely drop, without any injustice to his son, the course of education, which he had begun, and may suffer him to grow up in comparative ignorance. This would not only not be a very great punishment of his son, but no punishment at all. Whereas, if he should treat his son in the same manner, from the motive of testifying his displeasure at some trifling levity or childish inadvertence, it would be both a real and a very great punishment; and though it would consist in a loss or privation, yet it would be a much greater punishment than the infliction of a very considerable positive pain. In like manner, though annihilation may be inflicted in such a manner, as to be no punishment; yet when it is inflicted with the declared design of exhibiting the divine displeasure at sin; it is a far greater punishment, than a very great and long temporary misery. That annihilation is an evil, no man will deny, who allows that existence and happiness are good. And if it be an evil, it is an evil equal to the good lost by it, taking into view the

continuance of that loss; and as this is infinite, final annihilation is an infinite evil; and whenever it is inflicted in testimony of disapprobation of the conduct of the sinner, it is an infinite punishment.

Doubtless Dr. C. was of the opinion, that annihilation may be a punishment, as it was his belief, that if his scheme of universal salvation be not true, the wicked are to be annihilated. He would doubtless have allowed, that annihilation will not be brought on them in testimony of the divine approbation of their conduct. Nor can it be supposed to be the fruit of perfect indifference in the divine mind, with respect to their conduct. It must therefore be a testimony of divine disapprobation, which constitutes it a punishment. And as it is an infinite evil, of course it is an infinite punishment.*

Perhaps it may be further said, in opposition to what has been now advanced, that the meaning of those who assert, that sin does not deserve an infinite punishment, is not that sin does not deserve an endless *privation* or *negative* punishment; but that it does not deserve an endless *positive* punishment, consisting in *positive pains* or *torments*. If the objection be thus explained, it comes to this merely, that sin does indeed deserve an endless punishment, and so is truly and properly an infinite evil, in the sense in which any of us hold it to be an infinite evil; but it is not *such* an infinite evil, as to deserve so great an endless punishment, as endless positive pain and torment. But this stating of the objection entirely shifts the ground of the dispute; granting, that an endless punishment is justly deserved by sin, it denies, that so great *a degree* of punishment, as endless positive misery, is deserved by it. Endless annihilation is equally and as truly an endless punishment, as endless torment. Nor is there any ground of objection to the one more than to the other, on account of any difference in duration, or that in which alone the infinity consists. But the ground of objection to endless misery, rather than to endless annihilation, is, that it is a greater, more dreadful, and more intolerable punishment; or a greater punishment in *degree*.

Besides, not every *degree* of endless *pain* is a greater evil or punishment, than endless annihilation. No man will pretend, that any slight pain continued to eternity, is so great an evil, as end-

* To prove that sin does not deserve an endless punishment, Dr. Priestly too says, "There is no proportion between finite and infinite." Instit. Vol. II. p. 383. Neither is there any proportion between this finite life and endless annihilation. Yet Dr. Priestly is of the opinion, that endless annihilation would not be an unjust punishment of sin.

less annihilation and the endless loss of all enjoyment and existence.

On the whole, as the state of the argument before us is now wholly shifted; as it is granted by the objector, that sin deserves an infinite or endless punishment, but not so great an endless punishment, as is implied in *some degrees* of endless pain; every thing for which we contend, as to the duration of future punishment, is granted. It is not pretended by the advocates for endless punishment, that sin deserves an infinite *degree* of endless punishment. Nor do they pretend to *determine* the *degree* of punishment which it deserves. It becomes all to leave that to God, who alone is able to determine it. The advocates for temporary punishment will not pretend to determine the degree of temporary punishment which sin deserves. The *degree* of future punishment is not the subject of the present dispute. I might now therefore fairly dismiss the further discussion of the infinite evil of sin, as on account of the concessions already mentioned, wholly impertinent to the present dispute. But wishing to relieve what difficulty, and to throw what light on the subject I can, I proceed to observe:

Perhaps it may be yet further pleaded, that the opposers of the infinite evil of sin mean, that sin does not deserve such an endless positive misery, as is worse than non-existence. As to this, besides that it makes the subject of the dispute to be wholly the *degree* of punishment and not the *duration* of it; it may be remarked, that it is granted in this plea, that it would be just, if all the wicked who die in impenitence were annihilated. Annihilation therefore is the punishment deserved by the least sinner, who dies in impenitence; and those, whose guilt is more aggravated, deserve a greater punishment; and as some are inconceivably greater sinners than the least, they deserve an inconceivably greater punishment than annihilation. Again, as the least sinner deserves annihilation, so he deserves that degree of positive pain, or that mixture of pain and pleasure, which is equally undesirable, or equally dreadful as non-existence. Therefore, those who are inconceivably greater sinners than the least, deserve that degree of positive endless pain, which is inconceivably worse and more to be dreaded, than non-existence, or than that mixture of pain and pleasure, which is equally to be dreaded as non-existence. Therefore from principles conceded by Dr. C. it clearly follows, not only that all sinners deserve an endless punishment, but that all sinners, except those of the very lowest class, deserve that degree of endless misery, which is worse than non-existence; and which is not only an infinite evil, but an evil doubly infinite,

as the loss is infinite, and the positive misery exceeding all the good enjoyed, being endless, is infinite too.

2. The argument of Dr. C. now under consideration, "If it prove anything, proves a great deal too much," as it supposes, that any crime can justly be punished for no longer a time, than was consumed in the perpetration of the crime. That this is implied in the argument, will appear, if we consider, that if it be once allowed, that a crime may be punished for a longer time than was consumed in the perpetration of it, the whole argument, that a creature cannot in a finite life, commit such sin, as shall deserve an endless punishment, must be given up. If a man may in one day commit a crime, which deserves a punishment to be continued for a year, who will say, that he may not in one day commit a crime, which shall deserve a punishment to be continued for *two* years, for *ten* years, or during his life? Therefore in determining the duration of the punishment, no regard at all is had to the time taken up in the perpetration of the crime. And if no regard be had to this, there is no absurdity in supposing, that the crimes of a finite life may deserve an endless punishment. To say, that there is an absurdity in it, supposes that in adjusting the punishment, a regard is always to be had to the time taken up in the perpetration of the crime; which is contrary to known fact, as well as to the deduction just now made. Nay, it implies, as I before observed, that no just punishment can be continued for a longer time than was consumed in the perpetration of the crime. The mere duration of punishment is of no importance or consideration, unless the whole punishment be excessive. Therefore perpetual imprisonment is inflicted for crimes, which are perpetrated in a very short time.

By the same argument, by which Dr. C. undertakes to prove, that sin does not deserve an endless punishment, any man may undertake to prove that it does not deserve a punishment to continue for ages of ages. The Doctor's argument is, that sin deserves no more than a temporary punishment, because it is committed in a finite duration. With the same strength of argument it may be said: Sin deserves not a punishment of ages of ages, but a punishment of no longer duration than seventy years, because it is committed in the space of seventy years. It is manifest, that when a punishment of ages of ages is inflicted on the sinner, no regard is had to the time consumed in the perpetration of sin. And if it be just to inflict a punishment in one case, without regard to the time consumed in the perpetration of sin, why not in another? If because sin is the fault of a finite life, it does not deserve an infinite punishment; then because it

is the fault of a life of less duration, than that of ages of ages, it does not deserve a punishment which is to continue for ages of ages. Or how will Dr. C. prove, that sin, the fault of a life, which is to continue only seventy years, deserves a punishment which is to continue for ages of ages? I presume he will not pretend to prove it by any proportion between the duration of seventy years and that of ages of ages; but merely by revelation. From the same source of evidence, we undertake to prove both the reality and justice of endless punishment. And it is as ineffectual to object to our proof of endless punishment, the disproportion between an infinite and a finite duration, as it is to object to his proof of a punishment of ages of ages, the disproportion between the duration of ages of ages, and that of seventy years. I grant that the disproportion between infinite and finite duration, is greater, than that between ages of ages and seventy years. But, when the time consumed in the commission of a crime is not at all regarded, let the disproportion be what it may, nothing can be thence concluded.

If it be still pretended, that a regard to the time consumed in the commission of sin is had, in determining the duration of its punishment; I ask what regard is had to it? If the duration of the punishment may at all exceed the time consumed in the commission of sin, how much may the former exceed the latter? To say there is an infinite disproportion between a finite life, and an endless eternity, affords no satisfaction. So there is a very great disproportion between a life of seventy years, and ages of ages. And if on the principles of Dr. C. an endless punishment be more unjust than that of ages of ages, is not the latter on the same principles really unjust? If not, then a punishment, the duration of which is greatly disproportionate to the time consumed in the commission of the crime, is still just; and who will undertake to fix the degrees of disproportion between the duration of the punishment, and the time consumed in the commission of the crime, which are consistent, and which are inconsistent with justice? And let a reason be given, why it is not as really unjust to inflict a punishment, the duration of which is greatly disproportionate to the time spent in the commission of the crime, as to inflict a punishment, the duration of which bears no proportion to the time spent in the commission of the crime. Why would not the same argument from the disproportion of the duration of the punishment, to the time spent in committing the sin, prove, that Adam was unjustly punished, in that he was condemned to eat bread in the sweat of his face, *all the days of his life*, for the sin of eating the forbidden fruit, which was doubt-

less finished in a very short time? Also, that David was unjustly punished, in that *the sword never departed from his house*, because of his sin in the matter of Uriah?

If a finite creature, in a finite time, cannot commit an infinite evil, or one which deserves an endless punishment, it will follow, that even our Lord Jesus Christ himself, if he be a real creature, though the first born of every creature,* cannot, if he be disposed, commit an infinite evil. Yet as he created and upholds all things by the word of his power, he doubtless has power to annihilate all things. Now I ask, whether if Christ should annihilate the whole created system, himself only excepted, it would be a finite or an infinite evil? If the answer should be, that it would be a finite evil, I would ask again, whether it would not be as great an evil to the universe, as the endless misery of one sinner, provided he deserves that misery. I make this proviso, because we do not plead for endless punishment on any other supposition, than that it is just. And if it should be said, that the endless punishment of a sinner is an infinite evil, because it is unjustly inflicted, this would be a begging of the question; it would also follow, that on the supposition of the justice of the endless punishment of the sinner, it is not an infinite evil, and therefore there is no foundation for the objection now under consideration, that sin a finite moral evil is punished with an infinite natural evil or punishment. Beside, that the endless annihilation of the created system would be an infinite evil in the very same sense, in which the endless punishment of the damned is an infinite evil, is evident from this consideration, that the punishment of the damned is not pretended to be infinite in any other respect, than in duration. In the very same respect the endless annihilation of which we speak, is infinite.

If the answer to the question just proposed, should be, that the annihilation of the created system would be an infinite evil; the consequence is, that an infinite evil may be caused or committed by a finite creature, in a finite time.

Possibly it may be further objected, that if our Lord Jesus Christ be a mere creature, he had no power in himself to create the universe; but created it by divine power communicated for that purpose; and that if he should annihilate it, he must do it by the same communicated power. Therefore Christ himself has it not in his power, to effect an infinite evil. But we are to observe, that if Christ was a proper intelligent moral agent in crea-

* So far as can be judged from the book of Dr. C. now under examination, and some others of his works, he would not have objected to this character of Christ.

tion, that work is his work, and properly to be ascribed to him, as properly as any actions of men are to be ascribed to them. It is allowed on all hands, that all men have received all their powers of action from their creator; yet no man will dispute, whether these actions be the proper actions of men, or whether the effects produced by these actions be imputable to them, as their proper causes. Therefore with at least as great truth and propriety is Christ, even on the supposition that he is a mere creature, the proper cause of all his works, whether of creation or annihilation, as men in general are the causes of their works. He cannot possibly be more dependent for his powers, than we are for ours. Nor is it of any importance to the subject now under consideration, whether Christ had originally the power of creation and annihilation, or whether it was communicated to him afterwards. A power given by God at one time, is as really given by him, as if it were given at another time.

In the argument against the infinite evil of sin, that a finite creature cannot commit an infinite evil, in a finite time; the finitude of *the time* is either essential to the validity of the argument, or it is not. If it be essential, it implies, as was before observed, that no crime can deserve to be punished for a longer time, than was consumed in the commission of the crime. If the finitude of the time be not essential to the argument, but the meaning be, that a finite creature cannot at all commit an infinite evil, because he is a *finite creature*, it will follow, that if the whole system of intelligent creatures were to revolt from God, and to continue in their revolt to an absolute eternity, it would be but a finite evil.

Objection. The time never can come, at which the system of creatures shall have continued to an absolute eternity, in their revolt from God. Therefore, though we suppose that the whole created system should revolt, it is absurd to suppose, that they shall have continued in their revolt to an absolute eternity; and therefore it is impossible, that the whole created system should have committed an infinite evil. *Answer.* For the same reason it is impossible, that a creature should have been punished to an absolute eternity. The longest punishment to which any suppose the wicked are doomed, is in no other sense infinite, than that in which the revolt which has been supposed, may be infinite. If then the wicked be not doomed to an infinite or endless punishment, sin is not, on any scheme, punished with an infinite punishment; and then the whole objection of punishing a finite evil with an infinite punishment, falls to the ground.

But this whole argument, founded on the finitude of the life and of the capacity of the sinner, was virtually given up by Dr.

C. in that he believed, that endless annihilation would be a just punishment of sin; though the duration of the punishment in this case, would infinitely exceed the time consumed in the commission of sin.

III. We come at length to consider the third argument of Dr. C. against the justice of endless punishment, which is, that endless punishment, on account of the infinite evil of sin, as committed against a God of infinite glory, implies, that future punishment is infinite or to the utmost in *degree*, as well as *duration*, and therefore that the punishment of all the damned is equal, which is both absurd and contrary to scripture. This I take to be the argument intended in the latter part of the last quotation made in the beginning of this chapter. On this it is observable, that though a sinner, on account of the infinite evil of sin as committed against a God of infinite glory, deserves and shall suffer an endless punishment; it by no means follows, that he deserves or will suffer that punishment which is infinite in degree too, or which is to the utmost degree in which any sinner is punished. All that follows from the infinite evil of sin is, that it deserves an infinite punishment; and an endless punishment is an infinite punishment, though it be not to the utmost in degree. Therefore, when Dr. C. says, "According to this way of arguing, all sinners must suffer to the utmost *in degree*, as well as duration, otherwise they will not suffer so much as they ought to do;" he merely asserts what he ought to have proved. Therefore he fails in his attempt to fasten on the doctrine of the infinite evil of sin, the absurdity that the punishment of all the damned will be equal. He might as well have argued, that because all saints shall receive an infinite or an endless reward; the reward of every one will be to the utmost in degree, and the reward of all will be equal.

Or if the meaning of this argument be, that the wicked will all be punished equally, not because they will suffer an *endless* punishment, but because they all sin against the same infinitely glorious object, and therefore their sins are all equal; the answer is, that the consequence by no means follows from the premises. Though it be true, that the wicked all sin against the same God, and on that account all deserve endless punishment; yet it no more follows thence, that they all deserve the same punishment in degree, than if a number of subjects should rebel against the same excellent prince, it would follow, that they are equally guilty, and all deserve an equal punishment.

The expression, *infinite evil of sin*, seems to be very offensive to some gentlemen. They seem to conceive that it means as great an evil or crime, as it is possible for a man to commit, the

moral turpitude of which can in no respect be increased. This idea of the infinite evil of sin is very different from that which is entertained by those who hold, that sin is an infinite evil. All they mean is, that sin is in such a sense an infinite evil, that it may be justly followed by an endless punishment. It no more follows hence, that the moral turpitude of any particular sin cannot be increased, than that the endless punishment of it cannot be increased; or than that the endless happiness of the saints in heaven cannot be increased. Indeed, neither the happiness of heaven, nor the misery of hell can be increased in *duration;* nor can the turpitude of sin be so increased, as to deserve a greater duration of punishment, than that which is endless. But as both the happiness of heaven and misery of hell, though endless, may be increased *in degree;* so may the turpitude of sin be so increased, as to deserve a greater degree of punishment.

When it is said, that if the evil of sin be infinite, it is as great as possible, and so all sins are equal; it seems to be implied, that all infinites are equal in all respects, than which nothing is more false. An infinite line, an infinite superficies, and an infinite solid, are all infinites, and they are all equal in one respect or dimension, that of *length.* But a line though truly infinite in length, is not in the dimension of breadth equal to an infinite superficies. Nor is a superficies, though truly infinite in the two dimensions of length and breadth, equal in depth to an infinite solid. To apply this, sin may be infinitely aggravated with respect to the object against whom it is committed, and in that respect it may be incapable of an increase of aggravation. Still it may not be infinite with respect to the degree of opposition, or virulence and malignity to the object, against whom it is committed.

By the infinite evil of sin therefore is meant, that sin truly deserves an endless punishment, as it is committed against an infinitely glorious object, against God himself, his authority, his law, his government; and as it enervates the laws, violates the peace and safety of his kingdom, introduces confusion and ruin, and would actually ruin entirely that kingdom, and the happiness of all who belong to it, were not measures taken by God to prevent its natural effect. In this respect it is infinitely evil, and in this respect, in which it is infinitely evil, the evil of it cannot be increased, because the object against which it is committed, cannot be greater, more important, or more excellent; and in this respect all sins are equal. But by the infinite evil of sin, is not meant an evil, which deserves an infinite degree of punishment; or an act of opposition to God and his kingdom, which is infi-

nitely virulent or malicious. In this respect the evil of sin may be increased, and in this respect all sins are by no means equal. The evil of any one sin is not so great, but that on the whole it may be increased, as the happiness of heaven is not so great, but that on the whole that may be increased.

Though the turpitude of sin is infinite with respect to the object opposed, yet it is not infinite as to the degree of opposition. If a subject rebel against the most excellent sovereign on earth, his crime is, in respect to the object, as great as he can commit in rebellion against a temporal prince; because by supposition he cannot be the subject of a better temporal prince, and therefore he cannot rebel against a better. Yet this rebellion may be more aggravated by greater degrees of opposition, abuse or insult to this same excellent prince.

What has been now said concerning the infinite evil of sin, has been in the way of explanation, and in answer to Dr. C's objections. The positive proof, that sin is an infinite evil, has been so largely and ably given by others, that the reader will allow me to refer him to them.*

Thus I have particularly attended to the arguments brought by Dr. C. to prove, that the endless punishment of the wicked would not be just. I shall now proceed to a more general consideration of the justice of endless punishment consisting in misery, and to some arguments in proof of it. The first argument to which I wish to direct the attention of the reader, is, that if endless punishment be the curse of the divine law, or the punishment threatened in the divine law, as the wages of sin, or as the proper punishment of sinners; undoubtedly it is just. It is impossible, that a God of perfect and infinite justice should threaten an unjust punishment. I am indeed aware, that it is not a conceded point, that endless misery is threatened in the divine law; I therefore purpose to attempt the proof of it. The curse of the divine law is either endless annihilation, or it is that misery which the wicked in fact suffer in hell, or it is some temporary misery of greater duration than that which is actually suffered in hell, or it is endless misery. These several hypotheses shall come under consideration in the following chapters.

But before I proceed, it may be proper to explain in what sense I use the word *law*, in this inquiry concerning the curse of the divine law. By the divine law, I mean not merely any positive, revealed law, as that given to Adam concerning the tree of

* President Edwards' sermon on the Eternity of Hell-torments, and his tract on Justification. Dr. Bellamy's Essay on the Gospel, sect. 5. Mr. Hopkins on the Future State, sect. 4.

knowledge of good and evil; but what Dr. C. calls "the moral law of God," and the law of works, as requiring perfect, actual, indefectable obedience." The Doctor allows, that "he" [Adam] "was, without all doubt, under strict indispensable obligations to obey every command of God, wherein it should be made known to him—and must have rendered himself obnoxious to the righteous resentments of his God and king, had he expressed any disregard to any of them."* This he speaks concerning the moral law, as may be seen by the context. And doubtless as Adam was obligated to obey "every command" of the moral law, and in case of disobedience, was "obnoxious to the righteous resentments of God," the same is true of every other man. The righteous resentment of God for disobedience to this law, is that very *curse of the law*, from which Christ hath redeemed his people, and which is the proper object of our present inquiry. By law taken in this sense, Dr. C. abundantly holds, that no man can be justified. "By *law*, the apostle sometimes means law in general, both the law written in men's hearts, and in the books of revelation—sometimes, the Mosaic law in special. But whether he understands by it natural or revealed law, or law including both; works done in conformity to it, when mentioned with reference to justification, he always sets aside as totally insufficient for the procurement of it."† Here the Doctor tells us in what sense he uses the word *law*, which is the same in which I use it, in the present inquiry; and as he asserts in this context, and in very many other passages, that no man, "Jew or Gentile," can be justified on the foot of law taken in the sense just explained; of course all men are condemned by the law, and the punishment to which the law condemns all, is the curse of the law; or the curse of the law is that punishment to which the moral law condemns every man who transgresses it.

CHAPTER V.

IS ANNIHILATION THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED?

Doctor C's first object was, to prove that all men will be finally happy. If he should fail in this, his last resort was *annihilation*. "If the foregoing scheme," says he, "should be found to have no

* 5 Dissertations, p. 55. † 12 Sermons, p. 4.

truth in it, and the wicked are sent to hell, as so many *incurables*, the second death ought to be considered, as that which will put an end to their existence, both in soul and body, so as that they shall be no more in the creation of God."* Having made the supposition, that the *next* is the *final* state of men, he says, "It is most peremptorily affirmed, that they" (the wicked) "shall *reap corruption, perish*, be *destroyed*, and *die a second time*; which fixes the sense of the word *everlasting*, when joined with the *misery* they shall be doomed to undergo, limiting its meaning to an age, or period of duration only."† Corruption, perdition, destruction, and the second death do not limit the meaning of the word everlasting, unless it be on the supposition, that those words themselves mean annihilation. Sometimes by those words Dr. C. seems to have meant a transition from one future state of existence to another; at other times he expressly declares that they mean *misery, torment*. Now if those words applied to the wicked mean a transition from the next state of existence to another, they by no means certainly limit their misery. This transition may be from one state of misery to another state of misery; as Dr. C. supposed that they might pass through several future states of misery, before they should arrive at happiness. Nay, from the words used in this sense, no inference can be drawn, that they will *ever* arrive at a state of happiness; because a transition from one state of misery to another state of misery, is as truly a transition, as a transition from a state of misery to a state of happiness. But if those words mean *misery* or *torment*, they certainly do not limit the future misery of the wicked; as will more fully appear presently.

I do not find any proof offered by Dr. C. that the wicked will be annihilated, unless he considered the very meaning of the words *destruction, death*, etc. as a proof. But this proof, if it be one, was absolutely given up by himself, as he held, that those words signify not annihilation, but *misery*; as in the following passages: "*Everlasting punishment, everlasting fire, everlasting destruction*; so the words are rendered in our English bibles; but we are *very obviously* led to understand by them MISERY, that must be suffered for a certain period."‡ "If men continue the servants of sin, the wages they shall receive before the gift through Christ is conferred on them, will be the *second death*; whereas if they become the servants of God, this gift through Christ will issue in their eternal life, without their passing through the *second death*."§ That by the second death he here meant not annihilation, but the misery of hell, is manifest, as it is to be

* Page 282. † p. 288. ‡ p. 224. § p. 90

followed with the gift of God through Christ, which is eternal life. "The going away into everlasting punishment, the being cast into the furnace of fire, where there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth, mean the same thing in the sacred dialect, with the *second death*."* "They may be saved without first going through the *torments of hell*, or as the scripture expresses it, without being hurt of the *second death*."† How strange then is it, that Dr. C. should urge the literal and original meaning of the words *death*, *destruction*, etc. as an argument for annihilation, when he himself supposed that they mean not annihilation, but obviously mean *misery!* and that he should suppose, that they limit the sense of the word *everlasting*, when it is joined to the misery of the damned! As well might he have said, that the word misery limits the sense of the word everlasting, when it is joined to the misery of the damned!

Perhaps some admirers of Dr. C. may attempt to reconcile this inconsistence, by saying, he held that the words *death*, *destruction*, etc. mean and prove annihilation, on the sole supposition, that the next state is final; that on any other supposition he held that they mean misery. But this would be a vain attempt. For if those words do or may mean misery, then they are no proof of annihilation, whether the next state be final or not. They are no more a proof of it, than the words *misery* and *torment*; because by his own concessions, they are at least capable of meaning misery or torment. Therefore though Dr. C's scheme of universal happiness should fail, we should from the application of the words *death*, *destruction*, etc. to the wicked, be under no necessity of supposing that they will be annihilated; everlasting destruction may mean everlasting misery.

The truth appears to be, that Dr. C. was led to adopt, as the last resort, the idea of the annihilation of the wicked, not by the obvious meaning and use of the words *death* and *destruction* in scripture; since he allows they obviously mean misery or torment; but by the preconception, that it is a certain truth, that the endless misery of any of mankind can never exist. To this preconceived opinion the scripture must some way or other be accommodated.

But let us proceed to some considerations to confirm the proposition, that annihilation is not the curse or punishment denounced against sin in the divine law.

The doctrine, that annihilation is the curse of the divine law, may be holden in two different senses, both which I conceive to be entirely opposite to the truth. It is the sentiment of many,

* Page 210. † p. 337.

that annihilation is the punishment of sin threatened in the law, and is actually inflicted on those who die impenitent. Again; it is the sentiment of some, that though annihilation will not be inflicted on any, yet it is the curse which was originally in the law denounced against sin; but that Christ hath absolutely redeemed all from it, and therefore none will suffer it.

I. It is the sentiment of many, and was the sentiment of Dr. C. provided his scheme of universal happiness do not hold, that annihilation is the punishment threatened in the law, and is actually inflicted on those who die impenitent. Concerning which it is to be remarked:

1. That on this hypothesis, all Dr. C's arguments both from scripture and reason, to prove the salvation of all men, entirely fall to the ground; and it is nothing inconsistent with either the justice or goodness of God, that a great part of mankind should be forever cast off, and suffer an endless punishment;. and not only a great part, but the greater part of the whole; as he acknowledges, that but few are saved immediately from this life.* Nor is it at all inconsistent with the design of Christ's undertaking, nor with his honor as the Savior of mankind, that the greater part of the whole race should not be saved.† All that argument therefore of Dr. C. with his declamation on the supposed absurdity, that Christ should undertake to defeat the devil and destroy his works, and yet really be so far baffled by him,‡ as still to fail of the salvation of the greater part of mankind, comes entirely to nothing. Nor must it be any more urged as an argument in this dispute, that God is willing that all men should be saved, and not willing that any should perish; or that Christ died for *all* men, etc. At least these propositions must be received with the same limitations and distinctions, with which the despised *orthodox, systematic* divines have received them. At the same time, all those texts which speak of the restitution of *all* things; of God's tender mercies over *all* his works; of the free gift coming upon *all* men to justification of life; of the creature delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God; of the destruction of the last enemy, death; of all things gathered together in Christ; of all things reconciled to God by Christ; of every creature saying, blessing and honor, etc. to him that sitteth on the throne and to the Lamb, etc.,

* Pages 8, and 322.

† The reader will take notice, that these observations are made on the sole ground of Dr. C's concession, that but few of mankind are to be saved immediately from this life, and do not imply that this is the real truth.

‡ See pp. 322, 323.

must be given up, or understood with the like limitations, as are put upon them, by the believers in endless misery. At the same time, all Dr. C's labored criticism on αἰών, αἰώνιος, and εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων, etc., must be acknowledged to be groundless; and all that he hath said against vindictive punishment, and in favor of mere discipline, is nothing to the purpose.

2. The scriptural representations of the punishment of the wicked are inconsistent with the idea that it consists in annihilation. According to the scriptures the wicked depart into everlasting *fire*. The smoke of their *torment* ascendeth up forever and ever. They shall *weep* and *wail* and *gnash their teeth*. They have no rest day nor night. The rich man in hell lifted up his eyes, being *in torment*. The damned shall *dwell* with everlasting burnings. When the master of the house shall have risen up and shut the door, they shall stand without, crying Lord, Lord, open to us: to whom the master shall say, I know you not, depart from me. After they themselves shall have been thrust out, they shall see Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and all the prophets in the kingdom of God. The rich man in hell saw Abraham afar off and Lazarus in his bosom. The saved shall go forth and look on the carcasses of transgressors, and *they* shall be an abhorring to all flesh. The beast and false prophet, and by parity of reason, all men dying in wickedness, shall be cast into a lake of *fire* and shall be tormented forever and ever; βασανισθήσονται in the plural number, determining, that they, the devil, the beast and the false prophet, shall be *tormented* forever and ever. The wicked shall be tormented with fire and brimstone, *in the presence* of the angels, and *in the presence* of the Lamb.

But how can those who are annihilated, be said to be cast into *fire*, into a lake of *fire* and *brimstone*, and to be *tormented* there; to have no rest; to *weep*, and *wail* and *gnash their teeth*; to *dwell* with everlasting *burnings*?—As well might these things be said of them before they were created. How can they be said *to plead* for admission into heaven, and to *reason* on the subject with the master of the celestial mansions? How can they *see* Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of God? How can they, seeing Abraham and Lazarus in that state, *enter into discourse* with the former? Rev. 14: 2, The smoke of their torments ascendeth up forever and ever, and they have *no rest day nor night*. But those who are annihilated, so far as they have anything, have continual rest day and night.

The *different degrees* of the punishment of the wicked in hell prove, that their punishment does not consist in annihilation. Matt. 5: 22, "Whosoever shall be angry with his brother without

a cause, shall be in danger of the judgment: whosoever shall say to his brother, raca, shall be in danger of the council: but whosoever shall say, thou fool, shall be in danger of hell-fire." The servant who knows not his master's will, and commits things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with *few* stripes. But the servant who knows his master's will, and commits things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with *many* stripes. It shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon and for Sodom, than for Chorazin, Bethsaida and Capernaum. The wicked shall receive according to their works, according to the fruit of their doings, according to that which they shall have done in the body. The Scribes and Pharisees were to receive the greater damnation, Matt. 23: 14. But if annihilation be the punishment of the wicked, there is no difference between the punishment of the least sinner and the greatest, who die impenitent; which is both absurd in itself and absolutely contradictory to the scriptural account.

If it should be pleaded in answer to this argument, that though all the wicked shall suffer annihilation; yet the punishment of all will not be the same; as the more aggravated sinners will be made the subjects of misery for a while, and then be annihilated; it may be replied, this supposes the curse of the law to consist in two things, temporary misery and annihilation. But where have we any hint in the scripture, that the curse of the law, as suffered in the future world, is such a heterogeneous compound as this? After all, it seems, that annihilation is but a small part of that curse; for that alone will be inflicted on the least sinner only, and on account of the least sin; and all that punishment which shall be inflicted on any person, above that which is due to the least sin, is to consist in torment. Why then might not the constitution have been, that the small additional part of the curse, which is to consist in annihilation, should likewise be inflicted in torment? This was very feasible. He who suffers the punishment of ninety-nine sins in torment, might by a small addition, in degree or duration to his torment, have suffered the punishment of an hundred sins. Add to the torment of every sinner dying impenitent, a degree or duration of misery, equal to that which is deserved by one sin, and that the least, and there would have been no need that any of them be annihilated, but having suffered the whole curse of the law, they would on the foot of strict justice be entitled to exemption from further punishment. And who having by misery satisfied for all the various and most aggravated sins of his life, would not choose to satisfy, in the same way, for the least of all his sins, rather than be struck out of existence, and to lose inconceivable and endless enjoyment? As therefore this sup-

posed constitution would be so apparently unnecessary and unwise, it cannot be expected to obtain credit, unless it be most clearly revealed in scripture, which is not pretended concerning it. Besides, this hypothesis places so small a part of the punishment of sinners in annihilation, that it cannot with any propriety be said, that the curse of the law consists in annihilation.

Should it be further objected, that though all the wicked be annihilated, yet their punishment may be of different degrees, as the losses they shall respectively suffer, will be different according to their various degrees of enjoyment or capacities for enjoyment; it may be answered, that the wicked are to be punished according to their several crimes. A man guilty of murder, will, if his other crimes be the same, be punished more than the thief, who steals the value of five shillings. Yet the enjoyment of the latter and his capacity for enjoyment, may be far greater than those of the former. By annihilation, therefore, he would suffer a far greater loss. Not all those who know their master's will, and yet commit things worthy of stripes, possess greater enjoyments or capacities for enjoyment, than those who know not their master's will.

3. The punishment of the fallen angels does not consist in annihilation; and the damned suffer the same kind of punishment with them. That the fallen angels are as yet annihilated, I presume, will be pretended by no believer in divine revelation, and that they are not to be annihilated, will be evident, if we consider, that in expectation of that full punishment, to which they are liable, they asked our Lord, whether he were come to *torment* them before the time. It was *torment* then, and not annihilation, which they expected. The present state of the fallen angels is a state of torment to a certain degree. They "believe and *tremble*." "They are reserved in chains under darkness, to the judgment of the great day," Jude 6. "They are cast down to hell," 2 Peter 2: 4. "The devil that deceived them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet *are*, and [they] shall be *tormented* day and night forever and ever," Rev. 20: 10. This text proves,

(1) That the devil is now, before the general judgment, in a state of torment, in the lake of fire and brimstone.* And it appears from the question, which he put to our Lord, to which reference was just now had, that he anxiously dreads the removal,

* The scene of which this text displays a part, is manifestly an exhibition of what is to take place before the general judgment. This is evident from the context.

which he is to suffer, from this his present state, to that in which he is to be after the general judgment, and to which he and his angels, are reserved in chains. But can we suppose that he would anxiously dread a deliverance by annihilation, out of the lake of torment by fire and brimstone? This would imply, that endless annihilation is more to be dreaded, than the endless torment which is the subject of this controversy. If so, Dr. C. ought to have dropped all objections to the justice of endless torments, since he allowed that the annihilation of the wicked would be just. And if that be just, then also endless continuance in the lake of fire and brimstone, which is the utmost punishment that any man holds concerning the wicked, and which is now supposed to be a less punishment than annihilation, is just. But if it be granted, that annihilation is not so great a punishment as endless continuance in the lake of fire and brimstone; it is as absurd to suppose, that the devils should dread or tremble at the prospect of annihilation, as that a man tormented with the gout or stone, should dread or tremble at an assurance, that he should ere long be delivered from his tortures, and in their stead should suffer the prick of a pin.

(2) That text directly proves, that the devil is to be *forever* tormented, and not annihilated. "And *they*," [the nominative to be supplied] "shall be tormented forever and ever." To say that this means, that the devil will be first tormented for ages of ages, and then be annihilated, leads into the absurdities before noticed.

But to this state of torment, in which the fallen angels are, and are to be, the wicked shall be sent. "Depart ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." "The devil that deceived them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, *where* the beast and the false prophet are." And as the devil is not to be annihilated, but punished with torments, so are the wicked.

4. Rom. 9: 22, affords an argument pertinent to the present subject. The words are, "What if God willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction." One end it seems of permitting sinners to proceed to such lengths in sin, is to make known the divine power in their destruction. But annihilation is no exertion of power, it is a mere suspension of power. The words imply further, that the longer God endures with the wicked, the greater will be the manifestation of both his *wrath* and *power* in their destruction. But as annihilation is the same to every person annihilated, it exhibits no greater mani-

festation of power towards one than towards another. And if it were a manifestation of power, there would be no greater manifestation of power in the annihilation of one, than of another. It is presumed, that no unbiassed judge will say, that the meaning is, that God endures *with much long-suffering* the vessels of wrath, to display his wrath and power *in their annihilation*; as the very same display of both would be made, without any long-suffering.

The only consideration urged from scripture in support of the sentiment, which I am opposing, is the application of the words, *death*, *destruction*, *perish*, *corruption*, etc. to the punishment of the wicked. This however came with a very ill grace from Dr. C. who understood, and was necessitated by his scheme of universal salvation to understand, those words to mean misery, as I have already shown. With regard to others, who make not this concession, let them, if they believe in revelation, (and with such only I dispute) reconcile the scriptures with themselves, and understand such like passages as those I have quoted above, representing the punishment of the damned to consist in misery, in any consistence with the threatening of *death*, *destruction*, etc. otherwise than by allowing that those words do mean positive misery. But to allow this, is to give up the scheme of annihilation; or at least this argument for it.

Besides, the scriptures themselves explain their own meaning in the use of the words *death*, *destruction*, etc. The second death is expressly said to consist in being cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, and in having a part in that lake; which is not a description of annihilation, nor can be reconciled with it. Rev. 20: 14. 21: 8. Matt. 24: 51, "And shall cut him asunder, and appoint him his portion with hypocrites, there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth." To divide a man into two parts, as determinately expresses annihilation, as the words *death*, *perdition*, etc. This however the scripture supposes to be consistent with a state of misery, expressed by wailing and gnashing of teeth. Gen. 5: 24, "Enoch walked with God, and *was not*, for God took him." In this instance, though the scripture says, Enoch *was not*, which more directly expresses annihilation than *death*, *destruction*, etc. yet it explains itself to mean not annihilation; indeed no man pretends that the righteous are annihilated. When the scriptures say, that men are *dead* in trespasses and sins, no man understands the expression to mean annihilation. The same may be said of the apostle's words in 1 Tim. 5: 6, "She that liveth in pleasure is *dead* while she liveth."

Therefore, since the scriptures do often use the word *death*,

etc. to signify something entirely different from a cessation of life or of existence; and since we cannot make the scriptures consistent with themselves, unless we understand the same words in the same latitude, when applied to the punishment of the wicked, we are necessitated to understand them in that latitude.

II. As I observed, there is another sense in which annihilation may be holden, and was holden by Dr. C., which is this; that though annihilation will not actually be inflicted on any man, yet it is the curse which was originally in the divine law denounced against sin; but that Christ hath absolutely redeemed all men from that curse, so that no man is now liable to it. "By Christ —they were *absolutely* and *unconditionally* put into salvable circumstances. Upon this foundation and this *only*, they are become *capable* of a future *immortality*."* "God might upon the first offence he" [Adam] "committed, have immediately *turned him out of existence, as he threatened he would*; the effect whereof would have been the total loss of all his principles bodily and mental, and of all his obligations."† "The same grace through Christ, which continued Adam *in being* after the lapse," etc.‡ "It will further enhance our idea of the greatness of God's grace" [through Christ] "in restoring that *possibility of existence* which had been *forfeited* by Adam's lapse," etc.§ "Death—would have put a period to all possibility of perception or exertion in any shape forever, had it not been for the interposition of grace through Christ."‖ "The term *death* when used with reference to the posterity of Adam, considered simply as such, cannot contain more in its meaning, than is included in it, when used with reference to Adam himself."¶

On this hypothesis, the punishment actually suffered by the damned is no part of the curse of the divine law, but merely a necessary and wholesome discipline designed for the good of the patients. But this scheme of annihilation can, no more than the former, be reconciled with the scripture, which says the wicked shall receive according to their works, shall pay the uttermost farthing, shall have judgment without mercy, wrath without mixture, etc. Nor indeed can it be reconciled with Dr. C's book, which says, The wicked will be punished according to their deserts, according to their sins, according to the nature and number of their crimes and evil deeds; and so that the law will have its course, and the threatened penalty will be executed on some of them at least. These expressions certainly declare, that they will suffer the full curse of the divine law. Otherwise the curse

* Page 132. † 5 Dissert. p. 198. ‡ Ibid. p. 243. § Ibid. p. 244. ‖ Ibid. p. 140. ¶ Ibid. p. 144.

of the law is a greater punishment than that which is according to the deserts of the wicked, and greater too than the full penalty threatened in the law; which is absurd and contradictory.

Here I might repeat the various arguments urged in the third chapter, to prove that the punishment of the damned is not a mere salutary discipline. But to avoid repetition, I beg leave to refer the reader to the considerations there suggested; and to proceed to other considerations, which may further show, that the future punishment of the wicked is not disciplinary, and that Christ hath not so redeemed all men from annihilation, that no man is now liable to it, if indeed that be the curse of the law.

1. If annihilation be the curse of the divine law, and the torments of hell be a mere salutary discipline; then there is no forgiveness in exempting a sinner from those torments. To forgive a sinner is to exempt or release him from the curse of the law; not to excuse him from a salutary means of grace. If a physician excuse his patient from an emetic or from the cold bath, no man will pretend, that he exercises forgiving grace.

2. I wish the reader to attend to Gal. 3: 10, "For as many as are of the works of the law, are under the curse: for it is written cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them." This proves that all men are not absolutely delivered from the curse of the law, whether that curse consist in annihilation, or misery temporary or endless; because some men are evidently supposed in this text, to be exposed to that curse. "As many as are of the works of the law," as doubtless many of the Jews of that day were, are expressly said to be "under the curse." They therefore were not *absolutely and unconditionally* delivered from that curse. But if the curse of the law be annihilation, and all men be unconditionally delivered by Christ from that curse, how can any man be under it?

If it should be said, that this text is nothing to the purpose, because the curse here mentioned is the curse, not of the moral, but of the ceremonial law; it may be answered, If this text, with the context say nothing of redemption from the curse of the *moral* law, how is it known, that Christ, according to the hypothesis now under consideration, hath delivered all men unconditionally from annihilation, which is supposed to be the curse of the moral law? It is the 13th verse, which assures us, that "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law." If this mean the ceremonial law, it seems, we have no assurance that Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the moral law, be that annihilation or what it may; but all that Christ hath done or suf-

fered notwithstanding, we are as liable to that curse, as we were before Christ undertook for us.

Besides, the curse of the law here mentioned, is the very curse mentioned in Deut. 27: 26, from which it is quoted. But that was not the curse of the ceremonial law, but of the moral, as every precept enumerated in that context, and to which this curse is annexed, is purely moral. Or if this curse be that to which any man is liable, who transgresses any precept, written in the *book* of the law; it will certainly include the curse of the moral law. For whether the *book* mentioned, be the book of Deuteronomy, or the whole Pentateuch, it contained the whole *moral* law. Therefore the curse here mentioned includes the curse of the *moral* law. And indeed with respect to us under the gospel, the text must mean the moral law only, because, as the ceremonial law is now repealed, it is no longer in existence, and therefore is no longer contained in the book of the law. Further, if the redemption of Christ was a redemption from the curse of the ceremonial law only; then it had no respect at all to us Gentiles, who never were under the ceremonial law; nor are we in any respect redeemed by Christ.

It is also to be observed, that this curse is opposed by the apostle, throughout the context, to the blessing of Abraham, as is manifest by inspection. But the blessing of Abraham did not consist in freedom from the ceremonial law. If it consisted in that, the Gentiles originally possessed the blessing of Abraham, since they were as perfectly free from the ceremonial law, as Abraham himself. Whereas the coming of the blessing of Abraham on the Gentiles is spoken of as a new and adventitious blessing, not as one originally possessed by them; see v. 8 and 14. The blessing of Abraham is not only not said to consist in bare freedom from the ceremonial law, but it is positively said to consist in justification by faith; v. 6—10. v. 14 and 29.

This passage throws light on the present question in another point of view. As the curse of the law is set in direct opposition to the blessing of Abraham, all who are not entitled to the blessing of Abraham, are of course under the curse, and are not unconditionally rescued from it by Jesus Christ. If it should be said, that the blessing of Abraham is common to all mankind, all being justified and exempted from the curse of the law, as he was; let it be observed, that Abraham obtained this blessing in consequence of faith only: and will it be pretended, that all men are now the subjects of the faith of Abraham? The apostle constantly speaks of this blessing as suspended on the condition of faith: v. 7, "They which are of faith, the same are the children

of Abraham." V. 8, "The scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith." V. 9, "They which be of faith, are blessed with faithful Abraham." V. 14, "That the blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Jesus Christ; that we might receive the promise of the spirit through faith." V. 29, "If ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise." Now if faith in Christ be necessary to the inheritance of the blessing of Abraham, and all who are not entitled to that blessing, be liable to the curse of the law; then it cannot be true, that all mankind are unconditionally freed by Christ from the curse of the law, whether that curse be annihilation or anything else.

3. On the hypothesis now under consideration, what are pardon and justification? They are everywhere in scripture represented to be conditional, suspended on the conditions of repentance and faith; and the same is abundantly holden by Dr. C. however inconsistently with his other tenet concerning the unconditional exemption of all men from the curse of the law. The language of scripture is, He that believeth shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned. He that believeth not is condemned already—the wrath of God abideth on him, etc. How can those be *condemned*, and how can the *wrath of God abide* on those, who are unconditionally delivered from the curse of the law? Pardon is generally supposed to consist in an acquittance from the curse of the law; but if all men, penitent and impenitent, believing and unbelieving, be acquitted and delivered from that curse, where is the propriety or truth of limiting pardon to the penitent and believing, and of declaring, that all the rest of men are condemned? To what are they condemned? Not to suffer the curse of the law; from this they are by supposition unconditionally delivered. By what are they condemned? Not by the law; this would imply, that they are under the curse of it.

If to this it be said, that the impenitent are condemned to suffer the curse of the law, in this sense only, that the law declares the punishment to which, according to strict justice, they are liable; but not that punishment to which they are now liable, since the redemption of Christ;—To this it may be answered, In this sense the penitent and believing are equally condemned, as the impenitent and unbelieving; nay, the whole body of the saints in heaven. Nor would there be any truth in saying, in this sense, "He that believeth on Christ, is not condemned."

4. That single text, Gal. 5: 2, seems to confute the hypothesis now in question. The words are, "If ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." Whereas according to the hypothesis

now in question, whether the Galatians were circumcised or not; whether they depended on their circumcision and other conformity to ceremonial institutions or not; still Christ did profit them; still by him was unconditionally secured to them the infinite profit of escape from the curse of the law, and of an endless life of happiness and glory in heaven.

This argument is equally conclusive, whether it be supposed that Christ has unconditionally rescued all men from annihilation or any other punishment. If salvation be secured to all men by Christ, then he does profit them, however they be circumcised or depend on their circumcision.

Beside the two lights in which the doctrine of annihilation hath been stated above, there is another in which some seem to hold that doctrine; it is this, That if after God shall have used all proper means for the repentance and salvation of the wicked, they shall still remain impenitent, he will annihilate them from despair of ever bringing them to good. Concerning this sentiment it may be inquired, what then is the curse of the law? Is it annihilation? If so, then I refer to the arguments already urged in this chapter against that idea, viz. that on that supposition endless punishment is just; that the scripture abundantly represents the punishment of the damned to consist in misery; that the punishment of all who suffer the curse of the law will be equal; that the curse of the law is the same punishment which the devils suffer, which is not annihilation; that the punishment which the finally impenitent shall suffer, will be such, that in it God will display both his wrath and power, and greater degrees of wrath and power in the case of those, with respect to whom he exercises the greatest long-suffering; which cannot be true, if the curse of the law be annihilation, as that is not an exertion of power at all, or a display of greater wrath and power in the case of one sinner than of another. If it be said, that the curse of the law is that discipline which the wicked shall suffer, before they be annihilated, I refer to what has been said, Chap. II. and III. If it be granted that the curse of the law is endless misery; either it must be allowed, that endless misery will be suffered by some men; or that though endless misery be the curse of the law, Christ hath redeemed and will save all men from it, by admitting some to endless happiness, and by inflicting on others endless annihilation. With respect to this last sentiment, I beg leave to refer to the considerations already hinted in this chapter; and that the curse of the law, or all that punishment which the wicked justly deserve, whether it consist in endless misery or anything else, will actually be inflicted, hath been attempted to be proved in Chap. III.

On the whole, it is left with the candid and judicious to determine, whether annihilation be the curse of the law; and whether that, as the curse of the law, can be reconciled with the scriptures, on either of the forementioned hypotheses: 1. That all who die in impenitence, will be annihilated, as the proper and adequate punishment of their sins in this life. 2. That annihilation was originally the curse of the law; but that Christ hath rescued all from it. If it shall be found that annihilation in any view of it, is not the curse of the law, it will remain, that that curse consists either in that punishment which sinners actually suffer in hell; or in some temporary misery greater than that which they actually suffer in hell; or in endless misery. In which of these it does consist, shall be farther inquired in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

THE JUSTICE OF ENDLESS PUNISHMENT CONSISTING IN MISERY.

According to what was proposed in the close of the last chapter, I am to inquire in the first place, Whether the curse of the law, or the punishment which in the divine law is threatened against transgressors, consist in that punishment which the wicked will actually suffer in hell. That this cannot be the curse of the law, on the supposition that all men are to be saved, appears at first blush from this consideration, that some men will actually suffer that punishment; and if that punishment be the curse of the law, some men will be damned and not saved. For salvation consists in deliverance from the curse of the law. "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law:" and all who are saved, are saved by the redemption of Christ, which is a redemption from the curse of the law. But since all men are not saved from that punishment which a great part actually suffer in hell; it is absurd to say, that that punishment is the curse of the law from which Christ hath redeemed and will save all men.

I mean not now to enter into any dispute concerning the nature of Christ's redemption. It is sufficient for my present purpose to take for granted no more, than is granted by all christians, that all who are saved, are saved some how by and through Christ. This is abundantly asserted in the various works of Dr. C. But neither has he pretended nor will any other advocate for uni-

versal salvation pretend, that the punishment which is actually to be suffered by a great portion of mankind in hell, is the curse of the law from which Christ is to save *all men*; because by the very terms a great part of mankind are actually to suffer it.

Beside; if that be the curse of the law, it is all the punishment to which the sinner is justly liable. He having suffered that, cannot consistently with justice be made to suffer any further punishment; and if after that he be exempted from further punishment, he is exempted from it, not in the way of grace, forgiveness or pardon; but entirely on the footing of justice and his own personal right. It is to be noticed, however, that the gospel is ignorant of any salvation of sinners, except in the way of grace and forgiveness.

If the punishment actually to be suffered in hell be the curse of the law, the damned in their deliverance out of hell, and exemption from further punishment, experience no salvation at all. They are delivered from nothing to which they are or ever were exposed. We might as well say, that the most innocent citizen in the state *is saved from the gallows*, when he hath neither committed any crime, nor is accused of any. The very idea of salvation is deliverance from the curse of the law. But if the pains of hell for ages of ages be the curse of the law, they who suffer those pains, are not saved; they are damned to the highest possible degree consistent with law and justice, which is all the damnation for which any man can argue.

On the whole, I conclude, that the idea, that the curse of the law consists in the punishment which the damned are actually to suffer in hell, is totally irreconcilable with the salvation of all men.

In the next place we are to inquire, whether the curse of the law consist in some temporary punishment, which is of greater duration than that which is supposed to belong to the punishment which the damned shall actually suffer. If the curse of the law be a temporary punishment of greater duration than that which is actually to be suffered by the damned; that more lasting temporary punishment is doubtless threatened in the law. Doubtless the curse of the law is the curse threatened in the law; the very terms imply this. Now, where in all the law, or in all the scripture, is threatened any punishment of greater duration, than that which in the sacred dialect is said to be *everlasting*, *forever*, *forever and ever*, etc.? But all these expressions are on all hands allowed to be applied in scripture to the punishment which the damned shall actually suffer. Unless therefore some longer punishment can be found threatened in the scripture, than that which

is said to be *forever and ever*, etc., it cannot be pretended, that the curse of the law is a temporary punishment of greater duration, than that which is actually to be suffered by the damned. But no punishment of greater duration, whether temporary or endless, than that which the damned are constantly declared to suffer, can be pointed out from any part of scripture. Therefore the curse of the law is not a temporary punishment of greater duration, than that which is to be suffered by the damned.

Now, if this train of reasoning be just, if the curse of the divine law be neither annihilation, nor (on the supposition of the salvation of all men) that misery which the damned are actually to suffer; nor a temporary misery of greater duration; the consequence is inevitable, that it is endless misery. No other hypothesis seems to be conceivable. The law certainly threatens some punishment. This punishment must consist either in annihilation, or in something else. If it consist in something else, that something must be either temporary or endless misery. If it be temporary misery, it must be either a misery of shorter duration than that which is to be suffered by the damned; or that very misery which is to be suffered by the damned; or a temporary misery of longer duration. That the curse of the law is a misery of shorter duration than that which is to be suffered by the damned, no man will pretend; as this would imply that the damned will suffer a greater punishment than was ever threatened, and than is just. And that the curse of the law is neither the very misery to be suffered by the damned, nor a temporary misery of longer duration, I have endeavored to prove, and submit the proof to the candid and judicious. If the proof shall be found to be good, we are driven to the conclusion, that the curse of the divine law is endless misery.

If then it be an established point, that endless misery is the curse of the divine law; the inference is immediate and necessary, that the endless misery of the sinner is a just punishment of his sin. It is impossible that a God of inviolable and infinite justice should threaten in his law an unjust punishment. A law containing such a threatening, is an unjust law; and an unjust law can never be enacted by a legislator of perfect justice. It is in vain to say, that God will never execute the law. To make an unjust law, is as really irreconcilable with justice, as to execute it. What should we think of a human prince who should enact a law, that whoever should walk across his neighbor's ground without his consent, should die on the gallows? I presume no man would pretend, that the forbearance of the prince to execute the law, would save his character from abhorrence and contempt.

Again; if all men shall be saved, they will be saved from something, from some punishment. That punishment must be either temporary or endless. If it be temporary, it must be either that punishment, which is to be endured by the damned, or a longer temporary punishment. But for reasons already given, it can be neither of these. Therefore it must be an endless punishment. But if all men be saved from an endless punishment, they were exposed to an endless punishment, and exposed to it by a divine constitution, and therefore an endless punishment is just; otherwise it could not have been appointed by God.

If all men shall be saved, they are redeemed by Christ, and they are redeemed by him from some punishment. That punishment is either temporary or endless. If it be temporary, it is either the punishment which the damned shall actually suffer, or a longer temporary punishment. But for reasons already given it is neither of these. Therefore, it is an endless punishment. Therefore they were exposed to an endless punishment, and that punishment is just. Surely no christian will pretend, that our Lord Jesus Christ came to redeem and save us from a punishment to which we never were exposed, and which the very justice of God would never permit him to inflict.

If endless punishment be unjust, it seems that Christ came to save mankind from an unjust punishment; a punishment, to which they were not justly liable, and which could not be inflicted on them consistently with justice. But what an idea does this give us of God? It implies, that he had made an unjust law, denouncing an unjust penalty; that having made this law, he was determined to execute it, till Christ came and prevented him.

If all men shall be saved, and shall be saved in the way of grace, favor, pardon or forgiveness; then it would be just, that they should not be saved. If their deliverance imply grace and forgiveness, then it would be just, that they should not be delivered, and that they should suffer that punishment from which they are delivered. But for reasons already given, if all men shall be saved, they shall be saved from an endless punishment. And to be saved from an endless punishment not on the footing of justice, but by mere grace and forgiveness, implies, that the infliction of endless punishment would be just. Surely to liberate a person from an unjust punishment, is no act of forgiveness.

All the ascriptions of praise, and all hymns of thanksgiving sung by the saved on account of their salvation, prove, that it would have been just, that they should not be saved. If God in delivering all men from endless punishment, be worthy of praise

and thanksgiving, it would have been just, if he had not delivered them from it. A mere act of justice, which the object of it may demand on the footing of his personal right, does not infer an obligation to any great praise or thanksgiving. No man conceives himself bound very much to praise another for giving him his due, or for not injuring him, or for not punishing him, when he deserves no punishment. But the only punishment, from which God delivers all men, on the supposition, that all are to be saved, is an endless punishment, as was shown before. Therefore, unless endless punishment be just, there is no foundation of praise and thanksgiving for the salvation of all men.

If endless punishment be unjust, then God was bound in justice to save all men from it, and could no more fail of granting this salvation, than he could deny himself; and he was bound in justice to do whatever was necessary to that salvation, and if that salvation could not be dispensed, but in consequence of the incarnation and death of Christ; then unless God had given his son to become incarnate and to die, he would have committed injustice. So that on this plan, the very gift of Christ, of the gospel, and of all the means of grace, are mere acts of justice, and not of grace or favor; and the revelation of the gospel or of the salvation of all men is no gracious communication, but a communication made entirely on the foundation of justice. For surely it is but an act of justice to tell mankind, if there be any need of telling them, that God will not injure them, and so preserve them from the tormenting fear of injury from the hand of God. To have kept them without the necessary means of knowing this, would have savored of cruelty. Yet according to the scriptures the forementioned divine acts and communications are no acts of justice, but of free and infinite grace.

If endless punishment be unjust, it is hard to imagine of what advantage the mediation and redemption of Christ is to all mankind. Dr. C. speaking of his own scheme of universal salvation, says, "Nor is there any scheme that so illustriously sets forth the powerful efficacy and extensive advantage of the mediation of Jesus Christ. If mankind universally are the objects of his concern, if he died for them all, if he ascended up to heaven for them all, if he is there acting on their behalf, and managing all things in the kingdom of grace, with a view to their salvation, and will not give up his ministry in this kingdom, till he has actually accomplished this great design, and instated the whole human kind in eternal glory, what more noble idea can we form of his undertaking for us?" etc.* What is "the powerful efficacy and exten-

* Page 14.

sive advantage of the mediation of Christ," with regard to those who suffer for ages of ages, as Dr. C. allows some men do? Is "the powerful efficacy and extensive advantage of Christ's mediation" "illustriously set forth" in delivering them from an unjust punishment? is the idea, that Christ came to save them from a punishment, which they do not deserve, "the most noble idea we can form of his undertaking?" Those who are saved by Christ, without suffering the torments of hell, do indeed derive some advantage from the mediation of Christ. But this is no greater advantage than is derived from Christ, according to the scheme of those, who believe in endless punishment. They hold, that all who are preserved from hell, are preserved from it by Christ. But what advantage do those men derive from Christ's mediation, who pass through the torments of hell, and are not saved, till they have been punished for ages of ages? To say that they are rescued by Christ from endless misery, is either to give up the present question, and to allow that endless misery is just, or it is to give up the moral rectitude of the divine character, and to hold, that God has threatened, and was about to inflict, an unjust punishment. To say, that the advantage which they derive from Christ, is that they are rescued from a temporary punishment, which is longer than forever and ever, is to say, that for which there is no foundation, as no such punishment is threatened or mentioned in scripture. So that in any case, if endless punishment be unjust, it is impossible to imagine, of what advantage the mediation and redemption of Christ is to all mankind.

The *hope* of the gospel implies that endless punishment is just. On the plan of universal salvation, all men are encouraged to *hope* that they shall be delivered from some punishment. Dr. C. applies Rom. 8: 20, to all men, and supposes that they are all subjected to vanity *in hope* of "deliverance from the bondage of corruption," and from "the final consequences" of it.* That is, all men have a ground to hope, that they shall be at last delivered from sin and its punishment. This punishment as we have seen, can be no other than an endless punishment. But that God encourages us to hope, that we may escape endless punishment, as clearly implies that endless punishment is just, as his encouraging us to hope, that he will never leave us nor forsake us in this life, implies that it would be just, if he should leave us. If endless punishment be not just, then God encourages us to hope that he will not injure us, will not rob us of our rights or tyrannize over us! The very idea of hope in this case, implies some

* Pages 106, 119.

danger that God will injure us; however that there is a possibility, and therefore a foundation to *hope*, that he will not injure us.

If endless punishment be unjust, we are as sure that it will never be inflicted, as we are of the justice of God, or as we are that the judge of all the earth will do right. But are we ever encouraged in scripture barely to *hope*, that the judge of all the earth will do right?—What if a subject who has always entirely conformed to the laws of his prince and is conscious of his own innocence, and also knows that his prince is fully informed of it, should say, that he *hopes* his prince will not order him to be executed as a felon? This would certainly imply great diffidence in the justice of his prince, and would be a high reflection on his character. Much more is it a reflection on the character of God, to express a bare *hope*, that under his government, no man will be punished with an unjust punishment.

The *promises* of the gospel appear to be a further proof of the justice of endless punishment. They are promises of deliverance from some punishment. If there be any promises of the salvation of all men, they are not promises that all shall wholly escape the punishment of hell. Dr. C. and others grant, that some men will suffer that punishment. Nor are they promises of escape from a longer temporary punishment, than that of hell, as there is no mention in all the scripture of such a punishment. Therefore they are promises of deliverance from endless punishment. Therefore endless punishment is just; otherwise the promises that God will save from it, would be absurd. The very idea, that God promises to save from endless punishment, implies that he has a right to inflict it. Do we ever find God promising in scripture, that he will not injure or tyrannize over his creatures? And are the "exceeding great and precious promises," which the apostle Peter mentions, merely assurances that we shall not be treated by God unjustly? There would be nothing at all precious in such promises; because they would give us no greater security from such injury, than we should have without them. If the bare justice of God do not secure us from injury at his hands, neither will his veracity. What should we think of a prince of good reputation for justice, if he should make proclamation, that he would not punish any of his subjects ten times as much as they deserve; and should call this an exceeding great and precious promise? Whatever we might before have thought of him and of his government, we should doubtless then think that his subjects were not perfectly secure in their rights.

Dr. C. allows that it is our duty to pray for the salvation of all men. This appears especially in his comment on 1 Tim. 2: 4,

etc.* But this proves the justice of endless punishment. If we are to pray for the salvation of all men, we are to pray that they may be delivered from the curse of the law; which, as we have seen already, is an endless punishment. Now, to pray that God would save men from endless punishment certainly implies an acknowledgment of just exposure to such punishment. Otherwise there would be as much propriety, that the angels around the throne of God, should pray, that they, perfectly guiltless as they are, may not be punished with the torments of hell. What if an entirely innocent and most dutiful subject of some earthly prince, and one who is by all acknowledged to be such, should prefer a petition to his prince, that he would not order the petitioner to the stake or the gallows?

Hitherto the justice of endless punishment has been considered on the ground of what I suppose to be the truth, that it is deserved by every sinner, on account of the sins which he hath committed in this life only. There is another ground, on which it may be supported, and which is equally inconsistent with that capital argument in favor of the salvation of all men, that endless punishment is not reconcilable with justice. Though it were not just, to inflict an endless punishment for the sins committed in this life only, which I by no means allow; yet there would be no injustice in suffering the sinner to go on in sin, and to punish him continually and without end as he sins.

That it was no injustice in God, to leave man at first to fall into sin, will doubtless be granted by all, because it is an evident fact. Now if God may without injury permit a creature to fall into sin to-day, and punish him for it, why may he not do the same to-morrow, and so on through every day or period of his existence. And if it be just to leave a sinner to endless sin, it is doubtless just to inflict on him endless punishment for that endless sin. Therefore the endless sin and punishment of a creature is no more inconsistent with divine justice, than the existence of sin and punishment in any instance, and for ever so short a duration. If it be not consistent with justice, that a sinner be left by God to endless impenitence; then the leading of a sinner to repentance is an act of mere justice, the payment of a debt, and not an act of grace, which is utterly irreconcilable with the scriptures. If it be not consistent with justice to leave a sinner to final impenitence, then God is bound in justice, some time or other to lead every sinner to repentance. But when is this time? How long may God, without injury, permit the sinner to continue impenitent? If he may for one day, why not for two? for four?

* Page 163.

for eight, etc. to eternity? Though the damned should, by their sufferings, fully satisfy for all their past sins; yet God would be no more obliged in justice, to lead them to repentance, or to preserve them from sin in future, than he was obliged to preserve them from sin at the time they first fell into it; and consequently he would not be obliged in justice to release them from punishment. I take it to be abundantly conceded by Dr. C. that the damned may justly be punished till they repent. Therefore if they never repent they may justly be punished without end.

Now, that any advocate for universal salvation may establish his favorite proposition, that endless punishment is not reconcilable with divine justice; he must show, that it is not consistent with divine justice, to leave a sinner to proceed without end in his own chosen course of sin, and to punish him daily for his daily sins. Till he shall have done this, it will be in vain for him to plead, that those who die in impenitence, will all finally be saved, because endless punishment is not reconcilable with the justice of God.

If after all, any man will insist, that endless punishment is not reconcilable with divine justice; he ought fairly to answer the preceding reasoning, and to show that the curse of the divine law from which Christ hath redeemed us, is either annihilation, or that misery which the damned are actually to suffer, or a longer temporary misery. He ought to show further, that Christ came to deliver all men from some other punishment than that which is endless; or that it is reconcilable with the character of God to refuse to release man from an unjust punishment, without the mediation of his son; that deliverance from unjust punishment is an act of free grace, pardon, or forgiveness; that deliverance from an unjust punishment is a proper ground of ecstatic and everlasting praise and thanksgiving to God; that the very mission of Christ, the institution of the gospel and of any means necessary to the deliverance of sinners from endless punishment, can be considered as gracious gifts and institutions, on some other supposition than that endless punishment is just. He ought also to show, of what advantage the mediation of Christ is to those who suffer in hell for ages of ages; and how the *hope* and the *promises* of the gospel, and how *praying* for the salvation of all men, can be reconciled with the idea, that endless punishment is unjust; and finally, that it is unjust that God should leave a sinner to perpetual sin, and to punish him perpetually for that sin.

It seems to be but an act of justice to Dr. C. to repeat here, what I noticed before, that he himself, whether consistently or

not, does acknowledge the justice of endless punishment; as in these words: "If the next state is a state of punishment, not intended for the cure of the patients themselves, but to *satisfy the justice of God*, and give warning to others, 'tis impossible all men should be finally saved."* This is a plain declaration, that a state, in which all salvation, and all possibility of salvation, are excluded, no more than satisfies justice, or is no more than just. The same is confessed in those many passages of this and the other works of Dr. C. wherein he has positively asserted, that man cannot be "justified on the foot of mere law," of "rigid law," etc.† He would not deny, that the law of God is just, perfectly just. If therefore we cannot be justified on the foot of the divine law, we must on that foot be finally condemned, and consequently must be finally condemned on the foot of justice. Therefore the final or endless condemnation of the wicked is entirely just. The just law of God himself condemns them; and if that law, "mere law," "rigid law," be executed, they must be condemned to an endless punishment, and cannot possibly be justified or saved. So long therefore as the divine law is just, so long, according to the concession of Dr. C. the endless condemnation and misery of the wicked are just. There seems to be no way to avoid this consequence, but by holding that the curse of the law, and the punishment which "satisfies justice," are annihilation, with respect to which sentiment, I must refer the reader back to Chap. V. But how inconsistent it is, to hold, that endless punishment, whether consisting in annihilation, or misery, is no more than satisfactory justice; and at the same time to hold, that the wicked in temporary pains in hell, suffer according to their deserts, and endure the whole penalty of the law, cannot escape the notice of any attentive reader. Or will it be said that the Doctor held a *commutation* of punishment? that endless annihilation is *commuted* for temporary misery? If so, then temporary misery is the curse of the divine law now inflicted in *commutation* for endless annihilation; and our author was entirely mistaken in a doctrine abundantly taught in all his writings, that "by law," "mere law," "rigid law," no man can be justified or saved.

As a corollary from the whole of the preceding reasoning concerning the justice of endless punishment, may I not safely assert, what was most grievous to Dr. C. and is so to all other advocates for universal salvation; that *sin is an infinite evil?* If every sinner do, on account of sin, deserve an endless punishment, *sin* is an infinite evil; that is all that is meant by the infinite evil of

* Page 11. † pp. 34, 36, 43, etc.

sin. Therefore if any man deny the infinite evil of sin, let him prove that it does not deserve an endless punishment, and let him answer the preceding reasoning to evince the justice of endless punishment.*

Perhaps some may object, that supposing sin do deserve an endless punishment, when it is not repented of; yet how can it deserve so great a punishment, when it is renounced in real repentance. But if repentance make atonement for sin; if it satisfy the broken law of God; if it repair the damage done to society by sin; or if it so far atone, that the good of the universe, comprehending the glory of the Deity, though it before required that sin should be punished with endless punishment, now requires that it be punished with a temporary punishment only; then as repentance is a satisfaction made by the sinner himself, and makes a part of his personal character, sin repented of, does indeed not deserve endless punishment, otherwise it does. And if repentance do make the satisfaction for sin which has been described, then the satisfaction or atonement of Christ is in vain, since repentance would have answered the purpose without the death and atonement of Christ. There was no need that sinners be redeemed by Christ, or as Dr. C. says, that he should be "the person *upon whose account*," and that "his obedience and death should be *the ground or reason* upon which happiness should be attainable by any of the race of Adam." They might have redeemed themselves, and by repentance have made a full satisfaction or atonement for their own sins, and thus might have been saved *on their own account, and on the ground or reason of their repentance.* But if on the other hand it be granted, that repentance does not make atonement or satisfaction for sin, and it be just to punish a sinner without end, provided he do not repent; it is just to inflict the same punishment, though he do repent.

This chapter shall be closed with a remark on a passage before quoted from Dr. C.† in which he says, that the difference in the *degree* of the pain of the damned will scarce be thought worthy to be brought into the account, when the circumstance of endless duration, is annexed to it. If the different degrees of the misery of the damned be unworthy of notice, and do not sufficiently distinguish them according to their several degrees of demerit; then

* In this chapter it was often more convenient for me, on several accounts, to use the expression *endless punishment*, than that of *endless misery*. Still the reader will perceive, that the latter is my meaning. The reasons had been given in the preceding chapter, why the endless punishment of the damned cannot be annihilation.

† Page 309.

the different degrees in the happiness of the saints in heaven do not sufficiently distinguish them, according to their characters. Therefore on the same principle we ought to deny the endless duration of the happiness of heaven, as well as of the misery of hell; and to say, that the difference in the degree of happiness of the blessed in heaven, will scarce be thought worthy to be brought into the account, when the circumstance of endless duration is annexed to it; that if the happiness of heaven be of endless duration, the happiness of all the inhabitants of that world will be equal, which is inconsistent with the declarations of scripture, that all shall be rewarded according to their works; and that therefore the doctrine of the endless happiness of heaven is not true. But the falsity of this conclusion is evident to all; and equally false is the conclusion from the like premises, that the punishment of the damned is not endless.

CHAPTER VII.

CONTAINING ANOTHER VIEW OF THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE JUSTICE OF ENDLESS PUNISHMENT.

In the preceding chapter, the question concerning the justice of endless punishment was considered in the light in which it is stated by Dr. C. There is another view of the same question, which is not indeed exhibited in his book, but is much talked of by some who in general embrace his scheme. It is this: Whatever the general good requires, is just; whatever is not subservient to the general good, is unjust. Now as the endless punishment of the wicked is, in their opinion, not subservient but hurtful to the general good, it is, they say, unjust. The question thus stated seems to be nothing more than a dispute concerning the proper meaning of the word justice. It reduces all justice to the third sense of justice as explained above,* and perfectly confounds justice with goodness as it respects the general system. Therefore the question which comes up to view, according to the sense of justice now proposed, is the very same with this: Whether the endless punishment of the wicked be consistent with the general good of the universe, or with divine goodness; which shall be considered at large in the next chapter, and needs not to be anticipated here. However, it may be proper to point out the

* Page 80, etc.

impropriety and absurd consequences of this use of the word *justice.*

It was doubtless subservient to the general good, that our Lord Jesus Christ was crucified by wicked hands, and therefore in the sense of justice now under consideration, his crucifixion was just; they who perpetrated it, performed an act of justice. Yet will any man pretend, that our blessed Lord was not injuriously treated by his wicked crucifiers? If they committed no injury to our Lord, wherein did the wickedness of this action consist? The truth is, the crucifixion of Christ was no injury to the universe, but an inestimable benefit; yet it was the highest injury that could be done him personally.

Every instance of murder is doubtless made by the overruling hand of divine providence, subservient to the general good and the divine glory. But does a man murdered suffer no injury? The same may be said of all the assaults, thefts, robberies, murders and other crimes that have ever been committed. Though they will in the consummation of all things be overruled to subserve the general good, so that the universe will finally suffer no injury by them; yet very great personal injury may be done by them to those who have been robbed, murdered, etc. These observations may show the necessity of distinguishing between the private rights of individuals, and the rights of the universe, and between private, personal injustice, and injustice to the universe. If all the crimes in the world, because they will be finally rendered by the divine hand subservient to the good of the universe, be in every sense entirely just, and the omission of them would be unjust; where shall any injustice be found? No injustice is, ever was, or can possibly be committed by any being in this, or any other world. No injustice can be committed, till something shall be done, which God shall not finally render subservient to his own glory and the good of the intellectual system.

According to the principle now under consideration, it would not be just, that any man should escape any calamity, which he does in fact suffer. It was not just that Paul should escape stoning at Lystra, or that John should not be banished to the isle of Patmos; and whenever it is subservient to the public good, that any criminal, a murderer for instance, should be pardoned, or should be suffered to pass with impunity; it is not just to punish him; he does not deserve punishment; Cain did not deserve death for the murder of his brother, nor did Joab, during the life of David, deserve death for the two murders of Abner and Amasa, both better men than himself. And if he did not deserve death, what did he deserve? It appears by the history and by

the event, that it was not subservient to the general good, that he should, during the life of David, be punished at all. Therefore on the present supposition, he deserved, during that period, no punishment at all for those murders. If so, then during the same period, at least, there was no sin, no moral evil in those murders; for sin or moral evil always deserves hatred and punishment. But afterwards in the reign of Solomon, the general good required Joab to be punished with death. At that time therefore he deserved death for those murders; and those same actions which for several years after they were perpetrated, had no moral evil in them, grew, by mere length of time, or change of the circumstances of the state, to be very great moral evils. See then to what consequences the principle now under consideration will lead us! It must therefore be renounced as false, or as a great perversion of language.

When I assert the justice of the endless punishment of the wicked, I mean that it is just in the same sense, in which it was just, that Cain or Joab should be executed as murderers; i. e. it is correspondent to their personal conduct and characters. If those with whom I am now disputing, allow that the endless punishment of the wicked is just in this sense, they allow all for which I at present contend. If they deny, that it is just in this sense, they give up their favorite principle, and dispute against the justice of endless punishment, not merely because it would be inconsistent with the general good, but for the same reasons as those for which Dr. C. disputed against it; and they place the question on the same footing, on which it has been so largely considered in the preceding chapters. The execution of Cain as a murderer would have been correspondent to his personal conduct, and therefore would have been just. If the endless punishment of the wicked be denied to be just in this sense, it is denied to be just, not merely because it would not be subservient to the good of the universe; but because it would not be a punishment correspondent to their personal conduct; instead of this, it would exceed the demerit of that conduct, and therefore would rob them of their personal rights.

CHAPTER VIII.

IN WHICH IT IS INQUIRED, WHETHER ENDLESS PUNISHMENT BE CONSISTENT WITH THE DIVINE GOODNESS.

That this inquiry is very important, every one must be sensible, who is in the least acquainted with this controversy. No topic is so much insisted on by the advocates for universal salvation; on no subject do they throw out such abundant and fervent declamation; no argument is urged with such an air of triumph. This is their strong hold, in which they feel themselves perfectly secure, and from which they imagine such effectual sallies may be made, as will drive out of the field all believers in endless punishment. Therefore this part of our subject requires particular and close attention.

I propose to begin with stating the question; then to proceed to some general observations concerning the divine goodness and some concessions made by Dr. C.; then to consider Dr. C's arguments from the divine goodness; and in the last place, to mention some considerations to show, that the endless punishment of some of mankind, is not inconsistent with the divine goodness.

I. It is a matter of great importance, that the question now to be considered be clearly stated. The question is, Whether it be consistent with the divine goodness, that any of mankind be doomed to endless punishment consisting in misery. This question is not now to be considered with any reference to the atonement of Christ; or the argument in favor of universal salvation, drawn from the divine goodness, does not depend at all on the atonement. To argue that goodness requires the salvation of all men now since Christ has made a sufficient atonement, implies that without the atonement no such argument could be urged. To argue from the atonement is not to argue from goodness merely, but from fact, from the gospel, from particular texts or from the general nature of the gospel. The argument is this: Christ hath made atonement for all, therefore all will be saved. But that this argument may carry conviction, it must first be made evident that the atonement did respect all mankind; also that it is the intention of God, to apply the virtue of that sufficient atonement, to the actual salvation of all. But these things can be proved from the declarations of scripture only. Now all Dr. C's arguments from scripture shall be considered in their place; but this is not their place.

The question, Whether it be consistent with divine goodness, that any of mankind be punished without end, means, either, whether it be consistent with the greatest possible exertion or display of goodness in the Deity; or whether it be consistent with goodness in general, so that God is in general a good Being, and not *cruel* and *malicious*, though he do inflict endless punishment on some men. It is not an article of my faith, that in all the works of creation and providence taken together, God displays indeed goodness in general, but not the greatest possible goodness. This distinction is made, to accommodate the discourse, if possible, to the meaning of Dr. C. As he denies that God has adopted the best possible plan of the universe, it seems, that he must have distinguished in his own mind, between the goodness actually exerted and displayed by the Deity in the present system, and the greatest possible display of goodness.

If the former of these be intended by Dr. C. and others, all their strong and frightful declamations on this subject, come to this only, that endless punishment is not the greatest possible display of the divine goodness; or that the system of the universe, if endless punishment make a part of it, is not the wisest and best possible. But this is no more than is holden by Dr. C. and it is presumed by other advocates in general for universal salvation. Dr. C. abundantly holds, as we shall see presently, that the present system of the universe, according to his own view of it, without endless punishment, is not the wisest and best possible. It is therefore perfect absurdity in him, to object, on this ground, to endless punishment.

But it is manifest, by the vehement and pathetic exclamations of Dr. C. on this subject, that he aimed at something more than this. It is manifest that he supposed and meant to represent, that if the doctrine of endless punishment be true, God is not a good, a benevolent being, but a cruel, malicious one. He says, that the doctrine of endless punishment "gives occasion for very unworthy reflections on the Deity;"* that in view of that doctrine "an horror of darkness remains, that is sadly distressing to many a considerate heart."† He quotes with approbation those words from Mr. Whiston: "If the common doctrine were certainly true, the *justice* of God must inevitably be given up, and much more his *mercy*. This doctrine supposes him," [God] "to delight in *cruelty*."‡ So that the question agitated by Dr. C. is really, Whether, if God inflict endless punishment on any sinner, it be not an act of *cruelty* and *injustice*, as all cruelty is injustice. But this is the very question, which has been so largely

* Page 8. † p. 14. ‡ p. 356.

considered in several preceding chapters, and needs not to be reconsidered here. So that Dr. C's arguments from goodness are mere arguments from justice; and if endless punishment be reconcilable with divine justice, it is equally reconcilable with divine goodness, in the sense in which he argues from divine goodness.

If after all it be insisted on, that Dr. C. meant to consider the question, or that the question ought to be considered, in the first sense stated above, viz. Whether endless punishment be consistent with the most perfect display of goodness? although if the negative of this question were granted, Dr. C. could not consistently thence draw an argument in favor of universal salvation; yet it may be proper to consider this state of the question, and perhaps sufficient observations upon it will occur in the sequel of this chapter.

II. I am to make some general observations concerning the divine goodness, and take notice of some concessions made by Dr. C.

The goodness of God is that glorious attribute, by which he is disposed to communicate happiness to his creatures. This divine attribute is distinguished from the divine justice in this manner; the divine justice promotes the happiness of the universal system, implying the divine glory, by treating a person strictly according to his own character; the divine goodness promotes the same important object, by treating a person more favorably than is according to his own character or conduct. So that both justice and goodness may and always do, as far as they are exercised, subserve the happiness of the universal system, including the glory of the Deity, or the glory of the Deity, including the happiness of the universal system. As the glory of God, and the greatest happiness of the system of the universe, and even of the created system, mutually imply each other; whenever I mention either of them, I wish to be understood to include in my meaning the other also. The declarative or the exhibited glory of God, is a most perfect and most happy created system; and a most perfect and most happy created system is the exhibited glory of God; or it is the exhibition, the manifestation of that glory; as a picture is an exhibition of the man.

That infinite goodness is in God, and is essential to his nature, is granted on all hands; *God is love.* This attribute seeks the happiness of creatures, the happiness of the created system in general, and of every individual creature in particular, so far as the happiness of that individual is not inconsistent with the happiness of the system, or with happiness *on the whole.* But if in

any case, the happiness of an individual be inconsistent with the happiness of the system, or with the happiness of other individuals, so that by bestowing happiness on the first supposed individual, the quantity of happiness on the whole shall be diminished; in this case, goodness, the divine goodness, which is perfect and infinite, will not consent to bestow happiness on that individual. Indeed to bestow happiness in such a case would be no instance of goodness, but of the want of goodness. It would argue a disposition not to increase happiness, but to diminish and destroy it.

Therefore that Dr. C. might prove, that the endless punishment of any sinner is inconsistent with the goodness of God, he should have shown, that the sum total of happiness enjoyed in the intellectual system will be greater if all be saved, than it will be if any suffer an endless punishment. To show that God by his infinite goodness will be excited to seek and to secure the greatest happiness of *the system*, determines nothing. This is no more than is granted by the believers in endless punishment. It is impertinent therefore to spend time on this. But the great question is, Does the greatest happiness of the system require the final happiness of every sinner? If Dr. C. have not shown that it does, his argument from divine goodness is entirely inconclusive.

Instead of showing, that the divine goodness or the greatest happiness of the general system, requires the final happiness of every individual; Dr. C. has abundantly shown the contrary. In his book on the *Benevolence of the Deity*, he expresses himself thus: "It would be injurious to the Deity to complain of him for want of goodness merely because the manifestation of it to our particular system, considered *singly* and *apart from the rest*, is not so great as we may imagine it could be. No more happiness is required for our system, even from *infinitely perfect benevolence*, than is proper for a part of some *great whole*. We ought not to consider the displays of divine benevolence, as they affect individual beings only, but as they relate to the particular *system* of which they are parts. The divine benevolence is to be estimated from its amount to *this whole*, and not its *constituent parts* separately considered. The only fair way of judging of the divine benevolence with respect to our world, is to consider it not as displayed to *separate individuals*, but to the *whole system*, and to these as its constituent parts."* "No more good is to be expected from the Deity with respect to any *species* of beings, or any *individuals* in these species, than is reasonably consistent

* Page 56, etc.

with the good of *the whole* of which they are parts."* "It is true, that destruction of life will follow, if some animals are food to others. But it may be true also, that there would not have been so much life, and consequently happiness in the creation, had it not been for this expedient."† "As we are only one of the numerous orders which constitute a general system, this quite alters the case, making those capacities only an evidence of wise and reasonable benevolence, which are fitted for a particular part sustaining such a place in the constitution of *this whole*."‡ "I proceed to show wherein the unhappiness that is connected in nature, or by positive infliction of the Deity, with the misuse of moral powers, is subservient to the *general good of the rational creation*, which is hereby *more effectually promoted*, than it would have been, if free agents might have acted wrong with impunity."§ "For if they" [future punishments] "are considered —under the notion of a needful moral mean intended to promote, *upon the whole, more good in the intelligent creation*, than might otherwise be reasonably expected; they are so far from being the effect of ill will, that they really spring from *benevolence* and *are a proof of it*."‖

By these quotations it appears with sufficient clearness, that it was Dr. C's opinion, that there are defects, miseries and punishments of individual creatures, which are consistent with the good of the system, and are therefore consistent with the divine goodness; and that the divine goodness does not seek the happiness of any individual any further, than the happiness of that individual is subservient to the happiness of the system, or to the increase of happiness on the whole. Therefore Dr. C. supposes the miseries of men in this life, and even the punishments of the future world, are not inconsistent with the divine goodness, because they are subservient to the good of the system. Now the advocates for endless punishment believe the same concerning the endless punishment of those who die impenitent; and for him to suppose without proof, that this punishment is not consistent with the greatest good and happiness of the system, is but begging the question.

What is the absurdity of supposing, that the endless punishment of some sinners may be subservient to the good of the system? Why may not the general good be promoted, as well by endless misery, as by the miseries of this life? And why may we not be allowed to account for endless misery in the same way, that Dr. C. accounts for the miseries of this life, or for the temporary misery which he allows to be in hell? It is now supposed

* Page 58. † p. 84. ‡ p. 107. § p. 237. ‖ p. 242.

to have been proved, that endless punishment is just. If then the general good may be promoted by the tortures of the stone endured for a year, by a man who deserves them, why may not the general good be promoted by the same tortures, continued without end, provided the man deserves such a continuance of them? If we were to judge *a priori*, we should probably decide against misery in either case. But fact shows that temporary miseries are consistent with the goodness of God, or with the general good; and why may not endless misery be so too, provided it be just?

If it be asserted, that the endless punishment of a sinner who deserves such punishment, is so great an evil, that it cannot be compensated by any good, which can arise from it to the system; I wish to have a reason given for this assertion. It is granted that the good accruing to the system overbalances the temporary miseries of sinners both here and hereafter. And is the endless misery of an individual, though justly deserved, so great an evil, that it cannot be overbalanced by any endless good, which may thence accrue to the system? Endless misery is doubtless an infinite evil; so is the endless good thence arising, an infinite good.

Nor does it appear, but that all the good ends, which are answered by the temporary punishment of the damned, may be continued to be answered by their continual and endless punishment, if it be just. God may continue to display his justice, his holiness, his hatred of sin, his love of righteousness, and of the general good, by opposing and punishing those who are obstinately set in the practice of sin, and in the opposition of righteousness, and of the general good. In the same way he may establish his authority, manifest the evil of sin, restrain others from it, and by a contrast of the circumstances of the saved and damned, increase the gratitude and happiness of the former, as well as increase their happiness by the view of the divine holiness, and regard to the general good, manifested in the punishment of the obstinate enemies of holiness and of the general good; and by a view of divine grace in their own salvation, and the salvation of all who shall be saved. These are the principal public ends to be answered by temporary vindictive punishment, on supposition that future punishment is temporary; and if any other good end to the universe shall be answered by it, in the opinion of those who believe it, let it be mentioned that by a thorough inquiry we may see whether the same good end may not be answered by continual and endless punishment.

Another question concerning the divine goodness proper to be

considered here, is, whether it *secure* and *make certain* the final happiness of every man; or whether it be satisfied with this, that opportunity and means are afforded to every man to obtain happiness, if he will seize the opportunity and use the means. Concerning this also, Dr. C. hath sufficiently expressed his sentiment, as in the following passages: "We must not judge of the benevolence of the Deity merely from the *actual good* we see *produced*, but should likewise take into consideration the *tendency* of those general laws conformably to which it is produced. Because the *tendency* of those laws may be obstructed, and less good *actually take place*, than they were naturally *fitted* to produce. In which case, it is no argument of want of goodness in the Deity, that no more good was communicated; though it may be of folly in the creatures."* "It is impossible we should judge fairly of the Creator's benevolence, from a view only of our world, under its present actual enjoyments. But if we would form right sentiments of it, we must consider the *tendency* of the divine scheme of operation, and what the state of the world would have been, if the rational and moral beings in it had acted up to the laws of their nature and given them full scope for the production of good."† "All the good suitable for such a system as this, is apparently the *tendency* of nature and the divine administration, and it actually prevails so far as this tendency is not perverted by creatures themselves,—for which he" [God] "is not answerable."‡ The Doctor expresses himself to the same purport in many other passages of the same book.

It is manifest, that in these passages, Dr. C. esteems it a sufficient vindication of the divine goodness, that God hath established good laws, hath benevolently constituted the nature of things and hath given opportunity to men to secure to themselves the enjoyment of good; and that the divine goodness does not imply that every individual creature shall actually enjoy complete good or happiness. If these things be true, then no argument from the divine goodness can prove, that every individual of mankind will be finally happy; the divine goodness though complete and infinite does not secure *actual happiness* to every individual; it secures the opportunity and means only of happiness; or it secures such a divine scheme as has a *tendency* to the happiness of all, and would actually prevail to the communication of happiness to all, if it were not perverted by creatures themselves, for which perversion God is not answerable.

Now that such a divine scheme as this is actually adopted, is

* Benevolence of the Deity, p. 60. † Ib. p. 69. ‡ Ib. p. 73.

undoubted truth, and may be granted by every advocate for endless punishment. Therefore on the same ground on which Dr. C. vindicates the goodness of God, from the objections which arise from present calamities, and from future temporary punishment, may the same goodness be vindicated from the objections which are raised from endless punishment. In the former case it is pleaded, that God is infinitely good, though creatures suffer calamities here and deserved punishment hereafter, because he has given them *opportunity* to obtain happiness, and has adopted a scheme of operation which has a *tendency* to good. Just so God is infinitely good, though some men suffer deserved endless punishment; because he has given mankind opportunity to obtain eternal life and salvation, and has adopted a scheme of providence and of grace, which will actually prevail to the final salvation of all, if it be not neglected or perverted by men themselves; for which neglect or perversion God is not answerable.

It is also conceded by Dr. C.* that "none of the sons of Adam, by the mere exercise of their natural powers, ever yet attained to a perfect knowledge of this rule" [the rule of man's duty, and of God's conduct in rewarding and punishing.] "Most certainly they are unable, after all their reasonings, to say, what punishment as to *kind*, or *degree*, or *duration* would be their due, in case of sin." This is plainly to give up all arguments against endless punishment, drawn from the goodness of God, or from any other divine perfection. For if "most certainly after all our reasonings" from the divine perfections as well as from other topics of reason, we be "unable to say what punishment as to *kind*, or *degree*, or *duration*, is due in case of sin;" then "*most certainly* we are unable to say," but that an endless punishment, and that consisting in misery too, is due, and is necessary to secure and promote the good of the system. Therefore to have been consistent, Dr. C. ought never to have pretended, that endless misery is not reconcilable with divine goodness.

Dr. C. further grants, that it may be necessary, that the penalty of the divine law be inflicted, and that the infliction of it may be honorable to God, and useful to creatures; yea, he grants, that the full penalty of the law will actually be inflicted on some men. "Perhaps the reasons of government might make it fit and proper, and therefore morally necessary, that the threatening which God has denounced, should be executed. Would the wisdom of the supreme legislator have guarded his prohibition with a penalty it was not *reasonable* and just he should inflict? And might not the infliction of it, when incurred, be of service,

* 12 Sermons, p. 40.

signal service, to the honor of the divine authority, and to secure the obedience of the creature in all after times?"* If it be "fit and proper, and morally necessary;" if it be "of signal service to the honor of the divine authority, and to secure the obedience of creatures," to inflict the penalty of the divine law; doubtless the infliction of it is not only consistent with the general good, but subservient to it, and therefore perfectly consistent with the divine goodness. It is not "reasonable," that God should inflict the penalty of his law, unless the infliction be consistent with the general good, and so with the divine goodness. Therefore the question proposed in the last quotation may with equal truth and force be proposed a little differently, thus: Would the wisdom of the supreme legislator have guarded his prohibition with a penalty, which it was not consistent with the general good of the universe, or with the goodness of his own nature, that he should in any one instance inflict? Thus it appears to be fully granted, that divine goodness does not oppose the infliction of the penalty of the divine law, but requires it. Nay, as hath been hinted above, Dr. C. expressly asserts, that the penalty of the law will be inflicted on some men; that on those who pass through the torments of hell, the divine law will take its course, and the threatened penalty will be fully executed.† Now what the penalty of the divine law is, we have before endeavored to show. Therefore if our reasoning on that head be just, it follows from that reasoning and from Dr. C's concessions in the preceding quotations taken together, that endless punishment is not only reconcilable with divine goodness, but is absolutely required by it. Would divine goodness both denounce and actually inflict a penalty, which that goodness did not require, and which was not even reconcilable with it?

Dr. C. informs us, that "Christ was sent into the world, and the great design he was sent upon was to *make way* for the WISE, *just* and *holy* exercise of mercy, towards the sinful sons of men."‡ It seems then, that if it had not been for the mediation of Christ, there would have been *no way* for the exercise of mercy towards men, in a consistency not with justice and holiness only, but with wisdom; and if not with wisdom, not with the general good; for wisdom always dictates that which is for the general good. And if it would not have been consistent with the general good, to exercise mercy towards sinners, without the mediation of Christ, neither would it have been consistent with the divine goodness, for that and that only which is subservient to the general good, is an object to the divine goodness. In this

* 5 Dissertations, p. 231. † Page 336. ‡ 5 Dissertations, p. 247.

sentiment Dr. C. was very full, as we have already seen. Therefore without the mediation of Christ, divine goodness required, that all mankind be left in a state of despair under the curse of the law. And if it have been shown, that this curse is endless misery, it follows, that divine goodness, required that all mankind, if it had not been for the mediation of Christ, should suffer endless misery.

III. As was proposed, we now proceed to consider Dr. C's arguments from the goodness of God, to prove the salvation of all men. If some of the following quotations be found to be rather positive assertions than arguments I hope the fault will not be imputed to me, provided I quote those passages which contain as strong arguments from this topic, as any in his book.

"It is high time, that some generally received doctrines should be renounced, and others embraced in their room that are more honorable to the Father of mercies, and comfortable to the creatures whom his hands have formed. I doubt not it has been a perplexing difficulty to most persons (I am sure it has been such to me) how to reconcile the doctrine which dooms so great a number of the human race to eternal flames, with the essential, absolutely perfect goodness of the Deity. And perhaps they contain ideas utterly irreconcilable with each other. To be sure, their consistency has never yet been so clearly pointed out, but that a horror of darkness still remains that is sadly distressing to many a considerate tender heart."* In this passage it is implied, that the doctrine of endless misery is not honorable to the Father of mercies. But what is the proof of this? If there be any, it consists in these several particulars: That this doctrine is uncomfortable to the creatures of God; that it has been a perplexing difficulty to some, Dr. C. thinks to most, and "is *sure* it has been such to *him*," to reconcile that doctrine with the goodness of God; that *perhaps* they are irreconcilable; that to be sure (in Dr. C's opinion) they never have been so reconciled, but that a horror of darkness remains.

If these be arguments, they require an answer. The *first* is, that the doctrine of endless misery is uncomfortable, or rather not so comfortable to God's creatures, as some other doctrines; therefore it is not honorable to the Father of mercies. But would Dr. C. dare to say, that every doctrine is dishonorable to God, which is not equally comfortable to sinful creatures, as some other doctrines? and that no doctrine is consistent with the divine goodness, but those which are in the highest degree comfortable to such creatures? What then will follow concerning his

* Page 14.

doctrine of "torment for ages of ages?" Or would any man choose that the comparison be dropped and that the argument be expressed thus: The doctrine of endless misery is uncomfortable to creatures, therefore it is dishonorable to God? This still confutes the doctrine of torment for ages of ages. Beside, if the meaning be, that it is uncomfortable to all creatures, it is a mistake. To those who believe it to be a just and glorious expression of the divine hatred of sin, and a necessary mean of vindicating the justice of God, of supporting the dignity of his government and of promoting the general good; it is so far from being uncomfortable, that it is necessary to their comfort; and they rejoice in it for the same reasons, that they rejoice in the advancement of the general good. They rejoice in it on the same principles of benevolence and piety, that Dr. C. rejoiced in the prospect, that the divine law would have its course, and the full threatened penalty be executed on some of mankind.

The next particular of the above quotation is, that the doctrine of endless misery has been perplexing to some, or to most men, and to be sure to Dr. C. Doubtless this is true of many other doctrines, which however have been believed both by Dr. C. and by other christians; such as the perfect rectitude, goodness and impartiality of all the dispensations of divine providence; the consistence between the existence of sin in the world and the infinite wisdom, power, holiness and goodness of God; the final subserviency of all events to the divine glory and the general good of the system, etc. Therefore, if the argument prove anything, it proves too much.

The third particular is: Perhaps endless misery is not reconcilable with the goodness of the Deity. Answer: perhaps it is reconcilable with that divine attribute.

The last particular is: To be sure (in Dr. C's opinion) they never have been so reconciled, but that a horror of darkness remains with respect to the subject. Answer: in the opinion of many other men, they have often been so reconciled, that there was no reason, why a horror of darkness in view of the subject should remain in the mind of any man. They experience no more horror of darkness in the idea, that God inflicts that endless punishment which is perfectly just, is absolutely necessary to satisfy divine justice, and vindicate the despised authority, government and grace of God, and is subservient to the glory of God and the general good; than in the idea of most other doctrines of the gospel.

But let us proceed to another passage of Dr. C. "Multitudes are taken off before they have had opportunity to make

themselves hardened abandoned sinners; and so far as we are able to judge, had they been continued in life, they might have been formed to a virtuous temper of mind, by a suitable mixture of correction, instruction, and the like. And can it be supposed with respect to such, that an infinitely benevolent God, without any other trial, in order to effect their reformation, will consign them over to endless and irreversible torment? Would this be to conduct himself like a father on earth? Let the heart of a father speak on this occasion. Nay, it does not appear, that any sinners are so incorrigible in wickedness, as to be beyond recovery by still further methods within the reach of infinite power. And if the infinitely wise God can, in any wise methods, recover them, even in any other state of trial, may we not argue from his infinite benevolence, that he will?"*

The first branch of this argument is, that some die before they become incorrigible; therefore the fatherly goodness of God will give them another trial. But did Dr. C. know when sinners become incorrigible, and when not? Does any man know how long a person must live in sin, to arrive at that state? If not, what right has any man to say, that any sinners die, before God as perfectly knows them to be incorrigible, as if they had lived in sin ever so long? Beside, were sinners to live in sin ever so long, still this objection might be made; and Dr. C. has in fact made it, not only with regard to those who die prematurely, but with regard to all sinners. He says, "It does not appear, that *any* sinners are so incorrigible, as to be beyond recovery by still further methods." That is, if it do not appear, that sinners are in this world beyond recovery by still further methods to be used for their recovery, we are to believe from God's infinite benevolence, that those further methods will be used for their recovery. But should a sinner go through the torments of hell, and of ten other succeeding states of trial, it is to be presumed, that Dr. C. would not say, but that possibly he might be recovered by some further methods within the power of God to use, if indeed God should see cause to use those further methods. The ground of this argument is, that goodness requires, that God use means for the recovery of sinners, as long as it is in the power of God to use any further means to that end. But this as much needs to be proved as any one proposition advanced by Dr. C.

The next branch of this argument is, that it would not be acting like a father on earth, if God were to consign sinners to endless torment. And is it acting like a father on earth, to doom men to the second death, the lake which burneth with fire and

* Page 321.

brimstone, and there torment them for ages of ages? Let the heart of a father on earth speak and declare, whether it would be agreeable to him, to inflict on his children these extreme and long continued tortures? or even many of the temporal calamities which God inflicts on mankind; such as poverty, shame, a feeble and sickly habit, extreme pain and distress, loss of reason, and death attended with the most afflicting circumstances? Would a father on earth choose to plunge his children in the ocean, and leave them to the mercy of the waves? Would he set his house on fire, while they were buried in soft slumbers, and consume them in the flames? Such declamatory applications to the passions are a two-edged sword which will wound Dr. C's scheme, as certainly as that of his opponents. But this controversy is not to be settled by an application to the passions.

The last part of the above quotation destroys the whole. It is this: It does not appear that any sinners are so incorrigible, as to be beyond recovery by still further methods within the reach of infinite wisdom. If God have revealed that no sinners shall be recovered after this life, it is doubtless a wise constitution that this life is the only state of probation. Therefore it is not within the reach of infinite wisdom, to use any further means after this life for the recovery of those who are incorrigible here. So that this whole paragraph is a mere begging of the question; it takes for granted, that this life is not the only state of probation, or that the endless punishment of all who die impenitent is not a doctrine of divine revelation.

Dr. C. elsewhere* argues universal salvation from this, that God speaks of himself, "as the universal Father of men;" and says, "fathers on earth chastise their children for their *profit*, but do not punish them, having no view to their *advantage*." But does a father on earth never punish an incorrigible child, when it is necessary for the good of the rest of the family? If he did not, but suffered him to ruin his whole family, or even one of his other children; would he act the part, or deserve the name, of a father? "And shall we say that of our Father in heaven (who instead of being evil, as all earthly fathers are more or less, is infinitely good) which we cannot suppose of any father on earth, till we have first divested him of the heart of a father?" The truth is, this and all arguments of the kind take for granted what is by no means granted, that the salvation of all men is subservient to the good, not of the persons saved only, but of the universal system.

In various passages Dr. C. has much to say of our *natural no-*

* Pages 326, 327.

tions of God's goodness; particularly, that the natural notions we entertain of the "goodness and mercy of God, rise up in opposition to the doctrine of never ending torments."* I grant, that our natural notions of those divine attributes rise up in opposition to endless torments, on the supposition that they are unjust and inconsistent with the general good. But on the supposition that they are both just and subservient to the general good, our natural notions rise up in favor of them. So that this and such like arguments all depend on taking for granted what is no more granted than the main question.

Nearly allied to the argument from the divine goodness, is that by which Dr. C. attempts to prove universal salvation from the end of God in creation. "As the first cause of all things is infinitely benevolent, 'tis not easy to conceive that he should bring mankind into existence unless he intended to make them finally happy."† "If the only good God knew—that some free agents would make themselves unhappy, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of his wisdom to prevent it, why did he create them? To give them existence knowing at the same time that they would render themselves finally miserable—is scarce reconcilable with supremely and absolutely perfect benevolence."‡ This argument, as the preceding, entirely depends on the supposition that the final happiness of every individual is necessary to the greatest happiness of the system. Doubtless God is absolutely and perfectly benevolent; but such benevolence seeks the greatest happiness of the system, not of any individual, unless the happiness of that individual be consistent with the greatest happiness of the system. This is the plain dictate not of reason only, but of scripture, and is abundantly conceded by Dr. C. as appears by the quotations already made. There is no difficulty therefore in conceiving, that however the first cause of all things is infinitely benevolent, he should bring mankind into existence, though he never intended to make them all finally happy. He might in perfect consistence with infinite benevolence, bring them into existence, intending that some of them should suffer that endless punishment which they should deserve, and thereby contribute to the greatest happiness of the system. And if such a punishment be subservient to the greatest happiness of the system, infinite benevolence not only admits of it, but requires it; nor would God be infinitely benevolent, if he should save all men. Therefore this grand argument, on which Dr. C. and other writers in favor of universal salvation, build so much, is a mere begging of the question. Let them show that the greatest good of the sys-

* Page 352, etc. † p. 1. ‡ p. 2, 3.

tem requires the final happiness of every individual, and they will indeed have gone far toward the establishment of their scheme. But until they shall have done this, their argument from this topic is utterly inconclusive. It is no more inconsistent with the goodness of God, that he should create men with a foresight and an intention, that they should suffer that endless punishment which they should deserve, and which is subservient to the general good; than that he should create them with a foresight and intention, that they should subserve the same important end, by suffering the torment of ages of ages, or the pains of the stone or the cholic; provided these temporary pains are not subservient to their personal good. And to say that temporary pains cannot consistently with the divine goodness be inflicted on the sinner, unless they be subservient to the personal good of the patient, is to contradict the plain dictates of reason, of scripture, and of Dr. C. himself. But this subject has been largely considered in Chapter III.

These, I think, are Dr. C's principal arguments from the divine goodness, to prove universal salvation; I presume, that in his whole book there are none more forcible than these. His arguments of this kind generally, if not universally, depend on taking for granted what is as much in dispute as any point in the whole controversy, that endless punishment is not consistent with the greatest good of the universal system, or the greatest general good. If it be true, that any man will be punished without end, no doubt it is so ordered because infinite wisdom and goodness saw it to be necessary to the general good. If it be not true, it is equally certain, that infinite wisdom and goodness saw endless punishment to be inconsistent with the general good. But which of these is the truth, is the main question.

IV. That endless punishment is consistent with the divine goodness, not only is implied in various sentiments and tenets of Dr. C. but appears to be a real and demonstrable truth. To evince this, I shall now, as was proposed, mention several considerations.

1. All arguments against endless punishment, drawn from the divine mercy, grace or goodness, imply a concession, that endless punishment is *just*. Were it not just, there would be no occasion to call in the aid of *goodness*. Stern, unrelenting justice would afford relief. Nor is there the least goodness, as distinguished from justice, exercised by a judge, in delivering a man from an unjust punishment attempted to be brought upon him by a false accuser. If therefore the salvation of sinners, and of every sinner, be an act of goodness, mercy or grace, as Dr. C.

abundantly declares; then endless punishment is just. And if it be just, it appears by Chap. III, that it will be inflicted, and inflicted by God too. Therefore it is consistent with divine goodness.

It is hoped it has been made manifest in Chap. II. and III, that the end of future punishment is not the personal good of the patients, but to satisfy justice, and support the authority and dignity of the divine law and government; as both Dr. C. and the scriptures abundantly hold, that the wicked will be punished to the utmost extent of their demerit. Now if the end of future punishment, whether temporary or endless, be to satisfy justice, and to support government; then the general good is promoted by the satisfaction of justice; otherwise God would not inflict such punishment. And if the proof in Chap. VI, that endless punishment is just, be valid, then justice is not satisfied by any punishment short of endless. But by Chap. II. and III. it appears, that all that punishment, which the wicked deserve, will actually be inflicted upon them by God. Therefore endless punishment is perfectly consistent with divine goodness.

2. If the divine law may be in any one instance executed consistently with divine goodness, endless punishment is consistent with the divine goodness. But the divine law may, in some instances, be executed consistently with divine goodness. I have before endeavored to show, that the penalty of the law is endless punishment. If this be true, then when the law is executed, endless punishment is inflicted. And who will dare to say, that God has made a law, which he cannot in any one instance execute consistently with his own perfections; and that if he should execute it in any instance, his goodness and mercy must be inevitably given up? Nay, he delights in *cruelty?* If the law cannot be executed without cruelty, it is a cruel unjust law; and to make a cruel and unjust law, is as irreconcilable with the moral rectitude of God, as to execute that law. If the infliction of endless punishment be cruel, the threatening of it also is cruel. But this runs into the former question, whether endless punishment be *just.*

If it be said, though the law is just, and the execution of it would not be cruel; yet it cannot be executed consistently with the divine goodness, because the divine goodness seeks the greatest possible good of the system. But the greatest possible good of the system requires the final happiness of all. As to this I observe:

(1) That it is giving up the argument from divine goodness in the light, in which Dr. C. has stated it. It appears by the quo-

tations already made, that he held endless punishment to be so inconsistent with divine goodness, that if that punishment be inflicted, it will prove God to be destitute of goodness, and to *delight in cruelty*.

(2) That the question as now stated comes to no more than this, Whether endless punishment be consistent with the greatest possible display of divine goodness? For a system, in which there is the greatest possible good, and the greatest possible display of the divine goodness, are one and the same thing. But if it were granted, that endless punishment is, in this sense, inconsistent with the divine goodness, it would by no means follow, on Dr. C's principles, that all men will be saved. Because it is an established principle with him, that divine goodness is not and cannot be displayed, to the highest possible degree, or so but that there is room for higher displays and further communications of it. "Neither is it to be supposed, because God is infinitely benevolent, that he has in fact made an infinite manifestation of his goodness. Infinity in benevolence knows no bounds, but there is still room for more and higher displays of it. This perfection is strictly speaking, inexhaustible, not capable of being displayed to a *ne plus*."* Therefore, it would be absurd for Dr. C. or any one, who agrees with him in the sentiment expressed in the last quotation, to state the argument from divine goodness, in the light in which it is exhibited in the objection now under consideration. This stating of the argument runs entirely into the question, whether the present system of the universe be the best possible; which Dr. C. has sufficiently answered in the negative, in the passage last quoted, and in many other passages of his writings. If it be true, that divine goodness does not adopt and prosecute the best possible plan of the universe in general; what reason have we to think, that it will adopt and prosecute the best possible plan with regard to any part of the divine system; for instance the future state of those who die in impenitence?

(3) On the supposition, that God does adopt and prosecute the best possible plan, both with regard to the universe in general, and in every particular dispensation of his providence; still we shall never be able to determine *a priori*, that the final salvation of all men is, in the sense now under consideration, most subservient to the general good. It must be determined either by the event itself, or by revelation; and whether revelation do assure us of the salvation of all men, is not the subject of inquiry in this chapter, but shall be particularly considered in its place.

3. If divine goodness without respect to the atonement of

* Benevolence of the Deity, p. 40.

Christ; which is foreign from the subject of this chapter, require the salvation of all men; it either requires that they be saved, whether they repent or not; or it requires, that they be saved on the condition of their repentance only. If it require that they be saved, whether they repent or not, it follows, that they have done no damage to the universe or have committed no sin. For the very idea of sin is a damage to the universe, a dishonor to God, and an injury to the creature. Now whenever a damage is done to the universe, the good of the universe, or which in the present argument comes to the same thing, the divine goodness requires reparation. But if the good of the universe require, that the sinner be saved without even repentance, the good of the universe requires no reparation, and if it require no reparation, it has not been impaired, or there has been no damage done to the good of the universe; and if no damage have been done to the universe, no sin has been committed. No wonder then, that the divine goodness requires the salvation of those who have committed no sin or no moral evil.

If on the other hand it be allowed, that by sin damage is done to the universe, and yet it be holden, that divine goodness requires the salvation of all men, on the condition of their repentance only; it will follow, that repentance alone makes it consistent with the general good that the sinner be saved. Repentance then repairs the damage done to the universe by sin, and so makes satisfaction or atonement for sin. The very essence of atonement is something done to repair the damage done by sin to the universe, so that the sinner can be exempted from punishment, without any disadvantage to the universe. And as repentance is a personal act of the sinner, he does on this supposition make atonement for his own sin by his personal virtue. Therefore, if after this he be saved from wrath, he is but treated according to his personal character, or according to strict justice; not according to goodness or grace. So that while Dr. C. professes and supposes himself to be arguing from the divine goodness, the salvation of all men from the wrath to come; his arguments are really drawn from *the justice of God only*. They imply either that the sinner who is by divine goodness to be saved from the wrath to come, is no sinner, deserves no punishment, and therefore is incapable of being saved from wrath, as he is exposed to none; or that though he be a sinner, he has in his own person, made full satisfaction for his sin, and therefore merits salvation from wrath, and is incapable of it by an act of grace or goodness.

4. To argue the salvation of all men from the goodness of

God, without regard to the atonement of Christ; and yet to allow that endless punishment is just, is a direct contradiction. If it be allowed or proved, that endless punishment is just, it follows of course that it is consistent with the general good, and which is the same thing, with the divine goodness, and is even required by divine goodness, on the supposition on which we now proceed, that no atonement is made for sin. The very idea of a just punishment of any crime is a punishment which in view of the crime only, is requisite to repair the damage done to the system by that crime. Any further punishment than this is unjust, and any punishment short of this, falls short of the demand of justice. At the same time that this is demanded by justice, it is demanded by the general good too; because by the definition of a just punishment, it is necessary to the general good; necessary to secure it, or to repair the damage done to it, by the crime punished. So that a just punishment of any crime is not only consistent with the general good, but is absolutely required by it, provided other measures equivalent to this punishment be not taken to repair the damage done by sin, or, which is the same, provided an atonement be not made. And if the endless punishment of sin be just; it is of course, on the proviso just made, perfectly consistent with the general good of the universe, and absolutely required by it, and equally required by the goodness of God. And to say that though it be just, it is not reconcilable with the divine goodness, is the same as to say, that though it be just, it is not reconcilable with justice.

Objection. Divine goodness does not admit of the endless punishment of the apostle Paul; yet his endless punishment would be just. *Answer.* Divine goodness, or the general good of the universe, considering the sins or the personal character of Paul by itself, does both admit and require his endless punishment. But considering the atonement of Christ, which, as I have repeatedly observed, comes not into consideration in the present argument, it does not indeed admit of it.

I beg leave to ask the advocates for universal salvation, whether if Christ had not made atonement, it would have been consistent with the general good of the universe, that sinners be punished without end. If they answer in the affirmative, then endless punishment is in itself reconcilable not with justice only, but with goodness too, as goodness always acquiesces in that which is consistent with the general good. For if only in consequence of the atonement, endless punishment be inconsistent with the divine goodness, it becomes inconsistent with it, not on account of anything in the endless punishment of sin,

or in the divine goodness simply; but wholly on account of something external to them both; and therefore that external something being left out of the account, there is no inconsistency between the endless punishment of sin and the divine goodness in themselves considered. But that they are in themselves inconsistent is implied in Dr. C's argument from divine goodness; and that they are not in themselves inconsistent is all for which I am now pleading.

If the answer to the question just proposed be, that it would not be consistent with the general good, that a sinner be punished without end, even if Christ had not made atonement; it follows, that such punishment is not just; as the very definition of a just punishment is, one which in view of the sinner's personal character only is necessary to the general good. Or if this be not a proper definition of a just punishment, let a better be given. Any punishment is just, or is deserved, for no other reason, than that the criminal viewed in himself owes it to the public, or the general good requires it.

5. If divine goodness require, that every sinner be, on his mere repentance, exempted from punishment, it will follow that sin is no moral evil. If divine goodness require that every sinner be, on his mere repentance, exempted from punishment, the general good of the universe requires the same. If the general good do require it, then either the sinner hath in that action of which he repents, done nothing by which the general good hath been impaired; or that impairment is repaired by his repentance. For if he have impaired the general good, and not afterward repaired it, then by the very terms it requires reparation. And this which the general good in these cases requires of the sinner for the reparation of the general good, is his punishment, and not his exemption from punishment. But if the sinner have done nothing which requires that reparation be made to the general good, then he hath committed nothing which hath impaired the general good; or, which is the same, he hath committed no moral evil. For moral evil is a voluntary act impairing the general good consisting in the glory of God and the happiness of the created system. Or if it be said, that the repentance of the sinner repairs the general good, and prevents the ill effects of his sin; I answer, repentance is no punishment, nor any reparation of damage to the universe by a past action. It is a mere cessation from sin and a sorrow for it. A man who has committed murder, makes by repentance no reparation for the damage which is thereby done to society or to the universe. So that if ever any damage were done to the universe by sin, and if therefore the

public good required that reparation be made by the punishment of the sinner, it still requires the same, and therefore does not require his exemption from punishment. Beside; the false and absurd consequences* necessarily following from the principle that the penitent deserves no punishment which is the same with this, that the general good does not require that the penitent, viewed in his own character merely, be punished; plainly point out the falsity and absurdity of the principle itself. Particularly this consequence, that on that supposition the penitent never is nor can be forgiven, as he makes by his repentance full satisfaction in his own person, and thus answers the demand of justice or of the general good. But if it be true, that repentance does not repair the damage done by sin to the universe; and if as is now asserted, the general good do require that the penitent sinner, without regard to the atonement of Christ, be exempted from punishment; it required the same before he repented; consequently his sin never did impair the good of the universe, and therefore is no moral evil.

Objection 1. The fourth argument seems to imply, that sin consists in damage actually done to the universe; whereas there are many sins, in which no real damage is actually done. As if a man stab another with a design to murder him, and open an abscess, whereby the man is benefited instead of murdered; and in all acts of malice, which are not executed, no damage is actually done.

Answer. Taking the word damage in a large sense, to mean, not merely loss of property, as it is sometimes taken, but misery, calamity or natural evil; it may be granted, that sin does consist in voluntarily doing damage to the universe, or in doing that, which without the special interposition of God would be a real damage. It is a misery, a calamity, or a natural evil to any man, to be the object of the malice of any other person, though his malice be never executed. It exposes him to the execution of that malice; it renders him unsafe; and to be unsafe is a calamity; especially to be the object of the malice of another to such a degree, that the malicious man attempts the life of the object of his malice. In this case the man who is the object of malice is very unsafe indeed. And if but one person be in a calamitous situation, so far at least the public good is impaired, or the universe is damaged. Besides, if that one act impairing the public good be left unpunished, and no proper restraint by the punishment of the act be laid upon the man himself and upon others, the flood-gate is opened to innumerable more acts of the same,

* See these considered at large in Chap. II.

or a like kind. This surely is a further calamity to the universe. So that every sinful volition, though it fail of its object in the attempt or though it be not attempted to be executed in overt act, is a real calamity or damage to the universe.

Objection 2. The preceding reasoning must needs be fallacious, as it implies, that goodness or grace is never exercised in any case wherein punishment is deserved; that whatever is admitted by justice, is required by goodness; and that if sin be a moral evil and deserve punishment, it cannot consistently with the general good be forgiven.

Answer. This is not true. The reasoning above does not imply, but that there may be consistently with the general good, the forgiveness of some sinners. Nor does it imply, but that the general good may *require* the forgiveness of some sinners; as undoubtedly it does require the forgiveness of all who repent and believe in Christ, and so become interested in him according to the gospel. Nor does *this reasoning* imply, but that some sinners may obtain forgiveness on some other account than the merits of Christ; though I believe it may be clearly shown from scripture, that forgiveness can be obtained on no other account. But this reasoning does assert, that if all penitents *as such*, or merely because they are penitents, or on account of their own repentance and reformation, be required by divine goodness to be exempted from punishment; then sin deserves no punishment and is no moral evil.

6. The voice of reason is, that divine goodness, or a regard to the general good requires, that sin be punished according to its demerit, in some instances at least; otherwise God would not appear to be what he really is, an enemy to sin, and greatly displeased with it. It is certainly consistent with divine goodness, that sin exists in the world, otherwise it would never have existed. Now since sin is in the world, if God were never to punish it, it would seem, that he is no enemy to it. Or if he punish it in a far less degree than it deserves, still it would seem, that his displeasure at it is far less than it is and ought to be. Nor can mere words or verbal declarations of the Deity sufficiently exhibit his opposition to sin, so long as he uniformly treats the righteous and the wicked in the same manner. His character in view of intelligent creatures will appear to be what it is holden forth to be in his actions, rather than what he in mere words declares it to be. But will any man say, that it is conducive to the good order and happiness of the intellectual system, that God should appear to be no enemy, but rather a friend to sin?

Objection. God would still appear to be an enemy to sin,

though he were not to punish it; because he takes the most effectual measures, to extirpate it by leading sinners to repentance. *Answer.* The extirpation of sin shows no other hatred of it, than a physician shows to a disease, which he takes the most effectual measures to abolish, by the restoration of health. But these measures of the physician do not show, that he views his patient as blamable. Sickness is no moral evil, and all the pains of the physician to remove sickness, are no testimony of his abhorrence of moral evil. But sin is a moral evil, and it is subservient to the general good, that the great governor of the universe should testify his abhorrence of it, as a moral evil, or as justly blamable. To this end he must do something further than is done by the physician, who heals his patient; he must either in the person of the sinner, or in his substitute, punish sin, and that according to its demerit; otherwise he will not show himself displeased at it as a moral evil.

Hatred of sin is as essential to the Deity as love of holiness; and it is as honorable to him and as necessary to the general good, that he express the former as the latter. Indeed the latter is no further expressed, than the former is expressed; and so far as the former is doubtful, the latter is doubtful too. The question then comes to this, whether it be consistent with the general good, that God should in actions, as well as words, express his abhorrence of sin as blamable, or as a moral evil; and express this abhorrence to a just degree. If this be consistent with the general good, it is also consistent with the general good, that sin be punished according to its demerit; and if it deserve an endless punishment, it is consistent with the general good and with divine goodness, that such a punishment be inflicted.

7. That endless punishment is inconsistent with divine goodness, and that all men are saved by free grace, is a direct contradiction. To be saved is to be delivered from the curse of the law, which we have before endeavored to show to be an endless punishment. But to be saved from this by free grace, implies, that the person so saved, deserves endless punishment, and that such punishment is with respect to him just. But whatever punishment is just with respect to any man, provided no atonement be made by a substitute, is necessary to the public good; and unless it be necessary to the public good, it is unjust. If it be necessary to the public good, the public good requires it; and if the public good require it, divine goodness requires it. Therefore to apply this reasoning to the endless punishment of the sinner: The salvation of the sinner consists in deliverance from the curse of the law; the curse of the law is endless punishment;

and to be delivered from this by free grace, implies, that the endless punishment of the sinner is just. If the endless punishment of the sinner be just, and no atonement be made by a substitute, the public good requires his endless punishment, and the divine goodness of course requires it. So that if the sinner can be saved by free grace only, and no atonement be made by a substitute, the endless punishment of the sinner is not at all inconsistent with divine goodness; and to say that it is inconsistent with the divine goodness, and yet to say that all men are saved by free grace, and can be saved in no other way, implies, as I said, a direct contradiction. It implies, that endless punishment is just, as the deliverance from it is the fruit of grace only; it also implies, that it is not just, as the public good or the divine goodness does not require it, but is inconsistent with it.

CHAPTER IX.

IN WHICH IS CONSIDERED DR. C'S ARGUMENT FROM ROM. 5: 12, ETC.

Having in the preceding chapters considered Dr. C's arguments from reason and from the divine perfections, I proceed now to consider those which are drawn from particular passages of scripture. The first of those passages which demands our attention is Rom. 5: 12, etc. "Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned. (For until the law sin was in the world; but sin is not imputed when there is no law. Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, who is the figure of him that was to come. But not as the offence, so also is the free gift. For if through the offence of one many be dead; much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many. And not as it was by one that sinned, so is the gift; for the judgment was by one to condemnation; but the free gift is of many offences unto justification. For if by one man's offence death reigned by one; much more they which receive abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness, shall reign in life by one, Jesus Christ.) Therefore as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justi-

fication of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners; so by the obedience of one, shall many be made righteous. Moreover, the law entered that the offence might abound; but where sin abounded, grace did much more abound. That as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord."

The Doctor's argument from this passage depends wholly on the supposition, that the apostle considers "Adam and Christ as the respective opposite sources of death and life to mankind universally;" or that Christ is the source of life and eternal salvation to all men without exception, as Adam was the source of death to all men without exception. The Doctor's reasons to support this proposition are: (1) That in the 15th verse it is said, "If through the offence of one many be dead, much more hath the grace of God abounded unto many:" and as by *many* in the former part of this verse is meant all men, therefore he concludes that the same word is used in the same extensive sense, in the latter part of the verse; "the antithesis," he says, "will otherwise be lost." (2) The word *many*, πολλοί, means *all men*, because the article is prefixed to it, οἱ πολλοί. (3) That in the 18th verse it is expressly asserted, "As by the offence of one judgment came upon *all men*, εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon *all men*, εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, unto justification of life." Whence the Doctor concludes, that the words *all men* in both parts of the comparison, are used in the same extent. (4) That the advantage by Christ *exceeds, abounds beyond* the disadvantage by Adam; but this, unless all men be saved, would be so far from the truth, that the former would "sink below the latter." Let us attend to these distinctly.

1. The word *many* in the former part of the 15th and 19th verses, means *all men*; therefore it means the same in the latter part of those verses; "the antithesis will otherwise be lost."* Now how does the truth of this proposition appear? It must certainly be supported by proper proof to obtain credit. But in the very many instances in which the Doctor is pleased to repeat this proposition, in his long commentary on Rom. 5: 12, etc., I do not find one reason offered to prove it, beside that quoted above, "The antithesis will otherwise be lost."* This therefore is now to be considered. In the rebellion in Great Britain, 1745, large numbers of men were engaged in the rebellion, and were led away by the Pretender. After the Pretender was defeated, large numbers, by the influence of some particular person, we

* Page 32, 60, etc.

will suppose, returned to their allegiance, and took the proper oaths to the king; yet not all who were drawn into the rebellion by the Pretender. Now would there be any impropriety in saying in this case, As by the Pretender *many* had been drawn into the rebellion, so by that other person *many* were brought back to their allegiance? The former *many* is allowed to be more extensive than the latter; yet there is a manifest antithesis in the proposition; an antithesis as manifest as there would have been, if the men who returned to their allegiance, had been just as numerous as those who engaged in the rebellion, and had been the same individuals. Equally manifest it is, that though the *many*, who died in Adam, be more numerous than the *many* who are the subjects of saving grace by Christ; yet there is a proper antithesis in this proposition: "If through the offence of one many be dead; much more the grace of God by Jesus Christ hath abounded unto many."

2. The word *many*, πολλοί, means all men, because the article is joined with it, οἱ πολλοί, *the many*.* If this be evident at all, it must be evident either from the general use of the adjective πολλοί when connected with the article, or from the circumstances of the particular case in which it is used in this passage, Rom. 5: 15 and 19. If the validity of the argument now under consideration, be evident from the general use of πολύς in the plural with the article; then generally when used by good authors, and especially by the authors of the New Testament, it means a strict universality. Let us therefore attend to particular instances. Acts 26: 24, "Much learning doth make thee mad;" τὰ πολλὰ γράμματα. But no man will say, that this expression means all learning. The use of the article however is very proper, and the expression means the much learning of which the apostle was possessed. 2 Cor. 2: 17, "For we are not as *many*, οἱ πολλοί, which corrupt the word of God." If οἱ πολλοί here mean *all* men, the apostle in direct contradiction to himself in this very expression, means that he himself, and all the other apostles, as well the rest of mankind, did corrupt the word of God. Rev. 17: 1, "I will show unto thee the judgment of the great whore that sitteth upon *many* waters," τῶν ὑδάτων τῶν πολλῶν. *All* waters, or *all people* cannot be meant, because by far the greater part of the nations of the world never were under the influence of the great whore. The only other instances in the whole New Testament, in which πολύς in the plural is used with the article, are Matt. 24: 12. Rom. 12: 5. 15: 22. 1 Cor. 10: 17 and 33, which the reader may examine for himself, and it

* Page 60.

is presumed, he will find, that in no one of them is a strict universality clearly intended. If this be so, it is by no means evident from the general use of πολύς in the plural with the article, that *οἱ πολλοί*, *many*, in Rom. 5: 15 and 19, means *all* men.

Nor is this more evident from the circumstances of the particular case, in which *many*, *οἱ πολλοί*, is used in Rom. 5: 15. Let it be translated as Dr. C. chooses to translate it, thus: If through the offence of one, *the many* be dead, much more the grace of God, by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto *the many*. Nothing appears from the expression, but that the meaning of the apostle may be, what it has generally been understood to be, that *the many* who were connected with Adam, and whose life or death depended on his standing or falling, became dead through his offence; and *the many* who are connected with Christ, and with a particular design to save whom, He died, shall be made the subjects of the abounding grace of God in their most glorious salvation. I say, nothing appears, either from the general use of *οἱ πολλοί*, or from the particular use of it in this case, but that this and this only is the real sense of it, in this instance. And for Dr. C. to wish his readers, before he has given them a reason, to give up this sense in favor of his own, is for him to come to them in the humble character of a suppliant, and not in the dignified character of a cogent reasoner.

3. In the 18th verse, it is expressly asserted, As by the offence of one judgment came upon *all men*, εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon *all men*, εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, to justification of life; whence Dr. C. concludes, that the words *all men*, in both parts of the comparison are used in the same extent; and says, "It can be no other than a flat contradiction to the express words of the apostle to say, that in the latter part of this comparison not *all men* are meant, but *believers only*; that is, a few of them."* It is indeed a flat contradiction to Dr. C's sense of the apostle's words; but that it is a contradiction to the true sense of those words, does not appear. If it should be further granted to be a contradiction to the most *literal* sense of those words taken by themselves, it would not thence follow, that it is a contradiction to the true and real sense of the words. The real sense of words in all authors, is in thousands of instances to be known, not from the words themselves merely, but from their connection and other circumstances.

The Doctor rightly asserts, that the words *all men* in verse 18th,

* Page 32.

mean the same with *the many* in verse 15th. And as it has been shown, that there is no evidence given by the Doctor, that *the many*, to whom grace abounds through Christ, mean *all* men; so *all men* in the 18th verse meaning, by his own consent, the same with *the many* in verse 15th, must, until we have evidence to the contrary, be understood with the same restriction. To carry on the comparison, and maintain the antithesis, there is no more necessity of understanding the words *all men*, when applied to the saved by Christ in the 18th verse, to mean the whole human race; than there is of understanding in that extent, *the many* in the latter part of verse 15th.

Beside; the meaning of those words is abundantly restricted by the context; as verse 17th, "For if by one man's offence death reigned by one; much more they which receive abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness, shall reign in life by one, Jesus Christ." The 18th verse is an inference drawn from the 17th, and is introduced by ἄρα οὖν, *therefore*. But the 18th verse would be no just inference at all from the 17th, unless the words *all men* in the latter part of the 18th verse be equally restricted as the words *they which receive abundance of grace*, in the 17th verse. Let us make trial of understanding those phrases in a sense differently extensive, thus: For if by one man's offence death reigned by one; much more true believers in this life, who are the subjects of the peculiar and abundant grace of God, shall reign in eternal life by one, Jesus Christ. Therefore as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men universally to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men universally unto justification of life, whether in this world they believe or not. The whole force of this reasoning is more briefly expressed thus: Those who believe in this life, shall reign in life eternal; therefore also *all* men, whether they believe in this life or not, shall in like manner reign in life eternal. But who does not see, that this consequence by no means follows from the premises?

Although Dr. C. supposes "this *therefore*" [in verse 18th], "is the same which began the 12th verse;" yet he allows, "it will make no essential difference in the apostle's reasoning, if we should suppose, that the 18th and 19th verses introduced by ἄρα οὖν, are a conclusion from the three foregoing verses."* And it is evident by the Doctor's own discourse, that he himself was full in the opinion, that the 18th and 19th verses, are a conclusion from the three preceding verses, though he was of the opinion that those three verses, are an "*interposed* parenthesis." Let

* Page 67.

the reader notice the following passage: "The view of the apostle in interposing these verses" [the 15th, 16th, and 17th], "was that he might argue from the gift in this abounding sense, when he came to prosecute the comparison between Adam and Christ. And if the gift through Christ might be supposed to abound beyond the lapse, in the 15th, 16th, and 17th verses, why not in the 18th and 19th?"*

Indeed the Doctor himself allows, that the *all men* in the latter part of the 18th verse, is no more extensive, than *they which receive abundance of grace* in the 17th verse. But he supposes that the latter expression is equally extended with the former, and that the former extends to all mankind. I say, he *supposes* this; but his opponents in this controversy suppose the contrary; and how does it appear, but that their supposition is as good as his? If the Doctor wished that we should give the preference to his supposition, he ought to have given us some reason.

The Doctor with the help of a "learned friend" has given us a long dissertation on the 17th verse, and on the Greek verb λαμβάνω, with a design to prove, οἱ λαμβάνοντες, *they who receive*, mean not those who receive the grace of God *actively, voluntarily* and *with a heart to improve it*; but those who are the "objects of this grace," "or the persons upon whom it is bestowed." But this is altogether immaterial in the present dispute. By the abundance of grace Dr. C. understands *the abounding advantage by Christ, terminating in a reign in life.* Now it will be granted on all hands, that they on whom this grace is bestowed will be saved. Indeed the very expression, *reigning in life*, implies salvation. Those therefore on whom this grace is bestowed, will as certainly and as confessedly be saved, as those who cheerfully receive and improve the grace of God. All the question is, and a very important one it is, whether this abounding grace terminating in a reign in life, be bestowed on all men. That it is preached or offered to all men, is granted. But that it is so communicated to all, as to secure their reign in life, is a different idea, and is the main subject of this controversy.

So that all the labors of Dr. C. and his "ingenious friend," to settle the meaning of *receive*, λαμβάνω, contribute nothing to establish this point, That *all men* in the latter part of verse 18th, mean the whole human race. So long as the Doctor grants, that the words *all men*, verse 18th, are not more extensive than they which receive abundance of grace, verse 17th; and so long as he has not proved, that they which receive abundance of grace so as to reign in eternal life, mean the whole human race; so long

* Page 68.

nothing is done to prove universal salvation, from the use of the words *all men*, verse 18th. To say, that *they which receive abundance of grace* mean all mankind, because that expression is equally extensive as the words *all men* in the 18th verse, is a mere begging of the question. It is in the first place to suppose and not to prove, that the words *all men* mean all mankind; and then by them to prove, that also *they which receive abundance of grace*, mean all mankind.

The universal term *all men*, verse 18th, is by the former part of the chapter limited to those who are justified by faith, who have peace with God, and who joy in God, through Christ, as having received reconciliation. Dr. C's opinion was, that the 18th verse is but the full expression of the sentence left imperfect in the 12th verse, and that the *therefore* in the beginning of the 18th verse "is the same which began the 12th verse."* The 18th verse then is an immediate conclusion from the verses preceding the 12th, especially from the 11th. Now the believers in endless punishmeut hold, that in all that part of the chapter, from the beginning to the 12th verse, the apostle had been speaking of the privileges of believers only, and not those privileges which belong to all mankind. And to infer from those privileges which are peculiar to believers, that all mankind will be saved, is to infer a consequence, which is by no means contained in the premises; and such reasoning ought never to be imputed to any man of Paul's sound judgment, much less to *him*, an inspired apostle.

To illustrate this matter, permit me to descend to particulars. Verse 1st, believers are said to be justified by faith and to have peace with God; verse 2d, to have access by faith into the grace of the gospel and to rejoice (or glory) in the hope of the glory of God; verse 3d, to glory in tribulations; verse 5th, to have the love of God shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost; verse 8th, it is said that God commendeth his love towards believers, in that Christ died for *them;* verse 9th, that believers are justified by Christ's blood, and saved from wrath through him; verse 10th, that believers are reconciled to God by the death of Christ and saved by his life; verse 11th, that believers glory in God through Christ, by whom they have received the atonement or reconciliation. Now what is the consequence really following from these premises, ascribing to believers these peculiar and exclusive privileges? Is it that by the righteousness of Christ the free gift unto justification of life, is come upon all mankind, believers and unbelievers? By no means; any man, without the aid of inspiration, would be ashamed to draw such a

* Page 67.

consequence from such premises. The only just consequence of these premises, is that which has been generally taken to be the meaning of the 18th verse; viz. That as by the offence of one, Adam, judgment to condemnation came upon all mankind who were his seed; even so by the righteousness of one, Jesus Christ, the free gift unto justification of life, came upon all *his* seed, who are believers only, and who are the only persons of whom the apostle had been speaking in the premises. May I not now adopt the same bold language which Dr. C. often uses concerning his comments on scripture, that no other sense than this, can be put on this 18th verse without making the apostle argue inconclusively?

I know very well that the Doctor understood differently the whole passage from the beginning of this chapter to the 12th verse. But as his whole argument from Rom. 5: 12, to the end, in the present view of it, depends on his different construction of verse 1—12; it is not sufficient to say, that the Doctor *understood* that passage differently, or that it is *capable* of a different construction. It must be shown that it is not capable of the construction which is given above; and that the Doctor's construction must be the true one. Let us therefore attend to his construction and his reasons in support of it.

The construction is, that the last verse of the preceding chapter, the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th verses, and the latter part of the 11th verse of this chapter, are spoken of all mankind. The reasons which he assigns for such an understanding of those verses are:

(1) That in the 6th verse Christ is said to die for *the ungodly*.* But if we should assert, that by the ungodly here are meant those only, who afterward and during this life become godly or believers, though Christ died for them while ungodly or considering them as ungodly, the Doctor has given no confutation of such a construction. Therefore he had no right to expect, that it would be rejected by any one who should choose to adopt it. Or if we allow, that Christ did die for all men in this sense, that he died to introduce a dispensation of grace which should offer salvation to all, and invite all to it, and to use Dr. C's own expression, *to put all into salvable circumstances*; nothing will hence follow favorable to the actual salvation of all men, or to the Doctor's argument from Rom. 5: 12, etc. It will not follow, that all will accept the invitations to salvation and act upon them. Still the *we* and *us*, which occur so often from the 1st to the 12th verse, and particularly in verse 6th, may mean believers only.

* Page 35.

(2) "It is a gross mistake to think, that the apostle in this 9th verse is speaking of that justification he had in the 1st verse connected with faith; and for this decisive reason, because—as salvation from wrath is one thing essentially included in that justification which is the result of true faith; it would be ridiculous to argue, *much more* being justified, meaning hereby this justification, we shall be saved from wrath."* But did Dr. C. entertain the opinion, that justification and salvation are one and the same? Abraham believed God and it was counted to him for righteousness; he was then justified; but he did not then receive complete salvation. Believers being in this life justified by faith, have peace with God, according to the 1st verse of this chapter, as Dr. C. allows. Yet they are not in this life saved from wrath in the sense they will be, at the day of judgment. Therefore, however Dr. C. *asserts* it, it does not *appear* to be ridiculous to argue, that believers being in this life justified by faith in the blood of Christ, shall at the day of judgment, much more be saved from wrath through him. Is it ridiculous to argue, that Abraham being justified by faith here, will much more be saved from wrath hereafter?

(3) "The particle νῦν, *now*, connected with the justification here treated of, is emphatical, making it clear, that the apostle is not to be understood of justification at the great day; but of justification that had at that time been completed."* Nobody pretends, that the apostle means a justification at the great day. It is allowed on all hands, that he means a justification which had at that present time been completed. But what follows hence? Did Dr. C. imagine, that believers are not in a proper sense completely justified in this life? And that the justification of Abraham, Rahab, etc. was in no proper sense completed before their death, or before the great day? Concerning the former, it is expressly said, that he believed God, and it *was* counted to him for righteousness—that faith *was* reckoned to Abraham for righteousness, etc., and concerning the latter, *was* not Rahab the harlot justified, etc.? Nor is it material to the present purpose, whether this justification of Rahab mean a justification by God, or a manifestative justification, proving, that she was justified in the sight of God; because the latter, equally as the former, implies that she was then justified in the sight of God.

That believers are in this life justified in a peculiar sense, is further taught in 1 Cor. 6: 11, "And such were some of you; but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye *are justified* in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the spirit of our God." I

* Page 37.

presume it will be granted, that pardon or forgiveness is an essential part of justification, and that when a man is forgiven by God, he is justified by God. But that believers are forgiven in this life, is evident from the following texts, Matt. 9: 2, "Son, thy sins be forgiven thee." See also, Mark 2: 5, and Luke 5: 20. Col. 2: 13, "And you being dead in your sins, and the uncircumcision of your flesh, hath he quickened together with him, *having forgiven* you all trespasses." 1 John 2: 12, "I write unto you, little children, because your sins are forgiven you, for his name's sake."

But why need I produce proofs of what Dr. C. grants, though it seems in his comment on the 9th verse, he had forgotten it? In his comment on the 1st verse, etc., he speaks of "the justified by faith, as glorying in hope of the glory of God—and in their sufferings—because they knew that tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope." The Doctor, as the apostle did before him, evidently considers these things as taking place in this life. Indeed the contrary cannot be pretended without the grossest absurdity. He also considers these views and affections as peculiar to the *justified by faith*. Therefore some men are completely justified by faith in this life; at least so completely, as to render the 9th verse properly applicable to them. Therefore his argument from *νῦν*, *now*, that the justification spoken of in the 9th verse is not peculiar to believers, proves nothing.

Beside, Dr. C. could not, without the most glaring absurdity and inconsistency, understand this 9th verse of all mankind; because the persons here referred to shall be *saved from wrath*. But according to the Doctor some men will not be saved from wrath, they will suffer all that wrath to which they are liable on the footing of strict justice; they will suffer according to their sins, according to their crimes, and their deserts, and so that the whole threatened penalty will be executed on them.

(4) Doctor C. argues, that because it is said in verse 10th, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God; by the *we* here, we must understand, not believers only, but all mankind; or because, as the Doctor paraphrases the words, *while* they were enemies, they were reconciled; therefore this reconciliation cannot mean the cordial reconciliation of true believers.* The force of this argument wholly depends on this supposition, that the persons here intended, were reconciled, and yet after the reconciliation was effected, they still remained enemies. But what necessity of this gloss of the text? Why may it not mean this

* Page 38.

merely, that when the persons here intended were going on in their enmity, they were arrested by the grace of God, reclaimed from their enmity, and reconciled to God? There appears to be nothing absurd or unusual in this expression understood in this sense. If it should be said, When a subject was waging war against his sovereign, and was in actual battle with the troops of his sovereign, he was reconciled to him; the expression would not naturally imply, and no man would understand it to mean, that notwithstanding the reconciliation, he still continued a fixed and malicious enemy to his sovereign. No man would understand the expression in any other sense than this, that in the midst of the war and battle, he was struck with conviction of his wickedness, and became cordially reconciled to his sovereign.

If the Doctor depended on the original words *ἐχθροὶ ὄντες κατηλλάγημεν*, to make out that the reconciliation here intended took place, while the persons spoken of remained enemies; he might as conclusively have argued, that the person mentioned in John 9: 25, (*τυφλὸς ὢν βλέπω*) had his sight restored to him, while he remained perfectly blind; and that Saul went to Damascus, with the expectation of bringing certain persons to Jerusalem, who at the same time should still remain at Damascus, (*ἄξων τοὺς ἐκεῖσε ὄντας*) Acts 22: 5.

At length we come to the Doctor's exposition of the 11th verse, to which his criticism on all the preceding verses refers. He tells us, The meaning plainly and briefly is, "We believers glory in God of our interest, and relation to him, as our covenant God, through Jesus Christ, by whom we were so changed in our state, *while enemies*—in common with the rest of mankind, as to be capable of—final justification upon the foot of faith." On this it may be remarked, That if by "interest in and covenant relation to God," Dr. C. meant anything different from that state of reconciliation, which is obtained by Christ, and which is mentioned in the latter part of this verse, it does not appear that the text gives him any warrant to insert that interest, etc., in his comment, as a ground of rejoicing or glorying. I appeal to the reader, whether the most natural sense of the text be not this: We believers glory in God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, as having by Christ received reconciliation; or *for this reason*, that of God's rich grace through Christ, we have obtained reconciliation with God. Otherwise, why is the circumstance of our receiving the reconciliation by Christ mentioned in this connection with our glorying in God? Beside, to glory in God as our covenant God, and to glory in him on account of our reconciliation with him, is one and the same thing.

The glorying of which the apostle speaks, is through Christ; and this implies, that it is on account of some benefit or blessing received through Christ; and what this blessing is, which the apostle had in view, and which he considered as the ground of glorying to believers, he immediately explains in these words, *by whom we have received the reconciliation*, that reconciliation of which he had been speaking in the 10th verse. But if the reconciliation, which the apostle makes the great ground of rejoicing or glorying to believers, be, as Dr. C. holds, common to believers and unbelievers; then the great ground of glorying to believers is not any blessing peculiar to believers, but something common to all mankind; and therefore unbelievers have just the same reason to glory in that blessing as believers; which is no more credible than the doctrine of universal salvation, and wants as much proof as that doctrine; and therefore cannot be admitted as any evidence of the truth of that doctrine.

I beg the reader's patience, while I make a few other remarks on Dr. C's construction of the passage from Rom. 4: 25, to Chap. 5: 12; and I wish the reader to keep before him the passage itself, while he follows me in these remarks.

This whole passage is expressed in the first person, and is manifestly one continued discourse. Yet Dr. C. was of the opinion, that in this short passage of only twelve verses, the persons, or the *we*, *us* and *our*, which occur in almost every sentence, are shifted no less than four times. In the last verse of Chap. iv, it was his opinion, that all men are intended; that from the first to the sixth verse of Chap. v, only believers are intended; that from the 6th to the 11th verse all men are intended; that in the former part of the 11th verse believers only are intended; that in the latter part of the 11th verse all men are again intended. I beg leave to set down this whole passage, according to the Doctor's explanation, together with the text itself. Thus:

Text.	*Dr. C's Explanation.*
CHAP. 4: 25.	
Who was delivered for our offences and raised again for our justification.	Who was delivered to put *all men* into a *capacity* to obtain the pardon of their offences, and was raised again to put them into a *capacity* of being justified at the great day.
CHAP. 5: 1.	
Therefore, being justified by faith, we have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ.	Therefore *believers* being justified by faith, have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ.
2. *By whom also we have access by faith into this grace wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God.*	By whom also *believers* have access by faith into this grace wherein they stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God.

Text.	*Dr. C's Explanation.*
3. *And not only so, but we glory in tribulations also, knowing that tribulation worketh patience;*	And not only so, but *believers* glory in tribulations also, knowing that tribulation worketh patience;
4. *And patience experience; and experience hope;*	and patience experience and experience hope;
5. *And hope maketh not ashamed, because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us.*	and hope maketh not ashamed, because the love of God is shed abroad in the hearts of *believers*, by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto *them*.
6. *For when* WE *were without strength, in due time Christ died for the ungodly.*	For when *all men* were without strength, in due time Christ died for them *all*, while they were ungodly.
7. *For scarcely for a righteous man will one die; yet peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die.*	For scarcely for a righteous man would one die; yet peradventure for a good man, some would even dare to die.
8. *But God commendeth his love towards* US, *in that, while* WE *were yet sinners, Christ died for us.*	But God commendeth his love towards *all* men, in that while they were yet sinners, Christ died for them *all*.
9. *Much more then being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him.*	Much more then *all* men being now by the blood of Christ brought into a *capacity* or *possibility* of salvation, shall *in fact* be saved from wrath through Christ.
10. *For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son; much more being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life.*	For if when *all men* were enemies, they were by the death of Christ brought into a *possibility* of salvation; much more being brought into a *possibility* of salvation, those *all men* shall be *actually* saved by the life of Christ.
11. *And not only so; but we also joy in God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the atonement,* [*or the reconciliation.*]	And not only so; but *believers* also glory in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom *all men* have received the *possibility* of salvation.

How strange, that in a continued discourse all in the first person plural, the *we* and *us* should be changed backward and forward *four times!* What torturing of the scripture is here! At this rate, what discourse in the world will be intelligible? How will it be possible for any man, and especially for the common people, for whom as well as for the learned, the scriptures were written, to understand them?

But this is not all. By this various reference of the pronouns *we* and *us*, the reasoning of the apostle is rendered utterly inconclusive, in almost every step of it. Thus the first verse of the

fifth chapter is manifestly brought in by the apostle, as a consequence drawn from the last verse of the preceding chapter. But from the consideration, that Christ died and rose to put all men into a capacity of obtaining justification at the great day, it by no means follows, that *believers are now* justified by faith, and have peace with God. Verse 9th, if it be ever so true, that all men are put into a *possibility* of salvation, it by no means follows, that all men will be *actually saved.* It no more follows, than from the opportunity given all men, of obtaining salvation immediately after this life, it follows, that all will actually be saved immediately after this life; or than from the opportunity of entering the land of Canaan, given all that generation, which came out of Egypt, it followed, that all that generation would in fact enter that land; or than from the opportunity given any man to become rich or honorable, it follows, that he will in fact become rich or honorable. The same observation is equally applicable to the 10th verse. What was before observed concerning the 11th verse, understood in Dr. C's sense, needs not to be repeated.

But what is of chief importance is, that according to the Doctor's construction, there is no argumentative connection between the 11th and the 12th, or which is the same thing, between the 11th and the 18th verses. If the Doctor's sense of the 11th and 18th verses be true, the latter is no just consequence from the former. The Doctor's sense of the 11th verse is, that all men through Christ have received a possibility of final salvation; and his sense of the 18th verse is, that all men will actually be saved. But if it be ever so true, that all men have received a possibility or opportunity of final salvation, it does not follow, that all will actually be saved. Yet as the 12th or 18th verse, (the intermediate verses being a parenthesis) is a deduction from the 11th, the last of the propositions just expressed, should justly follow from the other; otherwise the apostle argues inconclusively. And as the Doctor's gloss of these two verses makes the apostle reason inconclusively, we may be sure, that he has not given the true sense of them. But according to the common understanding of these verses, the reasoning is clear and certain. For if believers have obtained through Christ a cordial reconciliation and peace with God, then certainly those same believers will, in the same way, obtain eternal life and salvation.

That the 12th, and therefore the 18th verse, is an inference from the 11th, is, I think, manifest from a careful perusal of the passage, and it is at least implicitly granted by Dr. C. He expressly says, that the *therefore* in the beginning of the 18th verse,

"is the same which began the 12th verse. The protasis or first part of the comparison was there entered upon, but left unfinished. 'Tis here resumed, I say, therefore, as by the offence of one man," etc.* And his paraphrase of the 18th verse is in these words: "I say, therefore, (to resume now and pursue the comparison I began in the 12th verse) as it was by the lapse of the one man, Adam," etc.† The Doctor also quotes Dr. Doddridge's assertion, that "the 12th verse is an inference from the 11th," and does not contradict that assertion, though he labors through a number of pages, to affix a different sense from that of Dr. Doddridge, to the 11th verse, that thus he may evade the construction of the 18th verse, which Dr. Doddridge had given, and establish his own. But all this was needless, if indeed the 12th and 18th verses are not an inference from the 11th. Nor is there any inconsistence in the opinion, that the 18th verse may be at the same time an inference from the 11th and from the 15th, 16th and 17th verses. True and sufficient premises or reasons of the proposition of the 18th verse, may be contained in the 11th verse. Those reasons may be explained, and even others added in the 15th, 16th and 17th verses, which fall into a parenthesis; and the 18th verse may contain an inference justly deducible from either, or from both.

I am indeed sensible, that Dr. C. in his paraphrase of the 12th verse, does not consider it as an inference from the 11th; but the 11th as deducible by way of inference from the 12th, in this manner: Because sin and death came upon all men by Adam, therefore all men have obtained a possibility of salvation by Christ. His words are: "For this cause or reason, we have received reconciliation by Jesus Christ, namely, because as sin entered into the world by the one man, Adam,"‡ etc. But this is as surprising as any part of Dr. C's truly surprising exposition of this chapter. In the first place, it is a mere conjecture, unsupported by anything but pure imagination. In the second place, to apply this paraphrase to the 18th verse, which is but the full expression of the 12th, it will stand thus: For this cause or reason all men have received a possibility of salvation, namely, that as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to actual salvation. Or more briefly thus: The reason, why all men have obtained a *possibility* of salvation, is, that salvation is *actually* come upon all men. Or to place the sentence in its proper arrangement, Salvation is actually come upon all men; therefore all men have received a possibility of salvation. On this

* Page 67. † p. 26. ‡ p. 23.

reasoning I need make no remark. It is not however probable, that the Doctor was sensible, that his paraphrase of the 12th verse, applied to the 18th, would come to this. Nor is the reason just expressed, that which the Doctor believed to be the true one, why we have received the reconciliation. But that which in the Doctor's opinion was the true reason, he expressly declares to be, "That it was in such a way, viz. by the offence of one, that judgment came upon all men to condemnation."* Who is answerable for this inconsistency, I need not inform the reader.

Before I dismiss this part of Dr. C's book, I cannot but observe, that he speaks of a double justification,† the one meaning absolution at the great day; the other meaning the advantageous state, or the possibility of the salvation of all mankind through Christ. It seems then that the Doctor had forgotten, that he had but a few pages before made out a three-fold justification; the first kind consisting in the introduction to a capacity or possibility of salvation through Christ; the second in the justification of believers who have peace with God while in this life—such was the justification of Abraham; the third an absolution at the great day. But when anything is abundantly multiplied, no wonder if the author himself of that multiplication forgets the number of units contained in his own product.

Dr. C. says,‡ It can be no other than a flat contradiction to the express words of the Apostle himself, to say that in the latter part of the comparison in the 18th verse, the words *all men* are not used in the same extensive sense, as in the former part of that verse. This is indeed a strong, positive assertion, but where is the reason to support it? Beside; he thought it no flat contradiction to the express words of the apostle, to say that *we* in the former part of the 11th verse, is not used in the same extensive sense as in the latter part of that verse; nor any flat contradiction to the words of our Saviour, to say, that the word *everlasting* is not used in the same extensive sense in the former part, as in the latter part of Matt. 25: 46, "These shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into everlasting life."

But it is time we should proceed to the other argument of Dr. C. to prove that universal salvation is taught in Rom. 5: 12, etc. viz.

4. The advantage by Christ *exceeds*, abounds beyond the disadvantage by Adam. But unless all men be saved, the former "sinks below" the latter.§ It is granted, that the advantage by Christ, to those who obtain salvation by Christ, exceeds, and

* Page 30. † p. 38. ‡ p. 32. § p. 32 and 81, etc.

abounds beyond the disadvantage by Adam. But the question is, whether this saving advantage extend to all those, to whom the disadvantage by Adam extended. That it does extend to all the same subjects to whom the disadvantage by Adam extended, is holden by Dr. C. But how does he prove it? By no other arguments than those which we have already particularly considered; and whether they be conclusive, is submitted to the reader. Dr. C. did not imagine, that the advantage by Christ was more extensive, or extended to a greater number of persons, than the disadvantage by Adam. He believed, that they both extended to all mankind. Therefore, the superabounding, the excess, or surplusage of the advantage by Christ, does not consist in the extent of it, but in something else, and that something else may exist, though the extent as to the number of persons be the same, or even less than the extent of the disadvantage by Adam.

If the glory of God, and the happiness of the created system, be more advanced by the salvation of a part of the human race, and by the rejection of the rest, than they would have been, if Adam had never fallen; then surely the advantage by Christ on the general scale, does not "sink below" the disadvantage by Adam; and to assert, that the divine glory and the happiness of the created system would be most advanced by the salvation of all men, is to beg material points in question. But if Dr. C. mean, that if all be not saved by Christ, then the advantage by Christ to those who shall be finally miserable, "sinks below" the disadvantage by Adam to the same persons; I grant it, and apprehend no disadvantage to my cause by the concession. For it is granting no more than is implied in the very proposition, which I endeavor to defend, that all men will not be saved.

I have now finished my remarks on Dr. C's argument from Rom. 5: 12, etc. If the reader think I have been prolix in these remarks, I hope he will remember how prolix the Doctor was in his argument from this passage; and I presume he will not think it unreasonable to take up nineteen pages in answering sixty-nine.

It is now left to the reader to judge, whether it be certain, that because the word *many* in the former part of the 15th and 19th verses means *all* men, it means the same in the latter part of those verses; whether it be certain, that the word *many* means all men, because the article is joined with it *οἱ πολλοί, the many*; whether because the words *all* men in the former part of the 18th verse, mean all mankind, they certainly mean the same in the latter part of that verse; whether because the advantage by Christ exceeds the disadvantage by Adam, it certainly follows, that the advantage to every individual man, will exceed the disadvantage to that man.

CHAPTER X.

IN WHICH IS CONSIDERED DR. C'S ARGUMENT FROM ROMANS 8: 19—24.

The text is, "For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject to vanity not willingly, but by reason of him who subjected the same in hope. Because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourselves also which have the first fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body." The words of chief importance are those of the 21st verse: "The creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God;" which are supposed by Dr. C. to hold forth the salvation of all men. But the main question here is, what is the meaning of the word *creature*. Dr. C. supposes it means *the human race*. Others suppose it means the whole of the creation which was made for the sake of men, and is subjected to their use. Beside the word *creature*, the following words and expressions, "manifestation of the sons of God"—"vanity"—"willingly"—"bondage of corruption"—are all understood differently by Dr. C. and by those who believe in endless punishment. Let us therefore attend to them respectively.

I. The meaning of the word κτίσις, *creature* or *creation*, is to be sought. It may not be impertinent to inform the reader who is unacquainted with the original, that the word translated creature in the 19th, 20th and 21st verses, is the very same which in the 22d verse is translated *creation*; and doubtless whatever be the meaning of it, it ought to have been translated uniformly throughout this passage. Dr. C. was of opinion that it means all mankind or the rational creation of this world. His reasons for this opinion are, that "*earnest expectation, groaning, travailing together in pain*, are more naturally and obviously applicable to the rational, than the inanimate" [and brutal] "creation" —"that πᾶσα κτίσις, the *whole creation*, is never used (one disputed text only excepted, Col. 1: 15), to signify more than the whole moral creation, or all mankind;" that "it would be highly incongruous, to give this style" [the whole creation] "to the infe-

rior or less valuable part, wholly leaving out the most excellent" part, mankind.

1. "*Earnest expectation, groaning, travailing together in pain*, are more naturally applicable to the rational, than the inanimate" [and brutal] "creation."* If this prove anything, it will prove too much; it will prove, that when in Ps. 114, it is said, "The sea saw it and fled; Jordan was driven back; the mountains skipped like rams, and the little hills like lambs;" the meaning is, that *men* saw it and fled; that men were driven back; that men skipped like rams and like lambs. It will prove, that Jer. 47: 6, "O thou sword of the Lord, how long will it be ere thou be quiet? put up thyself into thy scabbard, rest and be still;" means that *men* should put up themselves into a scabbard, and there rest and be still. It will prove that Hos. 13: 14, "I will ransom them from the power of the grave; I will redeem them from death. O death, I will be thy plagues; O grave, I will be thy destruction;" means that God will be the plagues and destruction of *men;* and when once it is established, that death and the grave mean men, as men are to be ransomed from the grave and redeemed from death, it will follow that men are to be ransomed from themselves and redeemed from themselves. But there is no end to the absurdities which will follow from this mode of construing the scriptures.

The truth is, that the figure of speech, whereby inanimate things are represented as living, sensible and rational persons, and are addressed as such, is very common in scripture. Beside the instances already mentioned, I beg leave to refer to the following: Deut. 32: 1, "Give ear, O ye heavens, and I will speak; hear, O earth, the words of my mouth." Ps. 65: 12, 13, "The little hills rejoice on every side. The pastures; the valleys; shout for joy; they also sing." Is. 55: 12, "The mountains and the hills shall break forth before you into singing, and all the trees of the field shall clap their hands." Hab. 2: 11, "For the stone shall cry out of the wall, and the beam out of the timber shall answer it." Ps. 89: 12, "Tabor and Hermon shall rejoice in thy name." Ps. 97: 1, "The Lord reigneth, let the earth rejoice; let the multitude of the isles be glad thereof." Is. 24: 4, "The earth mourneth and fadeth away, the world mourneth, languisheth and fadeth away." See also Ps. 98: 8. Is. 16: 8. 35: 1, 2. 49: 13. Lev. 18: 28, etc.

Now rejoicing, shouting for joy, singing, breaking forth into singing, clapping of hands, crying out, answering, mourning, lan-

* Page 98.

guishing, etc. are certainly in these passages applied to inanimate creatures. But they are applicable to such creatures, not more naturally and obviously, than earnest expectation, groaning and travailing in pain.

Though the Doctor thinks these expressions not properly applicable to any other creatures than mankind; yet he himself applies them to mankind in no other sense, than that in which they are applicable to the brutal creation. The sense in which he supposes all mankind *long* and *wait* for the manifestation of the sons of God, is, that they "groan under the afflictions of this world, sensible of its imperfections, and consequently desire something better." Now the calamities of the world fall not on the rational part of it only, but on all the animal, sensitive parts, and consequently they, as well as mankind, "desire something better." From these calamities and miseries the animal parts of the world will be delivered, at the manifestation of the sons of God.

Further, the inanimate parts of the world, once personified, as they are in innumerable instances throughout the scriptures, may as properly have the particular personal affections, actions and sufferings, of *expectation*, *waiting*, *groaning*, *travailing*, etc. ascribed to them, as any other personal affections, actions or sufferings.

If any should think it impossible for brutes and inanimate matter to enjoy the liberty of the children of God, and therefore that it is absurd to represent, that they shall be delivered into that liberty; let it be observed, that though this would be absurd, while they are represented to be still brutes and inanimate matter; yet as soon as they are represented to be intelligent beings, the absurdity ceases. There is in this case no more absurdity in representing them, as brought into the glorious liberty of the children of God after the resurrection, than in representing, that they rejoice in the manifestation of the divine perfections and in the prevalence of true religion in this world; as is done in the passages before quoted.

Objection. Though there would be no absurdity in figuratively representing brutes and inanimate creatures, in this world, as rejoicing in the manifestations of divine power, wisdom and goodness, yet there is an absurdity in the representation, that they shall be brought into the liberty of the children of God, after the end of the world; because then they will be annihilated; and to represent that after they shall be annihilated, they still enjoy glorious liberty, is a gross inconsistency. This is the objection in its full strength. Let us attend to it.

It is not agreed by all writers, that the liberty of the children of God mentioned in the 21st verse, means that liberty and blessedness which they shall enjoy after the resurrection and general judgment; some are of the opinion, that it means that liberty which they shall enjoy on earth in the latter days, when Christ shall reign on earth for a thousand years.* If this be the true sense of the apostle, the objection vanishes at once, as the brutal and inanimate creation will then be in as real existence, as they are now.

Nor is it agreed among writers, that this world will, after the general judgment be annihilated. It is the opinion of many, and of great authority too, that after a purification by fire, it will be restored to a far more glorious state, than that in which it is at present, and will forever be the place of the residence of holy and happy beings. If this be true, the objection again vanishes.

Finally, if it be the real truth, that the brutal and material creation will be annihilated, after the general judgment, yet there is no absurdity in representing, that it shall be brought into the glorious liberty of the children of God. Wherein does the liberty of the children of God consist? Doubtless in a great measure in deliverance from sin, and from the influence of it in themselves and others. So the brutal and material creation, even if it be annihilated, shall be delivered from the power, abuse and abominable perversion of wicked men, to which it had been long subjected, and under which it had long groaned. Therefore this creation introduced as a rational person, may, without impropriety be represented as earnestly wishing for that deliverance. And as the deliverance from sin in themselves and from the effects of sin in others, is at least a great part of the liberty which the children of God shall obtain after the general judgment; so the aforesaid deliverance of the creation may not improperly be called a deliverance into the liberty of the children of God, into a similar liberty, a like freedom from the tyranny, abuses and perversions of wicked men. Or the sense may be a deliverance *in, at,* or *on occasion of,* the glorious liberty of the children of God. The preposition εἰς, is capable of this sense, and then the construction of this passage will be, That the creation itself will be delivered from the bondage of corruption, at the time, or on occasion of the glorious liberty or deliverance of the children of God.

2. Doctor C. further pleads, "That πᾶσα κτίσις, *the whole cre-*

* See Guise's Paraphrase in loc. and Hopkins' Inquiry concerning the Future State of the Wicked, p. 101.

ation, is never used (one disputed text only excepted, Col. 1: 15) to signify more than the whole moral creation, or all mankind."* This is a matter of importance, and requires particular attention. The phrase πᾶσα κτίσις is used four times only in all the New Testament, beside the instance which is now under consideration. The places are, Mark 16: 15, "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to *every creature*." Col. 1: 15, "The first born of *every creature*." V. 23, "The gospel which ye have heard, which is preached to every creature, which is under heaven." 1 Pet. 2: 13, "Submit yourselves to *every ordinance of man* for the Lord's sake."

As to Mark 16: 15, it is granted, that in that text *every creature* means *human* creature. Though Dr. C. says, that Col. 1: 15, is disputed; yet he pretends not, that every creature here means mankind merely; nor does it appear, that the text is in this respect disputed. It is indeed disputed, whether πάσης κτίσεως, *every creature*, or rather, *all the creation*, refer to the new creation, i. e. the church, or to the old creation, which was made at the beginning of the world. It is also disputed, whether Christ be so the first-born of all the creation, as to be a creature himself; or whether he be the first-born in this sense only, that he is the heir, the head and Lord of all the creation. Πρωτοτόκος, in our version rendered first-born, is by some rendered *first creator* or *producer*, which gives a still different sense to the passage. But it does not appear, that it has ever been contended, that πάσης κτίσεως "signifies no more than all mankind." For in whatever sense Christ is the first-born of all the creation, he is the first-born not only of the human race, but of all the creation absolutely. If it be said, that Christ is the first-born of all the creation, as he is the first creature which was made; this implies, that he was made not before all men only, but before all creatures. If it be said, that he is the first-born of all the creation, as he was begotten from eternity, and so begotten before all the creation; still he was in this sense begotten not before all men only, but before all creatures. If it be said, that he is the first-born of all the creation, as he is the heir, the head, the Lord of all; still in this sense he is the first-born not of mankind only, but of all creatures. What right then had Dr. C. to suggest, that it is disputed, whether πάσης κτίσεως in this text "signify more than the whole moral creation of this world, or all mankind?"

The next passage, in which πᾶσα κτίσις occurs, is Col. 1: 23, "The gospel, which was preached to every creature under heaven." The doctor, who was well acquainted with the original,

* Page 99.

doubtless recollected, or at least he ought to have examined, and then he would have seen, that in the original it is, "ἐν πάσῃ τῇ κτίσει, "*in* all the creation under heaven," or in all the world. Surely the Doctor did not imagine, that the gospel was preached *within* every man.

The other passage is 1 Pet. 2: 13, "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of men;" πάσῃ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει, *every human creature.* The question is whether these words signify *all mankind;* and the very proposing of the question, I presume, suggests the answer. Will any man say, that every christian is required, either by reason or revelation, to submit to every individual of the human race, whether man, woman or child; and whether the christian be a lord or a tenant, a king or a subject? Besides; allowing that the phrase as it stands, means the human race; the addition of ἀνθρωπίνῃ to πάσῃ κτίσει shows that πάσῃ κτίσει without ἀνθρωπίνῃ, would not signify the human race; otherwise why is it added? If the words in our language, *every creature,* mean always every human creature, it would be needless in any case to insert the adjective *human;* and the very insertion of it would imply, that the writer or speaker was of the opinion, that the bare words *every creature,* were not certainly limited to human creatures, but would most obviously be taken in a greater extent. This text therefore is so far from a proof, that "πᾶσα κτίσις, *every creature,* is never used in all the New Testament (except in one disputed text) to signify more than all mankind;" that it is a clear proof, that it does naturally "signify more than all mankind," and to make it signify no more, must be limited by ἀνθρωπίνῃ, *human.*

After all, the very drift of the apostle shows, that in 1 Pet. 2: 13, he was so far from meaning all mankind by the expression πάσῃ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει, that he meant either not one of the human race, or at most but very few; that he meant either human laws and constitutions, or human magistrates, the king as supreme, governors who are sent by him, etc.

Now let the reader judge, whether πᾶσα κτίσις be never used in all the New Testament to signify more or less than all mankind; and whether of the four instances, in which it occurs, beside this of Rom. viii, it do not in every one signify either more or less than all mankind, excepting Mark 16: 15. And it is equally against Dr. C's argument from Rom. viii, whether it be used in other places to signify more, or to signify less than all mankind. If it signify more in other places, it may signify more in Rom. viii. If it signify less in other places, it may signify less in Rom. viii; and when the apostle says, "the earnest ex-

pectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God," he may mean that only believers and true christians, or the true church in all ages, as distinguished from the Apostle, and first converts, who had the first fruits of the Spirit, are thus waiting, etc.

It is further to be observed, that κτίσις *creature* or *creation*, without πᾶσα, is in the whole New Testament used ten times, beside the use of it in Rom. viii; in no one of which does it mean mankind. The places in which it is used are all noted in the margin, that the reader may examine them for his own satisfaction.*

In the Septuagint version of the Old Testament, κτίσις occurs but three times: 2 Chron. 14: 15, where it is translated *cattle;* Ezra 8: 21, where it is translated *substance;* and Ps. 104: 24, where it is translated *riches.* In the Apocrypha it is used nine times; and not once to signify all mankind and not more or less.†

But it is time we attend to Dr. C's other reason for understanding the *creature* to mean all mankind; or at least to include all mankind, if it mean anything more. The reason is,

3. That "it would be highly incongruous, to give this style" [the whole creation] "to the inferior or less valuable part, wholly leaving out the most excellent" part, mankind.‡ But is there more propriety in calling a small part, though it be the most excellent part, *the whole creation;* than in calling by far the greater part *the whole creation,* though it be not so excellent? The learned men in any nation, are, in some respects the most excellent part of the nation. But would it be more proper to call them, to the exclusion of all the unlearned, the whole nation, than to call all the unlearned, to the exclusion of the few learned, the whole nation. The few truly virtuous and holy persons who love God supremely and their neighbor as themselves, and who find the straight gate, are undoubtedly the most excellent part of any nation. But would it be more proper to call them alone the whole nation, than to call the rest alone, the whole nation? Those of the apostolic age, who had the first fruits of the Spirit, were, without doubt the most excellent of that generation. But would it therefore be more proper to call them as distinguished from the rest of men, that whole generation; than to

* Mark 10: 6. 13: 19. Rom. 1: 20, 25. 2 Cor. 5: 17. Gal. 6: 15. Heb. 4: 13. 9: 11. 2 Pet. 3: 4. Rev. 3. 14.

† The places are, Judith 9: 12. 16: 14. Wisd. 2: 6. 5: 17. 16: 24. 19: 6. Eccl. 16: 17. 43: 25. 49: 16.

‡ Page 98.

call the rest of men as distinguished from them, that whole generation? Beside; propriety or congruity of language depends wholly on use. If the words *creature*, *creation* and *whole creation* be frequently in scripture used without any reference to mankind; then there is no incongruity in the same use of the same words, in this eighth chapter of Romans; and that this is the case, I appeal to the texts before quoted, which are all the texts in which the words here translated *creature*, and the *whole creation*, are to be found in all the scriptures.

II. We are to inquire into the meaning of the expression, "manifestation of the sons of God." These words, "The earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God;" are thus paraphrased by Dr. C. "The creature, the rational creature, mankind in general, waits for the time when it shall be revealed, that they are the sons of God."* He here takes it for granted, that the word *creature* means *mankind*. Whether this be a supposition justly founded, is now submitted to the reader who has perused what has been offered on this subject.

But even on the supposition that the *creature* does mean *mankind*, how strange it is that the waiting of this creature for the manifestation of the sons of God, should mean that this creature is waiting to be *itself* manifested to be the sons of God! Would it not be strange arguing, to say, that because the Jews waited for the manifestation of the Messiah, therefore they waited to have it manifested, that they were the Messiah! or that because Simeon waited for the manifestation of the consolation of Israel; therefore he waited to have it made apparent, that he was the consolation of Israel! Yet either of these expressions as naturally imports the sense which I have now given, as the expression, *the creature waiteth* for the manifestation of the sons of God, imports, that the "creature" or race of creatures is waiting to have it "revealed that they are the sons of God."

III. The meaning of the word "vanity" next requires our attention. By this word Dr. C. understands *mortality* and all other unavoidable *unhappiness* and *imperfection* of this present weak, frail, mortal state."† Again, "mankind were subjected to vanity or *mortality*."‡ "God subjected mankind to vanity, i. e. the *infelicities* of this life."§ According to Dr. C. then, the vanity here spoken of is a *natural* evil. But it may at least be made a question, whether he be not mistaken, and whether it be not a *moral* evil. The same word, ματαιότης, is used twice more in the New Testament; Eph. 4: 17, "That ye henceforth

* Page 92. † p. 104. ‡ p. 106. § Ibid.

walk, not as other Gentiles walk in the *vanity* of their mind, having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God," etc.; and 2 Pet. 2: 18, "For when they speak great swelling words of "*vanity*." In these two, the only instances of its use in the New Testament, beside the text under consideration, it manifestly means not a natural but a moral evil, either positive wickedness or at least a sinful deficiency. Is not this a ground of presumption at least, that also in Rom. 8: 20, it means a moral evil?

In the same sense *μάταιος* the adjective from which *ματαιότης* is derived, is used Jam. 1: 26, "This man's religion is vain;" and 1 Pet. 1: 18, "Ye were not redeemed with corruptible things—from your *vain* conversation." *Ματαιόομαι* is also used in the same sense, Rom. 1: 21, "Became *vain* in their imaginations and their foolish heart was darkened." *Vain* and *vanity* in none of these instances signify "mortality" or "infelicity;" but either positive sin or sinful deficiency.

Besides; the very nature of the case shows, that vanity in this instance was not used by the apostle, in Dr. C's sense. According to his sense of *vanity*, the apostle under the influence of the Holy Ghost, advances this proposition: The human race was made subject to "mortality, unavoidable unhappiness and imperfection," not willingly. But who ever supposed that the human race was made subject to these things willingly? or that any man, or any intelligent being, ever chose to be subject to mortality and unhappiness? This is a proposition too insignificant to be advanced by so sensible and grave a writer as Paul, and under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost too. The Doctor seems to have been aware of this objection to his construction of *vanity*, and therefore supposes the word *willingly* means, not what is naturally understood by it, *a voluntary consent of the heart;* but that it means, "through some fault," "by a criminal choice." Therefore

IV. We are to inquire into the meaning of the word *willingly*. Is it not at first blush a little extraordinary, that willingness must certainly mean a fault, a criminal choice? Suppose an historian should say, that *Hugh Peters* and others who were executed at the restoration of *Charles* the second, were executed not *willingly*; must we understand him to mean, that they were not executed in consequence of any fault of their own? The original word *ἑκών* is used once more only in all the New Testament, 1 Cor. 9: 17, "If I do this thing" (i. e. preach the gospel) "*willingly*, *ἑκών*, I have a reward; but if *against my will*, *ἄκων*, a dispensation of the gospel is committed unto me." According

to Dr. C's construction of *willingly* in Rom. 8, the meaning of the apostle is, If I preach the gospel "through some fault of my own," or "by my own criminal choice," I have a reward; but if I do it without any fault or criminal choice of my own, a dispensation of the gospel is committed unto me. *Ἑκούσιος* deriv- from *ἑκών*, and of the same signification, is in the New Testament used in Phil. 14, only, "That thy benefit should not be of necessity, but *willingly*;" which I presume even Dr. C. would not expound thus: That thy benefit should not be of necessity, but through some fault of thine own. The adverb, *ἑκουσίως*, is used twice in the New Testament, Heb. 10: 26, "If we sin *wilfully*, after we have received the knowledge of the truth;" and 1 Pet. 5: 2, "Taking the oversight thereof, not by constraint but *willingly*." To the first of these the Doctor in a quotation from *Taylor*, refers, as an authority, to confirm his sense of *willingly* in Rom. viii. But surely both he and Taylor made this reference with little consideration; for according to them the sense of the verse in Hebrews is this: If after we have received the knowledge of the truth, we sin "through our own fault," or "by our own criminal choice." Did Dr. C. or Dr. T. indeed believe, that we ever sin without any fault of our own, or without our own criminal choice? It is plain, that the meaning of Heb. 10: 26, is what is well expressed in the translation: If we sin *wilfully*, not through some inattention, but pertinaciously, after we know the truth, know our duty and the proper motives to it; there remaineth no more sacrifice for sin.

Thus the construction, which Dr. C. gives of *willingly*, as meaning, "through our own fault," or "by our own criminal choice," appears to be wholly unsupported by any authority; to be a mere invention to help over the difficulty of the supposition, that the inspired apostle should advance so trifling a proposition as this; that mankind do not choose misery; and also appears to be attended with many absurdities.

The error of that construction further appears from this, that if what comes upon us not through our own fault, be properly expressed by saying, that we are subjected to it, *not willingly*; then what does come upon us through our own fault, may be properly expressed, by saying, it comes upon us *willingly*. At this rate the inhabitants of the old world were drowned *willingly*; Sodom and Gomorrah were burnt up *willingly*; Pharaoh was first plagued, and then destroyed in the Red Sea *willingly*; Korah, Dathan and Abiram were swallowed up in the earth *willingly*; those whom Dr. C. supposes to be punished in hell for ages of ages, are punished *willingly*.

Neither is it true, in Dr. C's sense, that mankind are made subject to vanity, *not willingly;* i. e. "Not through any fault of theirs;" "not by their own criminal choice." By *vanity* he understands "mortality," "and the infelicities of this vain mortal life." Therefore according to him, men are not made subject to mortality, and the infelicities of this life, through any fault of their own. And if so, then death and the various infelicities of life are not any evidence, that the subjects of death and those infelicities are themselves sinners, or the objects of God's displeasure. But this is contrary to the whole current of scriptural representations; particularly to Ps. 90: 3, etc. "Thou turnest man to destruction, and sayest, Return ye children of men. Thou carriest them away, as with a flood; they are as a sleep. In the morning they are like grass, which groweth up; in the evening it is cut down and withereth. For they are consumed *by thine anger*, and by thy *wrath* they are troubled. Thou hast set our *iniquities* before thee, our secret *sins* in the light of thy countenance. For our days are passed away in thy *wrath;* we spend our days as a tale that is told. The days of our years are threescore years and ten; and if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their strength labor and sorrow; for it is soon cut off, and we fly away. Who knoweth the power of thine *anger*? even according to thy fear, so is thy *wrath*. So teach us to number our days, that we may apply our hearts to wisdom." "How plain and full is this testimony, that the general mortality of mankind is an evidence of God's *anger for the sin* of those, who are the subjects of such a dispensation?"*

But if mortality and the calamities of life be an evidence of God's anger at the sin of those who suffer death and those calamities; then it is not true, that men in general are subjected to death and those calamities without any fault of their own; but the truth is, that they are subjected to them on account of their own sin, as this is the very cause of the divine anger, of which calamity and death are the effects and tokens.

If it should be objected, that to be made subject to vanity, in this passage, does not mean, to be made actually to suffer death and infelicity, or does not include the *infliction* of death and infelicity; but implies mortality only, or that constitution whereby men are made mortal or *liable* to death and infelicity; this objection grants, that death and infelicity are actually inflicted on

* For further proof that temporal death and infelicities come on men, on account of their own sins, I beg leave to refer the reader to President Edwards' book on Original Sin, Part I. Chap. II.

men on account of their own fault or sin; but holds, that the *sentence* of mortality and *liableness* to infelicity took place in consequence of Adam's sin only. So that according to this, the sense of the apostle will be, That the human race was put under a sentence of mortality, without any fault of their own; yet this sentence was never to be executed, but on account of their own fault. And the consideration that mankind are put under the sentence of mortality, without any fault of their own, is a ground of hope, that they will be delivered from that sentence of mortality. But as the *actual infliction* of death is on account of their own fault, there is no such ground of hope, that they will be delivered from death and infelicity themselves. A mighty privilege this (were it possible) to be delivered from the *sentence* of death, and from mortality, but not from *death itself!* To be delivered from *liableness* to infelicity, but not from infelicity itself!

I am not insensible of the absurdity and impossibility of such a supposition. But who is answerable for this absurdity? Doubtless the objector himself, who is of the opinion, that to be made subject to vanity, is to be under the sentence of death, and to be made liable to infelicity, but not to suffer death or infelicity.

The idea, that to be made subject to vanity, ὑπεταγη, means not the *state* of subjection to vanity, but the *act* by which the creature was subjected; and that διὰ τὸν ὑποτάξαντα means as Dr. C. says,* by or through him, who subjected it; implies this further absurdity, that the act, by which the creature was made subject to vanity, was by him who subjected it; or that act was really the act of him whose act it was; that he who subjected the creature to vanity, really did subject it to vanity. But who will dare to impute such identical propositions to the inspired apostle?

V. We at length come to consider Dr. C's sense of the phrase *bondage of corruption.* This according to him is synonymous with *vanity.* Therefore the same observations for substance, which were made concerning his sense of *vanity*, are applicable to his sense of *the bondage of corruption.* But a few things in particular are worthy of remark. Dr. C. says, that in consequence of the subjection of man "to a frail, mortal, corruptible condition —he is upon the foot of *mere law*, and without the supposition of *grace* or *gospel*, in bondage to bodily or animal appetites and inclinations."† It seems then, that since all christianized nations are under not *mere law*, but *grace*, and *gospel*, they are not in bondage to bodily or animal appetites and inclinations, and

* Page 105. † p. 109.

doubtless for the same reason, are not in bondage to any principle of depravity. But is this indeed so, that men under *mere law* are so depraved, as to be in bondage to animal appetites; but as soon as they are placed under the gospel, in the mere external dispensation of it, they are no longer the subjects of any depravity? It seems then, that the natural depravity of men depends on their mere external circumstances; that while they are without the gospel their hearts are in bondage to animal appetites; but as soon as they are placed under the gospel, however they disregard it, they are free from that bondage. But all those nations to whom Christianity is published, are under the gospel; therefore they are already free from bondage to animal appetites; and it is absurd for them to *hope*, that they *shall* be delivered from this part of the bondage of corruption.

Beside; Dr. C. says, that "both these senses of bondage," [i. e. bondage to death and bondage to animal appetites] "are certainly included in that vanity the creature is subjected to."* Then by the creature Dr. C. must mean, not the whole moral creation, or all mankind including those nations and individuals to whom the gospel is made known; because they are not under *mere law*, and therefore according to him are not subjected to that part of vanity which consists in bondage to animal appetites. Yet he abundantly holds, that all men are subjected to *vanity*, which certainly includes, according to him, bondage to animal appetites.

According to Dr. C. vanity includes bondage to bodily or animal appetites. Yet mankind are subjected to vanity not through any fault or crime of their own. But is it not a fault or crime in any man, to be governed by his bodily appetites, or to be in bondage to them? With what truth or consistency then could he hold, that men are subjected to vanity not through any fault or crime of their own, and that therefore their subjection to vanity is a ground of hope of deliverance from it; when the very state of subjection to vanity is a very great fault or crime? Can a fault or crime be a ground of hope of impunity, or of the divine favor?

But perhaps it may be pleaded, that though the *state* of subjection, or the being subject to vanity, implies a fault; yet the *act of subjecting*, or the act by which mankind were subjected to vanity, is not through, or on account of any previous fault of mankind in general; and this is the ground of hope that they shall be delivered. If this be the meaning of Dr. C. it comes to this. That because mankind are, in consequence of Adam's sin,

* Page 109.

not their own personal sin, subjected by God to frailty, mortality, bodily appetites and sin; therefore they do not deserve to be left without hope of deliverance; the divine perfections do not admit of it; it would not be just; at least it would be a hard case. Otherwise, where is the ground of hope of deliverance? No promise is pleaded as the ground of this hope. The only pretended ground of hope in this argument is, that mankind were subjected to vanity, not through any fault of their own; as in the following passage: "For if mankind were subjected to a state of suffering, not through any wilful disobedience which they themselves had been personally guilty of, it is congruous to reason to think, that they should be subjected to it not finally—but with room for hope that they should be delivered from it; and was it not for this hope, it cannot be supposed—it would be a reflection on the benevolence of the Deity to suppose, that they would have been subjected to it."* But if this subjection to vanity by God be perfectly just, what right have we to expect, that God will deliver *all* men from the consequences of it? Have we a right without a divine promise, to expect that God will suffer none of the sinful race of men to bear the consequences of a just and wise constitution? And would it be a reflection on the Deity, not to expect this?

So that this whole argument of Dr. C. implies that God in subjecting mankind, on account of Adam's sin, "to a state of suffering," made an unjust constitution. Yet Dr. C. himself abundantly holds, that this is a real constitution of God.

At the same time, it is implied in all this, that if mankind had been thus subjected to vanity, in consequence of their own personal sin; they might justly have been left without hope. Thus it is really granted by Dr. C. after all his labor to prove the contrary, that the personal sins of men, deserve a hopeless state of suffering. And the whole question in the present view of it, comes to this, Whether the personal actual sins of mankind, under the present divine constitution, be real sins, and deserve the punishment justly due to sin; or whether these sins be not excusable, because they are the established consequence of Adam's transgression, and not the consequence of their own voluntary act. Or in other words, whether the moral evil of any action consist in the nature of the action itself, or in its cause or antecedents. Of this question I should be very willing to enter into the discussion, were it necessary; but as it has been so particularly considered by another author, I beg leave to refer to

* Page 102.

him.* I beg the reader's patience however, while I make only one or two brief observations.

If the present actions of mankind be excusable, because they are the consequence of Adam's transgression and not of their own previous sinful actions or volitions in the first instance; it will follow that there is no sin or moral evil in the world, nor ever has been. All the present actions of men, if they be excusable, are no moral evil. The same is true of all the actions of men ever since the fall of Adam. And even Adam's transgression itself is no moral evil; for this did not take place in consequence of any previous criminal choice or action; because by supposition, that transgression was the first sin committed by man. Whatever transgression he first committed, is the very transgression of which we are speaking; and it is absurd to talk of a sin previous to the first sin.

Concerning Dr. C's idea, that mankind are subjected to mortality, infirmity, and the influence of bodily appetites, on account of Adam's sin only, without any regard to their personal sins; and that this subjection was the cause and occasion of all the actual transgressions and temporal calamities of the posterity of Adam; it may be observed:

1. That for reasons already given,† it appears not to be true, that mortality and the calamities of life are brought on men on account of Adam's sin merely, without regard to the personal demerit of those who suffer them.

2. That the human race was indeed, in the sentence of God on Adam, subjected to infirmity and mortality; but it was no more subjected to these, than it was to depravity and sin. At least to assert the contrary would be to beg an important point in dispute; and to be sure, Dr. C. could not with any consistency assert the contrary. He holds throughout this, and all his other works, that the human race is subjected to infirmity on account of Adam's sin, and the Doctor's idea of this infirmity amounts to a proper moral depravity of nature. All that is meant, or that needs to be meant, by the moral depravity natural to mankind, in this fallen state, so far as that depravity is distinct from *actual* sin, is something in our nature, which universally leads to actual sin. Whether this something exist primarily in the body and bodily appetites, or primarily in the soul, is perfectly immaterial, so long as it is an unfailing source of actual sin, as Dr. C. manifestly considers it.‡ In his *Five Dissertations* he is very ex-

* President Edwards' Enquiry into Freedom of Will throughout; particularly Part IV. sect. 1. † Page 169. ‡ p. 45, etc.

plicit and abundant in this matter. His words are, "In consequence of the operation of appetites and inclinations seated in our mortal bodies, we *certainly shall*, without the interposition of grace—do that—the doing of which will denominate us the *captives of sin* and the *servants of corruption*."* "He" [the apostle] "ascribes it to *the flesh*, by means of the *overbearing influence* of its propensities in this our present mortal state, that we do that which our minds disapprove;"† and in many other passages to the same effect. So that Dr. C. really, though it seems undesignedly, held, that moral depravity of nature comes upon all mankind, on account of Adam's sin; and his favorite construction of Rom. 5: 12, "And so death passed upon all men, *for that*" (or as he will have it, *whereupon, in consequence of which*) "all have sinned;" comes to this only; that on account of Adam's sin, a divine sentence was denounced on the whole human race, dooming it to a state of moral depravity; in consequence of which moral depravity all men commit actual sin. What then has the Doctor gained by the construction of this passage, which he has labored so hardly in this and his other works to establish; and in which he claims to be an original; and which perhaps is the only particular in his whole book, with respect to which he has a right to set up his claim? It is also curious to see a gentleman of Dr. C's abilities, both opposing and defending with all his might, the native moral depravity of human nature!

Reasons have been already given, why *willingly* ought to be understood not to mean *through the fault of a person*; but in its original proper sense, *with the consent of a person*. If those reasons be sufficient, there is a further difficulty in Dr. C's construction of this passage, especially of the 20th verse. According to his construction of κτίσις, *creature*, the apostle declares, that mankind are subject to their bodily appetites, and so to sin, not willingly, not with their own consent. But is it possible, that men should be subject to bodily appetites, and should commit actual, personal sin, without their own consent?—If, to evade this observation, it be said, that they are however by the act of God, without any previous consent of their own, subjected to frailty, mortality, bodily appetites, and so to sin; this would be mere trifling. Who ever imagined, that God first waited for the consent of mankind, and having obtained their consent, established the constitution, by which they became mortal, frail, subject to the influence of their bodily appetites and so to sin?

After all, Dr. C's exposition of this paragraph in Rom. viii, is

* Page 277. † Ibid.

by no means, even on his own principles, a proof of universal salvation. His translation of those most important words in the 20th and 21st verses, is this: "The creature was subjected to vanity, not willingly; but by the judicial sentence of him, who subjected it, *in consequence of a previous hope* that even this very creature should be delivered from its slavery of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God." So that the utmost, which this passage teaches, according to his own account, is, that mankind may now *hope*, that they shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. But what if there be a foundation to *hope* that this will be the case? Does it thence follow, that this hope will certainly be fulfilled? In consequence of the death of Christ and the proclamation of the gospel, there is a door of hope set open to all men. But does it hence follow, that all men will certainly enter in at this door, and secure the blessings for which there is a foundation to hope? Dr. C. would doubtless grant, that there is a door of *hope* opened to mankind in general, that they may be saved immediately after death. Yet he would not pretend, that this hope is realized. God delivered the Israelites out of Egypt in such a manner, as gave *hope* that even that generation would enter the promised land. Yet this hope was not fulfilled. Therefore, though it should be granted, that God hath subjected mankind to vanity *in hope*, that they shall be delivered from it, into the glorious liberty of the children of God, it would by no means follow, that all men will be saved; and Dr. C. is entirely mistaken, when he says, "Mankind universally is expressly made, in the 21st verse, the subject of this glorious immortality."* No such thing is expressly said, and in these words he contradicts his own paraphrase of that verse, in which he pretends no more, than that there is a foundation for *hope*, that mankind shall attain to a glorious immortality.

In the preceding remarks on Dr. C's construction of this passage, the sense, which I suppose to be the true one, hath been sufficiently expressed. Yet it may be proper here briefly to repeat it. The earnest expectation of the creation waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creation is subject to that use to which it is applied by sinful men, which, as to the end of its existence, the divine glory, is in its own natural tendency, vain and unprofitable, and in many respects positively sinful; I say, to this it is subject not voluntarily, but on account of him, for the sake of his glory, (διά governing the accusative) or for the accomplishment of the mysterious, but wise and glo-

* Page 102.

rious purposes of him, who subjected the same in hope, that this same creation shall be delivered from this unprofitable and sinful use, which may justly be considered as a state of bondage to it, into a liberty, in several important respects, similar to that of the children of God; or at least shall be delivered at the time, when the children of God shall be admitted to the enjoyment of their most glorious liberty. For we know, that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now, by reason of that vile abuse and perversion, which is made of it by sinful men, and through desire of that deliverance just mentioned, and in due time to be granted it.

Beside the observations on particular parts of Dr. C's construction of Rom. viii, some more general remarks occur. One is, that his construction implies, that the divine law is unjust, and cannot be executed consistently with justice. He says,* that man on the foot of *mere law*, without grace, is in bondage to bodily appetites; therefore on the foot of mere law, without grace, there is no hope for him. And he speaks† of the case of mankind as remediless, without the grace manifested in Jesus Christ. Yet in the same page he says, "It is the thought, that mankind were subjected to suffering, not remedilessly, but with an intention of mercy," and "it is this thought only, that can reconcile the unavoidable sufferings of the race of men, as occasioned by the lapse of Adam, with the perfections of God." So that God made a law, which could not be executed consistently with his perfections, and he was obligated in justice to show mercy through Christ to mankind. By mere law men were remediless, and if they had been suffered to remain in that remediless state, as they would have remained in it without Christ and the gospel, such a dispensation could not have been reconciled with the perfections of God. Therefore the divine law cannot be reconciled with justice, or with the perfections of God.

According to Dr. C. vanity included in it *bondage* to bodily appetites, as well as *bondage* to death.‡ Therefore, as God could not consistently with his perfections, subject mankind to vanity, without an intention of mercy;§ and as it would be a reflection on the Deity, to suppose, that he has subjected mankind to vanity, without hope of deliverance;‖ therefore on these principles, God could not consistently with his perfections and character, avoid giving mankind a ground of hope of deliverance from sin, or he could not withhold the grace of the gospel; but he was obliged in justice to his own character, to deliver men from both sin and the sufferings of this life, and it may be pre-

* Page 109. † p. 122. ‡ p. 109. § p. 122. ‖ p. 103.

sumed, that Dr. C. would have consented to add, and from the sufferings of hell too. Where then is the grace of the gospel, and of the gift of Christ? In the gift of Christ, in the institution of the gospel, and in everything pertaining to it, so far as was necessary to our deliverance from sin and punishment, God has done no more than was necessary to save his own character from reflections and reproach.

It may be further remarked, that Dr. C.* argues, that because men are subjected to a state of suffering, not through their own personal disobedience; "it is congruous to reason to think, that they should be subjected to it, not *finally*." But why does he say "not finally?" He might with the same strength of argument have said, *not at all*. The calamities of this life, with temporal death, are inflicted on mankind, either as a punishment, or as sovereign and wise dispensations of Providence. If they be inflicted as a punishment, without any sin by which the subjects deserve them, they are as real an injury as endless misery would be, if it were inflicted as a punishment, in like manner without any sin, by which it should be deserved. And if God do indeed injure his creatures in a less degree, he is an injurious being; and what security have we concerning such a being, that he will not injure them in the highest possible degree? So that if God be a just being, as it is agreed on all hands that he is, it is equally "congruous to reason to think," that he would not subject his creatures to a temporary state of suffering, as a punishment, without any sin by which they deserved it, as that he would not subject them to a state of final suffering.

If it be said, that death and the calamities of life are not a punishment of mankind, but mere sovereign, wise dispensations of providence; this supposition opens a door for endless misery. For how do we know, that the same sovereign wisdom, which is now supposed to inflict temporal evils on mankind, may not also see fit to inflict on them endless evils?

According to Dr. C. men are by a divine constitution subjected to vanity including mortality, infelicity and bondage to bodily appetites. But why was this constitution made? Was it made for the greater happiness of every individual, or of the system, or of both? Whichever of these answers be given, it will follow, that evil both natural and moral is subservient to good; and is introduced, if not in the first instance of Adam's transgression, yet in every other instance, by the positive design and constitution of God. Evil therefore both natural and moral, makes a part of the scheme of God, takes place by his constitution, and is sub-

* Page 103.

ject to his control. What then becomes of the scheme of self-determining power, for which Dr. C. is so zealous an advocate? And here how justly may many passages in Dr. C's writings be retorted. Particularly the following: "If men's volitions and their consequent effects, are the result of invariable necessity in virtue of some *exterior causes* so inviolably connected, as that they will and must come to pass, the author of this connection, which according to this plan is God, is the only efficient and real author of whatever has been, or shall hereafter be brought into event; not excluding any of the most complicated villanies that have been, or may be perpetrated by any of the sons of Adam. Is this a scheme of thoughts fit to be embraced by intelligent creatures?"*

Beside, if this constitution were made for the greater happiness of every individual, then every individual is more happy than he would have been, if he had not been subjected to vanity; and then there is no such thing as punishment in the subjection to vanity, or in any of its consequences; nor any foundation, with a view to the private interest of any man, to regret any of the evils of this life, or of that which is to come.

It does not however appear to be fact, that every individual is in this life rendered more happy by the evils which he suffers here; and to say that he will be rendered by them more happy on the whole hereafter, neither appears to be fact, nor to be capable of proof. How will any man prove that the Sodomites will on the whole be more happy, than Enoch and Elijah, who never tasted death?

If all men be subjected to vanity, to promote not their personal good, but the good of the system, and the good of individuals be given up to this end; why may we not in the same way account for endless punishment? If it be not consistent with the divine perfections to subject men to suffering, unless it issue in their personal good; then it is not consistent with the divine perfections to punish at all, either in this world, or the future.

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* Benevolence of the Deity, p. 136.

CHAPTER XI.

CONTAINING REMARKS ON DR. C'S ARGUMENTS FROM COL. 1: 19, 20. EPH. 1: 10, AND 1 TIM. 2: 4.

The first of those texts is: "For it pleased the Father, that in him all fullness should dwell. And having made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto himself; by him I say, whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven." Dr. C's sense of this passage is this: "It pleased the Father—by Jesus Christ—to change back all things to himself—to change the state of this lower world, of the men and of the things, whether they be in earth, or in the aerial heaven that encompasses it."* It was his opinion, that to reconcile all these things, is to rechange their state, or bring them back to that state they were originally in.† With reference to mankind, he says, "By Christ their state was changed back, they were absolutely brought back to the condition they would have been in, had it not been for the lapse; what I mean is, that they were absolutely and unconditionally put into salvable circumstances."‡ But what follows from all this? One would think Dr. C. had forgotten himself. Supposing all this were granted, would it follow, that all men will be saved? That because they are in salvable circumstances, therefore their actual salvation will be effected? No, no more than from the original state of Adam, it followed that he would never fall. He was indued with a power to stand; he was in such circumstances, that he might have continued in his original innocence. Yet he fell. So, though it be granted, that all men are by Christ put into salvable circumstances, yet through their obstinate impenitence and unbelief they may fail of this great salvation. Doubtless Dr. C. believed, that by Christ the state of mankind is so changed, that they are all salvable, or may be saved, immediately after the end of this world. But this notwithstanding, he believed also, that a great part of mankind would die impenitent, and that none of *them* would be saved within a thousand years of the end of this world, and some of them not till after ages of ages.

But in aid of his argument from this passage, the Doctor brings in again, Rom. 5: 10, "For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his son; *much more* being reconciled, we shall be saved, by his life." I have formerly re-

* Page 127. † p. 129. ‡ p. 132.

marked on the Doctor's use of this passage; and need not repeat those remarks. It may be observed, however, that the manner of his applying this passage to strengthen his argument from Col. 1: 20, really implies, that this last text taken by itself, contains no argument at all, and therefore ought never to have been introduced as a proof. Whatever force there is in it to prove universal salvation, depends entirely, according to Dr. C's stating of the matter, on Rom. 5: 10, which has been considered already. So that if his sense of Col. 1: 20, be true, it does nothing towards proving the salvation of all men.

I do not however mean to suggest, that Dr. C's sense is, in my opinion, the true one. It is impossible, that all things should be brought back, in all respects, to their original state. All mankind cannot now live in the garden of Eden. It cannot be again fact, that all the knowledge of God possessed by men, should be such as is derived from either the works of creation and providence, or from immediate intercourse of God and angels with men. Nor can it be ever again true, that God is propitious to men immediately, without a mediator. In these, and perhaps many other respects, mankind cannot be changed back to their original state. But if once the advocates for universal salvation admit of limitations, and say, that all things will however be brought to their original state in many respects, the believers in endless punishment too must be allowed to apply their limitations; and they will allow, that as the original state was a state of order, regularity and due subordination, wherein every person and thing were in their proper places; so in this sense all things will finally be brought back to their original state, and order will be again restored to the universe.

Nor does the verb *αποκαταλλάττω*, signify in general to change anything back to its former state. For instance, if two men had been long and habitual enemies to each other; and if having for awhile become friends, they should return to their former enmity; I believe no critic in the Greek language would think this return to their enmity, would be properly expressed by *αποκαταλλάττω*, *reconcile*. When the Jews were brought home from the Babylonish captivity, they were changed back to their former state. But is this change ever expressed by *αποκαταλλάττω*, *reconcile*?

This verb is never used in the New Testament, but to signify a change, whereby those who were at enmity, become friends. This observation is true of all those words of the same derivation, on which Dr. C. criticises so abundantly from page 128 to 142. It is therefore not applicable to *all* the things on this

earth, and in the aerial heaven, unless it be by the figure *prosopopoeia*. By that figure indeed everything animate and inanimate may be said to be alienated from man, in consequence of his sin; and to be reconciled to him in consequence of the blood of the cross, and of the return of man to God through Christ. But if this were the idea of Dr. C. he should have given up his objection to the sense of Rom. 8: 19, etc. given by the believers in endless punishment; and at the same time he would have virtually given up his own sense of that passage.

It is strange, that Dr. C. as well as the translators of the bible, should render the words εἰς αὐτόν in Col. 1: 20, *unto himself*. In the preceding verse we have ἐν αὐτῷ; in the 20th verse we have δι' αὐτοῦ, σταυροῦ αὐτοῦ, and again, δι' αὐτοῦ. Now it seems very odd, that in this multiplied use of αὐτός in its various cases, one instance only should be selected from the rest, and rendered *himself*, meaning the Father, and in all the other instances it should be referred to Christ. No person without prepossession, construing this passage, would render it in that manner. It is altogether unnatural to suppose, but that αὐτός refers to the same person in all these instances, and ought to be rendered accordingly.

It is further to be observed concerning ἀποκαταλλάττω and καταλλάσσω, that in all instances in which they occur in the New Testament, in the Septuagint and in the Apocrypha, the person to whom the subject of the proposition is said to be reconciled, is never once expressed in the accusative case governed by the preposition εἰς; but is always expressed in the dative case. Hence it may be inferred that εἰς αὐτόν in Col. 1: 20, does not mean the person to whom all things in heaven and earth are reconciled; but that it means, that all things in heaven and earth are reconciled to each other, into him; i. e. so as to be brought into Christ, to be united under him as their head, and be interested in the common advantages and blessings of his glorious kingdom.

To be in Christ is a common phrase of the New Testament to express subjection to Christ, and an interest in the blessings of his kingdom; and *to be reconciled into Christ*, may mean to become united to him by faith, to become subject to him in obedience, and to be interested in all the blessings of his kingdom.*

By sin angels and men, Jews and Gentiles, became alienated from each other; and men in general, by the predominancy of

* Whether this criticism on the words εἰς αὐτόν, be just or not, it affects not the main question of the salvation of all men.

self-love, became virtually enemies to each other. Now it pleased the Father to reconcile by Jesus Christ, angels and men, Jews and Gentiles to each other, and to diffuse by his grace a spirit of benevolence among them, whereby they should love their neighbor as themselves. And as to the universal term *all things*, we cannot take it in its literal and utmost extent, unless by the figure before mentioned, which Dr. C. cannot admit, without giving up what he most earnestly contends for, in his comment on Rom. 8: 19, etc. But if we once admit a limitation of that universal term, every one must be allowed to propose his own limitation, and some doubtless will insist, that it extends to angels and to believers only from among men; as it is said, that *all* Judea, and *all* the region round about Jordan, were baptized by John; *all* men counted John that he was a prophet; *all* men came to Christ, John 3: 26.

But if we should allow, that *all* things in heaven and earth include all mankind; still even in this extent it is true, that it pleased the Father to reconcile all things; but in such a sense, as not to imply the salvation of all men. This is true in the same sense, in which God hath no pleasure in the death of the wicked, Ezek. 33: 11; or in the death of him that dieth, Chap. 18: 32; in the same sense in which God was unwilling to give up Ephraim, Hos. 11: 8; and in the same sense in which Christ was unwilling to give up the inhabitants of Jerusalem, and would have gathered them together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings; though they would not. The destruction of the sinner is not in itself agreeable to God; as the punishment of a child is not in itself agreeable to a good parent. Yet as a good parent may, to secure the general good of his family, punish a disobedient child; so God, to secure the general good of his kingdom, may punish a rebellious creature. As the good parent who, to prevent that punishment to which his disobedient and apostate child must going on in his disobedience be subjected, uses all proper means to reclaim him, may be said to be pleased with the idea of his impunity; so the Deity who uses all proper means to reclaim all mankind, and to reconcile them to one another, may be said to be well pleased with the idea of this reconciliation, or to choose to reconcile all men to one another, and to bring them into Christ. In itself it is the object of his choice and complacency. In this sense it pleased the Father to reconcile all things; it was what pleased him.

On the whole it appears, that if Dr. C's sense of this passage be the true one, it affords no proof at all of universal salvation; —that his construction of it is far less favorable to that doctrine,

than that which seems to be holden forth by our translation;—that if this last construction be adopted, still it would be no real proof of universal salvation, for two reasons: (1) That the universal term must be limited, and therefore may be so limited as to comprehend angels and believers only of all nations. (2) That even if the universal term be extended to all mankind, still the text is capable of a construction both rational and analogous to other passages of scripture, which yet does by no means imply universal salvation. And the sequel of the apostle's discourse favors this last construction, implying, that it pleased the father, or was in itself pleasing to the father, to reconcile all men, *on the terms of the gospel*, and not *absolutely*, as Dr. C. supposes. The sequel is, "And you that were sometime alienated and enemies in your mind by wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled—to present you holy and unblamable and unreprovable in his sight; if ye continue in the faith grounded and settled, and be not moved away from the hope of the gospel." Will any man pretend, but that this implies, that if they did not continue in the faith, they would not be presented unblamable in the sight of God? But this is far from the doctrine which teaches, that all mankind, whether believers or unbelievers, whether they continue in the faith or not, shall be saved.

Before I quit this part of the Doctor's book, I shall add one remark more. In his comment on this, Col. 1: 20, and on Rom. 5: 10, he takes great pains to make out a double reconciliation to be taught by the apostle *Paul*. "The one," he says, "means that change of state all men are absolutely brought into by the death of Christ; and is opposed to the condemnation through the lapse of the one man Adam. The other is that change of state, which is connected with an actual meetness for, and present interest in eternal life."* But these two reconciliations are really but one; for the definition which the Doctor himself gives of the latter, perfectly agrees with the former. He abundantly holds, that "that change of state, into which all men are brought by the death of Christ," "is connected with an actual meetness for, and present interest in eternal life;" and his whole scheme implies this; otherwise there is no certainty, that all men will be saved, in consequence of the death of Christ. The Doctor himself, in the very next sentence to that just quoted, allows that the former reconciliation is *connected* in the scheme of God with the latter, and *will finally issue in it*. Now, if his first kind of reconciliation be connected with that kind, which is connected with actual meetness for, and present interest in eternal

* Page 135.

life; then that first kind of reconciliation is itself connected with actual meetness for, and present interest in eternal life. If Jacob be connected with Isaac, and Isaac be connected with Abraham, then Jacob too is connected with Abraham.

Let us now attend to the Doctor's argument from Eph. 1: 10, "That in the dispensation of the fullness of times, he might gather together in one, all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth, even in him." On this text the Doctor says, "By means of the lapse, and what has been consequent thereupon, all things in heaven and on earth, were got into a broken, disjointed, disorderly state; and the good pleasure of God to reduce them from their present separated, disorderly state, into one duly-subjected and well subordinated whole, may very fitly be signified by the phrase, ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα, to gather together in one all things. And this I take to be the thing intended here."* But what is this to the purpose of the salvation of all men? It is granted on all hands, that by the lapse, all things relating to men, got into a broken, disjointed, disorderly state; and that it is the good pleasure of God to reduce them from their present separated, disorderly state, into one duly-subjected, well subordinated whole, under Christ as their head; and that this is the thing intended by the apostle in this passage. But if the Doctor supposed, that this implied the repentance and salvation of all men, it was but a mere supposition without proof.

Suppose a rebellion be excited in the kingdom of a most wise and good prince, and this rebellion extend far and wide, so as to throw the whole kingdom into confusion. At length the king's son, at the head of his armies, subdues the rebels, pardons the generality, sentences the leaders, some to the gallows, others to perpetual imprisonment; and thus restores peace, tranquillity, good order and government. Is not a well subjected and duly subordinated state of things in that kingdom now restored and established, although those rebels who are confined in prison, still retain their rebellious tempers, and are not in a state of happiness?

Nor does Dr. C. pretend to point out how a well subordinated state of things proves the salvation of all men; unless it be in the following and other passages not more conclusive: "If God created all men—by Jesus Christ, we may easily collect hence, how he comes to be their common Father; and if they are his children, how fit, proper and reasonable it is, that they should be fellow heirs to, and joint partakers in that happy state, which he

* Page 144.

has proposed shall take place," etc.* It seems then that Eph. 1: 10, proves that all men will be saved, not by anything contained in the text itself, but because all men are the creatures of God. The argument is this: All men are the creatures of God, therefore that well subjected and duly subordinated state of things, which is to be effected by Jesus Christ, implies the salvation of all men. It seems then that that well subjected and duly subordinated state of things, does not of itself imply the final salvation of all men, and therefore this text is introduced with no force of argument. Dr. C. might have argued just as forcibly thus: All men are the creatures of God, therefore all men will be saved. But as to this argument it is entirely different from Eph. 1: 10, and hath been already considered.

We are, in the last place, to attend to Dr. C's argument from 1 Tim. 2: 4, "Who will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth." The questions concerning the meaning of this text, are, as Dr. C. justly observes, two: (1) Who are meant by all men; whether all men individually, or generically? (2) Is there a certain connection between God's willing that all men should be saved, and their actual salvation?

1. Who are meant by *all* men, whether all men individually, or generically. Dr. C. gives two reasons, why this expression should be understood of all men individually.

(1) "That God's willingness that all men should be saved, is brought in as an argument to enforce the duty of praying for all men,"† mentioned in the first and second verses. The Doctor takes for granted, that it is our duty to pray for all men individually; and then concludes, that all men individually are those whom God wills should be saved. But it is by no means true, that we are to pray for all men without exception. The apostle John expressly mentions a sin unto death, and for those who commit that sin we are not to pray, 1 John 5: 16, 17. Our blessed Savior not only did not in fact pray for the world, but openly and in the most solemn manner avowed the omission, John 17: 9. And the prophet *Jeremiah* was forbidden by God, to pray for the Jews for their good, Jer. 14: 11. So that when the apostle in the first verse of the context now under consideration, exhorts to pray for all men, we must of necessity, as we would not set the scripture at variance with itself, understand him to mean not all individuals without exception.

Beside, if it were our duty to pray for all individuals, it may not have been the design of the apostle in this passage to incul-

* Page 160. † p. 164.

cate this duty. The Jewish converts to christianity were full of prejudices against the Gentiles, and above all, against the Gentile kings, and those under whose authority they were; and who, in their opinion, had no right to exercise authority over their nation. Therefore with the utmost propriety does the apostle give the exhortation contained in the first and second verses of this context, though he meant no more, than that Christians should pray for the Gentiles of every nation, as well as for the Jews, and especially for kings and rulers among the Gentiles.

(2) The other reason given by Dr. C. why *all men* should be understood of all men *individually*, is the reason given, why God desires the salvation of all men, viz., that there is one God, and one mediator between God and men. "This," he says, "is a reason which extends to all men" individually, "without limitation." Very true; and it is a reason, which extends to all men generically too; and therefore is a very good reason, why we should pray for the salvation of men of all nations; nor is there anything in this reason which proves, that the apostle meant, that all men individually would be saved.

As to Dr. C's reasoning in the following passage:* "God is as truly the God of one man, as of another; and there is therefore the same reason to think, that he should be desirous of the salvation of every man, as of any man;" it is by no means allowed to be conclusive. It depends on this postulate, which is a begging of the question: That God cannot give existence and other common benefits to a man, and not save him. I might with the same force argue thus: God is as truly the God of one man as of another; therefore there is the same reason to think, that he should be desirous of the temporal prosperity of every man, as of some men. It is no more granted, and therefore ought no more to be asserted without proof, that salvation is connected with this circumstance, that God is a God to every man, in the sense in which it is granted, that he is a God to every man, than that temporal prosperity is connected with that circumstance.

Further, that all men individually are intended, Dr. C. argues from this, that the apostle says, "There is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus." The Doctor says, that the man Jesus mediates between God and men universally. If by the mediation of Jesus, the Doctor meant such a mediation as will certainly issue in the salvation of all men; this again is a mere humble begging of the question. But if he meant a mediation of the following description, that Christ hath made atonement sufficient for all men; is now offering the virtue of that

* Page 164.

atonement to all men; and is using a variety of means to persuade all men to accept and trust in that atonement, and to return to God, seeking his favor and eternal life, for the sake of Christ alone; it follows not at all from such a mediation of Christ, that all individuals will be saved. It no more follows, than from the facts, that God led the Israelites out of Egypt by the hand of a mediator; that he gave them opportunity to enter the land of promise; and that that mediator was the mediator of that whole generation individually; it followed, that that whole generation individually, would certainly enter the land of promise.

Dr. C. says,* "No good reason can be assigned, why the man, Christ Jesus, should mediate between God and *some men only, to the exclusion of others.*" Can a good reason be assigned, why Christ leads to repentance in this life, some men only, to the exclusion or dereliction of others? When such a reason shall be assigned, doubtless we shall be supplied with a reason, why Christ should effectually and savingly mediate in behalf of some men only.

2. The other question concerning the meaning of this text, which also Dr. C. notices,† is, Whether there be a certain connection between God's willing in the sense of this text, that all men should be saved, and their actual salvation. Dr. C. grants that men as free agents have *power* to oppose those means which God uses with them for their salvation; and yet holds that God has a power to counteract, in a moral way, this opposition of men.‡ Of this and other remarkable things in Dr. C. on the subject of *free agency*, particular notice will be taken hereafter. In the meantime it may be observed, that it appears from various passages of scripture, that God is frequently said to *will* things which do not in fact come into existence, or with respect to which his will is not efficacious; as in the following passages: Matt. 23: 37, "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets and stonest them which are sent unto thee; how often *would I*, ἠθέλησα, have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings; and ye *would not!*" Hos. 11: 8, "How shall I give thee up Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee Israel? How shall I make thee as Admah? how shall I set thee as Zeboim? mine heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together." Deut. 5: 28, 29, "They have well said all that they have spoken. O that there were such an heart in them, that they would fear me and keep my commandments always!" Chap. 32: 28, 29, "For they are a nation void of counsel, neither is there any understanding in them. O that

* Page 165. † p. 166. ‡ p. 166, 167.

they were wise, that they understood this, that they would consider their latter end!" Ps. 81: 13, "O that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways!" Isa. 48: 18, "O that thou hadst hearkened to my commandments! Then had thy peace been as a river, and thy righteousness as the waves of the sea." Luke 12: 47, "And that servant which knew his Lord's *will*, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his *will*," etc. Matt. 21: 31, "Whether of them twain did the *will*, of his Father? They say unto him, the first."

Now what right had Dr. C. to suppose, that the *will of God* in 1 Tim. 2: 4, is not used in the same sense as in the passages just quoted? and if it be used in the same sense, there is no more absurdity in supposing that the will of God should be resisted in the one case than in the other; no more absurdity in the supposition, that God should will the salvation of all men, and yet all should not be saved; than that he should will to gather together the inhabitants of Jerusalem, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings; and yet that they should not be thus gathered.

Beside the texts quoted above, I may further refer to Ezek. 18: 32, "I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God." Yet his death did, by the words of this text, take place in fact. So that here is a most plain instance of an event which takes place contrary, in some sense, to the pleasure or will of God. Dr. C's reasoning is this: Whatever God wills, will come to pass. God wills the salvation of all men; therefore this will come to pass. To apply this reasoning to the text last quoted, it will stand thus: Whatever God wills comes to pass. But God wills the continued life of him that dieth; therefore it comes to pass, that he who dieth, does not die.

The truth is, God wills the salvation of all men, in the same sense that he wills the immediate repentance and sanctification of all men; or as he wills them to be as perfect in this life, as their heavenly Father is perfect. He now commands all men everywhere to repent, to believe the gospel and to comply with the necessary conditions of salvation; and complying with those conditions, they shall be saved immediately after the present state. So that God's willing that all men should be saved, no more proves that all men will be saved, than his willing that all men should immediately repent, proves, that all will immediately repent; or than his willing that all men should be perfect in this world, and comply with his law as perfectly as the angels do in heaven, proves that these things will actually take place in this world.

It is presumed that Dr. C. would not have denied, that it is the will of God in some sense, and that a proper sense too, that all men be brought to repentance in this state, and that they be saved immediately after this state. Yet God does not *efficaciously* will either of these things. Was it not in a proper sense the will of God, that our first parents should retain their original innocence, and not by their apostacy deluge the world in sin and misery? I presume this will not be denied. It was his will, if it was his command. But if it was the will of God, that Adam should stand and not fall; the will of God in this case was not efficacious. And if it was not efficacious to prevent the entrance of sin into the world, how can we know, that it will be efficacious to extirpate it out of the world, or from among the human race? If God was not in any proper sense willing that sin and misery should enter and predominate in the world; then it seems, that infinite power and wisdom were in this instance baffled. And if these divine perfections have been baffled once, they may be baffled a second time, and notwithstanding all their attempts, sin and misery may continue without end, in some of the human race. If on the other hand, although God commanded and in a proper sense willed, that man should stand; still in another sense he consented, or willed, that he should fall; in the same sense God may consent, that some men shall be the subjects of sin and misery to an endless duration.

Dr. C. "readily owns, that men, as free agents, have the power of *resisting* and *opposing* those means, which God from his desire of their salvation, may see fit to use with them."* "Yet it appears," to him, "a gross reflection on that being, who is infinitely perfect, to suppose him unable finally to *counteract*, and in a moral way too, the weakness, folly and obstinacy of such poor inferior creatures, as men are."† How these two propositions, which in the Doctor's book occur within a page, can be reconciled with each other; how man can have a power to resist all the means which God uses to effect his salvation, and at the same time God can have a power to counteract, in a moral way, this obstinate resistance of man, must certainly be set down among *the things hard to be understood* in Dr. C.

But perhaps the word *finally* in the second quotation is emphatical, and Dr. C's meaning is, that though the power of resisting in man cannot consistently with free agency be counteracted even by God, at *once*, or in a *short time*; yet it may be counteracted in a very long time. This however will not agree with Dr. C's own language. He says, "The power in men of resis-

* Page 166. † p. 167.

ting the means, which God from desire of their salvation sees fit to use with them, ought not to be overruled, nor indeed can be in consistence with moral agency."* Now to counteract or overrule in a long time this power of resisting, is as really to overrule it, as to overrule it in a short time. But according to Dr. C. it cannot be overruled in consistency with moral agency. It seems then, that if the damned shall be finally brought to repentance by God counteracting their obstinacy, they are stripped of their moral agency.

Or if it be pleaded, that this counteracting is not an *effectual* overruling; but such an influence of means and motives, as is consistent with moral agency; still this gives no satisfaction. Is it such a counteracting, as will *certainly* and "*infallibly*" be followed by the repentance and salvation of the sinner? This is holden by Dr. C.† If this be so, what moral power of still resisting has the sinner at the time of his repentance? And if he have at that time no moral power of further resistence, then this power is overruled *effectually*, and of course, according to Dr. C's scheme, the sinner is deprived of his moral agency.

If on the other hand it be said, that the counteracting be not such as will certainly and "infallibly" be followed by the repentance of the sinner; then there is no certainty that the sinner will ever under the most powerful means which God shall use with him, be brought to repentance and be saved. Thus the certainty of universal salvation at once comes to nothing. There is no certainty, no ground of assurance, that all will be saved; and all the truth is, that God will use means with sinners hereafter, as he does in this state, to prepare them for salvation; but as in this state, so in the future, sinners may, or may not, comply with those means.

To Dr. C. "it appeared a gross reflection on that being who is infinitely perfect, to suppose him unable *finally* to counteract, and in a moral way too, the obstinacy of men."‡ But is it no reflection on God, to suppose him not to have been able in a moral way, to prevent the entrance of sin into the world? Is it no reflection on him to suppose that he is not able in a moral way to counteract the obstinacy of men in this life? Is it no reflection to suppose, that he is not able, by the powerful means used in hell, to counteract it, in a single instance, for the space of a thousand years?§ How long must God be unable to counteract human obstinacy, before the imputation of such inability becomes a reflection on him? How long may he consistently with his perfections be unable to counteract that obstinacy? and

* Page 166. † p. 167. ‡ Ibid. § See p. 402, 403.

what duration of that inability may be imputed to him, without a reflection on him, and what duration of it cannot be imputed to him without a reflection? If it be no reflection on God, to say, that he is unable to counteract that obstinacy within a thousand years; is it a reflection to say, that he is unable to counteract it in two thousand, in ten thousand, or in an hundred thousand years? If not, why does it become a reflection to say, that he is unable *finally* to counteract it? Let any believer in Dr. C's scheme answer these questions.

Doctor C's reasoning in the following passage, is worthy of notice: "If God desires the salvation of all, and Christ died that this desire of God might be complied with, is it credible that a small portion of men only should be saved in event?"* This reasoning may be retorted thus: If God desires that all men be saved immediately after this life, and Christ died that this desire might be complied with; is it credible, that a small portion of men only should be then saved?

The advocates for universal salvation, one and all, bring in the text now under consideration, "Who will have all men to be saved," as a proof of their doctrine. Therefore I wish to ask them, from what they believe all men are, according to these words, to be saved? From an endless punishment? Then they were by a divine constitution exposed to an endless punishment; then an endless punishment is just; then sin deserves an endless punishishment; then sin is an infinite evil; which to them is an infinitely horrible doctrine. But let them, if they can, avoid it, once allowing that all men are to be saved from an endless punishment. Or are all men, according to these words, to be saved from a temporary punishment? What temporary punishment? Not that which is to continue for ages of ages; some will suffer that. Not from a longer temporary punishment; because none such is threatened; and sinners are not exposed to a punishment greater than that which is threatened in the divine law. On the whole, according to universalism, these words mean, that all men shall be saved indeed, but shall be saved from—NOTHING!!!

* Page 168.

CHAPTER XII.

DOCTOR C'S ARGUMENTS FROM Ps. 8: 5, 6. HEB. 2: 6—9. PHIL. 2: 9, 10, 11. 1 COR. 15: 24—29, AND REV. 5: 13, CONSIDERED.

His arguments from Ps. 8: 5, 6, and Heb. 2: 6—9, is built on those words, "Thou hast put all things under his feet." He was of the opinion, that those words mean, by the universality of the terms, that even *sin itself* shall be subjected to Christ; and that sin cannot be subjected to Christ in any other way, than by the destruction of it.* But this is to suppose what is by no means granted, and ought not to have been asserted without proof. An enemy may be overpowered, taken, imprisoned, and put entirely under the power, or under the feet of the conqueror; and yet not be put to death or annihilated. When it is said Christ's *enemies shall be made his footstool*, Ps. 110: 1. Heb. 10: 13, no one will pretend, that this means either a cordial submission to Christ, or annihilation. When the captains of Israel put their feet on the necks of the Canaanitish kings, Josh. 10: 24, as this was no token of cordial submission or reconciliation; so it is certain, that those kings were not then annihilated. The same idea is naturally suggested by that expression, *Put under his feet.* Not any of these phrases is allowed to be used in scripture, to express either a cordial submission or annihilation. Sin is such an enemy, as never can in its nature be reduced to a cordial submission to Christ. Nor needs it to be annihilated, to answer the expression of being put under the feet of Christ; nor indeed does that expression naturally suggest the idea of annihilation; but naturally, if not necessarily implies the contrary. An enemy may be under the feet of his conqueror before he is annihilated, but after he is annihilated, he is neither under his feet, nor in any other place. To be under the feet therefore implies existence; and sin may properly be said to be put under the feet of Christ, when it is so restrained and exemplarily punished, that on the whole no dishonor is done by it to Christ, or to the Deity; no evil results from it to the universe, or to any of Christ's real followers; but on the other hand it is made, contrary to its own tendency, the instrument of promoting the glory of God and of the Savior, and of increasing the happiness of his universal kingdom, and of all his true subjects.

Dr. C. makes a distinction between God's government of *pow-*

* Page 179.

er and his *moral* government; by which it is supposed, that he meant to show, that sin cannot be brought into subjection to Christ, but by the willing submission of the sinner. "Men by sinning oppose the government of God; not his government of *power;* for this ever was, and ever will, and ever must be submitted to; but his *moral* government which he exercises over intelligent and free agents. Here is room for opposition. Men may resist that will of God, which requires their obedience," etc.* It may be presumed, that the passage now quoted was entirely out of the Doctor's mind, when he wrote the following: "'Tis readily acknowledged, the glory of Christ's *power*, as head of the government of God, will be *illustriously displayed*, if *by force only* he finally subdues obstinate sinners." By this it appears, that it was Dr. C's opinion, that men do oppose the *power* of Christ, and the power of Christ *as the head of the government of God* too; and that his power may be illustriously displayed, if it be employed to subdue *by force* their obstinate opposition. But to say, that power and force are employed to subdue obstinate opposition, and yet that this opposition is no opposition to that power and force, is as absurd as to say, that a prince exerts his power and force to subdue the opposition of an army of rebels, and yet that those rebels do not at all oppose his power; or it is as absurd as to say, that opposition can be subdued where there is no opposition.

It is by no means clear what Dr. C. meant by God's government of *power*, as opposed to his *moral* government. Can there be any government without power? It is plain by the last quotation, that Dr. C. did not imagine, that God's moral government is without either *power* or *force*, and that both power and force may be employed to subdue sinners, who as sinners are subjects of God's moral government only. But let the Doctor have meant by this distinction what he will, it is by no means true, that sinners are always so far restrained and subjected by God's moral government, that in the present state of things, and if all things were to remain as they now are, no dishonor would be done to God, no injury to his kingdom, to his chosen people, or to the intellectual system. There is room therefore for sin and sinners, in this sense, to be subjected and restrained by the government of God. When "the wrath of men shall praise God, and the remainder of wrath shall be restrained," then will sinners be brought to that subjection to Christ, of which I am speaking. But Dr. C. would not pretend, that in this sense, sinners *ever* have been, *ever* will

* Page 179.

be, and ever *must* be subject to God. In one word, to be subjected to Christ is to be made either actively or passively subservient to his purposes and to his glory.

When the enemies of a prince are overcome, and in chains and prisons are restrained from interrupting the peace and happiness of his faithful subjects; then they are put under his feet and are subjected to him, and all their "rule, authority and power are put down or abolished." So when all the enemies of Christ, all "obstinate sinners" shall be, to use Dr. C's own words, "by force finally subdued," shut up in prison, bound with chains, and prevented from doing the least mischief to the disciples and kingdom of Christ; then those enemies will be put under the feet of Christ; then "an end will be put to the dominion of sin;" then the works of the devil will be destroyed; then the serpent's head will be bruised, and the devil's kingdom will be overthrown, as really and effectually, as the power of a rebel can be overthrown by an entire conquest of him and his adherents, by his perpetual imprisonment and other proper punishment according to the laws of the kingdom, though he and some of his partizans be permitted to live, and though they retain a rebellious spirit. The verb ὑποτάσσω in Rom. 8: 20, signifies, as Dr. C. holds, an involuntary subjection. It may therefore mean the same in Heb. 2: 8, and 1 Cor. 15: 27, etc.

Doctor C. insists on the words in 1 John 3: 8, "For this purpose was the Son of God manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil." By the works of the devil, he understands *all sin;* by destroying he understands an entire abolition. On the other hand, by destroying the works of the devil, some understand a perfect defeat of every attempt in opposition to the peace, happiness and glory of God's kingdom: "The devil will be most effectually subdued, his works will be destroyed and his head bruised in the highest sense and degree, when he shall be perfectly defeated and disappointed in all his designs, and everything he has attempted against Christ and his interest, shall be turned against himself, to answer those ends which he constantly sought to defeat by all his attempts; and Christ shall be more honored, and his kingdom more happy and glorious forever, than it could have been, if Satan had never opposed him, or seduced and destroyed any of mankind."* As the text now under consideration is capable of the sense just given; until it shall be proved, that the Doctor's is the true sense, it proves nothing to his purpose.

Doctor C. grants,† That by destruction the scriptures mean

* Hopkins' Inquiry into the Future State. † Page 224.

the misery and punishment of sinners. Therefore sinners are in the sense and language of scripture destroyed, when they are sent to the place of restraint, imprisonment and misery prepared for them. And as sinners will be destroyed without *annihilation*, so may *sin* and the works of the devil.

That God has always power to subdue or to subject to himself his enemies, is one thing; actually to subject them, by restraining them from doing any damage to his kingdom or his subjects, is another. In the present state, the enemies of Christ tempt his subjects, obstruct his cause, and do many things, which if they were to remain as they now are, would be an everlasting dishonor to Christ. But they shall be made his footstool, they shall no more do any of those things.

When Christ puts his enemies under his feet, he treads them down in his anger and tramples them in his fury, agreeably to Is. 63: 3. But this surely is not to bring them to a cordial reconciliation.

Therefore, as Ps. 8: 5, 6. Heb. 2: 6—9, are fairly capable of a construction entirely different from that on which Dr. C's whole argument from them depends; they prove nothing to his purpose; especially as they are not naturally capable of his construction.

We are now to attend to Phil. 2: 9, 10, 11: "Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name; that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." The question concerning this text is the same as that concerning the text last under consideration: What are we to understand by that subjection, to which Christ in consequence of his exaltation, was to reduce mankind? Is it a free and voluntary subjection in all men? Or in some men a subjection to which they shall be reduced by the power and authority of Christ, in opposition to their own inclinations? Dr. C. asserts that the former is the most plain and natural sense, and that the latter is evidently too low and restrained an interpretation. But positive assertions prove nothing.

As to the Doctor's *reasons* to prove that the subjection in question is a free and voluntary one, they are as follows: That Christ is now endeavoring to reduce mankind to a voluntary subjection to himself.* That though Christ do not in this state, prevail on all men voluntarily to subject themselves to him, yet he may prevail on them in the next state.† That if Christ was

* Page 190. † p. 191.

exalted for this end, that every knee should bow to him, etc. he will fail of his end unless all men be reduced to a voluntary subjection.* That the genuflection in this Phil. 2: 10, evidently means a voluntary act.† That a compelled subjection is a poor, low kind of subjection in comparison with that which is voluntary; therefore the reward of Christ's humiliation, unless it imply an universal voluntary subjection of mankind, is low and small in comparison with what it would have been, had it implied a voluntary subjection.‡

1. Christ is now endeavoring to bring all men to a voluntary subjection to himself; and these endeavors will sooner or later be successful; therefore Phil. 2: 9, etc. means a voluntary subjection. *Answer.* Christ is now in no other sense endeavoring to bring all to a voluntary subjection, than in the days of his incarnation he endeavored to gather the inhabitants of Jerusalem together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings; or than he always has endeavored to prevent the death of him that dieth. But as those endeavors have not been efficacious; so his endeavors to bring all men to a voluntary subjection may not be. Therefore this argument proves nothing.

2. Though Christ do not in this state prevail on all men voluntarily to subject themselves to him; yet he may prevail on them in the next state; therefore in the next state all *will in fact* be brought to a voluntary subjection; therefore Phil. 2: 9, etc. means voluntary subjection. *Answer.* It does not follow from the *power* of Christ to reduce all men to a voluntary subjection, that he *will in fact*, reduce them to that subjection.

3. If Christ were exalted for this end, that every knee should bow to him, etc. he will fail of the end of his exaltation, unless all be reduced to a voluntary subjection. *Answer.* The consequence by no means follows from the antecedent. For though it be allowed that Christ was exalted for the end that every knee should bow to him; yet it is not allowed that this bowing of the knee is a voluntary subjection. So that Christ may obtain the whole end of his exaltation without effecting a voluntary subjection of all men. This argument takes for granted, that the bowing of the knee mentioned in Phil. 2: 10, is a voluntary submission.

4. The genuflection in Phil. 2: 10, evidently means a voluntary act. *Answer.* It does not evidently mean a voluntary act. A mere contradiction is a sufficient answer to a mere assertion.

5. A compelled subjection is a poor, low kind of subjection in comparison with that which is voluntary. Therefore the reward

* Page 192. † Ibid. ‡ pp. 192, 193.

of Christ's humiliation, unless it imply a voluntary subjection of all mankind, is low and small in comparison with what it would have been, had it implied a voluntary subjection. Therefore it does imply a voluntary subjection; therefore a voluntary subjection is intended in Phil. 2: 10.

Answer. We are very improper persons to determine *a priori* what is the proper reward of Christ, or what reward is the greatest and most honorable to Christ. Some may imagine it would be most honorable to Christ, to reduce all men to a voluntary submission in this life; as in that case they would be saved from *all* future punishment; and thus might the grace, power and wisdom of Christ in their opinion be more glorified. Hence they might argue just as forcibly as Dr. C. does in the other case, That undoubtedly Christ will in this life reduce all men to a voluntary subjection to himself. On the same principle it might also have been proved, before the fact showed the contrary, that all men would be reduced to a voluntary subjection to Christ, in a very short time, long before the time of their ordinary departure out of life. On the same principle too it might have been proved, that God would never permit sin and misery to enter the world. Thus it appears, that Dr. C's argument, if it prove anything, proves too much, therefore proves nothing.

The Doctor was not insensible, that the same words are quoted by the apostle Paul, and applied to the general judgment; at which time Dr. C. does not pretend, that all men will be voluntarily subject to Christ.* See Rom. 14: 10, 11, 12: "For we shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ. For it is written, as I live, saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to God. So then every one of us shall give account of himself to God." Therefore we have clear evidence, that these words do sometimes mean that subjection which is not voluntary. And that in Phil. 2: 10, they mean a voluntary subjection and that only, we must have good evidence, before we are obliged to believe it. The utmost evidence which Dr. C. gives us, respecting that matter, I have exhibited above; and concerning the sufficiency of it, the reader will judge.

Doctor C. acknowledges,† that the words are pertinently applied by the apostle, to that subjection which shall take place as to all, at the general judgment; but says that his thus applying them is no argument that they mean nothing more. To which it may be answered, that it is an argument that they mean nothing more in Phil. 2: 10, unless good reason can be given to show,

* Page 196. † Ibid.

that in this passage they do mean more; and whether the reasons which Dr. C. gives, be good and satisfactory, is submitted as before.

We come at length to the consideration of that passage of scripture, which Dr. C. "considers as *decisive of itself*, were there no other text in the Bible of the like import." It is 1 Cor. 15: 24—29. "Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. For he hath put all things under his feet. But when he saith, All things are put under him, it is manifest, that he is excepted which did put all things under him. And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him, that put all things under him, that God may be all in all."

The Doctor prefaces his criticism on this text, with some observations on the previous context, which demand our first attention. He quotes the 21st and 22d verses: "For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive;" and adds, "It is with me beyond all controversy evident, that the apostle is speaking here, not of a partial, but universal resurrection, not of the resurrection of the righteous only, but of the whole race of Adam. The same all who suffer death through Adam, shall through Christ be made alive. The comparison between the damage by Adam and the advantage by Christ, lies in this very thing."* Here we have the Doctor's opinion, and his reason for it. His opinion is, that in the 22d verse the apostle is speaking of all mankind; his reason for this opinion is, that otherwise there would be no proper comparison of Adam and Christ. But the truth of this observation is by no means conceded. The reader may have seen my ideas of this case in the remarks made above, on Rom. 5: 12, etc. If an army under one general be all killed or taken, and afterwards the surviving part of the same army, now liberated, and under the command of another general, return every one in safety from a dangerous battle; it may be justly said, As under the former general all the army was killed or taken, so under the latter general all the army returned from the battle in safety. There would in this case be a true and proper comparison. Yet the very same all would not be intended in both parts of the comparison. Dr. C's reason therefore is not sufficient to support his construction. There is a pro-

* Page 201.

per comparison of Adam and Christ, if the apostle say, and intended to say, As in Adam all his seed die, even so in Christ all his seed shall be made alive.

It is indeed a truth granted on all hands, that all mankind will be raised at the last day; but it does not hence follow, that the apostle in this verse is speaking of such a universal resurrection.

Beside, if it should be granted, that the 22d verse refers to the resurrection of all men, it would not follow, that all will be saved. For Dr. C. grants, that had the apostle "nowhere else opened his mind more fully and particularly upon this matter, the utmost we could have argued from his words, would have been, that as all men die in Adam, so in Christ they should all be delivered from this death, by a resurrection to life,"* How then does this text prove universal salvation? And especially how is this verse, or even the whole passage "of itself *decisive?*" Although Dr. C. in page 197, declares his opinion, that this passage is "decisive of itself, was there no other text in all the bible of the like import;" yet he himself in page 207, gives it up as decisive, in the following words: "This parenthesis, comprehended within the 24th and 29th verses, was purposely interposed to bring us to a pause—and give us opportunity—to reflect upon—the truths—here revealed; pursuing them in their just tendency, necessary connection and final result; in the doing of which, we should *virtually continue* the discourse, and finish it with respect to the wicked, as the apostle had done—with respect to the righteous." Thus it appears by the authority of Dr. C. that this portion of scripture does not contain anything plain, or positive concerning the salvation of those who die in wickedness; but to investigate that which to him was so important and favorite a doctrine, we must *virtually* continue and finish the discourse ourselves. How then is this passage decisive of itself? Unless we virtually continue and finish the discourse ourselves with respect to the wicked, as the apostle had done with respect to the righteous, we shall never, even in Dr. C's opinion come to the same conclusion concerning the wicked, to which the apostle came concerning the righteous, that they shall be saved.

The chief thing which Dr. C. endeavors by this passage to prove, with a final view to the establishment of universal salvation, is, that the mediatory scheme will not be finished at the second coming of Christ; but a great deal will then remain to be done before the plan of God, for the accomplishment of which the mediatory kingdom is intrusted to the son, shall be completed.† By the "finishing," "the completing," etc. of "the mediatory

* Page 201. † p. 208.

scheme," the mediatorial kingdom, etc. Dr. C. must have meant the finishing of the work of salvation, or of delivering sinners from sin and misery; otherwise he meant nothing to the purpose of proving the salvation of all men. What if the mediatorial kingdom be not finished at Christ's second coming? Yet if after that period, Christ will never more deliver any of mankind from sin and from wrath; those who shall at that time remain in sin, and under the wrath of God, will never be saved.

That in the sense now explained, the mediatorial scheme will not be finished at the second coming of Christ, is indeed a point in dispute, and the Doctor's proofs of this point are to be candidly weighed. They are these two: (1) This passage of scripture teaches, that a universal subjection to Christ is to be effected before the finishing of the mediatory scheme; but this universal subjection to Christ is not effected at the second coming of Christ. (2) The reward of the good and faithful subjects of Christ is to be bestowed on them in the kingdom of Christ, and therefore Christ's kingdom will not be at an end, till after they shall have enjoyed that reward for some time at least. I think these two are all the reasons which Dr. C. has given to support the proposition in question. He has indeed divided his long and complicated discourse on the text now before us, into five heads; but for what reason is not manifest.

I. It was the opinion of Dr. C. that 1 Cor. 15: 24—29 teaches us, that a universal subjection to Christ is to be effected before the finishing of the mediatorial scheme, though it is not effected at Christ's second coming. By subjection to Christ, Dr. C. meant with respect to intelligent creatures, a cordial, willing subjection. By subjection to Christ, with respect to sin and death the first and second, he seems to have meant *abolition*. But though it is agreed on all hands, that there will be a universal subjection to Christ effected, before the finishing of the mediatorial scheme; yet it is not agreed that this subjection, with reference to all intelligent creatures, will be a willing subjection or submission. Concerning this particular, some observations have been made in the former part of this chapter. That the text now under consideration does teach a willing subjection, must be shown, or the text will not appear to be to the purpose. Now to show, that all intelligent creatures will be cordially subjected to Christ, and will be saved, the Doctor insists, that both sin and the second death will be destroyed.

1. That sin will be destroyed. With reference to those words, "he must reign till he hath put all enemies under his feet"—"All things shall be subdued unto him"—the Doctor asks, "Is *sin* an

enemy?" Supposing it is an enemy, what follows? Not what the Doctor asserts, "Then it will be *destroyed*," meaning abolished, extirpated by universal obedience and virtue. For the apostle does not say, that all enemies shall be *destroyed*, abolished, extirpated or annihilated; but that all enemies shall be *subdued* and *put under Christ's feet*. So that the true and only consequence from the supposition, that sin is an enemy, is, that it shall be subdued, restrained and put under Christ's feet; which may be done in a sense true, proper, and as Dr. C. grants,* glorious to Christ, without the abolition of it.

Indeed the apostle says, that "the last enemy, death, shall be destroyed;" which by no means implies, that all other enemies shall be destroyed. It may mean, what our translators evidently understood by it, that the last instance which we shall have of the destruction of any enemy, will be in the destruction of death. The words literally, and according to the order of the original, are thus translated: the last enemy is destroyed, death; and they may mean, and may very properly be rendered thus: Death is destroyed, the last enemy. Now suppose an historian, in the account of a battle, should say, The general was killed, the last enemy; must we necessarily understand him to mean, that all the enemies of the whole army were killed, and the general was killed after all the rest? Might not his words be justly taken in this sense, that the general was the last enemy who fell, and many others might escape?

Or death may by the apostle be called the last enemy proverbially and with respect to this life only; as it is now sometimes called the last debt due to nature. Since the expression, "the last enemy that shall be destroyed is death," is capable of this sense; and since it does not appear, that it implies, that all other enemies will be destroyed; therefore it is no proof of universal salvation; as both sin and misery may still be allowed to be enemies, and yet may be in existence, after the destruction of death.

But it may be asserted in a true and proper sense, that sin, in the damned, is not an enemy. It does no damage to Christ, to his kingdom, or to the peace and happiness of his subjects. It is to be sure, an enemy in no other sense, than the damned themselves are enemies; and if from that expression, "the last enemy that is *destroyed*, *abolished*, καταργεῖται, is death," it follow, that all Christ's enemies will be abolished or annihilated; it will also follow, that all the damned will be annihilated. So that if

* Page 193.

this argument prove anything, it proves too much; so much that it entirely overthrows universal salvation.

But sin in the damned, and the damned themselves, instead of doing any damage to Christ or his subjects, will be the means of increasing the glory of the former and the happiness of the latter to eternity.

It is observable, that the verb καταργέω is never in all the New Testament, applied to express the destruction of all wicked men, of the enemies of God in general, or of all sin. Therefore as neither sin itself, nor all the enemies of God, are said καταργεῖσθαι, to be *abolished*, we have no right, even on the supposition that sin is an enemy in every sense, to say that it will be *abolished*, or extirpated from the universe. The peculiar phraseology of the passage now under consideration, is worthy of particular notice. In the 24th verse it is said, that Christ will "*abolish*, καταργήσῃ, all rule and all authority and power." But he is said to put all his enemies under his feet, θῇ ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ, verse 25th, and to put all things under his feet, ὑπέταξεν ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ, verse 27th. Although therefore all the *rule*, and all the *authority*, and *power* of Christ's enemies shall be abolished, and the apostle is careful to inform us of that; yet he is equally careful to inform us, that his enemies themselves shall be only *subjected* to him, and put under his feet; as it seems, designedly shifting the phraseology and avoiding the application of the verb καταργέω to them. What right then have we to apply it to them? Is not the application of words to persons or things, to which the apostle designedly did not apply them, a gross perversion of scripture?

Doctor C's argument that sin will be destroyed, depends wholly on this general proposition, That all Christ's enemies will be destroyed. Now the word destroyed in this case, doubtless means either *abolition* or *restraint* and *punishment*. If it mean *abolition*, *extirpation*, *annihilation*; then as was before observed, all the enemies of Christ will be annihilated, and the doctrine of universal salvation falls to the ground at once. If it mean *restraint*, *punishment*, *preventing from doing mischief*, etc., then sin may be said to be destroyed, and yet have an endless existence in the universe.

If then these words, "The last enemy death shall be destroyed," do certainly imply, that all Christ's enemies shall be destroyed; and if it be also certain, that sin *in the damned* is, in every proper sense, an enemy, those words are equally inconsistent with Dr. C's scheme, as with the opposite. They either imply a universal annihilation of all Christ's enemies; and so are

equally inconsistent with universal salvation, as with endless torment; or they are not at all inconsistent with it, and therefore are no argument against it. If they imply a universal annihilation of the enemies of Christ, as they are equally against Dr. C's scheme, as against the opposite; it equally concerns him, as his opponents to provide an answer to them, and it is absurd in him to object them to the doctrine of his opponents.

The sum of what has been said on this head of the destruction of sin, is (1) That it does not appear, that sin in the damned is properly an enemy to Christ and his kingdom; as it does no harm to that kingdom. (2) If it be determined that sin in the damned is an enemy to Christ, it will not follow, that it will be *destroyed*, meaning by destruction *annihilation* or *abolition*; because it is nowhere said, that all Christ's enemies will be destroyed, καταργεῖσθαι. Or even if this were asserted concerning all Christ's enemies, and the verb καταργέω were applied to them all, it would not certainly determine, that they will all be annihilated, as that verb is capable of another sense, and is doubtless used in another sense, Heb. 2: 14, "That through death he might *destroy*, καταργήσῃ, him that had the power of death, that is the devil." Dr. C. did not believe, that the devil will be annihilated. Therefore if that verb were applied to all Christ's enemies, and sin in the damned were allowed to be an enemy to Christ; still it might mean something else beside annihilation; nay, it must necessarily mean something else, or it would equally disprove universal salvation, as endless misery.

In Dr. C's discourse on this subject, it is implied, that when a sinner is brought to repentance and cordial reconciliation to Christ, he is *destroyed*. His words are, "Christ shall continue vested with regal power, till he has brought all enemies into *subjection* to him—Christ will continue head of the kingdom of God—till he has actually *subdued* all enemies—Is sin an enemy?—then it shall be *destroyed*—for Christ must *destroy* all enemies."* By these several expressions it appears, that it was Dr. C's opinion, that all Christ's enemies will be *subjected* to him, that they all will be *subdued* under him, and that they will all be *destroyed* by him. Now it is abundantly evident, that by *subjection*, *subduing*, etc. when applied to those who die in impenitence, Dr. C. meant a cordial reconciliation to Christ; and he by no means held, that these enemies thus reconciled, will be destroyed by annihilation. It follows therefore, that as all Christ's enemies are to be destroyed, to be *destroyed*, and to be *reconciled to Christ in true repentance*, are, according to Dr. C. one and the same

* Pages 214, 215.

thing. Therefore, when Paul was converted, he was *destroyed*; and as he will eternally be the subject of repentance, he will suffer an eternal destruction. The punishment of God's enemies is, that they shall be destroyed; they shall be punished with everlasting destruction. But what punishment are everlasting repentance and complacency in God? they are among the greatest blessings which Deity himself can confer on a creature. Endless destruction and endless salvation are throughout the scriptures opposed to each other. But according to Dr. C's scheme, they perfectly harmonize and mutually imply each other. Now whether this scheme harmonize with the scriptures is submitted to the reader.

Whether this scheme harmonize with the scriptures or not, it does not harmonize with other parts of Dr. C's book. He says, that by the destruction of the wicked, mentioned in 2 Thess. 1: 9, and in various other texts, "we are very obviously led to understand *misery*."* Surely conversion from sin to holiness, and especially the everlasting holiness of the saints in heaven, is not *misery*.

Dr. C. holds, that all enemies will be subdued and subjected to Christ, and that sin will be subjected to him, when it is abolished or annihilated. But if sin be subjected to Christ, when it is annihilated, then the sinner would be subjected to Christ were he annihilated. But this kind of subjection is no more a cordial subjection, than that which is effected by mere power, and which consists in restraint and punishment. Beside, according to Dr. C. there are two ways of subjecting to Christ intended in this passage; one is by cordial reconciliation, the other is by annihilation. This then will keep in countenance the opponents of Dr. C. who believe, that there are two ways of subjecting to Christ; one by cordial reconciliation, which respects the elect only; the other by restraint and punishment, which respects the reprobate.

On the whole, whether this passage be sufficient to prove a universal abolition of sin, is now left to the judgment of the reader.

2. Doctor C. was of the opinion, that 1 Cor. 15: 24—29, teaches, that before the finishing of the mediatorial scheme, the *second death* will be destroyed. He says, "The second death may with as much propriety be called an enemy, as the first death. Let any sense be assigned, in which the first death can be properly spoken of as an enemy, and it will at once be easy to make it appear, that the second death is, in the same sense, as truly an enemy, and much more so."† Is death, the second death, an

* Page 224. † p. 210

enemy? Then this enemy shall be destroyed; for Christ must destroy *all* enemies."* This is the Doctor's argument; in answer to which two observations may be made—That the second death is not an enemy, in the sense which the Doctor's argument implies—That if it were in every sense an enemy, it would not follow, that it shall be destroyed, i. e. *abolished.*

The reader has seen the observations made above, concerning sin as an enemy and concerning the destruction of sin; similar observations may be made concerning the second death.

(1) The second death is not an enemy in the sense which Dr. C's argument implies and requires. If the Doctor meant, that the second death is an enemy to those who are the subjects of it, as it destroys their happiness and prevents their admission to a glorious immortality; this is granted. But it is not granted, that therefore it will be destroyed; and for the Doctor to take it for granted, that therefore it will be destroyed, is the same thing as to take for granted that all mankind will finally be admitted to a glorious immortality, which is the grand subject of the present controversy. But if the Doctor meant, that the second death is an enemy to Christ, as it prevents the brightest display of his glory, the greatest prosperity of his kingdom, and the greatest happiness of his subjects; in this sense it is denied to be an enemy. This is a sense in which the first death is an enemy, and notwithstanding what Dr. C. says, it does not seem "easy to make it appear, that the second death is, in the same sense, as truly an enemy." The first death while it continues, prevents the brightest display of the glory of Christ, the greatest prosperity of his kingdom, and the greatest happiness of his subjects; if it should continue, it would be inconsistent with the promises of Christ, with the complete salvation of the elect, and would defeat the gospel. Now to make it appear, that in this sense the second death is an enemy, it may be presumed, is not a more easy task, than to prove the salvation of all men. The second death is no more an enemy to Christ, to his kingdom, or to his faithful subjects, than the execution of some most atrocious and ungrateful rebels, whose lives cannot be spared consistently with the glory of their king, the prosperity of his kingdom, or the happiness of his faithfnl subjects; is an enemy to the king, to his kingdom, or to his faithful subjects.

Dr. C. further urges, that "the second death is the last enemy, and the only one that is so."† If it be no enemy, it is neither the *last* nor the *first* enemy. Therefore "it seems" *not* "rea-

* Page 215. † p. 210.

sonable, when the apostle says, *the last enemy which is death, shall be destroyed*, to understand him to mean by *death*, the *second death*." The first death is in the sense before given, the last enemy; the last who prevents the complete display of Christ's glory, the last who prevents the perfection of his kingdom, the last who has power to hurt the saints. After the destruction of this death, they immediately receive the adoption of sons. Although the devils and those who have been persecutors in this world, will still be in existence after the destruction of the first death, they will no more have it in their power to dishonor Christ, or to interrupt the happiness of his subjects, than if they were annihilated.

(2) If the second death were in every sense an enemy, it would not follow, that it shall be *destroyed*, meaning *abolished*. All the enemies of God or of Christ, are nowhere said to be *abolished* καταργεῖσθαι, meaning *annihilation*. To be *subdued, subjected, put under feet*, is by no means the same as to be *annihilated*. If therefore the second death be ever so truly and properly an enemy, the utmost that would thence follow, is, that it would be so restrained and subjected to Christ, as to be prevented from doing mischief, and to be made an instrument of promoting the glory of God, and the happiness of his kingdom. In this sense it may be granted, that the second death will be destroyed; yet the salvation of all men would no more be implied in the concession, than it is implied in the destruction of the devil, mentioned, Heb. 2: 14, that he will be annihilated. Nor can we hold, that all Christ's enemies will be *destroyed* in the sense now opposed, without holding the annihilation of the wicked, and giving up universal salvation.

Dr. C. endeavors to make out, that if death, the last enemy, do mean temporal death, still the destruction of this death implies universal salvation. "Simple restoration to life," says he, "is not the thing the scripture means by death destroyed. To be sure the apostle Paul had quite another notion of it. What is the idea he leads us to entertain of it? Plainly not a bare return to life, but such an one as is connected with a glorious immortality."* That in this chapter the apostle speaks of such a return to life, as is connected with a glorious immortality, is granted; because in this chapter he is speaking of the resurrection of the saints only. The Doctor indeed tells us, that it was *with him* "beyond all controversy evident, that the apostle is speaking here, not of a partial, but universal resurrection." To others however it is beyond all controversy evident, that the apostle is

* Page 211, etc.

peaking here of the resurrection of the righteous only. Even ne Doctor acknowledges, that after the 28th verse the apostle confines his discourse to the righteous, without saying anything f the wicked."* Now this affords some ground of presumption t least, that in the former part of the chapter too, he confines is discourse to the resurrection of the righteous. Nor has Dr. :. given any reason, beside that which has been already examned, viz. That the comparison between the damage by Adam, nd the advantage by Christ, lies in this very thing, that the same *ll men* are meant in both parts of that expression, "as in Adam ll die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." So that Dr. 's argument,† that from the resurrection of all mankind, it folows, that all will be saved, depends on principles, which are neither granted nor proved, and therefore is utterly inconclusive.

He further says, "This *second* death, strictly and properly peaking, is *the last enemy*, and *the only one*, that is so."‡ Then urely there will not be a *third*, a *fourth* death, etc. for ages of ges. Yet this is taught in other parts of his book; as in the ollowing passage, "They may all—be doomed—to a state of nisery, which shall last for an age; in which state *some*—may e wrought upon to submit themselves to God. Others may *die* n this state stupid. And those who thus died in their obstinacy nay again—be put into a place of suffering for another age; in vhich *some* may be reduced—and others stand it out still. These thers may, in yet another form of existence, be sent into a place f discipline for another age; and so on, till there has been tornent for ages of ages."§ Here the Doctor distinctly mentions hree future states of suffering, and supposes there may be others ontinued in succession for ages of ages, which are so many disinct deaths, as really as the first state of suffering after this life, s the second death, with respect to temporal death. What ight then had the Doctor to say, and with what consistency ould he say, that the *second death* is the *last* enemy, and the *nly one* that is so?

II. The other argument of Dr. C. is, that the reward of the ood and faithful subjects of Christ is to be bestowed on them in he kingdom of Christ; and therefore Christ's kingdom will not e at an end, till after they shall have enjoyed that reward for ome time at least; and therefore will not be at an end, at the econd coming of Christ, or immediately after the general judgnent."‖ This argument wholly depends on the supposition, that t the time at which the work of salvation shall be completed by Christ he will entirely abdicate all government or superintenden-

* Page 207. † p. 211. ‡ pp. 210, 211. § pp. 309, 310. ‖ pp. 222, 223.

cy over those who shall be saved by him. If otherwise; if he shall still retain a superintendency over those who shall be saved by him; if he shall still be their immediate head or ruler, and the source of their happiness; though he shall not be the supreme ruler of the universe, nor even of the redeemed; but in this respect he shall resign the kingdom to the Father; he may be said yet to have a kingdom, and to sit on his throne; and to reign, etc. Before the resignation of the mediatorial kingdom, the government of *all things* is in the hands of Christ, being delegated by the Father to this government. Or as Dr. C. expresses it, "he will be head over all; he will govern all; he will be all unto all."* Christ during that period acts as the supreme head of the universe. But when he shall have resigned the mediatorial kingdom, the Father will act as supreme head. Still Christ may, under the Father, be the head and governor of his redeemed and saved people. The Father will be supreme ruler, and Christ with his church united to him, and dependent on him, will receive the benefits of his government. This does not imply, but that Christ himself, in subordination to the Father, will have a government over his saints.

Nor does it imply, but that the Son as one with the Father, as being in the Father, and the Father in him, shall reign after the resignation of the delegated sovereignty over all things. It may be presumed, that no man will say, that the Father does not reign now while the administration of universal government is in the hands of the Son. If he did not now reign, there would be no propriety in speaking as the scripture often does, "of him that sitteth on the throne, and the Lamb;" nor any propriety in the promise, John 15: 16, "That whatsoever ye shall ask of the *Father* in my name, he may give it you;" nor in those words of James, Chap. 1: 17, "Every good gift, and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the *Father* of lights." But I need not add texts to prove this. For the same reason therefore that the Father now reigns in and with the Son; so after the resignation of the general delegated administration, the Son will still reign in and with the Father. Now the government is conducted in the name and by the immediate agency of the Son; then it will be conducted in the name and by the immediate agency of the Father. Yet as now the Father reigns in and with the Son; so then will the Son reign in and with the Father. Christ now reigns with supreme sovereignty by delegation from the Father. After the resignation of this sovereignty, he will still reign over the saints by delegation from the Father, but with a domin-

* Page 217.

ion, which shall be subordinate to that of the Father. He will also at the same time reign in and with the Father, in the exercise of a dominion, which shall not be delegated, but which is essential to him as a divine person, and one with the Father; as the Father, by virtue of his divinity, now necessarily reigns in and with the Son. So that although Christ shall immediately after the general judgment, resign the supreme delegated sovereignty, which he now possesses; still he will reign in these two respects, by a delegated subordinate authority over his saints; and by an undelegated, essential authority, which by virtue of his divinity, he possesses necessarily with the Father.

But whether the true idea of Christ's delivering up the kingdom to the Father, concerning which divines have greatly differed, have been now precisely exhibited or not; still the scriptures necessitate us to believe, that in some sense Christ will reign to an absolute eternity. Heb. 1: 8, "Unto the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is *forever and ever*." Rev. 22: 5, "They" [the saints] "shall reign *forever and ever*." 1 Pet. 5: 4, "When the chief shepherd shall appear, ye shall receive a crown of glory that *fadeth not away*." 1 Cor. 9: 25, "We do it to obtain an *incorruptible crown*." Heb. 12: 28, "We receiving a kingdom *that cannot be moved*." Both these last texts are quoted by Dr. C.* to prove that the righteous shall live and be happy without end; and they equally prove that they shall *reign without end*. But the saints are to sit down with Christ on his throne and reign with him; and it is absurd to imagine, that *they* are to reign after the cessation of his reign; that they are to wear crowns which are incorruptible and fade not away; but that his crown is corruptible and fadeth away. Beside; the kingdom which the apostles and primitive christians received, according to Heb. 12: 28, was not the kingdom of the Father, as distinguished from that of the Son, but was the kingdom of the Son, which he himself had then lately set up. *This* kingdom is said to be incapable of being shaken or dissolved; and therefore is endless, as Dr. C. himself believed; otherwise it was absurd for him to quote that text to prove, that the righteous will live and be happy without end. Dan. 7: 14, "His" [the Son of man's] "dominion is an *everlasting* dominion, which *shall not pass away*, and his kingdom that which *shall not be destroyed*." Isa. 9: 7, "Of the increase of his government and peace there shall be *no end*." Luke 1: 33, "He shall reign over the house of Jacob *forever*, and of his kingdom there *shall be no end*." More determinate language

* Page 287.

thing. Therefore, when Paul was converted, he was *destroyed;* and as he will eternally be the subject of repentance, he will suffer an eternal destruction. The punishment of God's enemies is, that they shall be destroyed; they shall be punished with everlasting destruction. But what punishment are everlasting repentance and complacency in God? they are among the greatest blessings which Deity himself can confer on a creature. Endless destruction and endless salvation are throughout the scriptures opposed to each other. But according to Dr. C's scheme, they perfectly harmonize and mutually imply each other. Now whether this scheme harmonize with the scriptures is submitted to the reader.

Whether this scheme harmonize with the scriptures or not, it does not harmonize with other parts of Dr. C's book. He says, that by the destruction of the wicked, mentioned in 2 Thess. 1: 9, and in various other texts, "we are very obviously led to understand *misery*."* Surely conversion from sin to holiness, and especially the everlasting holiness of the saints in heaven, is not *misery*.

Dr. C. holds, that all enemies will be subdued and subjected to Christ, and that sin will be subjected to him, when it is abolished or annihilated. But if sin be subjected to Christ, when it is annihilated, then the sinner would be subjected to Christ were he annihilated. But this kind of subjection is no more a cordial subjection, than that which is effected by mere power, and which consists in restraint and punishment. Beside, according to Dr. C. there are two ways of subjecting to Christ intended in this passage; one is by cordial reconciliation, the other is by annihilation. This then will keep in countenance the opponents of Dr. C. who believe, that there are two ways of subjecting to Christ; one by cordial reconciliation, which respects the elect only; the other by restraint and punishment, which respects the reprobate.

On the whole, whether this passage be sufficient to prove a universal abolition of sin, is now left to the judgment of the reader.

2. Doctor C. was of the opinion, that 1 Cor. 15: 24—29, teaches, that before the finishing of the mediatorial scheme, the *second death* will be destroyed. He says, "The second death may with as much propriety be called an enemy, as the first death. Let any sense be assigned, in which the first death can be properly spoken of as an enemy, and it will at once be easy to make it appear, that the second death is, in the same sense, as truly an enemy, and much more so."† Is death, the second death, an

* Page 224. † p. 210

enemy? Then this enemy shall be destroyed; for Christ must destroy *all* enemies."* This is the Doctor's argument; in answer to which two observations may be made—That the second death is not an enemy, in the sense which the Doctor's argument implies—That if it were in every sense an enemy, it would not follow, that it shall be destroyed, i. e. *abolished.*

The reader has seen the observations made above, concerning sin as an enemy and concerning the destruction of sin; similar observations may be made concerning the second death.

(1) The second death is not an enemy in the sense which Dr. C's argument implies and requires. If the Doctor meant, that the second death is an enemy to those who are the subjects of it, as it destroys their happiness and prevents their admission to a glorious immortality; this is granted. But it is not granted, that therefore it will be destroyed; and for the Doctor to take it for granted, that therefore it will be destroyed, is the same thing as to take for granted that all mankind will finally be admitted to a glorious immortality, which is the grand subject of the present controversy. But if the Doctor meant, that the second death is an enemy to Christ, as it prevents the brightest display of his glory, the greatest prosperity of his kingdom, and the greatest happiness of his subjects; in this sense it is denied to be an enemy. This is a sense in which the first death is an enemy, and notwithstanding what Dr. C. says, it does not seem "easy to make it appear, that the second death is, in the same sense, as truly an enemy." The first death while it continues, prevents the brightest display of the glory of Christ, the greatest prosperity of his kingdom, and the greatest happiness of his subjects; if it should continue, it would be inconsistent with the promises of Christ, with the complete salvation of the elect, and would defeat the gospel. Now to make it appear, that in this sense the second death is an enemy, it may be presumed, is not a more easy task, than to prove the salvation of all men. The second death is no more an enemy to Christ, to his kingdom, or to his faithful subjects, than the execution of some most atrocious and ungrateful rebels, whose lives cannot be spared consistently with the glory of their king, the prosperity of his kingdom, or the happiness of his faithfnl subjects; is an enemy to the king, to his kingdom, or to his faithful subjects.

Dr. C. further urges, that "the second death is the last enemy, and the only one that is so."† If it be no enemy, it is neither the *last* nor the *first* enemy. Therefore "it seems" *not* "rea-

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sonable, when the apostle says, *the last enemy which is death, shall be destroyed*, to understand him to mean by *death*, the *second death*." The first death is in the sense before given, the last enemy; the last who prevents the complete display of Christ's glory, the last who prevents the perfection of his kingdom, the last who has power to hurt the saints. After the destruction of this death, they immediately receive the adoption of sons. Although the devils and those who have been persecutors in this world, will still be in existence after the destruction of the first death, they will no more have it in their power to dishonor Christ, or to interrupt the happiness of his subjects, than if they were annihilated.

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II. The other argument of Dr. C. is, that the reward of the good and faithful subjects of Christ is to be bestowed on them in the kingdom of Christ; and therefore Christ's kingdom will not be at an end, till after they shall have enjoyed that reward for some time at least; and therefore will not be at an end, at the second coming of Christ, or immediately after the general judgment."‖ This argument wholly depends on the supposition, that at the time at which the work of salvation shall be completed by Christ he will entirely abdicate all government or superintenden-

* Page 207. † p. 211. ‡ pp. 210, 211. § pp. 309, 310. ‖ pp. 222, 223.

effectually influence them to exercise their faculties in repentance and virtue, or in any one way; it would be entirely inconsistent with liberty and moral agency.

That Doctor C. also held, that the future repentance and salvation of all men, is certain, and that this certainty is caused and established by a cause extrinsic to the will of all men, is evident in the following passages out of many, "God—really meant—an *engagement*, that mankind *universally* should, in due time—resemble Abraham in his moral temper—which is the same thing with their being blessed in Christ, or being *reduced* BY HIM under moral subjection to the government of God."* "They" (all men) "will be *wrought upon* sooner or later in a moral way, such an one as is adjusted to moral agents, to become righteous persons."† "It is absolutely declared in this passage of scripture, that they shall be *made* righteous,"—"Unless they are thus *made* righteous," etc.—"God—has *absolutely* and *unconditionally determined*—that all men, the whole race of lapsed Adam shall finally reign in life, and be prepared for that state, by being *formed into* righteous persons."‡ "It is the purpose of God—that mankind *universally*—shall *certainly* and finally be saved."§ He speaks of some persons as "*infallibly* selected for salvation."‖ In these passages it is manifest, that Dr. C. held, not only *an absolute infallible certainty* of the salvation of some, yea of all men; but that this certainty is established by God, and is the effect of his determination, and also, that all men will finally be brought to repentance, to "the moral temper of Abraham," "to a moral subjection to the government of God;" and that they shall be "*made* righteous," and "*formed into* righteous persons;" all which expressions imply a cause extrinsic to the will of man, which cause effectually and certainly operates to lead him to repentance, or to an "exercise in one certain way only." How these things can be reconciled with the Doctor's avowed principles of liberty and moral agency, is hard to be conceived.

Nor was it through inattention, that the Doctor held an extrinsic cause certainly operating on the minds of men. It is a doctrine essential and important in his scheme, that all the damned will be finally and certainly brought to repentance, and brought to repentance by the torments of hell too. Are not those torments a cause extrinsic to the human will? If that cause be certainly effectual to lead the damned to repentance, what, on the Doctor's plan, becomes of their moral agency? If that cause be not certainly effectual to lead them all to repentance; it is not certain that all men will be saved. So that on the plan of the Doctor's book, ei-

* Page 244. † p. 85. ‡ p. 86. § p. 22. ‖ p. 231.

ther his grand doctrine of the final certain salvation of all men by a disciplinary punishment, must be given up, or it must be supposed, that all who are in that way saved, are divested of their moral agency and are reduced to mere machines.

Indeed if the salvation of all men be certain, and it be certain that all men will repent; it is by some cause or other *made certain*. That which is now a certain futurity, was a certain futurity from the beginning; yea from eternity. As it is now a certain futurity, that Christ will come to judgment, so it was certain from the beginning. Therefore if it be now a certain futurity, that all men will repent and be saved, it was a certain futurity from the beginning; and that certainty was established by some cause; and that cause must have been extrinsic to the wills of men; because both the certainty and the cause of it existed before the existence of men or their wills. So that if it be a real and certain truth, that all men will be saved, to prove which, Dr. C. wrote his whole book, it is equally certain on his plan, that all men are divested of their moral agency.

Should it be still pleaded, that this certainty of the salvation of all men, is not effected by any cause extrinsic to the wills of those, who are to be saved, but by their wills themselves; the absurdity of this supposition must be glaring to every man on the slightest reflection. A great part of those who are to be saved, are not as yet in existence; and it will not be pretended that their wills can have produced an effect, or established a certainty, before they exist. And doubtless Dr. C. and other universalists would allow, that the salvation of those who are in existence, was as certain before their existence, as the salvation of those is, who are in future to come into existence. But that certainty could not, for the reason already mentioned, be the effect of any exertion of their own wills.

Beside; if it were not for this absurdity, a certainty established by the will of man with respect to the will itself, as effectually binds that will, and is equally inconsistent with its liberty, as if that certainty were established by any other cause. Suppose the will of any man shall establish in itself a *certain* and *unfailing* bias to any particular action or series of actions; it cannot be pretended that this fixed bias already established, is any more consistent with liberty and moral agency, in the man in whom the bias exists, than if it had been established by any other cause. If a man were to cut off his own leg, though he might be more blamable for the act of cutting it off, than he would be for the same act performed by another; yet the effect, as to his subsequent inability to walk, would be the very same.

Therefore whatever be the cause of the certainty and fixed futurity of the repentance and salvation of all men; the doctrine of the certain salvation of all men, is on Dr. C's plan of liberty, wholly inconsistent with human liberty, and implies that all men are, and ever have been, mere machines.

In vain does Dr. C. endeavor to relieve this difficulty, by observing in various passages, as in one of the quotations above, That this repentance is brought about "in a moral way, such an one as is adjusted to moral agents." For he has told us that such exertions of the Deity, as shall be *certainly effectual* to restrain free agents from perverting their faculties, and such an influence of any extrinsic power, motives or whatever, as shall unavoidably put their faculties into exercise in one way only, are not adjusted to moral agents; but are inconsistent with their proper powers. Therefore, according to the Doctor, it is not in the power of the Deity himself, certainly and infallibly to lead all men, in a moral way, to repentance. It is a direct contradiction. And though he observes, That that being who is infinitely perfect will be able, in a moral way, finally to counteract human obstinacy;* he is utterly mistaken, if there be any truth in his idea of liberty. If God were to overcome human obstinacy, an extrinsic cause would effectually and certainly incline the human faculties to an exercise in one way; which the Doctor says is inconsistent with moral agency.

The Doctor tells us, that to "represent hell to the view of sinners in such a striking light, as that they should be irresistibly stopped in their wicked pursuits, would not comport with their free agency."† Yet he supposes, that to be in hell, and to feel its torments so strikingly as to be *certainly and infallibly* stopped in wicked pursuits, and thus to be brought to repentance, is to be brought to repentance in a moral way, entirely comporting with free agency.

Upon Dr. C's plan of liberty, there not only is not, and cannot be any certainty, that *all* men will be saved; but there is not, and cannot be, any certainty that *any one* man will be saved. The Divine Being himself cannot make it certain, without destroying moral agency. Not any of the promises of the gospel give us assurance of the salvation of any man; nor is it in the power of God to give a promise of salvation which shall insure the event, so long as men remain moral agents. Therefore it was to no purpose that Dr. C. quoted so many promises and scriptural declarations to prove the salvation of all men.

On the same hypothesis concerning liberty, even though all

* Page 167. † pp. 344, 345.

men were delivered from hell and admitted to heaven, there would be no certainty that they would continue there. They would be constantly liable to sin anew, and bring on themselves a second damnation. To deny this, would be, to allow that their faculties might consistently with moral agency, be *certainly* and *fixedly* inclined to exercise themselves in one way only."

That the inhabitants of heaven are liable to sin and damnation, is actually allowed by honest Bishop Newton. "This life is indeed a state of trial, but not a trial to fix our fate forever, without any possibility of changing for better or for worse, in the world to come. For if the righteous can be but righteous, and the wicked can be but wicked, and cannot act otherwise; there is an utter end of all freedom of will and morality of action. Their virtue ceases to be virtue, and their sin is no longer sin."* "The scripture assures us, that in the next life men will be made (Luke 20: 36) equal unto the angels; but angels, we know, have apostatized and fallen; and why may not men, even when made equal unto the angels?† If righteousness should degenerate and become wickedness; or if wickedness should amend and become righteousness; the tables would then be turned, and with the change of their nature, their state and condition would be changed too."‡ How then is it certain that all men will be finally holy and happy? It neither is, nor can possibly be certain; because certainty in this case would imply that "the righteous can be but righteous;" and so "there would be an utter end of all freedom of will and morality of action."

What then becomes of the boasted evidence of the final salvation of all men? There is no certain evidence of it. There is not, nor can be, on this scheme of liberty, any certain evidence but that all men will finally apostatize, and of course be doomed to misery correspondent to their wickedness.

It is true, the Bishop abundantly contradicts this sentiment concerning liberty, and holds that the damned must repent, and cannot but repent, as in the following passages: "It is *impossible* for any creature to live in eternal torments. If nothing else yet his own sensations and feelings *must* bring him in one time or other, to an acknowledgment of his sin and of his duty."§ "The fire *must* in time purge away and consume the dross and leave only the gold behind. No creature *can be* so totally depraved and abandoned, as to hold out under the most exquisite tortures, obstinate and obdurate to all eternity. In short, if they

* See Newton's Works, Vol. VI. p. 361. † p. 362. ‡ p. 360. § p. 362.

have any sense or feeling, any reason or understanding, any choice or free-will, they *must* one time or other, sooner or later, *be brought to repentance.*"* "Tortures upon tortures, tortures without end, no creatures of the least sense or feeling *can support;* but *must* all be *brought to submission* at last; and they had much better make a virtue of *necessity.*"† Virtue then is consistent with necessity. How is this idea consistent with what has been before quoted from this same author? But inconsistence and self-contradiction relieve no difficulty.

From the same hypothesis it follows that God himself does not and cannot possibly govern mankind with certainty; that there is no foundation to pray for any event which depends on the volitions of our own minds, or those of other men; that there is no ground for confidence in the divine providence; and that it is impossible that any future free actions of men, or any events depending on those actions, should be certainly foretold, or even foreknown by God himself; because what is absolutely uncertain, cannot be certainly known, and what is certainly known is certainly fixed and determined. But it is not consistent with my design to enlarge on the endless absurdities of this scheme of human liberty, absurdities from which, though long since pointed out to belong to that scheme, the ablest advocates for it, have not been able, and it is presumed never will be able, to clear it.

CHAPTER XIV.

A REPLY TO DR. C'S ANSWERS TO THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF ENDLESS PUNISHMENT, DRAWN FROM THOSE TEXTS WHICH DECLARE THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED TO BE EVERLASTING, FOREVER, FOREVER AND EVER, AND THE FIRE OF HELL TO BE UNQUENCHABLE.

Doctor C. says, that the misery of the damned is said to be *eternal* or *everlasting*, in five texts only in all the New Testament.‡ Whatever was intended by this ambiguous proposition, the fact doubtless is, that many of his readers have been grossly deceived by it, as they have been led to believe, that the doctrine of endless punishment is apparently taught, in no more than five texts in all the New Testament; or that no more than five texts

* Page 364. † p. 366. ‡ p. 258.

can be produced, the words of which seem to import an endless punishment. Whereas, all that Dr. C. or any man can pretend is, that the punishment of the damned is in five texts only, in the New Testament, asserted to be *eternal*, by the use of the adjective *αἰώνιος*, commonly translated *eternal* or *everlasting*. It cannot be pretended, but that the texts in which the punishment of the damned is in some manner or other declared to be eternal, and in words as determinate, as the adjective, *αἰώνιος*, eternal, far exceed the number *five*. The five texts now referred to, do not comprise any of those, in which the damned are said to be punished forever, forever and ever; to be punished by a worm that dieth not, and a fire that is not quenched; to be confined by an impassable gulf; to be shut out from the kingdom of heaven; not to see life, etc.

Now what follows from this circumstance, that the punishment of the damned is in five texts only, in the New Testament, declared to be eternal, by the application of the Greek adjective, *αἰώνιος*? It may still be declared to be eternal, by other words equally determinate, in above five hundred texts.

Or if there were no other texts, expressing in other words, endless punishment; are not five divine asseverations of any truth sufficient to bind our faith? If five be not sufficient for this end, neither are five thousand.

Besides; all that Dr. C. says on this head, may be justly retorted; and if his observations in pages 229, 230, be of any force to show, that the doctrine of endless punishment is not taught in the scriptures; just as forcibly may it be proved, that the damned will not be punished for an age. Supposing, as Dr. C. does, that the words *αἰών*, *αἰώνιος*, etc. do not mean an endless duration, but the duration of *an age;* I might say, "The misery of the wicked is said to be *for an age*, in only five texts, in all the New Testament; upon which I cannot help making a pause to express my surprise to find the sacred writers so very sparing in the use of this word *age*, as referring to future torments. It is used but three times by Matthew; but once by Mark; but once by Paul; and not once by the other writers of the New Testament. All which is very extraordinary, if it be a doctrine of christianity, that the wicked are to be punished *for an age*. And the omissions of the sacred writers upon this head, are a strong presumptive argument, that they knew nothing of this doctrine, which has been so vehemently pleaded for in these latter days," by Dr. C. and some others. Therefore, whenever it shall be proved, that notwithstanding the rare use of the word *age*, with a reference to the punishment of the wicked, that punishment will really

last *for an age;* it is presumed, that it can be proved from the same topics, that it will last *without end.* If a word, signifying an age, applied five times to future punishment, prove that punishment to continue for an age; why will not a word signifying an endless duration, applied five times to that punishment, prove it to be without end? Nothing therefore can be concluded from the number of times αἰώνιος, *eternal,* is applied to future punishment. The whole question, in this state of it, depends on the proper meaning of the word; not at all on the frequency of its use.

Dr. C. says, "That αἰὼν and αἰώνιος *may* signify a limited duration;" and that "from this remark it follows, that the preceding evidence in favor of universal salvation, remains strong and valid."* It is acknowledged, that if those words *may* signify and all things considered, do *as probably* signify, a limited as an unlimited duration, when applied to the punishment of the wicked; nothing either for or against endless punishment, can be concluded from the use of those words. It is also, on the same suppositions, acknowledged, that by that application of those words, the evidence which Dr. C. has exhibited in favor of the salvation of all men, is not at all impaired. But it is not granted, that those words, when applied to the punishment of the wicked, do as probably signify a limited as unlimited duration. Nor is it granted that Dr. C's evidence of universal salvation is valid. Though we should grant that it remains unimpaired by the words αἰὼν, and αἰώνιος, *eternity* and *eternal;* yet it may be utterly invalidated by other considerations; and that this is in fact the case, I have endeavored already, and shall further endeavor to show; how successfully, is submitted to the reader.

The Doctor manifestly argues on this head from possibility to probability, and even to fact. He says, "If αἰώνιος *may* signify a period of time only, there is not a shadow of an interference between its connection with the punishment of wicked men, and their being finally saved;"† i. e. If it may possibly signify a period of time only, it is absolutely certain, that when it is applied to future punishment, it does signify a period of time only. The inconclusiveness of such argumentation must be manifest to every reader. In the same manner it is easy to prove, "that there is not the shadow of an interference between the connection of αἰώνιος, eternal," with the life and happiness of the righteous, and their final damnation.

The Doctor says, "These words, αἰὼν and αἰώνιος are evidently more loose and general in their meaning, than the English

* Page 260. † p. 261.

words *eternity, everlasting*. If it were not so, how comes it to pass, that αἰὼν and αἰώνιος will not always bear being translated eternity, everlasting?"* By the same argument it may be proved that the words *eternity* and *everlasting* in our language, are more loose and general in their meaning, than the Greek αἰὼν and αἰώνιος. We frequently say, such a man is an everlasting talker, or he talks eternally; he is eternally slandering and quarrelling with his neighbors. But according to Dr. C's sense of the Greek words αἰὼν and αἰώνιος, the English phrases just mentioned cannot be properly translated by the use of those Greek words. The Doctor says, they properly mean the duration of an age. But when it is said, a man talks eternally, the meaning is not, that he talks *for an age*. The truth is, there are idioms in all languages, which will not bear a literal translation into any other language. The circumstance that αἰὼν and αἰώνιος, will not always bear to be rendered *eternity* and *eternal*, no more proves that they do not properly signify the same with our words *eternity* and *eternal*, than the circumstance that they will not always bear to be rendered *an age*, and *during an age*, proves that they do not properly signify the duration of an age. It is said, Rom. 16: 26, "According to the commandment of the *everlasting God*, αἰωνίου Θεοῦ;" but no man would render this, According to the commandment of the God *who lives for an age*.

The Doctor thinks that "before *eternal times*, is an impropriety in English," and hence infers, that πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων Tit. 1: 2, means a limited duration. It is presumed, that the Doctor would not have objected to the propriety of expressing a proper eternity, by saying, *From eternity, from everlasting, from eternal ages*. Yet in reality there is as great an impropriety in these expressions, as in that which the Doctor pronounces an impropriety. Understood strictly and literally they imply, that there is a point at which eternity began, and *from eternity* is from that point. The very use of the preposition *from* implies this. It implies, that the computation is made *from* something, at which eternity began. This something must strictly be some time, or some point in endless duration. So that *from eternity* taken strictly, is as real and as great an impropriety as *before eternity or before eternal times*. The same is observable of *to eternity*. Yet *from eternity* and *to eternity*, are in fact used among us to express an absolute eternity; and how does it appear absurd, that the apostle should express the same idea by a phrase, in which no greater impropriety is naturally implied, and which may as

* Page 261.

well, and in the same way, as the phrases *from eternity*, and *to eternity*, be made properly to signify an absolute eternity? The impropriety supposed to be in the expression, *Before eternal times*, is, that it implies a beginning to eternity. The same is implied in the expression *from eternity*; and in the phrase *to eternity* it is implied that there is an end to eternity. But I mean not to insist on this; I do but just mention it, to show that Dr. C's most favorite proof, that αἰώνιος means a temporary duration, is not demonstrative.

The Doctor further observes,* "The particles ἔτι and ἐπέκεινα, are sometimes added in the Septuagint, to the word αἰών. Whereas, should we add the English words answerable to those Greek particles, to the term *eternity*, it would make evident nonsense." The Doctor was mistaken; we do say forever*more*, forever *and ever*, forever and *for aye*. Yet no man will hence infer, that in our language the word *forever* does not properly mean an endless duration, or that *forever and ever* implies an addition to eternity.

Doctor C. insists, that "αἰών and αἰώνιος signify nothing more than *an age, dispensation, period* of continuance, either longer or shorter;" That "it is certain, this is the sense in which they are commonly, if not always used in the sacred pages;" That this is the frequent and almost perpetual use of the words —in the sacred writings."† It is by no means granted, nor has the Doctor made it evident, that this is almost the perpetual use of those words, especially in the New Testament. Αἰὼν reckoning the reduplications of it, as οἱ αἰῶνες τῶν αἰώνων, to be but single instances of its use, occurs in the New Testament in one hundred and four instances; in thirty-two of which, it means a temporary duration.‡ In seven, it may be taken in either the temporary or endless sense.§ In sixty-five, including six instances in which it is applied to future punishment, it plainly signifies an endless duration.‖ How then could Dr. C. say, that it is

* Page 263. † pp. 264 and 267.

‡ The places are, Matt. 12: 32. 13: 22, 39, 40, 49. 24: 3. 28: 20. Mark 4: 19. Luke 1: 70. 16: 8. 20: 34, 35. Acts 3: 21. Rom. 12: 2. 1 Cor. 1: 20. 2: 6 twice, 7, 8. 3: 18. 10: 11. 2 Cor. 4: 4. Gal. 1: 4. Eph. 1: 21. 2: 2. 6: 12. 1 Tim. 6: 17. 2 Tim. 4: 10. Tit. 2: 12. Heb. 1: 2. 9: 26. 11: 3.

§ The places are, Mark 10: 30. Luke 18: 30. John 9: 32. Eph. 2: 7. 3: 9. Col. 1: 26. Heb. 6: 5.

‖ The places are as follows: Matt. 6: 13. 21: 19. Mark 11: 14. Luke 1: 33, 55. John 4: 14. 6: 51, 58. 8: 35 twice, 51, 52. 10: 28. 11: 26. 12: 34. 13: 8. 14: 16. Acts 15: 18. Rom. 1: 25. 9: 5. 11: 36. 16: 27. 1 Cor. 8: 13. 2 Cor. 9: 9. 11: 31. Gal. 1: 5. Eph. 3: 11, 21. Phil. 4: 20. 1 Tim. 1: 17 twice. 2 Tim. 4: 18. Heb. 1: 8. 5: 6. 6: 20. 7: 17, 21, 24, 28. 13: 8, 21. 1 Pet. 1:

commonly if not *always* used in the sacred pages, to signify an age or dispensation only? and that this is *almost the perpetual* use of it?

But if αἰών used absolutely did generally signify a mere temporary duration; it would not thence follow, that it has the same restricted signification, when governed by the preposition εἰς. It is never applied to future punishment, but in this construction. In the whole New Testament, it is used in this construction, sixty-one times, in six of which it is applied to future punishment.* That in all the remaining fifty-five it is used in the endless sense, I appeal to the reader. If in those fifty-five instances it be used in the endless sense; this surely is a ground of strong presumption, that in the six instances, in which it is applied to future punishment, it is used in the same sense.

The adjective αἰώνιος is still more unfavorable to Dr. C's system, than the substantive αἰών. It is found in seventy-one places in the whole New Testament; sixty-six beside the five in which Dr. C. allows it is applied to future punishment.† In every one of the sixty-six instances except two, 2 Tim. 1: 9, and Tit. 1: 2, it may, to say the least, be understood in the endless sense. If beside the two instances just mentioned, Rom. 16: 25. Philem. 15. Heb. 6: 2, and Jude 7, should be pleaded, which I think are all that any universalist will pretend do contain a limited sense; it may be observed concerning Rom. 16: 25, that μυστηρίου Χρόνοις αἰωνίοις σεσιγημένου may, with at least as great truth and propriety, be rendered "mystery kept secret during the eternal

23, 25. 4: 11. 5: 11. 2 Pet. 3: 18. 1 John 2: 17. 2 John 2. Rev. 1: 6, 18. 4: 9, 10. 5: 13, 14. 7: 12. 10: 6. 11: 15. 15: 7. 22: 5. The six instances in which it is applied to future punishment are Mark 3: 29. 2 Pet. 2: 17. Jude 13. Rev. 14: 11. 19: 3. 20: 10.

* In this construction it is found in all the texts mentioned in the last marginal note, except Acts 15: 18. Eph. 3: 11, 21. Once in 1 Tim. 1: 17, and 2 Pet. 3: 18. I have been thus particular in noting all the texts, in which αἰών occurs in the New Testament, that the reader may examine them and judge for himself, whether I have given a just representation of the use of that word by the inspired writers.

† The places are, Matt. 19: 16, 29. 25: 46. Mark 10: 17, 30. Luke 10: 25. 16: 9. 18: 18, 30. John 3: 15, 16, 36. 4: 14, 36. 5: 24, 39. 6: 27, 40, 47, 54, 68. 10: 28. 12: 25, 50. 17: 2, 3. Acts 13: 46, 48. Rom. 2: 7. 5: 21. 6: 22, 23. 16: 25, 26. 2 Cor. 4: 17, 18. 5: 1. Gal. 6: 8. 2 Thess. 2: 16. 1 Tim. 1: 16. 6: 12, 16, 19. 2 Tim. 1: 9. 2: 10. Tit. 1: 2, twice. 3: 7. Philem. 15. Heb. 5: 9. 6: 2. 9: 12, 14, 15. 13: 20. 1 Pet. 5: 10. 2 Pet. 1: 11. 1 John 1: 2. 2: 25. 3: 15. 5: 11, 13, 20. Jude 7, 21. Rev. 14: 6. The five texts in which Dr. C. allows αἰώνιος to be applied to future punishment are, Matt. 18: 8. 25: 41, 46. Mark 3: 29. 2 Thess. 1: 9. To which is to be added, Jude 7.

or unlimited past ages, or from eternity," as "mystery kept secret since the world began." The literal construction of Philem. 15: 16, is, "That thou mightest receive him eternal, no longer as a servant, but above a servant, a brother;" or more briefly thus = "That thou mightest receive him as an eternal brother." That Onesimus was, in the endless sense, become an eternal brother to Philemon, and that as such he ought to be received by Philemon, cannot be disputed, provided they both were, as the apostle supposed them to be, real christians. The final judgment intended in Heb. 6: 2, may with the same propriety be called an *endless* judgment, because it refers to an endless duration to follow; as it may be called the judgment *of an age* or *dispensation*, because it refers to an age or dispensation which shall then have been past. As to the fire suffered by the Sodomites, if the text mean the fire of hell, then Jude 7 is to be added to the five texts, in which it is acknowledged αἰώνιος refers to future punishment. If it mean the fire in which they and their city were consumed in this world, it can be called eternal, or αἰώνιος, with respect to the effect only; and to say that this effect is to last for a limited time only, is the same as to say, that the Sodomites are finally to be saved; which is to beg the grand question.

As to 2 Tim. 1: 9, and Tit. 1: 2, without insisting on what has been observed in page 220, 221, if it should be granted, that in these two instances αἰώνιος is used in a limited sense, I conceive no injury would result to the doctrine for which I plead. It will not be disputed that the words *eternal* and *everlasting* in our language, are sometimes used in a limited sense; and perhaps no book written in the English language, especially written by so many different authors, and at such distant times, as the New Testament, can be found, in which the word *eternal* is used seventy times, and not twice at least in the limited sense.

As the proper meaning of the word αἰώνιος is so much insisted on by Dr. C. and as he triumphs in the idea, that it is almost perpetually, by the sacred writers, used in the limited sense, I must beg the patience of the reader, while I descend to the consideration of the particular texts, in which it occurs. In forty-four of the forementioned sixty-six texts, αἰώνιος is applied to the future life of the righteous, and therefore is used in the endless sense. If this be not allowed, it will follow, that there is no promise, no security of an endless life to the righteous, or to any of mankind, and of course universal salvation must be given up; as shall be more particularly shown presently. In Luke 16: 9, it is applied to the celestial habitations of the righteous; in 2 Cor. 4: 17, to the future glory of the righteous; in 2 Cor. 5: 1, to their house

in heaven; in 2 Thess. 2: 16, to their consolation; in 2 Tim. 2: 10, to their future glory; in Heb. 5: 9, to their salvation; in Heb. 9: 15, to their future inheritance. That in these seven instances it is used in the endless sense, will doubtless be granted, by all those who allow this to be the sense of it in the preceding forty-four. In Heb. 9: 12, it is applied to the redemption of Christ; in Heb. 13: 20, to the covenant of grace; in Rev. 14: 6, to the gospel. That in these three instances, it is used in the endless sense, it is presumed, there can be no dispute among Christians. The sense is still more determinate, when it is applied to the Deity or his perfections, as it is to God himself, in Rom. 16: 26; to the divine power, in 1 Tim. 6: 16; to the divine glory, in 1 Pet. 5: 10; to the Holy Ghost, in Heb. 9: 14.—In 2 Cor. 4: 18, it is applied to things unseen, as opposed to things seen; and to suppose, that in this instance it means the duration of an age or dispensation only, would destroy all opposition between things seen and things unseen; because many of the former continue for an age or dispensation, as well as the latter. The bare writing of this passage, so as to express a limited duration, sufficiently confutes that sense; thus, "The things which are seen, are temporal; but the things which are unseen, continue for an age or dispensation." In 2 Pet. 1: 11, αἰώνιος, is applied to the kingdom of Christ. I am aware, that the believers in Dr. C's book, will hold, that in this instance, it is used in the limited sense, because according to that book, the kingdom of Christ is of mere temporary continuance. To assert this however is a mere begging of a question in dispute. That this kingdom is not of mere temporary continuance, some reasons have been urged to show.* How forcible those reasons are, is submitted to the reader. Now these texts, together with 2 Tim. 1: 9. Tit. 1: 2. Rom. 16: 25. Philem. 15. Heb. 6: 2, and Jude 7, which were before considered, make up the whole sixty-six.

For the truth of this account of the use of αἰώνιος in the New Testament, I appeal to all who are acquainted with the Greek Testament, or are capable of examining it. And if αἰώνιος be used seventy-one times in the whole; sixty-six times beside those instances, in which it is allowed to be applied to future punishment; and if in all those sixty-six instances, except two, it certainly mean, or at least may fairly and most naturally be understood to mean, an endless duration; if in all, except six, it must necessarily be understood in the endless sense; what are we hence naturally, and may I not say, necessarily led to conclude, concerning those instances, in which it is applied to the punishment

* See Chap. XII. page 207, etc.

of the wicked? Doubtless that in those instances too it is used in the endless sense.

But what are we to think of Dr. C's saying, that this word is, in the sacred pages, *most frequently* and *almost perpetually*, used in the limited sense? With all his parade of Greek learning, and of a thorough acquaintance with the Greek Testament, was he in reality so little acquainted with it, as to fall into such an egregious mistake? If it should be here pleaded in defence of Dr. C. that he supposed αἰώνιος to be used in the limited sense, in all those instances in which it is applied to the future life of the righteous; and that on this supposition, it is almost perpetually used in the limited sense; it may be observed, that Dr. C. did indeed *suppose* this; and he might as well have *supposed*, that the same word applied to future punishment is used in the limited sense. This latter supposition would have been no more a begging of the question than the former. But of this more presently.

Dr. C. thinks "it is evident from the very texts that are brought to prove the strict eternity of hell-torments, that they contain no such doctrine."* This proposition is supported by the following considerations—That in two texts the word *everlasting* is applied to the fire of hell, not to the punishment or misery of the wicked—That fire in its own nature tends to an end, and will by the laws of nature necessarily in time come to an end—That fire powerfully tends to bring on a dissolution of those bodies that are cast into it.

1. That the word *everlasting* is applied, in two texts, to the *fire*, not to the *punishment* of hell; hence the Doctor infers, in words which he quotes with approbation from *Nichol Scot*, that though "the fire be without end, it will not follow, that every individual subject, which is cast into it, must be so too,"† Did the Doctor then believe, that some of the subjects of hell-fire will not exist without end, but will be annihilated? This is to give up the salvation of all men. Besides; that the fire of hell will be kept up without end, and therefore eternal ages after all the subjects shall be either annihilated or delivered out of it, is a mere conjecture, unsupported by any evidence from scripture or reason. As well might the Doctor have said, The saints will indeed be received to everlasting habitations; the *habitations* will be strictly without end; but the *saints* will, after a while, be all either annihilated or sent to hell. What if the word everlasting be in *two* instances applied to the *fire* of hell? In other instances it is applied to the *punishment*, to the *destruction*, to the *smoke of the*

* Page 272. † Ibid.

torment, and to the *torment* itself of the damned, Rev. 20: 10, "And" [they] "shall be *tormented*, day and night, forever and ever." And if, when applied to the *fire*, it prove that to be without end, doubtless when applied to the *punishment*, to the *destruction*, to the *torment*, it equally proves them to be without end.

2. That "fire as such naturally tends to an end, and will, in time," by the laws of nature, "actually come to an end."* This, like many other of Dr. C's arguments, if it prove anything, proves too much, and therefore really proves nothing. It depends on this very false principle, that whatever, according to the laws of nature, established in this world, would without an immediate divine interposition, come to an end, will certainly come to an end in the future world. Now according to this principle, all the bodies of both sinners and saints, in the future world, as well as this, will be dissolved. Nay, as their souls too are constantly upholden in existence by the agency of God, and would in their own nature immediately cease to exist, were it not for that continued agency; it follows according to the principle now under consideration, that all the souls of both sinners and saints will actually come to an end, in the future world. But as this consequence will be rejected, and as it will be granted, that the souls of all men will, by the agency of God, be upholden without end; so the same agency will be sufficient, to continue the fire of hell without end; and that whether it be material fire or not. If it be not material fire, it does not, in its own nature, more tend to an end, than the souls of men, or the faculties of those souls. If it be material fire, still it may, as was just now observed, be perpetuated to an absolute eternity.

If this argument from the tendency of fire to an end, be of any force, it will overthrow Dr. C's scheme equally as the contrary. For it is equally the tendency of all the fire, of which we have any experience, to come to an end, in a short time, as to come to an end at all. No fire in this world will, without new supplies of fuel, last for ages of ages, or even for one age. But with a proper supply of fuel, any fire may be kept up without end. If therefore we are to conclude, that the fire of hell will come to an end, because the fire of which we have knowledge, will without a new and constant supply of fuel, come to an end; we are also to conclude, that the fire of hell will come to an end, before the expiration of one age. Indeed God can make the fire of hell last for an age; and he can with equal ease make it last without end. Nay, he can make our common fire last without

* Page 273.

end. The same power which shall make our bodies immortal, can make our common fire strictly eternal. In order to this the nature of that fire needs no greater alteration, than the nature of our bodies needs, to render them immortal.

The Doctor informs us, that he "sees not but an age, dispensation or period, for the continuance of this fire, will very well answer the full import of the word *αἰώνιον*, *everlasting*; especially, if we suppose this age to last till the fire has accomplished the end, for which it was enkindled."* But it is not allowed by the opponents of the Doctor, that the fire will ever have accomplished the end, for which it was enkindled; and to argue on that supposition, is to take for granted what is as much in dispute, as any subject of this whole controversy. He adds, The words concerning Sodom and Gomorrah, "They are set forth for an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire," "import no more than this, that this fire lasted till it had accomplished the design of heaven, in the destruction of those cities, for a standing example of the divine *vengeance*† to after ages. And the fire of hell is "doubtless called everlasting for the like reason." According to this then, the word *everlasting*, etc. applied to future punishment, gives no evidence, that that punishment is to last longer than the time, during which the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah were in consuming, or longer than one day; and the flood of Noah, as it lasted till it had accomplished the design of heaven in the destruction of the old world, for a standing public example of the divine vengeance to after ages, was an eternal flood; the deaths of Korah, Dathan and Abiram, of Nadab and Abihu, of Zimri and Cosbi, etc. were for the same reasons *eternal deaths*. But how is this sense of everlasting consistent with that for which Dr. C. abundantly contends, that it signifies the duration of an age? And if "the fire of hell be doubtless called everlasting," in the former sense, how does it appear, that it ever is, or that it can consistently be called everlasting in the latter sense?

3. "Fire powerfully tends to bring on a solution of continuity, in those bodies that are cast into it;" therefore the punishment of hell is not endless.‡ So fire tends to bring on a dissolution of the human body in a very short time, in one hour, or in a much shorter time; therefore the punishment of hell will not last for ages of ages, or for one age, or even for one day. This argu-

* Page 274.

† Let it be remembered, that Dr. C. is a bitter enemy to *vindictive* punishment.

‡ Page 276.

ment is just as conclusive, as that now quoted from Dr. C. He who can make a human body endure the fire of hell for an age, can make it endure the same fire, for an endless succession of ages. Therefore though fire does powerfully tend to bring on a dissolution of those bodies, which are cast into it, it by no means thence follows, either that such dissolution will be effected in the wicked; or that their torment will ever come to an end.

The Doctor proceeds to argue, that future punishment will not be endless, because "the wicked are not said *to live always in torment without dying;* or that their bodies shall be immortal, or incorruptible, or indissoluble; but that they shall reap corruption, be destroyed, perish, undergo death."* On this passage it may be remarked:

1. That by *dying, corruption, destruction, perishing, the second death,* he evidently means something different from torment; as he sets those terms in opposition to torment or misery. Yet he tells us in the very same page, that "the second death, which wicked men shall pass through, and their being cast into the lake of fire, mean—one and the same thing." In other parts of his book, he declares, that everlasting destruction evidently means *misery,*†—that "the being cast into the furnace of fire, where there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth, means the same thing, in the sacred dialect, with the second death,"‡—that the scripture expresses going through the torments "of hell, by being hurt of the second death."§

2. If by *death, destruction,* etc., Dr. C. mean anything different from the torment of the damned, it seems he must mean either annihilation, or a dissolution of the connection of the souls and bodies of the damned, and their transition from the state, in which they are to be immediately after this life, to the next succeeding state. If he mean the former, it is indeed opposed to their endless misery, and equally opposed to their final salvation. If he mean a transition of the damned to some other state, this is no proof against endless misery; because the Doctor himself supposes, that the damned, or some of them at least, will pass through several succeeding states of misery. And let them pass through ever so many succeeding states, there is no evidence arising from this bare transition, that they will ever be saved. So that let the Doctor mean, in this case, what he will, by *death, destruction,* etc. those words are either not at all opposed to the endless misery of the wicked, or they are equally opposed to their endless happiness. Whether they do mean annihilation or not,

* Page 277. † p. 224. ‡ p. 210. § p. 337.

has been already considered in Chap. V. The truth undoubtedly is, what Dr. C. himself abundantly holds, though in writing this passage, he seems to have forgotten it; that the death, destruction, corruption, second death of the damned, is their misery or torment, the smoke of which shall ascend forever and ever, and in which in Rev. 20: 10, they are expressly said to be tormented forever and ever.

3. If the express words "The wicked shall *always live in torment, without dying*," be not written in scripture, yet it is there written, that "they shall go into everlasting punishment;" that "the smoke of their torment shall ascend forever and ever," "that they shall be *tormented* forever and ever," etc. In Rev. 20: 10, it is said, "The devil that deceived them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and *they shall be tormented* day and night forever and ever;" βασανισθήσονται, in the plural number. Now so long as a person is tormented, he lives in torment without dying; and to be tormented forever and ever, is to live always in torment without dying. What right then had Dr. C. to say, that the wicked are not said to live always in torment without dying? And if the very words just quoted from Dr. C. had been inserted in the sacred volume, they might have been explained away as easily as the expressions just now quoted from scripture, and as the many other declarations of endless torment which are there to be found. It might have been said, The wicked, while such, shall indeed always live in torment; but no sooner shall they repent and become righteous, than they shall be delivered from their torment, into endless bliss. The righteous are no more in the very words said to be immortal in happiness, than the wicked are said to be immortal in misery; and shall we therefore deny, that they are to be immortal in happiness? If it had been said, that the wicked shall be incorruptible or indissoluble in misery, it might have been pleaded, with as much plausibility, as attends many of Dr. C's pleas, that this meant, that while they are in misery, they are incorruptible, etc. not that they shall without end remain in misery.

The Doctor tells us, that "the texts which join αἰώνιος, *everlasting*, with the misery of the wicked, are very few, in comparison with those, which join with it a dissolution, destruction, or death."* That this observation may be at all to the purpose, it ought to be shown—1. That destruction, death, etc. as applied in scripture to the damned, are inconsistent with their endless misery, and are not at the same time, equally inconsistent

* Page 279.

with their final salvation. 2. That whenever there is a seeming inconsistency between several passages of scripture, and to relieve the difficulty, we are necessitated to understand some of them in a figurative sense; we are to determine, that the truth is according to the literal tenor of the greater number, and that the minority, as in popular assemblies, is always to give way to the majority, and complaisantly submit to a figurative construction.

A view has now been taken of Dr. C's arguments to prove, that *αἰών eternity*, and *αἰώνιος eternal*, do not in the sacred writings properly mean an endless duration. Concerning the validity of those arguments, it is the province of the reader to judge.

We are next to attend to the Doctor's answer to the argument drawn from the circumstance, that the same word in scripture is used to express the duration of the misery of the wicked, as is used to express the duration of the happiness of the righteous, and that in the same text; as Matt. 25: 46, "These shall go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life."

The Doctor's first answer to this argument is, that the state next succeeding the present, is not final, either with respect to the wicked or the righteous; and therefore the word *eternal*, even when applied to the life of the righteous, means not an endless duration.* For this hypothesis he gives no new reasons, but refers us to what he had said before, which we have already considered,† and the sum of which is, that Christ's kingdom is not to continue without end, but is at last to be delivered up to the Father; that the reward promised in scripture to the righteous is to be bestowed upon them in this kingdom of Christ; that that reward therefore cannot be without end. In opposition to this, it has been shown, that the scriptures abundantly assure us, that the kingdom of Christ is to be without end; and that whatever is said in scripture concerning Christ's resignation of the kingdom to the Father, must be understood in a consistency with the endless duration of Christ's kingdom; and an attempt was made, to show in what sense of resigning the kingdom, a consistency can be preserved.

Further; the idea now advanced by Dr. C. cannot be admitted, in a consistency either with the scriptures, or with Dr. C. himself.

1. Not with the scriptures. For if Matt. 25: 46, and the many other texts, which promise *eternal* life to the righteous, do

* Page 282. † p. 207, etc.

of promise them an endless life and happiness, there is no promise of such happiness to the righteous in all the scripture; and with at least as much plausibility as the Doctor evades the force of Matt. 25: 46; may the force of any text be evaded, which can be brought to prove the endless life of the righteous. Let us consider those, which the Doctor supposes *determine* the future life and happiness of the righteous to be endless.* Luke 20: 36, "Neither can they die any more." This may be evaded two ways; it may be said to mean no more than that they shall not die during the continuance of Christ's kingdom; and the original happily favors this construction. *Οὔτε ἀποθανεῖν ἔτι δύνανται.* Neither can they die *as yet;* their death will be deferred till the end of Christ's kingdom. It may also be evaded thus: If they cannot *die* any more they may *live in misery.* 1 Cor. 9: 25, "But we an incorruptible crown." True, the *crown* may be incorruptible indeed! but the possessor may be very corruptible; as Dr. C. supposes the *fire* of hell may be endless, though the wicked shall be delivered out of it in time. And when the bodies of the saints are said to be raised *incorruptible,* to put on *incorruption, immortality,* etc., this may mean indeed, that they shall exist and live, but not that they shall be happy without end. "We receiving a kingdom, which cannot be moved," Heb. 12: 28; the *kingdom* may indeed be immovable, yet a great part of the *subjects* may be removed. 1 Pet. 1: 4, "He hath begotten us—to an inheritance incorruptible, undefiled, and that fadeth not away." All this may be true concerning the *inheritance,* yet all the heirs from among men, of that inheritance, may be removed from the possession of it, and in that sense, may fade away. Rev. 2: 11, "He that overcometh, shall not be hurt of the second death." He may however be hurt of the third, fourth or fifth death. Chap. 21: 4, "God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and there shall be no more death." Here also I avail myself of the original; it may be literally rendered, "The death shall not be *as yet.*" 1 Thess. 4: 17, "So shall we be *ever* with the Lord." The word *ever,* πάντοτε, properly signifies not *endlessly,* but *constantly, continually, uninterruptedly.* In this sense it is manifestly used in every other instance in the New Testament. Nor is it in any instance, beside this, 1 Thess. 4: 17, applied at all to the future state. Therefore 1 Thess. 4: 17, means no more, than that the saints, while they are in heaven, shall be uninterruptedly with Christ; as John 12: 8, means, that while we are in the world, we uninterruptedly have the poor with us.

‡ Page 286.

Thus by admitting Dr. C's sense of Matt. 25: 46, we erase n the scriptures every promise of endless life and happiness to righteous, and overthrow the gospel. Indeed Dr. C. expressolds, that there is no promise in the gospel of endless happis to any man; how consistently with himself, the reader will ge. "The reward promised, under the administration of ist's kingdom, in the present state, in order to persuade men ecome his good and faithful subjects, is not the final happiness d intends to bestow upon them; but the happiness of that e, which intervenes between the resurrection and God's being in all."* Yet he quotes the texts remarked on in the last agraph,† and says they *determine*, that the happiness of the iteous is to be endless; and were not those texts supposed by C. to be promises, given under the administration of Christ's gdom in this present state, in order to persuade men to bene his good and faithful subjects?

t. Nor is Dr. C's construction of Matt. 25: 46, any more conent with his own scheme, than it is with the Bible. His whole eme supposes, that all men will be finally happy; and he beed that the doctrine of final happiness is taught in scripture. professes to ground his whole book immediately on scripture. if there be no promise in scripture of endless happiness, as nplied in his construction of Matt. 25: 46, and as he expressolds in page 222, his whole scheme falls to the ground.

That Dr. C. does in other parts of his book, hold that there promises of endless happiness, does not relieve the matter. be inconsistent and to contradict one's self, clears up no diffity. Who is answerable for that inconsistence, I need not in-n the reader. It is manifest, the Doctor was driven into this onsistence, by the pressure of the argument from Matt. 25: 46, at the punishment of the wicked is of the same duration with happiness of the righteous, because in the very same sentence said, The wicked shall go away into everlasting punishment, the righteous into everlasting life.

f there be no promise in scripture of final happiness, then all se texts from which the Doctor argues universal salvation, are gether impertinent, and prove nothing to the purpose for ich they are brought. A promise is an assurance of the bewment of some future good. If therefore, Rom. 5: 12, etc. p. 8: 19, etc. 1 Cor. 15: 24, etc. be no promises of endless piness, they afford no assurance or evidence, that all will be lly saved.

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* Page 222. † p. 286, etc.

In the same manner in which Dr. C. restricts Matt. 25: 46, to a limited duration, may every text from which he argues universal salvation, be restricted. If the life promised in the last quoted text, be a limited life; a life to be enjoyed before the kingdom is delivered up to the Father; what reason can be given why, in Rom. 5: 18, "The free gift came upon all men to justification of *life*," the life promised is not the same, and of the same limited duration? If life for a limited duration only be promised in Matt. 25: 46, then the destruction of death for a limited duration only, is of course all that is promised in the same text. And if the destruction of death for a limited duration only be all that is promised in Matt. 25: 46, how does it appear, that a destruction of death for any more than a limited duration, is promised in 1 Cor. 15: 26, "the last enemy that shall be destroyed is death?" And how strange is it, that Dr. C. should from Rom. 8: 21, "The creature shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God," argue the certain salvation of all men, when he himself holds, that the glorious liberty promised the children of God, does not mean final salvation!

The Doctor's second answer to the argument from Matt. 25: 46, is founded on the supposition, that the next is the final state with respect to both the righteous and the wicked.* If the next state of the wicked be final, the Doctor abundantly declares, that all men will not be saved.† "If the next state is a state of punishment not intended for the cure of the patients themselves,—it is impossible all men should be finally saved."‡ "If—the wicked are sent to hell as so many absolute incurables, the second death ought to be considered as that which will put an end to their existence both in soul and body." Thus this second answer of Dr. C. wholly depends on the supposition, that the wicked are to be annihilated; and to evade the argument from Matt. 25: 46, to prove endless punishment, he is necessitated to adopt the scheme of annihilation, and thus to give up his whole system of universal salvation.

The Doctor gives us three reasons to show, that even on the supposition, that the next is the final state, it will not follow, from the endless happiness of the righteous, that the wicked will suffer endless misery. The first reason is, That the word, *everlasting*, αἰώνιος, when applied to the righteous, is mostly joined with the word *life*; whereas this word, when applied to the wicked, is never connected with their *life*, but always with the *fire*, or with their *damnation*, *punishment* or *destruction*.§ Now this observation is wholly impertinent, on any other supposition, than that the wick-

* Page 283. † p. 11. ‡ p. 282. § p. 284.

ed are to be annihilated; for Dr. C. himself makes this observation, supposing that the next state of the wicked will be final. And if it be final, the wicked must be without end in that state, which is allowed by all to be a state of misery; or they must not exist at all. Thus still the Doctor is obliged to give up his favorite scheme of the salvation of all men.

His second reason is, that it perfectly falls in with our natural notions of the infinite benevolence of the Deity, that he should reward the righteous with endless life; but not that he should punish the wicked with endless misery.* But our notions of the benevolence of the Deity, are to be conformed to divine revelation; and only when they are conformed to that standard, are they right. And to suppose, that the endless misery of those, who live and die in wickedness, is not agreeable to scriptural representations of the benevolence of the Deity, is a mere begging of the question. This subject has already been largely considered in Chapter VIII.

The Doctor's last reason is, "That we are naturally and obviously led to interpret *αἰώνιος*, *everlasting*, when joined with the happiness of the righteous, in the endless sense, from other texts which determine this to be the meaning." "This," adds the Doctor, "I call a decisive answer to this branch of the objection, upon supposition, that the next is the final state of man."† Now all those his determinate texts have been already considered in page 232, etc.; and in view of the observations there made, the reader will judge, whether those texts do any more decisively, than the word *αἰώνιος, everlasting*, prove the future happiness of the righteous to be without end.

To confirm his construction of Matt. 25: 46, Dr. C. mentions two texts in which he supposes the word *αἰώνιος*, *everlasting*, is in the same sentence used both in the limited and endless sense. One is Rom. 16: 25, 26, "According to the mystery which was kept secret [*χρόνοις αἰωνίοις*] *since the world began*—but is now made manifest—according to the commandment [*τοῦ αἰωνίου Θεοῦ*] of the everlasting God." Concerning this text it was before observed, that *χρόνοις αἰωνίοις* is perfectly capable of the endless sense. The mystery was kept secret from all eternity, or during the eternal ages which preceded creation, or through the eternity *a parte ante*, as some call it. So that this text answers not the Doctor's purpose. The other text produced by the Doctor, is Tit. 1: 2, "In hope [*ζωῆς αἰωνίου*] of eternal life, which God that cannot lie, promised [*πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων*] before the world began." On this text, it has been observed,‡

* Page 285. † p. 287, 288. ‡ p. 221.

that there is no absolute certainty, that it means a limited duration. But supposing that this indeed is an instance to the Doctor's purpose; when it shall be made as evident from the very nature of the case, or from any other source of evidence, that the wicked cannot be punished without end, as it is, that God could not give a promise before eternity; doubtless we shall give up the doctrine of endless punishment.

At length we come to the Doctor's criticism on the expression *forever and ever*. He seems to suppose, that expression in scripture does not refer to the future punishment of all the wicked, but only of "the worshippers of the beast," and to a certain "rabble rout of men," as he calls them. Be this as it may, it equally overthrows the Doctor's scheme, as if it ever so confessedly referred to the punishment of *all* the wicked. But on the supposition, that *forever and ever* refers to the punishment of the wicked in common, the Doctor thinks that that "phrase is obviously capable of being understood of a limited duration."* His reasons are, That αἰών in the singular number almost perpetually signifies an age, or a limited duration,†—That though this word in the plural is to be met with in several places in the Septuagint, yet in them all it signifies a limited duration.‡—In like manner the plural of αἰών is most commonly, if not always, used, in the New Testament, to point out a limited duration;§—That εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων is applied in Rev. 11: 15, to the kingdom of Christ, and therefore must mean a limited duration;‖—That εἰς αἰῶνα αἰῶνος, and εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος are always in the Septuagint to be understood in the limited sense.¶

1. Αἰῶν in the singular number almost perpetually signifies a limited duration. Answer. It is by no means granted, that αἰῶν in the singular almost perpetually signifies a limited duration; especially when governed by the preposition εἰς. In p. 222, etc. the use of αἰῶν, in the New Testament, was traced, both in the singular and plural, and it was found, that it is much more frequently used in the endless, than in the limited sense. If the use of the singular number only be traced, in even this number it is still most frequently used in the endless sense, as the learned reader may see, by examining the texts, in which it is used in the Greek Testament, all which have been already noted. Dr. C's assertion therefore, that it almost perpetually signifies a limited duration, is a *mere* assertion, and stands for nothing until it shall be proved; and to make a mere assertion a ground of an important consequence, is not warrantable by the laws of reasoning and philosophy.

* Page 295. † Ibid. ‡ p. 296. § p. 297. ‖ p. 298. ¶ p. 301.

But if the assertion were ever so true, the consequence, which Dr. C. thence draws, would by no means follow. If αἰὼν in the singular did almost perpetually signify a limited duration, it would not follow, that οἱ αἰῶνες τῶν αἰώνων too signifies a limited duration. Language is not made metaphysically by philosophers, but by the vulgar, without metaphysical reasoning; and the meaning of particular phrases is wholly determined by use, not by metaphysical reasoning on the natural force of the words. If therefore use have determined οἱ αἰῶνες τῶν αἰώνων to mean generally or universally an endless duration, this is enough to settle the present question, let αἰῶν mean in the singular what it may.

Or if we must reason metaphysically on this subject, it may be asserted, that ὁ αἰὼν τῶν αἰώνων or οἱ αἰῶνες τῶν αἰώνων is no absurd or unintelligible mode of expressing an endless duration. If αἰὼν signify *an age*, and the phrases just mentioned be rendered, *the age of the ages* and *the ages of the ages*, the strictest philosophy will justify those phrases, as applied to eternity. We have no idea of eternity, but as an endless succession of ages. Therefore that age, those ages, or that duration, which comprehends all those successive ages, is a proper eternity. The Doctor undertakes to reason metaphysically on this subject, and observes, that "a duration for eternities of eternities, is a very uncouth mode of expression."* But it is not more uncouth, than the expression of *An eternity added to an eternity*, or *an eternity and an eternity*. Yet this is the strict analysis of *forever and ever*, an expression rendered abundantly proper by use.

One thing more ought to be observed, that αἰὼν, whether in the singular or plural, governed by the preposition εἰς, invariably in the New Testament, signifies an endless duration. But in the phrase in question, εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων it is governed by that preposition,

2. That though αἰῶνες, the plural, is met with in several places in the Septuagint, yet in them all it signifies a limited duration.† *Answer* 1. It does not appear, that αἰῶνες in the Septuagint always signifies a limited duration; nor is it used in this sense in all the instances, which Dr. C. produces to prove, that it always means a limited duration; as Ps. 145: 13, "Thy kingdom is an everlasting kingdom; βασιλεία πάντων τῶν αἰώνων." Dan. 2: 44, "In the days of these kings, the God of heaven shall set up a kingdom—and it shall stand forever, εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας." Though the Doctor endeavors to prove, that in these texts a limited duration must be intended, because in 1 Cor. 15: 28, Christ is represented as delivering up his kingdom to the Father; yet it is at

* Pages 297, 298. † p. 296.

least as clearly proved by Luke 1: 33, "Of his kingdom there is no end," and the other texts before quoted,* that the texts now in question are to be taken in the endless sense. Besides, how does it appear, that Ps. 145: 13, refers to the kingdom of Christ, as distinguished from the kingdom of the Father? And the kingdom of the Father Dr. C. allows, is without end.

There are other texts, in which αἰῶνες seems beyond dispute to be used in the endless sense; as Ps. 77: 7, "Will the Lord cast off forever, εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας? and will he be favorable *no more?*" The latter expression explains the former to mean an endless duration. The next verses further confirm this idea. Dan. 4: 34, "I praised and honored him, that liveth *forever*, εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας." Chap. 6: 26, "For he is the living God, and stedfast *forever*, εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας." If αἰῶνες be not in these instances used in the endless sense, it is in vain to search for instances, in which it is used in that sense; and it may be presumed, that it is incapable of any application, by which it shall appear to be used in that sense.

Answer 2. But if it were ever so true, that αἰῶνες is never used in the Septuagint, but in a limited sense; it by no means thence follows, that εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων is in general, or at all, *in the New Testament*, used in a limited sense.

3. In like manner the plural of αἰῶν, is commonly, if not always, used in the New Testament to point out a limited duration.† The answers to this argument are the very same, with those given to the preceding. (1) The plural of αἰῶν, in the New Testament, even when it is not redoubled, is not commonly, much less always, used to point out a limited duration; but is generally used to point out an endless duration, as the reader may see by the texts in which it occurs, all which are noted in the margin.‡ Dr. C. quotes Luke 1: 33, "He shall reign over the house of Jacob forever," as an instance, that αἰῶνες means a limited duration. But if he had quoted the whole verse, the latter part would have effectually confuted his sense of the former part. The words are, "and of his kingdom there shall be no end." (2) If αἰῶνες by itself did commonly point out a limited duration, it would not follow, that the same limited sense belongs to εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων.

4. Εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων is applied to the kingdom of

* Page 209, etc. † p. 297.

‡ In the endless sense, Matt. 6: 13. Luke 1: 33. Rom. 1: 25. 9: 5. 11: 36. 16: 27. 2 Cor. 11: 31. Eph. 3: 11, 21. 1 Tim. 1: 17, and Heb. 13: 8. In the limited sense, 1 Cor. 2: 7. 10: 11. Eph. 2: 7. Heb. 1: 2. 9: 26. 11: 3. In Eph. 3: 9, and Col. 1: 26, it is capable of either sense.

Christ in Rev. 11: 15; and therefore must mean a limited duration.* *Answer.* The application of that phrase to the kingdom of Christ, is no proof at all, that it is ever used in the limited sense; because it appears by Luke 1: 33. Dan. 7: 14. Is. 9: 7, and more largely by what was said, page 209, etc. that Christ's kingdom is without end.

5. The phrases εἰς αἰῶνα αἰῶνος, and εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος are always in the Septuagint, to be understood in the limited sense.†

Answer 1. It is by no means a conceded point, that those phrases in the Septuagint are always to be understood in a limited sense. The contrary appears even from the instances quoted by Dr. C. to prove that they are used in the limited sense; as Ps. 119: 44, "So shall I keep thy law continually forever and ever." Ps. 145: 2, "I will praise thy name forever and ever." To suppose, that these texts contain no more, than a professed intention of the psalmist, to obey and to praise God, as long as he should live in this world, is as arbitrary a supposition, as to suppose, that when the scriptures speak of God as living forever and ever, they mean no more, than that God will live as long as men live in this world.

Answer 2. But if those phrases in the Septuagint did ever so certainly mean a limited duration, it would not follow, that also the very different phrase εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων in the New Testament, means a limited duration. The truth is, this last phrase is not to be found in the Septuagint, though it frequently occurs in the New Testament. Be it so therefore, that those phrases in the Septuagint, mean a limited duration; is it not very singular argumentation, thence to infer, that a very different phrase found in the New Testament, means a limited duration too? This is just as if Dr. C. had argued, that because the word *lion* in the Septuagint means a four-footed beast, therefore the word *man* in the New Testament means a four-footed beast too.

The Doctor holds, that "it is of no significancy, that this phrase is sometimes applied to God;"‡ because, if from this application merely, we argue the absolute eternity of God; we may argue the absolute eternity of the land of Canaan, and of the successive generations of men, from the application to them, of the same or an equivalent phrase. But the same phrase is never applied, either to the land of Canaan, or to the successive generations of men; and whatever other phrase is applied to them, is by that very application proved not to be equivalent; because we have no other possible way to know, that any phrase is equiva-

* Page 298. † p. 301. ‡ p. 303.

lent, than by its application to those subjects alone, which are of equal duration with those, to which alone the phrase in question is applied. The Doctor proceeds: "Reason assures us, that the duration of God will have no end"—for this cause, "not from the force of this phrase, we interpret it when applied to God, as meaning a duration without end." But is not the eternity of God revealed in scripture, as well as known by reason? If so, where and in what words is it expressed? Let any more determinate expression of it be pointed out in the scriptures. If the divine eternity be clearly revealed in scripture, and this phrase be as determinately expressive of it, as any in the bible, doubtless it determines the future punishment of the wicked also, to be without end, because it is repeatedly applied to that.

Finally, the Doctor observes, "That it is as certain, that the phrase *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων*, ought to be construed *for ages of ages*, as that the wicked in the resurrection state, will not be incorruptible, but shall die a second time."* That the wicked shall reap corruption, and shall suffer the second death, is not in the least inconsistent with their endless misery, unless corruption and the second death mean either annihilation or final happiness. If they mean the same with the destruction of the wicked, they mean misery, as Doctor C. himself allows;† and no man will say, that the declarations of scripture, that the wicked shall reap *misery*, or suffer misery, are a proof, that that misery is not endless. Or if corruption and the second death mean a transition from the resurrection state, to the next succeeding state, if any such there be, still that succeeding state, or the final state of the wicked, may be a state of misery. But if corruption and the second death mean annihilation, they overthrow the salvation of all men. Is it not therefore surprising, that Dr. C. should over and over again, insist on an argument, as fully demonstrative of his scheme, which argument either wholly overthrows his scheme, or is utterly impertinent to the subject?

On the whole, it is left with the reader to determine, whether the reasons offered by Dr. C. prove, that *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων* means a limited duration. That the reader may judge concerning the true force of that expression, every place in which it is used by the inspired writers, is noted in the margin.‡

Next occurs Dr. C's answer to the argument from Mark 9: 43,

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* Page 304. † p. 224.

‡ Gal. 1: 5. Phil. 4: 20. 1 Tim. 1: 17. 2 Tim. 4: 18. Heb. 13: 21. 1 Pet. 4: 11. 5: 11. Rev. 1: 6, 18. 4: 9, 10. 5: 13, 14. 7: 12. 10: 6. 11: 15. 14: 11. 15: 7. 19: 3. 20: 10. 22: 5.

"The fire that never shall be quenched; where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." The Doctor's answer consists of these particulars: That the *fire* of hell may never be quenched, yet the wicked may not live in it endlessly;* That *in hell*, or while the wicked are in the next state of existence, their worm indeed shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched; but their torment shall be continued during their existence in that state.† As to the first observation, That the fire of hell may never be quenched, though the wicked shall be delivered out of it in time, by either salvation or annihilation; it has been observed to be a mere wild conjecture, and probably would never have been thought of, had not the scheme been in distress, and must be relieved by some means or other. Other remarks have been made on this conjecture, to which I refer the reader. Nor does the latter observation, especially as connected with the former, appear to be more rational or pertinent. According to these two observations, the sense of Mark 9: 43, 44, is merely this: It is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands, to go into the fire which never shall be quenched, though thou mayest soon be delivered out of it; and in which while thou continuest, thy torments will not cease. But where is the evidence of the truth of this proposition? How does it appear to be better for a man to cut off his right hand, and be forever after maimed, than to go into a fire which is indeed endless, and in which while he continues, he will be uneasy, and even feel torment; though he may not continue in it two minutes or two seconds? Who would not choose to suffer even a very painful torment, for a few seconds, or minutes, rather than to lose a hand or an eye? Thus the sense which Dr. C. puts on Mark 9: 43, etc. utterly frustrates the manifest design of our Lord, which was in that passage to exhibit a most powerful motive to the greatest self-denial. But according to the Doctor's construction, the passage contains no powerful motive to self-denial, or anything else.

Besides; is it not flat and insipid, to tell a man that he shall go into a fire which shall never be quenched, though he may be immediately taken out again? Yet this is the sense which Dr. C. puts on those words of our Savior! But how is it to the purpose? or how does it concern any man, if he be not in the fire of hell, that that fire shall never be quenched? Suppose a man is to be burnt at the stake. It would be a matter of indifference to him, whether the fire, in which he should be put to

* Page 311. † Ibid.

death, be continued burning for five hundred years after his death, or be extinguished immediately; and to tell him by way of threatening, that that fire shall be kept up five hundred years after his death; or to threaten a criminal who is about to be executed on the gallows, that the gallows on which he shall die, shall stand a thousand years after his execution, would be perfect impertinence.

Doctor C. seems to insist much on this: That in Mark 9: 43, etc. a reference is had to the punishment of those whose bodies were either burnt in the valley of Hinnom, or permitted to lie upon the ground, to be fed upon by worms. But it does not thence follow, as Dr. C. supposes, that as the fire of the valley of Hinnom went out, when the bodies were consumed, and the worm died, when the bodies were eaten up; so the fire and worm of hell shall cease. The sense may be, that as those bodies in the valley of Hinnom, were consumed by fire and worms, which after a while ceased; so the wicked in hell shall be tormented by fire and worms, which shall not cease. Indeed this is expressly asserted; and as Mr. Hopkins justly observes: "It cannot be granted, that our Savior by those words, 'Where their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched,' means a worm that *dieth*, and a fire that *is quenched* very soon. For this would be to suppose, he *means* directly contrary to what he *says*."*

The Doctor argues against endless punishment from the smallness of the number of those who are saved in the next state.† That "only a few of mankind" should be saved finally, and "the greater part eternally perish" he thinks not reconcilable with the great mercy of the christian dispensation; or with the glad tidings of great joy, and the divine good will celebrated at the birth of our Savior. This argument is built on the supposition, that it would not be dishonorary to Christ, that a minority of mankind be lost. But this would be equally inconsistent with Dr. C's scheme, as that a majority be lost. This argument, as it grants that some will not be saved, gives up the grand question, and disputes concerning the number only, which is to be saved. But this is no subject of dispute in this controversy.

Is it then no instance of great and glorious mercy, to institute a scheme, by which salvation may be offered to every creature; by which whosoever will, may take the water of life freely, and no man shall perish, but in consequence of his own voluntary rejection of that institution? Is not the certain information of this institution indeed glad tidings of great joy to all people? Is not the institution a clear proof of the abundant good will of God to

* Future state of those who die in their sins. † Page 322.

men, even though sinners, through their voluntary opposition, obtain no good by it? It certainly is, if we may believe Dr. C. for it is a maxim with him, "that we must not judge of the divine goodness, by the *actual good*, which we see *produced*, but must take into view the tendency of the divine administration," etc. See the quotations made page 125.

The Doctor says, "It is incredible, that God should constitute his Son the Savior of men, and the *bulk* of them be finally damned."* But why is it incredible? Is it not an undertaking worthy of Christ, in a way most honorary to God, to open a door of mercy and salvation to all mankind, though by the wicked and ungrateful rejection of Christ by the majority, a minority only will actually be saved? If it be not credible, that God should constitute his Son the Savior of men, and "the *bulk*" of them be finally damned, is it credible, that Christ should be constituted the Savior, and a bare majority of mankind be saved? If not, how large must the majority be?

As to the observation, "That it is a gross reflection on the Savior, whose proper business it is, to destroy the works of the devil, and rescue mankind out of his hands; to suppose, that the devil should finally get the better of Christ, by effecting the everlasting damnation of the greater part of men;"† there are some particulars in it, which want explanation. First; what is meant by destroying the works of the devil? If this mean to abolish all sin, and all the misery consequent on sin to any of the human race; it is not granted, that this is *the proper business* of our Savior, nor is this the proper meaning of the original, in 1 John. 3: 8, the text to which Dr. C. refers. The verb is λύσῃ, *dissolve*, *take to pieces*, and thus prevent the ill effect of the works of the devil. But if destroying the works of the devil mean, to defeat and to prevent the ill consequences of those works so that no final damage shall thence arise to the interest of God's kingdom, or of the universe; it is granted, that this is the proper business of Christ. But it is not granted, but that this may be effected, without the salvation of all men. Again, what is meant by "the devil's getting the better of Christ?" This doubtless means, that he defeats Christ more or less, as to some object of his mediatorial undertaking. But Dr. C. has no more made it appear, that the final salvation of only a part, and a small part of the human race, implies such a defeat; or that it was not the original intention of Christ to save a small part only; than he has made it appear, that it was the intention of Christ to save all men.

* Page 323. † Ibid.

Dr. C. seems not to have reflected, while he was urging this argument, that it equally militates against his own last resort, annihilation. For if an "end be put to the existence, both in soul and body," of all who die impenitent, as the Doctor allows will be the case, if universal salvation be not true;* then on his principles, the devil will not be vanquished by Christ; the works of the devil will not be destroyed, but "he will get the better of Christ by effecting the everlasting destruction of the greater part of those whom Christ came from heaven to save."† So that when this objection shall be answered, so far as it lies against Dr. C's last resort, doubtless an answer will be supplied to those who believe in endless misery.

After all, it is not an article of my faith, that only a small part of the human race will be finally saved. But my faith in this particular is not built on abstract reasonings from the divine goodness and the mission of Christ. That divine goodness which suffered *all* the apostate angels to perish finally, might have suffered all, or a greater part of the apostate race of men to perish in like manner. My faith is built on several representations and prophecies of scripture, particularly concerning the millennium, and the general and long prevalence of virtue and piety in that period. Therefore in this view, the foundation of the objection from the smallness of the number saved, is taken away.

CHAPTER XV.

IN WHICH ARE CONSIDERED DR. C'S ANSWERS TO THE ARGUMENTS DRAWN FROM WHAT IS SAID CONCERNING JUDAS, MARK 14: 21,—FROM THE UNPARDONABLE SIN,—AND FROM THE TENDENCY OF THE DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSAL SALVATION TO LICENTIOUSNESS.

The Doctor answers to the argument from Mark 14: 21, "Woe to that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed. Good were it for that man, if he had never been born;"—That perhaps it may be a proverbial expression, not literally true;‡—That if the literal sense were the most reasonable, considering this text by itself, yet considering the many passages brought by Dr. C. which declare the final salvation of all men, we must not understand this passage in the literal sense, as in that case we

* Page 282. † p. 324. ‡ p. 329

shall set the scripture at variance with itself;*—That the real meaning of this passage may be prophetical, as if our Lord had said, "The man who shall betray me" shall practically declare, that in his apprehension, it "were good had he not been brought into being."† As to the first of these answers, it is a mere unsupported conjecture, and therefore is to be set down for nothing. As to the second, it is not allowed that the Doctor has produced any one passage of scripture which declares the final salvation of all men; but this in view of what has been said on the passages produced by the Doctor, is submitted to the reader. As the Doctor contends that this passage cannot be understood in the literal sense, without setting the scripture at variance with itself; so it is contended by the advocates for endless punishment, that it can be understood in the literal sense, without setting the scripture at variance with itself in the least degree; and that the general tenor of the scripture points out the literal sense to be the true sense. As to Dr. C's third answer, it is, in the first place, a mere unsupported conjecture; secondly, it may be noticed, that it is manifest, that the text pronounces the proper woe or curse, which should fall on the man who should betray our Lord. "The Son of Man indeed goeth, as it is written of him; but woe to that man, by whom the Son of Man is betrayed; good were it for that man, if he had never been born." But according to Dr. C. all the curse which this text denounces, is such a weariness of life and impatience of existence, as has sometimes befallen even true saints; as in the instance of Job. And is it credible that this was the proper and full curse of betraying the Lord of life and glory? Or that if this be but a very small part of the curse of that abominable wickedness, our Lord would have mentioned it in such a manner, as naturally to communicate the idea, that it is the proper and full curse of it?

After all the ingenuity of Dr. C. and other universalists, in torturing this passage to a meaning consistent with their scheme; it remains a plain, direct, and positive testimony against it.

Next follows Dr. C's answer to the argument from what is said concerning the sin against the Holy Ghost, Matt. 12: 32, "Whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come." Mark 3: 29, "He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damnation." Luke 12: 10. "Unto him that blasphemeth against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven."

* Page 330. † p. 331.

The Doctor's first answer to this argument is taken from Grotius. He tells us that Grotius "looks upon the words as an Hebraism intended to signify, *not so much* the pardonableness of some sins, and the unpardonableness of others; as the greater difficulty of obtaining pardon for blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, than for any other blasphemy." It is wholly immaterial whether the words were intended to signify *not so much* the unpardonableness of some sins. If they were intended to signify *at all* the unpardonableness of some sins, that is sufficient for the present purpose. So that both Dr. C. and his favorite author Grotius, virtually concede all that is demanded in this instance.

Concerning this construction of Grotius, which is but a mere conjecture, brought in to help over an argument which crowds hardly on Dr. C's scheme; the Doctor says, "Whoever goes about to prove, that there is no truth in it, will perhaps find, that he has undertaken a very hard task." The same may be said of any man, who should undertake to prove, that there are not a dozen primary planets belonging to the solar system; or who should undertake to disprove any one of a thousand other conjectures.

After all, the Doctor does not depend much on this construction of Grotius, and proceeds to give us his own sense of the passages above quoted; which is, That it is indeed true, that "the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost "is absolutely unpardonable;"* that the divine law shall take its course on those who are guilty of that blasphemy, and no intervening pardon will prevent the full execution of the threatened penalty on them; and forgiveness strictly and literally speaking will not be granted to them;† yet that they will be finally saved, and admitted to heaven, after they shall have suffered the full penalty threatened in the law. On this idea of Dr. C. some remarks have been already made in Chap. I. Nor can it escape the notice of the attentive reader, that it implies that some men are saved, not only without forgiveness; without the exercise of divine grace, in the scriptural sense of grace; without any aid from the merit or atonement of Christ; and therefore not "on the account, on the ground, or for the reason of Christ's obedience and death;"‡ but wholly on the footing of the law. But the idea that any of mankind are to be saved without forgiveness, is wholly foreign from the scriptures, nor can it be pointed out to be contained in any part of scripture. Every chapter of the gospel is inconsistent with it; to refer to particular texts would be endless and needless. And what divine grace is there exercised in the salvation of one, who

* Page 334. † p. 336. ‡ p. 20.

has by suffering the whole threatened penalty of the law, made full satisfaction for his own sins? There is manifestly no more *grace* in saving such a man, than there is in saving one who has never sinned. Nor is he who has suffered the full penalty of the law, saved on account of the death or obedience of Christ. On the account of Christ's obedience or death he is released from no punishment; and to suppose, that God has not goodness enough, without an atonement, to take a creature to heaven, who in the eye of the law is perfectly innocent, is a supposition utterly inconsistent with the divine goodness. Lastly, he who is saved in consequence of suffering the whole penalty threatened in the law, is saved on the foot of law. Yet it is utterly and abundantly denied by Dr. C. to be possible, that any sinner should be saved on the foot of law.

In view of these observations, the reader will judge, whether Dr. C's construction of the passages, which speak of the sin against the Holy Ghost, be admissible; and whether those passages and the argument deduced from them, do not remain in full force against universal salvation.

We come at length to Dr. C's answer to the last argument of those in the opposite scheme which he considers, which is drawn from the tendency of Dr. C's system to licentiousness and vice.

On this the Doctor observes: "To disprove the final salvation of all men, it must be plainly shown, that this doctrine does naturally and directly tend to encourage men in vicious practice."* In this it is implicitly granted, that if the doctrine of universal salvation do indeed naturally and directly tend to encourage men to persist in vicious practice, it is not true. On this we may join issue with him. That that doctrine does comparatively encourage men to persist in vice, will appear perhaps from the following considerations. It will not be denied that if there were no punishment threatened to the wicked, it would naturally and directly encourage them to persist in vice. This is granted by Dr. C.—"Had we attempted to introduce mankind universally into a state of happiness, upon their leaving this world, whatever their moral conduct had been in it, the argument," that Dr. C's scheme tends to licentiousness, "would then have held strong."† But if the argument holds strong, provided there be no future punishment, it holds proportionably, if that punishment be very small and far less than is deserved by the wicked; and especially if at the same time that punishment be suited to their personal good. Now that the future punishment of the wicked is, on Dr. C's scheme, very small, compared with what it is on the opposite

* Page 341. † p. 342.

scheme, is manifest at first sight; it is infinitely less. And that it is far less, nay infinitely less than the wicked deserve, is manifest by what Doctor C. as well as his opponents allow, that all who are saved, are saved by *unbounded grace*. Therefore, if the damned be finally saved, as they are saved by unbounded grace, they are punished infinitely less than they deserve. Also, that according to Dr. C's scheme, the wicked are to be punished with a disciplinary punishment suited to the good of the subjects, is manifest from his whole book. Now that this punishment of the wicked does comparatively encourage vice, may be illustrated by an example. It is generally agreed that murder deserves death. But suppose a law should be made, by which no murderer should be punished with death, or with any other punishment to be continued longer, than till he should repent. Would not such a law as this, compared with the law as it now stands, naturally and directly tend to encourage murder? I need not make the application.

Doctor C. seems to think that his doctrine of future punishment even more powerfully restrains from sin, than the doctrine of endless punishment, because his doctrine is more credible to men in general. But are we to inquire what is most likely or most easy to be believed by men in general, to determine what is most likely to restrain from sin or to be the real truth of God? Then certainly the doctrines of the divine character and mission of Christ, of his miracles, resurrection, ascension, etc. in short the doctrines of christianity in general, are not so likely to restrain men from sin as the doctrines of mere natural religion. Or if it be said that those doctrines are capable of such proof, as will satisfy and convince all candid inquirers; the same is said of the doctrine of endless punishment.

I have now finished my reply to Dr. C's answers to the arguments in favor of endless punishment; and having before considered his arguments in favor of his own scheme, I shall now proceed to some arguments in confirmation of the doctrine of endless punishment.

CHAPTER XVI.

IN WHICH SOME DIRECT ARGUMENTS ARE PROPOSED, TO PROVE THE ENDLESS PUNISHMENT OF THE WICKED.

I am sensible that my book is already protracted to a considerable length. Therefore to relieve the patience of the reader, I shall endeavor to crowd this part into as narrow a compass as possible. Indeed if the answers already given to the objections to endless punishment be sufficient, the less needs be said in way of direct proof.

The various texts always brought in discourses on this subject, come now with full force, in proof of this doctrine. As Matt. 18: 8, "It is better for thee to enter into life halt or maimed, rather than having two hands or two feet, to be cast into *everlasting fire.*" Chap. 25: 41, "Then shall he say unto them on the left hand, depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels." Verse 46, "These shall go away into *everlasting punishment.*" 2 Thess. 1: 9, "Who shall be punished with *everlasting* destruction from the presence of the Lord and the glory of his power." 2 Pet. 2: 17, "To whom the mist of darkness is reserved *forever.*" Jude 13, "To whom is reserved the blackness of darkness *forever.*" Rev. 14: 10, 11, "And he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone, in the presence of the holy angels, and in the presence of the Lamb: And the smoke of their torments ascendeth up *forever and ever.*" Chap. 19: 3, "And again they said, Alleluia: and her smoke rose up *forever and ever.*" Chap. 20: 10, "And the devil that deceived them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and [they] shall be tormented day and night, *forever and ever.*"

The evasions of these texts have been particularly considered, and it is hoped, sufficiently answered.

The Greek words used in these texts are, *αἰῶνιος, εἰς αἰῶνα* and *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνους τῶν αἰώνων.* From an inspection of every text in which these words and phrases are used in the New Testament, it has been found, with regard to the first, that quite contrary to Dr. C's account, it "is almost perpetually," i. e. in the proportion of sixty-six to two, used in the endless sense; setting aside the places in which it is applied to the punishment of the wicked. With regard to the other two phrases, it has been found, that they are without exception used in the endless sense.

Nor does the Greek language furnish any word more determinately expressive of endless duration; and notwithstanding what Dr. C. says to the contrary, it appears that they do as properly and determinately express an endless duration, as the English words *eternal* and *eternity*. If therefore these words be explained away to mean a mere temporary duration, it is impossible that any words be used, which would not suffer the same treatment from the same hands.

The texts concerning the sin against the Holy Ghost still remain a clear proof of endless punishment. They are Matt. 12: 31, 32, "The blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, shall not be forgiven unto men. Whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world neither in the world to come." Mark 3: 29, "He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, hath never forgiveness; but is in danger of eternal damnation." Luke 12: 10, "Unto him that blasphemeth against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven."

So long as the gospel rejects every idea of the salvation of men without forgiveness, so long will these texts confute the salvation of all men.

To these I may add the following texts: 1 John 5: 16, "If any man see his brother sin a sin which is not unto death, he shall ask, and he shall give him life, for them that sin not unto death. There is a sin *unto death. I do not say that he shall pray for it.*" So that we are not to pray for those who sin unto death. Why not? evidently because their salvation is impossible. If their salvation be possible, I presume no sufficient reason can be given, why we should not pray for it. If it should be said that we are not to pray that the salvation of such should be immediately accomplished, but that it may be accomplished in due time; the answer is at hand, that we are not at liberty to pray that any man may be saved *out of* due time; and in this sense we are prohibited to pray for the salvation of any man.

Heb. 6: 4—6, "For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come; if they shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance." Since it is impossible to renew such to repentance, it is according to Dr. C. as well as the scripture, impossible that they be saved. Of like import in Chapter 10: 26, 27, "For if we sin wilfully after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries."

If there remain *no more or no longer* a sacrifice for sins; then neither will the man whose character is here described, be able by his own sufferings to make a sacrifice or satisfaction for his sins, nor will the sacrifice of Christ be longer of any avail to him. And if the judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the adversaries, remain for him, he must suffer them without a possibility of escape, either by the sacrifice of Christ or in consequence of his own sufferings.

The woe denounced by Christ on Judas also seems to remain a demonstrative proof of endless punishment. Matt. 26: 24, and Mark 14: 21, "Woe to that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed; good were it for that man if he had never been born." Let Judas suffer a temporary misery of ever so great duration, it must be infinitely less than an endless duration of happiness. So that if Judas were finally to enjoy endless happiness, he would be an infinite gainer by his existence, let the duration of his previous misery be what it might. It was therefore on the supposition of his final salvation, not only good, but infinitely good, that he had been born; which is a direct contradiction to the declaration of our Savior.

In connection with this passage, I shall introduce the following: Luke 6: 24, "Woe unto you that are rich; for ye have received your *consolation*." On the supposition of the salvation of all men, the rich do by no means receive in this life their consolation; but they are to receive infinitely the greatest consolation in the future life. Ps. 17: 14, "From men of the world, who have their *portion* in this life." Plainly implying that they are to have no portion in the future life. Luke 16: 25, "Son, remember that thou in thy life time receivedst thy good things." If all shall be saved, the rich and the men of the world in no other sense have their portion in this life, than the rest of men. They have some good things in this world, but infinitely the greatest part of their happiness is to be enjoyed in the world to come, and what they enjoy here, is nothing in comparison with what they are to enjoy hereafter. More than this, cannot be said of any man.

Mark 9: 43—49, "If thy hand offend thee, cut it off; it is better for thee, to enter into life maimed, than having two hands, to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched; where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched. And if thy foot offend thee, cut it off; it is better for thee to enter halt into life, than having two feet, to be cast into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched; where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched. And if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out;

it is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God, with one eye, than having two eyes, to be cast into hell-fire; where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." Matt. 3: 12, "Whose fan is in his hand, and he shall thoroughly purge his floor; and gather his wheat into the garner; but he will burn up the chaff with *unquenchable fire.*"

John 3: 36, "He that believeth on the Son, hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son, shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him." If all are to be saved, then all will see life and enjoy it. Should it be said, that the meaning of this text is barely, that he that believeth not, shall not see life, while he remains an unbeliever; it may be observed, that this sense of the text will admit the idea, that unbelievers may all become believers, at death, or at some future time in life; as it holds forth no more, than that a man while an unbeliever, shall not be admitted to life; and says nothing but that all unbelievers may become believers in this life, or at death; and therefore may attain to life and salvation in heaven, just as soon as those, who are now believers. But can any man bring himself to believe, that this text was not designed to teach us, but that unbelievers will attain to the life and salvation of heaven as soon as believers? If that be the true sense, this text teaches us no more concerning unbelievers, than is true concerning all saints in this state of imperfection. It may on this supposition be said, with equal truth, and in the same sense, that no imperfect saint shall see life, as that no unbeliever shall see life. It is plain, that this text was meant to exhibit some privilege of the believer above the unbeliever. But if the construction, now under consideration, be the true one, and universal salvation be true, what is that privilege? The believer has the promise of an endless life; so has the unbeliever in common with all mankind. The believer cannot perhaps be admitted to the inheritance of that promise, within less than ten or twenty years. Within the same time the unbeliever may be admitted to the same inheritance, whether he be admitted to it at death, or in consequence of some discipline in hell, by which he is led to repentance and faith. The believer has the present comfort of anticipating his future happiness; there is on the plan of universal salvation, abundant foundation for the same anticipation to the unbeliever. It is true, the unbeliever is not yet prepared for the possession of heavenly happiness; neither is the believer during his present imperfection.

Luke 16: 26, "And besides all this, between us and you there is a great gulf fixed; so that they which would pass from hence to you, cannot; neither can they pass to us, that would come

from thence." Matt. 6: 15, "If ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses." Chap. 18: 34, 35, "And his Lord was wroth, and delivered him to the tormentors, till he should pay all that was due unto him. So likewise shall my heavenly Father do also unto you, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his brother their trespasses." Heb. 6: 8, "That which beareth thorns and briers, is *rejected*, and is nigh unto *cursing*; whose *end* is to be burned." How is the end of any man to be burned, if all shall finally be saved? Luke 14: 24, "For I say unto you, that none of those men who were bidden, shall taste of my supper." Chap. 13: 25, 26, 27, "When once the master of the house is risen up, and hath shut to the door, and ye begin to stand without, and to knock at the door, saying, Lord, Lord, open unto us, and he shall answer and say unto you, I know you not, whence you are—I tell you, I know you not whence you are, depart from me all ye workers of iniquity." Rev. 22: 11, 12, "He that is unjust, let him be unjust still; and he which is filthy, let him be filthy still; and he that is righteous, let him be righteous still; and he that is holy, let him be holy still. And behold, I come quickly; and my reward is with me, to give to every man according as his work shall be." These last words, with verse 10th, determine this text to refer to the general judgment. The words of the tenth verse are, "Seal not the sayings of the prophecy of this book; for the time is at hand." But a period ages of ages after the general judgment cannot be said to come quickly, and to be at hand.

If to these texts it should be said, that they mean no more, than that they cannot *as yet* be saved, though they will be saved in proper time; I answer, (1) That there is no appearance in the texts themselves, of such a sense. (2) That if that were the true sense, they would mean no more, than might be said, *mutatis mutandis*, of all real saints, who are not about to die immediately. (3) That that sense would imply, either that the future punishment of the wicked is a mere wholesome discipline, or that those who die impenitent do not deserve endless punishment. If they pass the great gulf as soon as they repent, their punishment is a mere wholesome discipline; but that it is not a mere wholesome discipline, I have endeavored to show in Chap. II. and III. If they suffer the full punishment which they deserve, and then come out, they are saved without forgiveness, and they never deserved an endless punishment, the contrary to which I have endeavored to prove in Chap. VI. To those chapters I beg leave to refer the reader, for what might be said here in further answer to this objection. If because the damned cannot pass the great

gulf at present, it be said, There is a great gulf fixed, so that they cannot pass thence to heaven, then because a saint is not about to die at present, it might with propriety be said, there is a great gulf fixed between him and heaven, so that he cannot pass it. If those scriptural expressions, "Let him be unjust still,"—"Great gulf fixed, so that they cannot pass,"—"Depart, I know you not," "Shall not taste of my supper," etc. mean no more than that they shall remain unjust, etc. for the present; why may not the following expressions—"Shall not come into condemnation,"—"Are justified from all things,"—"Is passed from death unto life," etc. mean no more, than that the saints shall not come into condemnation for the present, or for some time to come?—Are for the present justified from all things? Is for the present passed from death unto life?

Rev. 3: 5, "He that overcometh, the same shall be clothed in white raiment; and I will not *blot out his name out of the book of life;* but I will *confess his name* before my Father, and before his angels." Does not this text plainly hold forth, that the names of all who do not overcome, shall be blotted out of the book of life; and that Christ will not confess their names before the Father, and before his angels? Chap. 13: 8, "And all that dwell upon the earth shall worship him, *whose names are not written in the book of life of the Lamb*, slain from the foundation of the world." Chap. 21: 27, "And there shall in no wise enter into it anything that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination, or maketh a lie; but they which are *written in the Lamb's book of life.*" Ps. 69: 27, 28, "Add iniquity to their iniquity, and let them not come into thy righteousness. Let them *be blotted out of the book of the living*, and *not be written with the righteous.*" Now will any be saved, whose names are not written in the Lamb's book of life? In the quotation from Rev. 21: 27, it is expressly asserted, that no one who defileth, worketh abomination, or maketh a lie, shall enter the heavenly city; but they only who are written in the Lamb's book of life. Therefore not only will not all men be saved, as some will be excluded the heavenly city; but some men have not their names written in the Lamb's book of life, and this is a further evidence, that all will not be saved.

It is said, "that sinners shall not stand in the congregation of the righteous" (Ps. 1: 5), and the representation in the parables of our Lord, is, that after the general judgment, the tares and chaff shall be no more mixed with the wheat; nor the good with the bad fish. Nor is there any intimation that the tares or the chaff will become wheat, or the bad putrid fish become good;

but the contrary is plainly implied in the parables themselves. Besides, the judgment is said to be *eternal*, *αἰώνιον*,* doubtless with respect to the endless and unchangeable consequences. But if the judgment be strictly eternal with respect to its consequences, the punishment of the damned will be without end.

The parables before mentioned further prove endless punishment, as they represent, that the bad fish are *cast away*; that the tares and chaff are *burnt up*. How is this consistent with their final salvation and happiness?

All those texts which declare, that those who die impenitent shall *perish*, shall *be cast away*, shall *be rejected*, *be destroyed*, *be lost*, etc., disprove universal salvation; as 1 Cor. 1: 18, "The preaching of the cross is to them that *perish*, foolishness; but unto us who are *saved*, it is the power of God." 2 Pet. 2: 12, "These shall *utterly perish* in their own corruption." Luke 9: 25, "For what is a man advantaged if he gain the whole world and *lose* himself, or be *cast away*?" Heb. 6: 8, that which beareth thorns and briers is *rejected*." 2 Cor. 4: 3, "If our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are *lost*." 2 Thess. 1: 8, "Who shall be punished with everlasting *destruction*." Matt. 21: 44, "On whomsoever it shall fall, it shall *grind* him *to powder*," etc. Now with what truth or propriety can those be said to *perish*, be *cast away*, be *rejected*, *destroyed*, *lost*, who are all finally saved? Perdition, destruction, etc. are ever in scripture set in opposition to salvation, and are represented to be inconsistent with it. But where is the opposition, if those who perish be saved too?

Acts 3: 21, "Whom the heaven must receive until the times of the restitution of all things, which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began." This text which has been often quoted as a proof of universal salvation, is, I conceive, a clear proof of the contrary. The heaven will receive and retain our Lord Jesus Christ, until the time shall come when all those things shall be restored, which God, by the mouths of all his prophets, hath declared, *πάντων ὧν ἐλάλησεν*, shall be restored, which things doubtless comprehend all things which ever shall be restored. But our Lord Jesus Christ will not be retained in heaven longer than till the general judgment. After that time therefore, nothing will be restored. But it is granted on all hands, that after that time the wicked will be in misery. Therefore they shall never be recovered from that misery.

* Which word, I hope, from what has been already discovered in the investigation of its true sense, I have a right to consider as used in the endless sense.

2 Pet. 3: 9, "The Lord is not slack concerning his promise (as some men count slackness) but is long suffering to us ward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance," also hath been quoted to prove universal salvation. It is however impertinent to that purpose, but upon the supposition that the word *perish* means *endless perdition.* Not even any universalist will say, that God is unwilling that those who die in impenitence should perish *for a while*, until they are brought to repentance, or until they shall have suffered the just punishment of their sins. But if *perish* in this passage mean endless perdition, it doubtless means the same in all those texts in which the wicked are positively said to perish, as 1 Cor. 1: 18, "For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness."

Luke 20: 35, "But they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage." Some then will not obtain that world, and therefore will not be saved. John 17: 9, "I pray for them; I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me, for they are thine." But are any to be saved, for whom our Lord does not make intercession? Heb. 12: 15, "Looking diligently lest any man fail of the grace of God." Some then will fail of that grace.

Prov. 1: 26—29, "I also will laugh at your calamity and mock when your fear cometh; when your fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction cometh as a whirlwind; when distress and anguish come upon you. Then shall they call upon me, but *I will not answer;* they shall seek me early but they *shall not find me.*" If God shall never answer their calls, and they shall never find God, they will never be saved. Ps. 112: 10, "The desire of the wicked shall perish." Job 8: 13, 14, "The hypocrite's hope shall perish; whose hope shall be cut off, and whose trust shall be a spider's web." Prov. 10: 28, "The expectation of the wicked shall perish." Chap. 11: 7, "When a wicked man *dieth*, his expectation shall perish, and the hope of unjust men perisheth." Chap. 29: 1, "He that being often reproved hardeneth his neck, shall suddenly be destroyed and that without *remedy.*" If all men are to be saved, the hope and expectation of the wicked are not cut off, do not perish, in any other sense than that in which the hope and expectation of the righteous perish and are cut off. The wicked may expect to obtain happiness before they are sufficiently disciplined, or before a certain period. So may the righteous expect to make their transition to heaven before it will come. This expectation of both will be cut off. But the expectation which the wicked

have of final happiness, will never, according to Dr. C's system, be cut off. Nor, according to the same system, can it be true, that the wicked shall be destroyed *without remedy*. Prov. 14: 32, "The wicked is driven away in his wickedness; but the righteous hath hope in his death." But according to the universal system, the wicked hath in his death as real and well founded a hope as the hope of the righteous. Job 11: 20, "Their hope shall be as the giving up of the ghost." Chap. 27: 8, "For what is the hope of the hypocrite, though he hath gained, when God taketh away his soul?" Phil. 3: 19, "Whose *end* is destruction." But if all men be finally saved, the *end* of no man is destruction. Heb. 6: 8, "Whose *end* is to be burned." 2 Cor. 11: 15, "Whose *end* is according to their works." This is said of the ministers of satan, whose works are certainly evil. Their end therefore being according to their works must be evil too. How then can they be FINALLY saved? If it should be said, that these texts do not mean the *last* end of the wicked; this would be a mere assertion. As well might we say that Rom. 6: 22, "Ye have your fruit unto holiness and the end everlasting life," means not the last end of the righteous.

The scripture represents, that at the end of this world, all things are brought to *an end*. 1 Pet. 4: 7, "But the end of all things is *at hand*," ἤγγικε. Surely this cannot mean that the end of all things will take place after *ages of ages* to succeed the end of this world. A period so distant is never in scripture said to be *at hand*; nor could this with propriety, be said of such a period. Matt. 24: 14, "This gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world, for a witness to all nations; and *then*, τότε, shall the end come." But when all things shall have come to their *end*, they will be in a fixed, unalterable state, and after that, there can be no passing from hell to heaven. Nor can there be any such passing after Christ shall have delivered up the kingdom to the Father. To this Dr. C. agrees. But I have already given my reasons for believing that Christ will deliver up the kingdom to the Father, at the end of this world; and for believing that 1 Cor. 15: 24, must be understood in this sense, and that according to Dr. C's explanation of that text, it cannot be reconciled with Matt. 13: 40—44, and other passages of scripture.

2 Cor. 6: 2, "Behold *now* is the accepted time; behold, *now* is the day of salvation." Heb. 3: 7, "*To day*, if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts." But if the greater part of mankind shall be saved out of hell, and the means of repentance in hell be far more conducive to the end, than the best means

used in this world, it should have been said, In the future state is the accepted time, and in hell will be the day of salvation.

2 Cor. 4: 18, "The things which are seen, are temporal; but the things which are not seen, are *eternal.*" If all the unseen things of the future state be eternal, the punishment of the damned is eternal. And eternal, αἰώνια, must in this instance mean endless; otherwise all opposition with regard to duration, between things seen, and things unseen, is lost; and things unseen are as truly temporal, as things seen. At most, on Dr. C's principle of construing scripture; the apostle's proposition comes to this merely: The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are unseen are to continue for an age. But this is true of many present seen things.

The promises of the gospel in general afford an argument in favor of endless punishment. Rev. 2: 11, "He that overcometh, shall not be hurt of the second death." I presume all will grant, that this promise implies, that all who do not overcome, shall be hurt of the second death. Therefore, by parity of reason, when it is promised in the same chapter, "To him that overcometh, I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of God;" it implies, that those who do not overcome, shall never eat of that tree. "To him that overcometh, will I give to eat of the hidden manna, and will give him a white stone," etc. implies, that he who does not overcome, shall never eat of the hidden manna, shall never receive the white stone, etc. "Him that overcometh will I make a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go no more out," implies, that he who does not overcome, shall not be a pillar in the temple of God. "To him that overcometh, will I grant to sit with me in my throne," implies, that he who does not overcome, shall never sit in Christ's throne. These I give as a specimen only of the promises, and of the argument which they afford.

Finally, if all shall be saved, why have not Christ, and those who wrote by the inspiration of his spirit, been explicit in the matter? Why have they used so many expressions, which in the literal sense assert the contrary doctrine? and which apparently obscure the truth, and blind the eyes of the readers of the New Testament? Especially, if, as Dr. C. holds, universal salvation be so glorious to God, the main subject of the gospel, and so necessary to vindicate the divine character? Surely this of all doctrines ought to have been indisputably revealed, and not one hint given to the contrary

Besides these arguments drawn directly from texts of scripture; I shall mention one drawn from the general nature of the gospel,

or from the particular doctrines of the gospel, acknowledged by both parties in this controversy.

Those who die impenitent, deserve an endless punishment. The proof of this hath been attempted, Chap. VI. It is briefly this: If endless punishment be not the penalty threatened in the law, and justly deserved by the sinner, no account can possibly be given of the penalty of the law. It cannot be the temporary punishment actually suffered by the damned; because then the damned would be finally saved without forgiveness. It cannot be a temporary punishment of less duration, than that which is suffered by the damned; because on that supposition the damned are punished more than they deserve. It cannot be a temporary punishment of longer duration, than that which the scriptures abundantly declare the damned shall suffer; because no such punishment is threatened in the law, or in any part of scripture. It must therefore be an endless punishment. This endless punishment threatened in the law, is not annihilation, but endless misery; because if it were annihilation, none of the damned, on supposition, that they are all finally saved, will be punished with the curse of the law, or which is the same, with the punishment which they justly deserve. But both the scripture and Dr. C. abundantly hold, that the damned will be punished as much as they deserve, as hath been shown Chap. III. But for the full proof, that the punishment of hell is not annihilation, I must refer the reader to Chap. V. If the endless punishment threatened in the law, and deserved by the wicked, be not annihilation, it must be endless misery. But whatever punishment the wicked justly deserve, they will in fact suffer; they will have to pay the uttermost farthing; they will suffer judgment without mercy. Therefore, they will suffer not only an endless punishment, but an endless misery, or torment.

The same argument is a little differently stated thus: Dr. C. allows, that if the punishment of the damned be intended to satisfy justice, it is impossible all men should be saved.* He also holds abundantly, that it is impossible, that any sinner should be justified or saved "on the foot of law." He equally holds this with regard to the moral law, "the law written in men's hearts," "the natural law," and the law as promulged in the gospel by Jesus Christ and his apostles," as with regard to the "Mosaic law."† He also holds, that "the law of God is a perfect rule of righteousness." Now if it be impossible that any sinner be justified by the moral law, then every sinner is, and must be condemned by it, and from that condemnation he can never

* Page 11. † See 12 Sermons p. 4, etc.

e acquitted by the law. If it be impossible that any sinner be aved by that law, then on the footing of that law, every sinner must be excluded from salvation.

But this law is "a perfect rule of righteousness." Therefore perfect righteousness, or strict distributive justice, will never admit of the salvation of any sinner; but every sinner justly deserves to be endlessly excluded from salvation. Again, a punishment which satisfies justice, is one which is perfectly just and deserved by the sinner. Therefore, if the sinner be punished according to his desert, he can never be saved. But both the scriptures and Dr. C. hold, that the damned will be punished according to their deserts; therefore they will never be saved.

CONCLUSION.

I have now finished a work which has been attended with considerable labor to me, and with some to the reader who has perused the whole. I am sensible that controversial writers often misunderstand each other, and therefore often spend their own time and labor, and the time of their readers for nought. I have been aware of the danger of this, and have endeavored to my utmost to avoid it; how successfully must be submitted. I have often wished for an opportunity of conversation with some sensible and thorough believer in Dr. C's scheme, that I might obtain explanation of some things, to me unaccountable. But I have not been favored with such an opportunity. I have endeavored to meet the Doctor's chief arguments and not to carp at particulars which are of no importance to the scheme, and have not designedly shunned any argument which appeared to me to be important, and not implied in other arguments particularly noticed. I hope that whoever shall undertake the confutation of what is now offered to the public, will treat it with the same candor. In a work of this length, and on a subject of such intricacy, it would be strange indeed if there were not some slips which would give advantage to an antagonist; yet those slips may not affect the main question. If any man shall write to point out such errata, it will hardly be worth while for me to trouble either myself o the world with a reply. But if any gentleman will candidly poi out the fallacy of the main arguments, on which I have rest what I fully believe to be truth; however I may be affected by i

doubt not but that the public will have the candor ingenuously to acknowledge it. If on the contrary his reply shall consist chiefly of declamation and warm addresses to the passions and imaginations of mankind, pathetical and frightful representations of the torments of the damned, interlarded with sarcastic fleers and other essays at wit; I doubt not the same candid public will properly notice it, and draw an inference not very favorable to the cause which is to be supported by such auxiliaries. Such artifices are unworthy of theologians, philosophers and any inquirers after truth. I hope whoever undertakes a reply, will tell us what punishment sin justly deserves; what is the penalty of the moral law; or that curse of the law from which Christ hath redeemed us.* I hope he will further inform us whether all men shall be saved in the way of forgiveness. If they be, he will reconcile that mode of the salvation of all men with those declarations of scripture which assert, that the wicked shall be punished according to their works, shall have judgment without mercy, and shall pay the uttermost farthing. If it shall be his opinion, that the damned will be punished according to their demerits, and then be saved without forgiveness, it is to be hoped he will reconcile this idea with the whole New Testament, which everywhere represents, that all who are saved, are saved in the way of forgiveness. If he shall hold, that *αἰώνιος, eternal, εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, forever*, and *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων, forever and ever*, generally in the scripture mean a limited duration, let him point out the instances of that use of them, that they may be compared with those instances in which they are used in the endless sense. But I need not enumerate the various particulars, which ought to be minutely and distinctly considered, in a candid and judicious discussion of this important question.

I have no apprehension, that the doctrine of endless punishment will suffer at all by a thorough discussion. In the course of the disquisition many may be perverted to fatal error; yet the final result will be the more clear elucidation of the truth. However "many may run to and fro, yet knowledge shall be increased."

Finally, if any man, after a careful perusal of what has been, or may be offered, on both sides of this important question, shall be in doubt on which side the truth lies; it would certainly be most prudent and safe for him to act as he would, if he fully believed endless punishment; it will be most prudent and safe for him to yield a cordial compliance with the gospel, in repentance,

* Dr. C. explains Gal. 3: 10, to mean the curse of the moral law, or the law under which all men are; 12 Sermons, p. 13.

faith and obedience. Then he will be safe on either supposition, But if he trust to the flattering doctrine, that all are finally to be saved, and in this presumption shall neglect the gospel, its invitations and requirements; and it shall finally prove, that that doctrine is a mere imagination of men; alas! he is lost; irrecoverably lost; while those who receive the gospel with "the obedience of faith," shall through the blood of atonement, "have right to the tree of life, and shall enter in through the gates into the City."

APPENDIX,

CONTAINING REMARKS ON SEVERAL AUTHORS.

Remarks on Bishop Newton's Dissertation on the final State and Condition of Men, contained in Vol. VI. of his Works, p. 325, *etc.*

The Bishop held, that all the damned will be punished accord- to their demerits; as may appear by the following passages: There will be different degrees of happiness or misery, *in pro- rtion to their different conduct and behavior in this world.* nothing is *juster* and more *equitable* in itself, so nothing is arer and more demonstrable from scripture. Shall not the lge of all the earth *do right*, in every single instance, as well in the general account? It is not only agreeable to the first nciples of reason, but may also be confirmed by the most ex- ss testimonies of revelation."* "Our Savior threateneth dif- ent punishments to the wicked, as he promiseth different re- rds to the righteous, greater or less, *according to the nature l qualities of their actions.*"† "It is evident then and un- iable, that every man shall receive his own reward or punish- nt, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or l."‡ "It must be then admitted, that God hath threatened rlasting misery to the wicked, as plainly and positively as he h promised everlasting happiness to the righteous. He hath ly set before us life and death, blessing and cursing, eternal piness as well as everlasting misery, the one to balance the er. Is there any injustice in this? Are not the terms and iditions equal? And if men will choose cursing rather than ssing, and voluntarily incur everlasting misery, when they ght as easily attain eternal happiness, whom have they to com- in of, or whom can they arraign of unequal proceeding but mselves? (Ezek. 18: 29), Are not my ways equal? Are your ways unequal, saith the Lord? You cannot then com- in of injustice, for the rewards and punishments are equal; l it was really necessary, that these rewards and punishments uld be everlasting."§ "Would anything less than everlast-

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* Page 344. † p. 347. ‡ Ibid. § p. 356.

ing rewards and punishments be sufficient to encourage the good, to deter the bad, and secure obedience to the divine commands?"* "How then can you complain, that God is an arbitrary governor, and annexeth greater penalties to his laws than are necessary. You cannot then complain, that the sanction of eternal penalties is unreasonable, for you see plainly, that it is no more than is absolutely necessary. But possibly you may think, though it may be necessary in the government of this world for such things to be denounced by God, and believed by man, yet there may not be the like necessity for inflicting them in the world to come; God is not obliged to execute his threatenings, as he is to make good his promises. But why is he not obliged to perform the one as well as the other? His threatenings are never, like those of men, made rashly, never founded in passion or caprice, that it should be better not to execute, than execute them. If God will not execute as well as threaten, why doth he threaten at all? Is it not more suitable to the character of a God of truth, and becoming the simplicity and sincerity of a divine revelation, to declare the truth, and nothing but the truth, and leave it to work upon men as it can, rather than denounce in the most solemn manner what was never intended, and never shall come to pass, and so endeavor to alarm them with false fears, and to work upon them with false persuasions, which have nothing to answer them?"† "God must be just as well as merciful. He can never exercise one of his attributes so as to clash or interfere with another."‡

On these quotations it may be remarked, that the Bishop plainly held, that endless misery is threatened; for he always uses the word *everlasting* in the endless sense, and believed this to be the scriptural sense of it, when applied to future punishment.§ He also rejected the doctrine of annihilation.‖ Now then his opinion was either, that endless misery is unconditionally threatened to all who die impenitent; or that it is threatened to them on condition of their continued impenitence in the future world. If it be threatened unconditionally, it follows: (1) That endless misery is the just punishment of the sins committed in this life. For who will pretend, that God hath made a law, which contains an unjust penalty? This would be equally inconsistent with the divine moral rectitude, as to make a law containing unjust or unreasonable precepts; or to execute the unjust penalty. But if this were the opinion of the Bishop, to be consistent he must have given up the doctrine of universal salvation, to establish which he wrote his dissertation. For he

* Page 357. † p. 357, 358. ‡ p. 388. § p. 355. ‖ p. 349.

not only declares in the passages already quoted, that "God must be just as well as merciful, and can never exercise one of his attributes so as to interfere with another;" and "that his threatenings are never like those of men, made rashly, never founded in passion or caprice, that it should be better not to execute, than execute them;"* but according to Matt. 5: 26, and 18: 34, he acknowledges, that the damned shall pay the uttermost farthing, and all that is due.† (2) It will follow, that sin is an *infinite evil.* Certainly that moral evil which deserves an infinite natural evil to be inflicted by way of punishment, is an infinitely ill-deserving moral evil; this is plain by the very terms; and a moral evil, which is infinitely ill-deserving, is all that is meant by the infinite evil of sin. Yet this sentiment he reprobates in the strongest terms.

But if those who die impenitent be threatened with endless misery, *on condition of their continued impenitence only;* then a mere salutary discipline is all the punishment which any sinner deserves according to strict justice. The law is the rule of righteousness; the penalty of that is adequate to the demand of justice; and if the penalty of that be an endless punishment unless the sinner shall repent, the penalty in reality is so much punishment only as shall lead the sinner to repentance; and this salutary and necessary discipline is the whole penalty or curse of the law.

That this was really the opinion of the Bishop may appear from the following expressions: "If God will not execute as well as threaten, why does he threaten at all? It must be said to reclaim a sinner; and it is allowed that if the sinner be reclaimed, the end is obtained, and the threatening is voided of course."‡ "Several of the fathers conceived the fire of hell to be a *purging* as well as a *penal* fire. But this penal purging fire is very different from the purgatory of the church of Rome; for that is not once mentioned in scripture, but this is often repeated."§ "If the offender be corrected and reformed, the first end is fully answered, and the punishment should cease of course. If he still remain incorrigible, it is fitting that the punishment should be continued and increased, till it have the due effect."‖ "It is just, and wise, and good, and even merciful, to correct a sinner as long as he deserves correction, to chastise him into a sense of his guilt, to whip and scourge him, as I may say, out of his faults."¶ "If they will not repent, why should he not execute upon them the threatenings which they have despised?" "This is the only means

* Page 358. † p. 382. ‡ p. 358. § p. 379. ‖ p. 365. ¶ Ibid.

of escaping, there is none other *condition* or *reservation.*"* "This I conceive to be the true notion of the eternity of rewards and punishments. Righteousness will be forever happy and glorified, wickedness will be forever miserable and tormented. But if righteousness should become wickedness, and wickedness should become righteousness—with the change of their nature, their state and condition would be changed too."†

But where in all the scriptures is any such condition mentioned in the account of future punishment? It is not said depart ye cursed into fire which shall be everlasting unless ye repent,—These shall go away into punishment which shall be everlasting unless they repent,—Their worm shall not die unless they repent,—They cannot pass the great gulf unless they repent,—The smoke of their torment shall ascend up forever and ever, unless they repent. And to say that the meaning of the scripture is thus conditional, is to assert without any proof or evidence; nor does the Bishop pretend to produce any.

The Bishop argues universal salvation in this manner, "He would have all men to be saved; and whence then ariseth the obstruction to his good will and pleasure, or how cometh it to pass, that his gracious purposes are ever defeated?"‡ So it may be said, "God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance, and *now* commandeth all men every where to repent." It is the will of God that all mankind should repent *now this very day.* Yet all mankind do not repent this very day. Whence then ariseth the obstruction to his good will and pleasure, or how cometh it to pass that his gracious purposes are defeated?

"Nothing," says the Bishop, "is more contrariant to the divine nature and attributes, than for God to bestow existence on any beings, whose destiny he foreknows must terminate in wretchedness without recovery."§ The truth of this proposition depends on the following principle, That it is not, nor can be, in any case, consistent with the general good implying the glory of God, that a sinner should be miserable without end. For if God foresee that the endless misery of a man will be subservient to the general good; there is nothing contrariant to the divine nature, to bestow existence upon him, though he foreknow that he will sin, that he will deserve endless misery, and that his destiny will terminate in wretchedness without recovery.

We find that there are in fact temporary miseries in the world. On what principle can these be reconciled with the divine attributes? If it be answered, on the sole principle, that they will

* Page 359. † Ibid. ‡ p. 367. § Ibid.

issue in the personal good of the patients; the reply is, (1) That this will be fact wants proof. It is by no means evident, that God aims at the personal good of every individual in all his dispensations, however distressing; it is not evident that the inhabitants of the old world, of Sodom and Gomorrah, etc. are more happy in the whole of their existence, than if they had lived and died like other men. (2) Especially it is not evident, that all the sin and wickedness which any man commits will finally make him a more happy man, than he would have been if he had committed no sin. If God may without a view to promote the personal good of a man, permit him to fall into sin, why may he not without a view to the same object, punish him for that sin? To say that God could not consistently with the moral agency of the man, prevent his falling into sin, will infer that God cannot consistently with the moral agency of the man, certainly and infallibly lead him to repentance. (3) The principle now under consideration implies that there is not now nor ever has been in the universe, anything which on the whole is a real evil to any man considered in his individual capacity; that no man ever was or ever will be the subject of any curse, or any calamity which any man, with a view to his own happiness only, should wish to avoid.

Or if temporary calamities be reconciled with the divine attributes on this principle, that they are subservient to the general good; on the same principle we reconcile with the divine attributes, the endless misery of the damned. This whole argument depends on the supposition, that the final misery of any sinner cannot be subservient to the general good. To take this for granted is intolerable.

As we have seen, it is a fundamental principle with the Bishop, that such a punishment as is sufficient to lead a sinner to repentance, is all which is threatened in scripture. This then is the penalty or curse of the divine law; this is the utmost which strict justice will admit; and he on this supposition justly asserts, "that some time or other satisfaction may be made, the debt of sin may be discharged, and the sinner himself released out of prison."* This is utterly inconsistent with the salvation of the damned in the way of forgiveness. Yet his texts to prove universal salvation, imply salvation in the way of forgiveness only. After quoting Exod. 34: 6, 7, "The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin;" he adds, "But how can such attributes consist with a system of irrevocable vengeance for thousands, trans-

* Page 382.

gressions never to be forgiven," etc.? To which I answer, They can just as well consist with such a system, as with Bishop Newton's system, which implies that the damned suffer all that they deserve; for what is this but irrevocable vengeance to the highest degree? And surely the transgressions of those who suffer such a punishment are never forgiven.

It is absurd therefore for him to argue from grace, compassion, the divine readiness to forgive, etc. And equally absurd to argue as he does from the merits of Christ. For do they obtain any relief by Christ, who themselves suffer the whole penalty of the law, and thus make satisfaction for their own sins? Yet he abundantly holds the salvation of all men by the merits of Christ; as in the following passages out of many: "It is the declared end and purpose of our blessed Savior's coming into the world, to recover and to redeem lost mankind. How often is he styled the Savior of the world in the full extent and meanning of the words?"* "His very enemies are reconciled to God by the *merit* and *sufferings* of his beloved Son."† "He only requires us to exert our best endeavors, and the *merits* of our Savior will *atone for the rest.*"‡

"To suppose that a man's happiness or misery to all eternity should absolutely and unchangeably be fixed by the uncertain behavior of a few years in this life, is a supposition even more unreasonable and unnatural, than that a man's mind and manners should be completely formed in his cradle, and his whole future fortune and condition should depend upon his infancy; infancy being much greater in proportion to the few years of this life, than the whole of this life to eternity."§ The same might be said, if the time of man's probation were ever so long, but limited. Thus; to suppose that a man's happiness or misery to all eternity should be unchangeably fixed by the uncertain behavior of millions of millions of ages, is a supposition even more unreasonable, than that a man's mind and manners should be completely formed in his cradle, and his whole future fortune and condition should depend upon his infancy; infancy being much greater in proportion to the few years of this life, than millions of millions of ages to eternity.

"Nor could even his" [God's] "justice for short-lived transgressions inflict everlasting punishment."‖ But how long-lived must the transgressions be, that justice may consent to inflict for them everlasting punishments? Let them be ever so long-lived, provided they are limited, they are still infinitely short-lived in comparison with an everlasting duration. And will it be said

* Page 382. † p. 383. ‡ p. 387. § p. 361. ‖ p. 368.

that the transgression must be as long-lived as the punishment, and that justice will not admit that the punishment of any transgression be of longer continuance, than the transgression was in the perpetration?

"What glory to God, to see a number of his creatures plunged in the depth of misery? What good-will towards men, to consign so many of them to everlasting punishments?"* It is doubtless glory to God, that they be plunged into the depth of misery, if both they deserve it, and it be subservient to the good of the universe; and the gospel is a revelation of divine good-will towards men, though many of them reject the infinite grace and eternal salvation exhibited in that revelation, and by this and their other sins justly deserve and finally bring on themselves everlasting punishment.

II. *A few remarks on James Relly's Treatise on Union.*

He seems to hold, that all mankind were from eternity so united to Christ, that he and they make properly one whole or complex person. But it is extremely difficult to determine with precision what his ideas were. I shall therefore make several quotations from him, and subjoin such remarks as appear pertinent. "It doth not appear how God—could punish sin upon Christ, without the concurrence of righteousness and truth; nor can this concurrence be proved, without union between Christ and those for whom he endured the cross—because contrary to truth, which declareth, that every man shall die for *his own* sin.†" "Such an union between Christ and his church, as gives him the right of redemption, and brings him under that character, which is obnoxious to punishment, is absolutely necessary."‡ "Without the consideration of union, where is the justice of charging the black rebellion and crying guilt of man, upon the pure and spotless head of Jesus."§ "Sin is—a crime—only atoned for—by the death, yea, the *eternal* death of the sinner; which justice must inflict before it can be properly satisfied; nor can it possibly admit of a surety here; because it can only punish him, whom it first finds guilty; and not by reckoning him, to be what he is not, according to human quibbles, but according to artless, reasonable, divine equity; which can only declare such guilty, on whom the fault is found, and can only find the fault on such who have committed it. We only committed the fault; upon us only can it be found. Therefore, without

* Page 382. † p. 3. ‡ Ibid. § p. 4.

such an union between Christ and us, as exposes us in his person, to judgment and condemnation, the harmony of the divine perfections doth not appear in the things which he suffered, because contrary to truth and justice."* He largely illustrates this union between Christ and his church, by the union between the head and members in the natural body, and adds, "The union and harmony of the body renders it equitable to punish and chastise the whole body in one member for its offence in another. Because if one member suffer, all the members suffer with it. As the union of the body makes it equitable to punish the head, for the offence of the other members; with like equity do the members participate with the head, in all its honors and glory. Thus the crowning of the head, crowns the whole man, and every member partakes of the honor."

These quotations may serve to give an idea of the union between Christ and mankind, for which Mr. Relly pleads. I now proceed to the following remarks.

1. It appears by the foregoing quotations, that Relly held such a union between Christ and his church, that he upon the ground of justice became liable to punishment on account of their sins. Otherwise the sufferings of Christ were both unjust and contrary to truth; unjust, as he did not deserve them, contrary to truth, as the divine declaration is "The soul that sinneth shall die." But if this be true, if Christ was liable to punishment on the ground of justice, distributive justice; then Christ deserved death as much as the sinner. In his sufferings, the Father did but treat him according to his own character and conduct; he did but cause him to eat the fruit of his own ways and to be filled with his own devices; and no more thanks or praise are due to Christ on account of his sufferings, than are due to the damned sinner, on account of his enduring the pains of hell. Beside; how contrary is this to the scripture! That declares, that "Christ suffered the *just* for the unjust;" that "he was holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners;" That "he did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth." Now if Christ was a "character obnoxious to punishment," on the foot of distributive justice, he was very far from being *just*, and from being *holy*, *harmless*, *undefiled*; he *did sin*, and *guile was found* in his mouth. Indeed this is no more than Relly asserts in the above quotations, when he says, "that justice can only punish him whom it finds guilty; not by reckoning him what he is not, but according to artless divine equity, which can only find the fault on such as have committed it." Therefore, according to this, Christ as one with

* Page 4.

sinners committed the fault, and therefore deservedly suffered for it.

If it should be granted, that Christ did not himself commit the fault or sin for which he suffered, but that by a wise, sovereign, divine constitution, to which he himself fully consented, he suffered for the sins of others; this would be to give up all, and to acknowledge, that Christ did not suffer for sin on the footing of distributive justice.

2. It appears by the same quotations, that Relly was not of the opinion, that Christ suffered in consequence of the imputation of sin to him, or because he was the surety of his church; but on the ground of his proper union with men. This appears by these words: "Sin is a crime only atoned for by death, which justice must inflict; nor can it possibly admit of a *surety* here; because it can only punish him whom it first finds guilty; and not by reckoning him to be what he is not." Yet he holds that Christ suffered on the sole ground of *imputation*. His words are, "The doctrine of union, which represents Jesus suffering under the character of the sinner, doth not suppose him such in his own particular person; nay strongly witnesseth the contrary, and respects him only thus by such an *imputation* as is just and true."* If then the sufferings of Christ do not suppose him to be a sinner "in his own particular person;" how can this be reconciled with what is quoted above from page 3d, in which he argues, that unless Christ be one with those for whom he died, his sufferings cannot be reconciled with the scripture, which declares that every man shall die for *his own* sin? Or with what is quoted from page 4th which declares, that justice does not admit of a *surety*, or of reckoning Christ to be what he is not?

3. It further appears by the same quotations, that Relly considers Christ and mankind, as one, in the same sense that the head and members in the natural body are one. If this be so, then we are no more indebted to Christ for our redemption, than a man's hands are indebted to his head for inventing means for his livelihood; or his head is indebted to his hands for applying those means.

4. It also appears, that on this plan Christ is now suffering, and will without end suffer, an *eternal death*. Observe the quotation from page 4th, "Sin is a crime only atoned for by the death, yea the *eternal death* of the *sinner*; which justice must inflict, before it can be properly satisfied; nor can it possibly admit of a *surety* here; because it can only punish him whom it first finds guilty; and not by reckoning him to be what he is not,

* Page 41.

according to human quibbles, but according to divine equity, which can only declare such guilty on whom the fault is found, and can only find the fault on such who have committed it." These expressions manifestly declare, (1) That Christ is a sinner, and committed the sin or fault for which he suffered, and that not by *imputation* and as the *surety* of his people, but really and literally. (2) That sin can be atoned for by the suffering of *eternal death* only. This and this only will properly satisfy justice. (3) That therefore, as Christ is the propitiation for our sins, he is now, and will without end be suffering *eternal death.*

But I need not trouble the reader with any further remarks on such wild and confused mysticism—such horrid doctrine.

III. *Remarks on M. Petitpierre's "Thoughts on the Divine Goodness, relative to the government of moral agents, particularly displayed in future rewards and punishments."*

This author is a Swiss, who was a clergyman in his own country; but falling into universalism, was censured and deposed. After this he went to London, where he published the book which is now the subject of remark. It first appeared in French, and was published in English in 1788.

If I mistake not, the fundamental principles of this book are these two: That the sinner on the footing of strict justice, deserves no other punishment, than that which is necessary to lead him to repentance and prepare him for happiness; That the happiness of every individual creature is necessary to the greatest happiness of the general system.

In page 24th, of the preceding work, a quotation or two was made to show, that the first of the two propositions now mentioned, is a principle of this author. To those quotations a great part of his book may be added to show the same; but I shall add the following sentences only: "The Deity being infinitely just, will inflict on the wicked just and equitable punishments; punishments exactly proportioned both in degree and duration, to the nature and extent of their crimes."* "The second rule which divine justice follows in the dispensation of punishment, is, to employ rigor only so much, and so long, as shall be necessary to the destruction of sin, and the conversion of the sinner."† "The third rule of divine justice in the dispensations of sufferings, informs us, when the Supreme Being ceases punishment;"‡ i. e. when the sinner repents. "We have established a principle whence to form consistent ideas of the *justice* and *severity* of

* Page 91. † p. 102. ‡ p. 110.

God, who punishes the wicked that he might bless them in turning them every one from their iniquities."* Infinite justice adapts with the most perfect and minute detail, the respective suitableness of his dealing to our *moral state*, and consequently to *our wants*, throughout the whole of our existence."†

On these quotations it may be remarked:

1. That according to this plan, the most *exact* and *rigorous justice*, *divine* justice, *infinite* justice, admits that a sinner be made to suffer till he repents, and no further. Such a punishment as this, is "exactly proportioned both in degree and duration, to the nature and extent of the crimes" of the sinner. This then is the utmost which the divine law will admit; this is the true *curse* of the divine law; even that curse from which Christ hath redeemed us.

2. This punishment inflicted on any sinner, utterly precludes all pardon, forgiveness and mercy. How is he forgiven, who suffers to the utmost extent of justice? How is any sparing mercy exercised toward him, on whom the curse of the law is fully executed? Yet M. Petitpierre constantly holds, that the salvation of sinners is effected in the way of *mercy*, *pardon* and *forgiveness*. Thus, speaking of the divine goodness, he says: "Are men miserable? It is termed that *infinite compassion* he has for their wretchedness. But when by a sincere repentance they turn from their iniquity, then it is his *clemency*, his *pardon*, his *mercy*, and his *grace*, that is extended to them."‡ "How striking, how awful, and at the same time how *merciful*, are the representations of future torments!"§ "He will constantly *pardon*, and receive into favor the sincerely penitent offender. Repentance appeases divine anger and disarms its justice, because it accomplishes the end infinite goodness has in view, even when arrayed in the awful majesty of *avenging justice;* which was severe, because the moral state of the sinner required such discipline; and which when that state is reversed by conversion—will have nothing to bestow suitable to it, but the delightful manifestations of *mercy* and *forgiveness*." It seems then, that not only is *justice satisfied* by the repentance of the sinner; but *justice*, even *the awful majesty of avenging justice*, will bestow *mercy* and *forgiveness*. But how forgiveness can be an act of *justice*, and especially an act of *avenging* justice, remains to be explained.

3. The punishment now under consideration, is utterly inconsistent with redemption by Christ. How are they redeemed or

* Page 137. † p. 76. ‡ p. 6. § p. 109.

delivered from the curse of the law, who in their own persons suffer that curse? And if Christ should deliver them from it, he would deprive them of an inestimable benefit.

4. If "*infinite justice* adapts with the most perfect and minute detail, the respective suitableness of his dealings to our moral state, and consequently to our wants, throughout the whole of our existence;" then what is *goodness?* and how is it distinguished from justice? What more kind and favorable than this, can goodness, the divine goodness, infinite and incomprehensible goodness do for us? According to this definition of *infinite justice*, the institutions, promises and scheme of the gospel, nay the unspeakable gift of Christ himself, are mere communications of justice, and not of goodness and grace; and according to the same definition there never has been, and never can be, any benefit granted by the Deity to any of his creatures, which is any more than a fruit of mere justice, and which may be withholden consistently with justice; and all that God ever has done, and ever will or can do, for the happiness of his creatures, is barely sufficient to save his character from a well-grounded charge of injustice.

But I mean not to dwell on this subject; I do but hint these particulars. It would be an infinite labor to point out the endless absurdities of this scheme of justice and punishment. I have considered the point more largely in Chap. II, to which I beg leave to refer the reader.

The other fundamental principle of this book is: That the happiness of every individual creature is necessary to the greatest happiness of the system. This idea is expressed in various passages, particularly in the following: "It is impossible the Divine Being should ever dispense any evil in this world, or in the world to come; which is not even to the individuals an actual exercise of perfect goodness."*

And that this is necessarily implied in the scheme of this author, and of all others who argue universal salvation from the divine perfections, without respect to the atonement, must be manifest upon the slightest reflection. Goodness will always seek the greatest good or happiness of intelligent beings. And that the happiness of the system is a greater good than the happiness of any individual or individuals of that system, is a self-evident proposition. Therefore goodness will never seek the happiness of any individuals, so as to diminish the happiness of the system; for this would be not to seek the advancement of happiness on the whole, but the diminution of it. If therefore the divine

* Page 220.

goodness seeks the final happiness of every intelligent creature, it must be because the happiness of every creature promotes and is necessary to secure the greatest happiness of the system. If it be not necessary to the greatest happiness of the system, it is no object to goodness.

Concerning this principle the following strictures are suggested:

1. The truth of it is by no means evident. Indeed M. Petitpierre supposes the absurdity of the contrary position to be exceedingly clear, and therefore indulges himself in the following ardent effusion: "Can we suppose that intelligent creatures capable by their nature of perfection and felicity, would be unable to attain to this glorious destination, unless at the same time a number of intelligent beings existed in eternal misery? Among creatures of the same nature, thence capable of the same happiness; must a part be made happy at the expense of a considerable portion devoted to endless misery and despair? Cannot a Being infinitely perfect and happy communicate beatitude to his intelligent offspring on other and more favorable terms? Can he not be to some the inexhaustible source of happiness; unless he is to others the never-failing source of misery? But let us cease to heap contradiction on contradiction, horror upon horror, and end this disagreeable discussion."—M. Petitpierre did not reflect, that if this passage contain any argument, it is equally forcible against the evils which *in fact* take place in this world, as against the punishments of the future; and that the passage may be retorted thus: Can we suppose that intelligent creatures capable by nature of peace, liberty, and all the enjoyments of human society, would be unable to attain to this excellent destination, unless at the same time a number of intelligent beings were rendered miserable by fines, confiscations, ignominy, prisons, chains, stripes and the gallows? Among creatures of the same nature, thence capable of the same happiness; must a part be made safe and happy at the expense of a considerable portion devoted to misery and despair, in the ways just mentioned? Cannot a being infinitely perfect and happy communicate beatitude to his intelligent offspring on other and more favorable terms? Can he not be to some the source of peace, safety, liberty, and happiness; unless he be to others the source of misery? But let us cease to heap contradiction on contradiction, horror upon horror, and end this disagreeable discussion.

To say that God can convert the wicked, and without endless imprisonment and punishment, prevent the mischief which they would do to the system, affords no satisfaction. So God can convert the wicked in this world, and prevent all the mischief which

they do here. The question is not, what God has power to do, but what he will in fact do; and what he may see fit to permit others to do.

M. Petitpierre proceeds to argue against the possibility, that the misery of some intelligent creatures should be necessary to the happiness of the rest; and urges that instead of this, it would subvert their happiness; because the inhabitants of heaven are so full of benevolence and compassion, that they cannot be happy, while numbers of their fellow creatures are miserable; and especially because it must be still more painful to them, to know that the eternal sufferings of those their fellow creatures were necessary to their own happiness.* But these observations are no more reconcilable with fact and with experience, than those which I just now quoted from the same author. Are the best of men in this world so compassionate, that they cannot be happy so long as thieves and robbers are confined in work-houses and prisons, and murderers die on gibbets? And do they disdain to enjoy their lives, their liberty, their peace and their property, unless they can be secured in the possession of them, on terms less ignominious and painful to some of their fellow creatures?

Such are the arguments by which M. Petitpierre endeavors to prove, that the misery of some men cannot be necessary to the greatest good of the system. If these arguments be not convincing, it is in vain to expect convincing evidence of the proposition now under consideration, from M. Petitpierre.

2. The reader has doubtless taken notice that the proposition now under consideration implies, not only that endless misery, but any temporary calamity cannot be inflicted on an individual, consistently with the good of the whole, unless that temporary calamity be subservient to his personal good. Observe the words quoted above, "It is impossible the Divine Being should ever dispense any evil *in this world* or in the world to come, which is not even *to the individuals*, an act of perfect goodness." Then all evils and calamities which have ever existed, or do exist, or ever will exist, in this world, as well as the future, are no real evils, no *curse* to the patients themselves; but they are all so many benefits and *blessings* to them. The destruction of the old world, of Sodom, etc. were real blessings to the patients personally. But how does this appear? They certainly did not in this world operate for the good of the patients; and how does it appear, that they will operate for their good in the future world? To assert this without assigning a reason, is impertinent. Beside; on this hypothesis, there is no such thing as any *curse*

* Page 215, etc.

either in this world or the future; and there is no difference between a *curse* and a *blessing*. What then shall we make of the scriptures, which speak abundantly of curses, and constantly distinguish between curses and blessings?

3. This, which I have called the second fundamental principle of this author, is in reality not distinct from the first. If the good or happiness of the system require the happiness of every individual, it surely cannot require the misery of any individual; and if it do not require his misery, it is not consistent with justice, that he should be made miserable by punishment; or it is not consistent with justice that he be punished any further than is subservient to his own personal happiness. No punishment is consistent with justice, which in view of the criminal alone, without respect to a substitute, or an atonement, the public good does not require.

So that the whole system of this author depends on this single principle, That it is not consistent with justice, to punish a sinner any further, than is subservient to his own personal good; and this principle, as I have endeavored to show in Chap. II. and VIII. really comes to this, *Whether sin be a moral evil.* Moral evil is in its own nature odious, and justly the object of divine disapprobation, and of the manifestation of disapprobation, whether such manifestation of disapprobation be subservient to the personal good of the sinner or not. But the manifestation of divine disapprobation is punishment. Therefore moral evil may justly be punished, whether such punishment be subservient to the personal good of the sinner or not. But as sin according to the principle now under consideration, cannot be justly punished any further than is subservient to the personal good of the sinner, of course it is no moral evil.

Again; moral evil in its own nature impairs the good of the moral system. Therefore God as a friend to that system, must necessarily, and may justly disapprove it, and manifest his disapprobation, though it may not tend to the personal good of the sinner. But this manifestation of divine disapprobation is punishment, and just punishment. But sin, according to the principle now under consideration, cannot justly be thus punished. Therefore sin is not, according to this principle, a moral evil.

If therefore M. Petitpierre believe, that sin is a moral evil, and in its own nature deserves the divine abhorrence, he must, to be consistent, give up his whole system of universal salvation.

As the book now before us is a later publication than Dr. Chauncy's; and as the Doctor's book, which at its first appearance was so highly extolled for deep learning and demonstrative

reasoning, did not convert the world; the zealots for universalism have been lavish of their encomiums on this work of Petitpierre, and as it seems, have great expectations from it. However, it requires no spirit of prophecy to foresee, that this book will not effect more numerous conversions, than that of Dr. C. The author has a good talent at *declamation*; and those who are already persuaded of the truth of his system, may be much comforted by his pathetic representations of the divine goodness and of universal happiness. But those who are doubtful, and wish to see a consistent system established on the broad basis of reason and revelation, will doubtless find themselves necessitated to prosecute their inquiries further than M. Petitpierre will lead them.

BRIEF OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSAL SALVATION,

AS LATELY PROMULGATED AT NEW HAVEN.*

It is proposed in these few pages, to give some account of the doctrine of universal salvation, as lately proclaimed in this city, to consider the principal arguments by which it is attempted to be supported, to mention some passages of scripture which are inconsistent with it, and to point out some of the consequences which will follow from it.

I. The doctrine is, that all mankind, without exception, but none of the devils, will be saved; that this universal salvation will take place immediately after the general judgment, so that after that time, there will be no punishment of any individual of the human race; that this deliverance from future punishment is obtained in the way of the most strict justice; that Christ having paid the whole debt, for all mankind, it is not consistent with justice, that any man should be punished for sin, in his own person; that the sinners of the old world, however, were kept in hell from the flood till the crucifixion of Christ, and that during the three days that Christ's body lay in the grave, his spirit went and preached the gospel to them, and delivered them from further punishment; that *perhaps* those who die in impenitence and unbelief, may, till the final judgment, be in the same state, in which the sinners of the old world were, before the death of Christ.

II. I am to consider the principal arguments by which this system is attempted to be supported.

It is argued partly, from the divine goodness and compassion, but chiefly from several passages of scripture. The arguments

* Referring to the preaching of Murray the Universalist.

from divine goodness, equally prove that all *devils*, as that all *men*, will be saved. If a God of infinite goodness and compassion cannot inflict endless punishment on a fallen *man*, how can he inflict the same on a fallen *angel?* True goodness and compassion do not act with partial biasses and attachments, but seek the happiness of every intelligent being, whose happiness is consistent with the good of the system. To say, there is no atonement made for the fallen *angels*, gives no satisfaction. For why did not infinite goodness provide an atonement for them, as well as for mankind? If it be said, that the perdition of devils is not inconsistent with goodness, because it is not opposed to the good of the system in general, but necessary to it; I answer, in the same way the eternal perdition of ungodly men, may be reconciled with goodness. The argument from the divine goodness is also wholly inconsistent with the well known dispensations of providence towards mankind in this world. The argument hath been stated thus: "Can you, an affectionate parent, take your own child, and cast it into a glowing oven? No. But hath not God as much goodness and tenderness as you? How then can you suppose, that he will cast any of his children into the lake of fire and brimstone, and confine them there forever." On this argument I observe:

1. That it equally militates against the eternal punishment of any of the fallen angels, as any of fallen men; for they are the children of God by creation, as truly as men. It is however true, that though we cannot bear to cast our children into glowing ovens, yet God can and does, first neglect the means necessary for the salvation of some of his children, and then cast them into the lake of fire and brimstone.

2. That it also proves, (so far as it proves anything) that God cannot afflict and destroy mankind, as we all know he does, in this world. Permit me in my turn, to use this argument: "Can you an affectionate parent, throw down your child from eminences, so as to break his bones, mangle his flesh, and dislocate his neck? Or can you plunge him into a raging sea, and leave him to the mercy of the waves? Can you cast him to be devoured by lions or tigers? Can you voluntarily bring on him the tortures of convulsions, of the colic or of the stone? Can you set your house on fire, and in it consume your wife, your children and whole family together? I know you cannot think of doing any of these. But hath not God as much goodness and tenderness as you? How then can you suppose that he will ever treat any of his children in this manner?" Yet in fact he doth all those things to his children. The instances are very

common. This shows the absurdity of all such arguments, as that stated above; which however are the most popular, and with many, the most convincing arguments employed to prove universal salvation. It is mere trifling to argue against future punishment, on principles which cannot be reconciled with God's common providence; and to assert boldly that God cannot do what we all see and know, that he in fact doth.

The principal texts of scripture, produced in support of this doctrine, are these which follow:

1 Cor. 15: 22, "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." From these words it is argued, that as all mankind died in Adam, so all mankind will live eternally in and through Christ. In this chapter, the apostle is discoursing of the resurrection of Christ's people, the whole body of his followers, verse 23, "But every man in his own order, Christ the first fruits, afterward *they that are Christ's*, at his coming." These words immediately follow those now under consideration, and plainly show the sense of the apostle in the 22d verse to be, that all *Christ's*, all his *disciples*, or his *followers* shall be made alive in him. But who those are whom the apostle calls *Christ's*, or his *people*, his *followers*, is not determined in this text. It is however abundantly determined by the whole New Testament, that they are the *penitent* and *believing*, and they only. As all who were in Adam, or were represented by him, died in him; so all who are in Christ, or are represented by him, shall live in him. But it is denied, that all men are in Christ, and are represented by him, as their spiritual head, nor is this asserted in this text. The whole that is asserted in it is, that all who are in Christ, shall live by him, as all who were in Adam, died in consequence of his fall.

But in aid of the construction of the text aforesaid, which I oppose, it is said, "that the head of every man is Christ;" which is supposed to mean, that every man is in Christ, and is represented by him. The words are in 1 Cor. 11: 3, "The head of every man is Christ, and the head of the woman is the man, and the head of Christ is God." I grant that, as in the work of redemption, the character and office of God the father is superior to the Son; and as in the family economy, the husband is superior to his wife in honor and authority, so Christ is exalted in authority and dominion over all mankind. In this sense too, he is the head of the devils, as he is "made head over all things to the church," and "all things are put under his feet, he only excepted, who put all things under him." But that he is so the head of all men, that all will be saved by him, does not appear.

But it is pleaded, that "Christ died for all," that he is "the Savior of all men,"—that he is "the Savior of the world,"—"and a propitiation for the sins of the whole world,"—"that he gave himself a ransom for all,"—"and that he tasted death for every man." Doubtless these expressions are strictly true, as Christ has made an atonement, or laid a foundation in his death and sufferings, for the salvation of all mankind; so that salvation is offered to all; *all* without exception are invited to accept it. But what if some obstinately refuse to accept it? Will they still inherit this salvation? This is not asserted in any one of those texts now referred to. Yet it should be asserted, to make them at all to the purpose of universal salvation. All that is asserted, is, that Christ has made atonement or provision for the salvation of all men. But this no more proves that all men will in fact be saved, than if a prince should make a feast sufficient to entertain all the inhabitants of a city, this proves, that all those inhabitants will actually partake of the feast. Notwithstanding this provision, a great part may refuse to comply with the royal invitation, and thus exclude themselves. Yet it is true that there was a feast made for all. In like manner the provision made by Christ is abundantly sufficient for all; yet some exclude themselves by their unbelief. In this sense Christ gave himself a ransom for all, and tasted death for every man; and this sense of these passages is plainly given by the scripture itself, particularly in John 3: 16, "God so loved *the world*, that he gave his only begotten Son," not that all mankind might be saved by him, but "that *whoever believeth in him*, should not perish, but have everlasting life."

It is further pleaded, that God "will have all men to be saved," —that he hath "no pleasure in the death of the wicked,"—and that he is "not willing that any should perish." The death or perdition of the wicked is not in itself a desirable object; in this view God doth not, nor can take pleasure in it; he cannot delight in the punishment and destruction of his creatures simply considered. Yet he may inflict on them punishment and destruction, when they are necessary to vindicate his character, to support his law, to restrain others from sin, and to promote the good of the whole. The texts now under consideration are to be taken in the same sense with Lam. 3: 33, "He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men;" and Hos. 11: 8, "How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee, Israel? How shall I make thee as Admah? How shall I set thee as Zeboim? Mine heart is turned within me; my repentings are kindled together." A most benevolent parent may find it necessary to chastise, and even to disinherit a child. Yet he never

does it, as we say, *of choice;* but with great reluctance. It is true, all things considered, he may choose to do it. Still, in itself, it is very disagreeable and painful to him.

Jer. 31: 34, "They shall all know me, from the least of them, to the greatest of them," hath been introduced as an argument of universal salvation, because, *to know God is life eternal.* But those words of Jeremiah refer not to the state of things after the general judgment, but to the millennial state, and are equivalent to Isa. 11: 9, "For the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea;" and to Hab. 2: 14. But it is not pretended, that universal salvation will be effected on *this earth*, or before the general judgment, which is to be in the air, not on this globe. It is granted that in the general resurrection, some will come forth to the resurrection of damnation. Therefore universal salvation will not take place before that period.

A further argument hath been drawn from Rev. 5: 13, "Every creature which is in heaven, and on earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, and all that are in them, heard I, saying, blessing, and honor, etc. It is said that these words show, that all men will finally unite in hymns of praise to God and the Lamb and therefore will be saved. But this text says nothing particularly of *all men;* it speaks of *all creatures*, rational and irrational, animate and inanimate, and represents them as joining with the angels, the four beasts, and elders, in a hymn of praise, and is an instance of the figure called *prosopopoeia*, similar to that in Ps. 19: 1, and in Ps. 148: 1—11. It is therefore nothing to the purpose of the salvation of all men. Besides; this text as much implies the salvation of all devils, as of all men, and so if it prove anything, proves too much for those by whom it is quoted in the present question.

Phil. 2: 10, "That at the name of Jesus, every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth, and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord," etc. is supposed to imply the salvation of all men. But this is a mere declaration of Christ's exaltation, and of the subjection of all things to him, and is tantamount to those texts before quoted, which declare, that he is made head over all things to the church; and that all things are put under his feet. But these passages do not imply, that all men will *voluntarily* submit to him. See also Rom. 14: 9—13.

From "the restitution of all things," mentioned in Acts 3: 21, it hath been urged, that all men will be restored to the favor of God. On this I observe,

That these words might well have been rendered, The *completion* or *consummation* of all things, and are so rendered and interpreted by some of the best commentators. If they be taken strictly according to the present translation, they will prove that all devils are to be restored to the divine favor, as well as *all men*. Therefore they prove too much for those with whom I am at present concerned. But the original puts this text entirely out of the present question. Without insisting on a different rendering of the word translated *restitution*, the sense according to the original is this: The times of the restitution of *all those things which* God hath spoken by the mouth of all his prophets. So that if the restoration of all men be a doctrine taught by the prophets, this text declares, that the time will come, when such a restoration will be effected. Otherwise it says nothing concerning it. This text is sometimes introduced in this manner: "The restitution of all things is declared by all the prophets from the foundation of the world;" which is a perversion of the text, and shows either great dishonesty, or great inattention to the original.

These are the principal scriptures on which the doctrine of universal salvation, as lately published among us, is supposed to be founded, and whether they be a sufficient foundation, I now appeal to every candid man, who is but tolerably acquainted with the scriptures.

III. I am to mention some passages of scripture which appear to be irreconcilable with the salvation of all men.

Matt. 25: 31—46, especially v. 41, "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." It is pretended that the goats on the left hand, in this passage, are the devils; that the sheep on the right, are all mankind; and that the devils are condemned to everlasting fire, because they restrained men from acts of charity. Why then is it not said, Depart, ye cursed, etc. not because I was an hungred, and *ye gave* me no meat; but because I was an hungred and ye *restrained others* from giving me meat? And why was it not said, Depart, ye cursed, into everlasting fire prepared for *you*; not, for *the devil and his angels*, implying, that they were different persons from those to whom the Judge was speaking. But the 32d verse puts this matter out of all dispute: "Before him shall be gathered *all nations*; and he shall separate *them* one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats." What is the antecedent of *them*? not surely the devils, for they are not mentioned in the context. It is the *nations*; and to say that *them* refer to any other antecedent, is a violation of all the rules of grammatical construction. But to such shifts as these, the advocates for

universal salvation are reduced, to reconcile their doctrine with the scriptures! Surely that doctrine must be very foreign from the scriptures, which can be no better reconciled with them, than universal salvation can with this passage in the 25th of Matthew.

Rev. 14: 11, "And the smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever and ever: and they have no rest day nor night, who worship the beast and his image." If *the beast* mean what is commonly understood by it, Rome heathen and papal, the worshippers are not merely the devils, but some men are comprehended in the number. If *the beast* mean the devil himself, still some *men* are comprehended in the number of *his* worshippers. See 1 Cor. 10: 20. Thus on every supposition, this text declares that some *men* will be tormented forever and ever.

Isa. 66: 24, "They shall go forth and look upon the *carcasses* of the *men*, that have transgressed against me; for their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched." These were not *devils*; they are expressly called *men*, and were clothed with *carcasses*, or *bodies*, which is not true of the *devils*.

2 Thess. 1: 8, 9, "In flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and *that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, who* shall be punished with everlasting destruction." The devils, however they are obliged to obey the law, are not obliged to obey the gospel and to believe in Christ. Therefore this passage means *men* not *devils*.

2 Cor. 11: 15, "Whose end shall be according to their works." The persons spoken of are *false-apostles*, *evil-workers*, v. 13, and in v. 22, are declared to be *Hebrews*, *Israelites*, *the seed of Abraham*. Therefore they could not be *devils*. But their end is said to be according to their works, as false-apostles and evil-workers; which end must doubtless be an *evil* one, not the good end of salvation.

2 Pet. 3: 7, "The heavens and the earth—are—reserved unto fire—and *perdition* of ungodly *men*." *Men* not *devils*.

Luke 16: 22, 23, "The *rich man*—in hell—lifted up his eyes being in torments." This was a *rich man*, not a *rich devil*, v. 19, and he was confined in hell by an impassable gulf, v. 26.

1 Cor. 1: 18, "The preaching of the cross is to them that *perish* foolishness, but to us which are *saved*, it is the power of God." These that perish are those to whom the gospel is foolishness, and such the apostle declares the Jews and Greeks to be, v. 23.

Heb. 10: 38, "We are not of them who draw back unto perdition, but of them that believe to the saving of the soul." Some then do draw back unto perdition, i. e. from a professed *faith*,

as is manifest from the verse preceding, "The just shall live by faith, but if any man draw back," i. e. from the faith, or the profession of it; "my soul hath no pleasure in him." But the fallen angels do not draw back from the faith, or the profession of it; because they never pretended to have received it. Therefore the persons who draw back *unto perdition*, are men and not devils.

Luke 13: 25—29. We are here informed of some who shall be shut out of heaven, and shall in vain seek admission. But who are these? Not the devils surely, because Christ addresses them in the second person, "and *ye* begin to stand without;" "I know *you* not, whence *you* are, all *ye* workers of iniquity;" which shows that they were the *men* with whom he was then in conversation. How is this reconcilable with the salvation of all men?

Dan. 12: 2, "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." This is spoken of those who sleep in the dust of the earth, who cannot be the devils, but *men*. Some of these are to awake to everlasting contempt.

These are only a few of the many sacred passages which might be adduced on this occasion. And can we suppose that a God of infinite goodness, delights to vex and worry mankind with groundless fears? Or that a God of unviolable truth will denounce threatenings, which he never means to execute? Would not such a construction of the *theatenings*, weaken the credibility of all the *promises* of the gospel too? If God doth not declare what is about to be in one case, how know we that he does in another?

Besides the supposition that devils only are intended in some of the threatenings, the advocates for universal salvation, whom I oppose, have several other evasions. According to them, in some instances in which death is threatened to sinners, no more is intended than that they shall die *as sinners*, i. e. shall *repent* and *forsake their sins*. In others, they shall *die*, be *damned*, etc. as they shall be condemned *in their own consciences*, and shall *expect* and *fear* eternal death. In others, it is only declared, that they should die in *Christ*, as in this text, "The soul that sinneth it shall die."

On the *first* mode of evasion, I observe, that repentance is no death of men, or of the soul; on the other hand, it is a resurrection to spiritual life, the proper life of man. Again; that repentance is no token of divine displeasure, but is a sure token of divine favor, Acts 11: 18, "They glorified God, saying, Then

hath God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life." It cannot therefore be made the subject of a *threatening;* but whenever it is predicted, is promised as a blessing. Again; it cannot be said, that in this sense, the worm of the wicked shall not die; that their smoke shall ascend forever and ever; that they are fixed in torment by an impassable gulf; that they shall be punished with everlasting destruction; that they shall seek admission into heaven, but seek in vain.

On the *second* mode of evasion, That sinners shall be damned in their own *consciences* and die in *expectation,* I observe, that by the same rule of construction, we have no warrant to suppose, that the promises of the gospel, mean any more than that some men will be confident of their good estate, or favor with God, and so pronounce a sentence of justification on themselves, in the *expectation* or strong *hope* of eternal life. If it be said, "that they that do evil shall come forth to the resurrection of damnation," only as they shall pronounce a sentence of condemnation on themselves, and shall expect and fear eternal damnation; I will say, "that they that do good shall come forth to the resurrection of life," only as they shall, in a confidence of the divine favor, pronounce sentence of justification on themselves, and shall expect and hope for eternal life, yet shall never enjoy it, any more than the wicked shall suffer eternal punishment. If, "he that believeth not, shall be damned," mean only, that he shall be condemned in his own mind; then, "he that believeth, shall be saved," means only, that he shall be saved in his own mind or expectation. Besides, according to this sense of the threatenings, how can the wicked be said to be the subjects of the never dying worm? or to be in a place of torment from which they can never escape? or to be punished with those torments, the smoke of which shall ascend forever and ever? Surely, according to the doctrine which I oppose, they will not *forever and ever* expect punishment; nor can they be supposed to be the subjects, *forever and ever,* of any other self-condemnation, than that which is implied in true repentance, which is consistent with perfect and eternal happiness, and therefore cannot be made the matter of threatening.

On the last mode of evasion, That sinners shall die *in Christ* only, I observe, That it is applicable only to those texts, which were written before the death of Christ, not to any which were written after that event and are expressed in the *future tense;* as these, 2 Thess. 1: 9, "*Shall be* punished with an everlasting destruction," etc. Phil. 3: 19, "Whose end is destruction." 2 Cor. 11: 15, "Whose end *shall be* according to their works."

Again; dying in Christ, i. e. that Christ should die for a sinner, is no proper subject of threatening, as it is the greatest blessing ever granted to a fallen world; as well might we be threatened with the inheritance of heaven. Again; that this threatening, if it be so called, might as well have been denounced on the righteous as on the wicked; it being granted on all hands, that Christ died for the penitent and believing. Once more; that if these words, "the soul that sinneth it shall die," mean that such a soul should die in Christ, as Christ should die in its stead, and the soul personally should not die; with as much authority will I say, that these words, "He is just, he shall surely live," mean only that he shall live in Christ, as Christ shall live in his stead, but the man personally shall not live at all.

Thus these men, while they attempt to reduce or annihilate the threatenings of scripture, equally annihilate the promises, and entirely overthrow that very universal salvation, for which they so earnestly plead.

There is still another mode of evading the texts of scripture, which assert a future punishment; this is by supposing that the sins of men are to be separated from the men themselves, and to be sent to hell, while the men who committed those sins are to be taken to heaven. Thus the chaff in Matt. 3: 12. Luke 3: 17, is said to mean the sins of mankind; these sins are to be separated from the wheat, which is the men themselves, and to be burnt up with unquenchable fire. The carcasses of the men, who have transgressed against God, in Isa. 66: 24, are said to be the sins of those transgressors. On this I observe,

1. That it is difficult to conceive how this interpretation can be reconciled with most of those texts quoted above, or with others which may be quoted, as Phil. 3: 18, 19. Those whose end is destruction, are said to be the enemies of the cross of Christ, whose God is their belly. Sins are indeed acts of enmity, but not *enemies*, nor have they any *bellies* to be their Gods. Those who, according to 2 Thess. 1: 8, 9, are to be punished with everlasting destruction, are not lifeless actions, but persons (οἵτινες, in the masculine gender) who know not God, and obey not the gospel. But sins are capable of neither knowledge nor obedience. In 2 Cor. 11: 15, false apostles and evil workers, who were Hebrews, Israelites, the seed of Abraham, are said to come to an end according to their works. But sins are neither false nor true apostles, neither good nor evil workers, are neither Israelites, Hebrews, nor the seed of Abraham; nor can they perform any works, according to which their end shall be. 2 Peter 3: 7, speaks of the perdition not of *sins*, but *men*. Surely the

Jews and Greeks to whom the gospel was foolishness, and who therefore perished, were not *sins*, but *sinners*. And what an absurdity to say, that the sins of men draw back from the gospel faith unto perdition, according to Heb. 10: 39.

2. It is equally difficult to reconcile the idea of *sin's suffering*, or being *tormented*, with common sense. How can the sins of transgressors be eaten by worms, or burnt with fire, while the transgressors themselves are in heaven? How can an act of murder, or fornication, or blasphemy, be tormented forever and ever in fire and brimstone, while the authors of those actions are in perfect bliss? If such punishments are feasible, and answer the end of punishment, why are they not adopted by human legislators? Why is not felony hanged, or cropt and branded, and the felons suffered to go free? But the absurdity sufficiently appears; it would be altogether as good sense to talk of punishing the north-west wind, or tormenting the sound of a trumpet.

3. With regard to that text in Isa. 66: 24, it seems to be very unluckily chosen to prove, that *sins* are to be tormented, but the *sinners* saved. I will undertake to prove from the same text, with much more plausibility, that the sins of mankind are all to be saved, and to be happy in heaven forever, while *all men* without exception are to be sent to eternal torments in hell. For the words immediately preceding are, "All flesh shall come to worship before me, saith the Lord." As the prophet had been just speaking of the new heavens and new earth, these words, I suppose, on all hands are allowed to be descriptive of the heavenly state. Therefore *all flesh* shall be admitted into the heavenly state. But *flesh* in scripture very commonly signifies the *sin* or *wickedness* of men. Therefore all the sins of all men will be taken to heaven. But the worm of those who have transgressed against God shall never die, and their fire shall never be quenched. Now all men without exception have transgressed against God. Therefore all men without exception, shall suffer eternal torments in hell, while their sins shall enjoy eternal peace and happiness in heaven. Thus we see to what conclusions we are led, by taking no greater liberty with the scriptures, than those take with whom I am now concerned.

IV. I am to point out some of the consequences which will follow from this system.

1. It follows from this system, that the confinement of the sinners of the old world in the prison of hell, till the death of Christ, and the similar treatment of those who die in impenitence and unbelief, is a direct violation of justice, and can no more be reconciled with it, than the eternal punishment of a great part of

mankind. The reason why it is supposed to be inconsistent with justice, that any men should be eternally punished, is, that Christ as the substitute of all mankind, hath taken the whole punishment of sin on himself, and hath paid for all men the whole debt. Therefore payment being made by the substitute, it is unjust to exact payment of any sinner in his own person.

This would be to exact double payment. On the same principle I argue, that if Christ has so paid the *whole* debt for all men, that it is unjust to inflict the *whole* punishment of sin on *the person* of any sinner, it is also unjust to inflict on the person of any sinner *a part* of the punishment; as this would be *so far* to exact double payment of the debt; and to exact double payment for *a part* of a debt is as *real* injustice, though not so great a degree of it, as to exact double payment for *the whole*. Therefore justice was entirely violated, in confining the sinners of the old world, in the prison of hell, for more than two thousand years.

2. It follows from this system, that the *divine justice* is violated also by all the tokens of divine wrath or displeasure, which are ever inflicted on men in this life. That there have been many tokens of divine wrath inflicted on men in this life, cannot be denied, to be sure, by those who believe the divine authority of the scriptures; such was the destruction of the old world, of Sodom and Gomorrah, of the Canaanites, of Pharaoh and his army in the Red Sea, of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar, and afterwards by the Romans, when wrath came upon them to the uttermost; the death of Nadab and Abihu, of Hophni and Phinehas, of Ananias and Sapphira, etc. These are plain instances of punishment of sin inflicted by God; but how can these, on the system which I oppose, be reconciled with divine justice, any more than the everlasting punishment of sin? If these punishments were just, it follows that Christ has not so paid the whole debt, but that it is consistent with justice that sinners should be punished in their own persons; and therefore the argument in favor of universal salvation, drawn from the consideration of Christ's having paid the *whole debt*, entirely falls to the ground.

I may also mention the calamities to which all mankind are liable, and which they constantly suffer; the sickness, pains and sorrows, the vexations and disappointments, which await us all; the pangs of child-birth, the agonies of death, etc. To say that these are the necessary consequences of sin and could not have been prevented by the Deity, is an affront to reason and an impeachment of the divine Omnipotence. It was in the power of Omnipotence to have constituted things in such a manner, that child-bearing and death should have been without the least pain,

or that we should all have been translated without tasting death. With equal ease could God have prevented every other temporal calamity. To say that these calamities are mere parental chastisements designed for our good, and therefore not punishments or tokens of divine displeasure, is contradictory. For no good parent ever chastised a child, but for some fault, at which he was displeased.

What then are all these calamities of life and agonies of death, but so many tokens of God's displeasure at sin? But such tokens of God's displeasure can never be reconciled with justice, on the supposition that Christ so paid the whole debt of punishment for all mankind, that justice will not allow, that they be punished in their own persons. And if justice will allow that men be punished in their own persons, it is a matter of grace, sovereign grace, that any of mankind are saved; and if *any*, who and how many.

3. It follows from this system, that we have an absolute and immediate right, on the footing of *justice*, to the inheritance of heaven and all its blessedness, and that we are injured by the Deity, in being kept out of it for a day or an hour. Christ has purchased heaven for us equally as an escape from hell. But to be kept out of a glorious inheritance, to which we have an entire and absolute right on the footing of justice, and at the same time, to be detained in a state of imprisonment, as is the case with a great part of mankind, (Zech. 9: 12), or in such a state that even the best of men groan being burdened, and are in bondage, (Rom. 8: 23, and 2 Cor. 5: 2—5, and Heb. 2: 14, 15), is not merely to be injured, but to suffer an injury which is great and oppressive. If, to avoid this consequence, it should be said, that doubtless Christ in the covenant between him and the Father, consented that his redeemed should be kept out of the possession of heaven for a season; this would be to open a door at which certain guests, very unwelcome to the advocates for universal salvation, may easily enter. For in this concession it is granted, that the purchase of Christ is not absolute and unconditional, but limited with stipulations and conditions. Hence at once arises this question: What are the stipulations and conditions, on which an inheritance of the blessings of Christ's purchase is to be obtained? Is not that purchase so limited, that none can enjoy the saving blessings of it, who die in impenitence and unbelief. Doubtless he who had a right to consent, that all men should for a season be kept from the enjoyment of the blessings purchased by Christ, had a right to consent that some men should be kept from them forever. And if, this being the case, no injury is done those who are excluded from those blessings

for a season, neither is any injury done those who are finally excluded; because the conditions of the purchase in either case are fulfilled. It remains therefore to be shown, what are, and what are not the conditions of enjoying the blessings purchased by Christ; and the argument from the absolute purchase, whether of escape from hell, or of the possession of heaven entirely falls to the ground.

4. It follows from this system, that we have a right on the footing of *justice*, to immediate complete sanctification, and are constantly injured so long as we are kept in a state of depravity or imperfection. Perfection in holiness is a part of the purchase of Christ. (Heb. 12: 23, and Rev. 21: 27.) But the foundation of the argument, that we cannot consistently with justice, suffer the penalty of the law, is, that we have a right on the footing of *justice*, to whatever Christ has purchased for us. Therefore we have a right to immediate and complete sanctification. If here too it should be said, that Christ has consented, that we should be kept out of this privilege for a while; I answer, as under the preceding article, that with as much reason, I may say, he has consented that some should remain without it forever.

5. It follows from this system, that we are under no obligation to obey the divine law. Christ has equally obeyed the law for us, as he has suffered the penalty. He has equally paid the debt of obedience, as the debt of punishment. Now if, since Christ has paid the debt of punishment, to exact punishment of men personally, be to exact double payment of the debt; then, since Christ has paid the debt of obedience, to exact obedience of men personally, is to exact double payment of the debt of obedience; which is unjust, tyrannical and oppressive, and can never consist with the divine rectitude and perfection. It follows therefore that we are under no obligation to obey the divine law in any particular, whether as it respects God or men. We are under no obligation to love the Lord our God with all our heart, to observe his Sabbath, his ordinances of public or private worship, or to comply with any precept of the first table. Equally free are we from obligation to love our neighbor as ourselves, to speak the truth, to practise justice, fidelity, humanity, charity, temperance, sobriety, or any other virtue. And where there is no law, there is no transgression. Therefore, according to this system, we are not capable of committing sin; and though we should fall into profaneness, perjury, blasphemy; though we should practise injustice, fraud, theft, malice, revenge, murder, they would be no sin, but would be as perfectly innocent, as those which are esteemed the most amiable virtues.

6. It follows from this system, that *grace* is in a great measure excluded from the plan of salvation published in the gospel. In the late exhibition of universal salvation in this place, the preacher himself declared, "that however some hoped to be saved by *free grace, he* expected to be saved in the way of *strict justice.*" This declaration is perfectly consistent with his general system, and necessarily implied in it. For if we have a right *on the footing of justice*, to deliverance from hell, and admission to heaven, we doubtless have the *same right* to conversion, pardon, justification, the teachings and assistance of the Spirit, in short, to every blessing which Christ has purchased. If so, where is the grace in communicating these blessings? Manifestly there is no grace in the communication of any of them. They are *due* to us, and, according to the system which I am opposing, in communicating them, God does but discharge his *debts*. But is not this grating to the ear of every christian? It most directly contradicts the whole gospel, the language of which is, "By *grace* are ye saved," —"Being justified *freely* by his *grace*,"—"in whom we have—forgiveness according to the *riches of his grace*," etc.

7. It follows from this doctrine, that there is no foundation for *thanksgiving* or *praise*, on account of any of the forementioned blessings of conversion, pardon, justification, victory over the world, over our lusts, over satan, or final and eternal glory. We are not obliged to thank any man for giving us our *dues:* nor are we any more obligated to render thanks to *God* if *he* only gives us our dues. Therefore all that is said in the Psalms, or any other parts of scripture, in the way of praise or gratitude, on account of these blessings, is without reason or foundation, and the inspired writers herein show their great ignorance of the truth.

8. It follows from this doctrine, that there is no foundation for *prayer*. To pray is to ask a favor. But all spiritual blessings being purchased for us by Christ, we have a right to them on the footing of justice, and therefore may properly *demand* them; and to pray for them, is to act out of character. For the same reason, there is no propriety in praying for temporal blessings, if they are purchased by Christ, as they are generally allowed to be. Again, as we are under no obligation to obey the divine law, and are incapable of sin, we are of course, in our own persons, perfectly innocent, and being innocent, we deserve none of the calamities to which we are liable in the world, which are tokens of God's displeasure. We may therefore demand exemption from them. As to those calamities, which are tokens of the divine complacency or approbation, if any such there be, surely no man in his senses would pray to be preserved or delivered from them.

From this induction of particulars, it appears, that there is nothing in the universe, whether good or evil, whether of a temporal or a spiritual nature, which according to this system, can with propriety be made the subject of prayer.

9. This doctrine takes off all restraints on wickedness, arising either from a sense of sin or moral evil, or from the prospect of punishment in the future state. Because the doctrine not only asserts, that there is to be no future punishment, but as I have already shown, implies that men are not under moral obligation and consequently are incapable of sin. There is therefore no reason why men should avoid any actions, either through fear of future punishment, or through fear of contracting the guilt and turpitude of sin. Nay, this doctrine greatly diminishes, if it do not entirely annihilate the force of civil punishments. The greatest and last of them is death. But if death be a sure transition to complete and eternal happiness, what is there in it terrible? The mere pains of death by the hands of the executioner, are so momentary and all sensibility is so soon past, that they cannot justly excite any great terror. Thus this doctrine cuts the sinews of all civil government, and throws off almost every restraint by which mankind, in the present depraved state, are kept in tolerable order.

Having now finished what I proposed on this subject, I leave it with the candid reader to determine, whether I have done justice to those sacred texts, which I suppose to have been perverted to support the doctrine of universal salvation; whether of the many texts which seem to declare a future punishment, the few which I have found room to insert in these observations, do sufficiently establish it; whether the remarks, which I have made on the several modes of evading the force of those and similar texts, be pertinent; whether the consequences, which I have mentioned, do not necessarily follow from the doctrine which I oppose; and finally, whether, if the consequences are absurd and even shocking, the doctrine itself from which they follow, is not so too.

I hope and pray, that the promulgation of universal salvation in this city, may be the means of happily exciting the attention of the citizens, to the important subject of a future state in general, and of future punishment in particular; that they may inquire for themselves, make the scriptures the foundation of their faith, imitate the example of the noble Bereans in searching the scriptures daily, with respect to this subject; and that in the issue they may be established on "The foundation of God, which standeth sure, having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are his."

A

DISSERTATION

CONCERNING

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY;

CONTAINING

REMARKS ON THE ESSAYS OF DR. SAMUEL WEST,

AND ON THE WRITINGS OF

SEVERAL OTHER AUTHORS, ON THOSE SUBJECTS.

ADVERTISEMENT.

I BEGAN this Dissertation before I saw Dr. West's second edition of his First Part published with his Second Part; but on hearing, that he was about to publish his sentiments on Liberty and Necessity more largely, I suspended the prosecution of my design, that I might see what he should further publish. Since the publication of the second part, I have been necessarily though reluctantly kept back till this time, from finishing what I had begun. At length I send it forth, requesting the candor of all who shall read it. If ever candor to a writer be reasonably requested, it is so, on the deep and difficult subjects brought under consideration in this Dissertation.

The quotations from the Doctor's first part, are made according to the pages of the first edition, with which I began. Yet wherever any variation in words, between the first and second editions, has been noticed; the second edition has been followed in that respect. When I quote the first part, the page or pages only are referred to. When I quote the second part, I specify the part as well as the pages.

DISSERTATION.

CHAPTER I.

OF NATURAL AND MORAL NECESSITY AND INABILITY.

PRESIDENT Edwards, in his book on *the Freedom of Will*, distinguishes between *natural* and *moral* necessity and inability. By *moral* necessity he tells us, he means, "That necessity of connection and consequence, which arises from such moral causes, as the strength of inclination or motives, and the connection which there is in many cases between these and certain volitions and actions."* By *natural* necessity he explains himself to mean, "Such necessity as men are under, through the force of *natural* causes, as distinguished from what are called *moral* causes; such as habits and dispositions of heart, and moral motives and inducements."† He further holds, that "the difference between these two kinds of necessity, does not lie so much in the *nature* of the connection, as in the *two terms* connected;" that in moral necessity, "the cause—is of a *moral* nature, either some *previous habitual disposition*, or some *motive* exhibited to the understanding: And the effect is also—of a moral nature —some *inclination* or *volition* of the soul or *voluntary action*."‡ Also he held, that natural necessity always "has reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavor, which is insufficient. But no such opposition or contrary will and endeavor is supposable in the case of moral necessity, which is *a certainty of the inclination and will itself*, which does not admit of the supposition of a will to oppose and resist it. For it is absurd to suppose the same individual will to oppose itself *in its present act*."§ "Philosophical *necessity* is really nothing else than the full and fixed connection between the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition. When there is such a connection, then the thing affirmed in the proposition is necessary—in this sense I use the word *necessity*—when I endeavor

* Page 21. † Ibid. ‡ p. 22. § pp. 23, 24.

to prove, that *necessity is not inconsistent with liberty.*"* "Philosophical necessity is nothing different from the certainty that is in things themselves, which is the foundation of the certainty of the knowledge of them."†

This is the account given by President Edwards, of the distinction, which he made between natural and moral necessity. Moral necessity is the certain or necessary connection between moral causes and moral effects; natural necessity is the connection between causes and effects, which are not of a moral nature. The difference between these two kinds of necessity lies chiefly in the nature of *the two terms* connected by it. Natural necessity admits of voluntary, but ineffectual opposition from him who is subject to the necessity; the immediate effect, produced by that necessity, may be opposed by the will of the subject. But with respect to moral necessity, which is a previous certainty of the existence of a volition or voluntary action, it is absurd to suppose, that *in that act* the will should either oppose itself, or the necessity from which the act arises. The distinction between natural and moral inability is analogous to this. Inability is the reverse of necessity.

Now Dr. West tells us, that this "is a distinction without a difference."‡ But if the terms connected in these cases be different, as President Edwards supposes; if in one case "the cause, with which the effect is connected, be some previous habitual disposition, or some motive exhibited to the understanding; and the effect be a volition or voluntary action;" in the other, the cause be neither an habitual disposition nor a motive exhibited to the understanding, and the effect be neither a volition nor a voluntary action; it is manifest, that there is that very difference in the two cases, which President Edward's distinction supposes. To say, that this is a distinction without a difference, is to say, that an habitual disposition§ or a motive, is the same with something, which is not an habitual disposition or motive; and that a volition or voluntary action is the same with what is not a volition or voluntary action.

But Dr. West endeavors to support his charge of a distinction

* Page 16. † Ibid. ‡ p. 8.

§ Gentlemen may differ in their explanations of that habitual disposition or bias, which is the cause or antecedent of volition or voluntary action; some supposing it to be a certain cast or mould of the substance of the soul; others supposing it to consist in a divine constitution, that volitions of a certain kind, shall, in a regular manner and on certain conditions, succeed each other in the mind. But it does not appear, that President Edwards meant to decide this question.

without a difference. Let us attend to what he offers with this view: It is this, "That," according to President Edwards, "the principal, if not the only difference between natural—and moral necessity and inability, is, that in the former case, the opposition and endeavor against what does take place, is overcome and borne down by a superior force; but in the latter kind of necessity and inability there is no opposition and endeavor, that is overcome by any superior force. But that Mr. Edwards' moral necessity and inability are attended with as much insufficient opposition and endeavor, as his natural necessity and inability."* Whether this, which is here said to be, be indeed according to President Edwards the only or the principal difference between natural and moral necessity and inability, I shall not at present stand to dispute. It is sufficient for my present purpose to show, that President Edwards' moral necessity and inability are not, and cannot be attended with as much insufficient opposition and endeavor, as his natural necessity and inability.

Natural necessity may compel a man to that, to which his whole will is entirely opposed, and against which he puts forth all the opposition, of which his strength of body and mind admits. As when he is thrown from a precipice or is dragged to prison. But a man's whole will is never opposed to the influence of that bias, disposition or motive, or of any moral necessity, with which he complies. Whenever any of these influences a man to put forth a volition or a voluntary external action, it prevails on his will; his will therefore consents, though it may be with some degree of reluctance occasioned by some other bias or motive. Nothing is more common than such opposition between reason or conscience, and depraved appetite; between covetousness and ambition; indolence and a wish for gain, etc. But whenever any of these principles becomes stronger than its opposite, the will consents, and the man acts voluntarily under the influence of moral necessity; and though he may act with some degree of reluctance from the opposite principle, yet no man will say, that he is compelled to act against his *whole* will, or even against his strongest inclination; for by the very case supposed, he acts agreeably to his strongest inclination.† But by natural necessity he is or may be compelled to that, to which every inclination and act of his will, the strongest as well as the most feeble, is most directly opposed. A man dragged to prison may be compelled to enter it, in direct opposition to every act of his will.

* Page 8.

† By *inclination, disposition* or *bias*, I mean something distinct from volition. This distinction is made by Dr. West, p. 13.

This is natural necessity. But an indolent man, who is influenced to labor by the prospect of gain, is not compelled to labor in opposition to every inclination or act of his will, but complies with the stronger inclination and act, in opposition to the weaker, which would lead him to indulge himself in ease. This is an instance of moral necessity. One difference between natural necessity and moral is, that every inclination and act of the will does or may directly oppose natural necessity; but every act of will always coincides with that moral necessity, from which it arises, and when there is a struggle between different inclinations or propensities and their acts, the acts of that which prevails, never oppose the moral necessity by which they take place.

When President Edwards says, that no voluntary insufficient opposition or endeavor is supposable in the case of moral necessity; his evident meaning is, that it is not supposable, that an act of the will should be opposed to that moral necessity, by which it takes place. For instance, if a man be under a moral necessity of choosing a virtuous course of life, this choice is not opposed to the necessity, which is the source of it, nor is it supposable, that it should be opposed to it or at all resist it. The case is very different with regard to natural necessity. A man dragged to execution may in every respect oppose with his will, that necessity, by which he is carried on.

But though a man, who is determined by moral necessity to choose a virtuous course, cannot *in that act* oppose that choice or the cause of it; yet he may *in other acts* of his will oppose both this choice and the cause, and thus in different acts choose and act inconsistently. He may from prevailing motives and from moral necessity, choose virtue. He may at the same time from weaker motives and ineffectual temptations, choose vice, and so far feel reluctant or indisposed to virtue. And this weaker choice is no more opposed to the moral necessity, which causes it, than the stronger choice of virtue is to the moral necessity which causes that. In both there is no supposable opposition to their respective necessities, which are their causes. This is true with respect to every choice whether stronger or weaker, whether prevailing to govern the heart and conduct, or not. Yet there is a mutual opposition between the forementioned different acts of choice, the choice of virtue and choice of vice. Indeed these two opposite choices cannot both prevail, so as to govern the heart and life at the same time. They may in particular cases be equal, or so nearly equal, that neither of them at that instant appears to prevail, and the man "is in a strait be—

twixt two." In other instances they may for a time at least alternately prevail, and exhibit a man of very inconsistent conduct. In other instances one may generally prevail, and denominate the subject a virtuous or vicious man, accordingly as the choice and love of virtue, or of vice, prevails and governs him. Thus we shall have all those four modes of insufficient opposition to moral necessity, which Dr. West says,* President Edwards allows may take place, and from which he argues that President Edwards' moral necessity may be attended with as much insufficient opposition, as his natural necessity; and that therefore President Edwards' distinction between natural and moral necessity is without a difference. 1. The weaker motives to vice may oppose the stronger motives to virtue. 2. The man may *now* have strong and prevailing acts, desires and resolutions against those acts of vice, to which he foresees he shall in certain circumstances be exposed, and which he actually indulges, when the foreseen circumstances take place. 3. The will may remotely and indirectly resist itself, not in the same acts, but in different acts; the depraved appetites may struggle against the principles of virtue. 4. Reason pleading in favor of virtue, may resist the present acts, which incline, and perhaps prevailingly, to vice. Nor is there anything in all this, but what was long since observed by the poet, and has always been noticed by all attentive observers of human nature:

"Video meliora, proboque; deteriora sequor."

Now, it will not be pretended, that this opposition of one act of the will to another, is parallel to the entire opposition of the will which there is or may be, to natural necessity; e. g. to falling when a man is thrown down a precipice, or to going to the gallows, when a man is forced thither. In the latter case, there is or may be an entire and perfect opposition of the whole will, to the necessity. In the former, there is a consent of the will to the necessity, though there may be a degree of opposite choice arising from some other motive, bias, cause or necessity.

Dr. West infers from this actual or possible opposition of the acts of one propensity in human nature, to those of another, acknowledged by President Edwards, that all those acts which admit of this opposition are necessary with natural necessity. If this inference be just, doubtless every act of the human will is necessary with natural necessity. If a man choose virtue, he doubtless does or may from temptation feel some inclination to

* Page 10.

vice. In this case then his choice of virtue is, according to the reasoning of Dr. West, the effect of natural necessity; for natural necessity is, according to that reasoning, that which admits of any voluntary opposition. And as there is no propensity in human nature, which may not be opposed by some other propensity; and as the human mind is not capable of any act, which may not be attended with some degree of reluctance at least; therefore human nature is not capable of any act, which is not necessitated with a natural necessity, a necessity, which is equally inconsistent with praise and blame, as that by which a man falls when he is thrown from an eminence.

This opposition of one propensity in human nature to another, and of one act of the will to another, is abundantly granted by Dr. West. So that if this prove or imply a natural necessity, he holds that the acts of the will are subject to natural necessity. "A man may *love* a person, whom he knows to be utterly unworthy of his affections, and may really *choose* to eradicate this propension from his mind; and yet he may find this passion rising in his breast, in direct opposition to his *will* or *choice*. And the same observations may be made with respect to every other propension in the human mind. *They may all be in direct opposition to present acts of the will and choice.* Were not this the case, there could be no struggle in the mind, to overcome wrong propensions and vicious habits. But common experience will teach us, that there is frequently a very great struggle in the mind, to gain the victory over vile affections."* Whatever distinction Dr. West makes between propension and volition, he will doubtless grant, that there may be acts of the will agreeable to a propension, as well as in opposition to it; that there may be volitions and actions agreeable to a vicious propension, and yet there may be a struggle of virtuous propension and volition in opposition to the vicious. On the other hand, there may be a struggle of vicious propension and volition in opposition to the virtuous. Dr. West will not deny that love to God, to his law and to virtue, is a voluntary exercise. Now he who has a degree of voluntary love to God and true virtue, and a degree of voluntary love to vice, has an opposition not only of propensions, but of voluntary acts and exercises, i. e. of volitions. Yet would Dr. West allow, that this love of virtue, which is opposed by a degree of love to vice, is necessitated by a natural necessity? This will follow from the principle of his argument to prove, that President Edwards' moral necessity is really a natural necessity.

Dr. West asserts, "that it is absurd, that the will should direct-

* Page 14.

ly oppose its own present acts;"* and yet he says, "there may be will and endeavor against, or diverse from *present acts of the will.*"† These propositions seem incapable of reconciliation, unless on the ground of the distinction, which I have made between the will opposing itself in the same acts, and in different acts arising from different motives or propensities.

President Edwards constantly holds, that natural necessity and inability are inconsistent with blame in any instance. The reason of this is, that all our sincere and most ardent desires and acts of will, as well as external endeavors, may be resisted, opposed and overcome as to their effects. But this is not the case in moral necessity and inability; therefore they do not excuse from blame. When under a moral necessity we will to do an action, our strongest desires and acts of will coincide with the moral necessity, and we voluntarily act agreeably to it. And if we have weaker wishes and desires opposing the necessity and the stronger desires and acts of our will, which follow from that necessity, we are not to be excused from blame on that account, because on the whole we consent to do the action. No man will pretend, that he who is influenced by the malice of his own heart, to murder his neighbor, is excusable in that action, because he has some weak and ineffectual reluctance arising from a knowledge of the divine law and from the dictates of his own conscience.

It has been said by some of our opponents in this disquisition, that they cannot find out what we mean by moral necessity, as distinguished from natural or physical. If it be not sufficiently plain from his own writings, what President Edwards meant by it, I can only give my opinion concerning his meaning. But concerning my own meaning I have a right to speak more peremptorily, that I mean all necessity or previous certainty of the volition or voluntary action of a rational being, whatever be the cause or influence, by which that necessity is established, or the volition brought into existence, and however great and efficacious that influence be. When "God's people are made willing in the day of his power," there is doubtless a necessity of their being willing. This necessity I call a moral necessity. Against this willingness, or the necessity, or the necessitating cause, from which it arises, the will of him who is made willing, does not and cannot possibly make entire and direct opposition. By the very supposition he is made willing, his will therefore coincides with

* Page 14. † p. 9.

the necessity and consents to it; and so far as it consents, it cannot dissent or make opposition.

Some seem to imagine, that the difference between natural and moral necessity, is, that the former is the effect of a strong and irresistible cause; but the latter of a weak one, which may be resisted and overcome; and that entire opposition of will is supposable in both cases; though with this difference, that in natural necessity it is ineffectual, but in moral it may be effectual. Whereas the truth is, that let the cause of a moral act be what it will, it involves a moral necessity only, because it is not supposable, that the will should be entirely opposed to it.

The persons abovementioned object to the application of such strong epithets as *infallible*, *unavoidable*, *unalterable*, *unfrustrable*, etc. to moral necessity and inability, supposing that they imply a natural necessity inconsistent with praise and blame. But when our Lord had given the prediction, was there not an infallible, unavoidable, unalterable and unfrustrable certainty, that Judas would betray his Lord? And will it be pretended, that on that account he was not to be blamed for so doing? Yet this action of Judas was rendered no more unfrustrably necessary by the prediction, than it was before, as it was before certainly foreknown. Nor was it more certainly foreknown, than every event and every moral action, which ever has or will come to pass. Therefore all moral actions are unfrustrably certain previously to their existence; and all those epithets are as properly applicable to them, as to the treachery of Judas, after it was divinely predicted.

It has been said, that till the measure of influence implied in moral necessity, is distinctly known, it is impossible to tell, when or how far a person is rewardable or punishable. But this is said, under a mistaken idea of moral necessity, viz. that moral necessity implies a low degree of influence only. Moral necessity is the real and certain connection between some moral action and its cause; and there is no moral *necessity* in the case, unless the connection be real and absolutely certain, so as to *ensure* the existence of the action. And will it be pretended, that if the measure of influence be increased beyond this, the necessity ceases to be moral and becomes natural? That if a motive or a malicious temper be barely sufficient certainly and infallibly to influence a man to murder his neighbor, the necessity is moral and the man is blamable; but if it become more than barely sufficient for this, so as to excite him to perpetrate the action with great eagerness and with the overflowing of malice, that in this case the necessity is natural and the man entirely un-

blamable? The truth is, that there is no inconsistence between the most efficacious influence in moral necessity and accountableness. Let the influence be ever so great, still the man acts voluntarily, and there is no supposable entire opposition of will; and as he is a rational creature, he is accountable for his voluntary actions. The contrary supposition implies, that in order to accountableness a man must have a liberty of *contingence*, and it must be, previously to his acting, *uncertain* how he will act. A bare previous certainty of the voluntary action of an intelligent being is as inconsistent with liberty and accountableness, as any possible degree of influence producing such an action. In either case there is an equal consent of the will, and an entire opposition of the will is no more supposable in the one case, than in the other.

Some insist, that moral necessity and inability are always of our own procuring; and whatever necessity is not caused by ourselves is not moral necessity. But moral necessity is the previous certainty of a moral action. Now as it was divinely foretold, ages before it came to pass, that the Jews would crucify our Lord, and that the man of sin would persecute the saints, etc. there was a moral necessity, that those facts should come to pass. And as this necessity existed long before the perpetrators of those facts existed, they did not cause the necessity. Therefore according to this account of moral and natural necessity, it was a natural necessity, and the Jews and the man of sin were in those actions, as innocent as they were in breathing or in any involuntary motion. Further, as all the actions of rational creatures are foreknown by God, before the authors of them come into existence, they are equally certain and necessary, as those which are predicted. But this necessity, for the reason already given, cannot be the effect of those, whose actions they are. Therefore either this is not a natural necessity, or there never was, is now nor can be any crime or sin in the universe.

Dr. Clarke in his Remarks on Collins gives a true account of moral necessity: "By *moral necessity* consistent writers never mean any more than to express in a figurative manner, the *certainty* of such an event."* And he illustrates it by the impossibility, that the world should come to an end this year, if God have promised that it shall continue another year. Yet in his dispute with *Leibnitz* he gives a very different account of it. "That a good being, continuing to be good, cannot do evil; or a wise being, continuing to be wise, cannot do unwisely; or a veracious person, continuing to be veracious, cannot tell a lie;

* Page 16.

is *moral necessity*."* This last account implies no other necessity, than that a thing must be when it is supposed to be; which is no more than the trifling proposition, that *what is, is*. But the certainty implied in the divine prediction, that the world will continue to a particular period, is a very different matter. Dr. West, if I understand him, has adopted the last account given by Dr. Clarke of moral necessity. No doubt he and Dr. Clarke had a right to give their own definitions of moral necessity; but Dr. West had no right to impute his idea to President Edwards, and then dispute against it as belonging to him. Dr. Clarke's last described moral necessity would exist, if human volitions came into existence by a self-determining power or by mere chance. On either of those suppositions, *what is, is*, and must be, so long as it is. But President Edwards' idea of moral necessity is utterly inconsistent with volitions coming into existence by chance, or by self-determination, unless self-determination be previously established.

In all matters of dispute, it ought to be considered how far the parties are agreed, and wherein they differ. As to natural and moral necessity, I believe both parties are agreed, in this, that all necessity inconsistent with moral agency, or praise and blame, is natural necessity; and that all necessity consistent with praise and blame, is moral necessity. Therefore if all necessity of the volitions of rational beings, be consistent with praise and blame; all such necessity is moral necessity. But if any necessity of the volitions of a rational being, be inconsistent with praise and blame; then I have given an erroneous account of moral necessity. Therefore on this let us join issue. If an instance can be produced of the volition of a rational being in such a sense necessary, as to be on that account the proper object of neither praise nor blame; I will confess, that I am mistaken in my idea of moral necessity. But until such an instance can be produced, may I not fairly presume, that my idea is right? If it should be said, that no volitions of rational creatures are in any sense necessary, or that they are not previously certain; I recur to the instances of Judas' treachery, Peter's falsehood, Pharaoh's refusal to let Israel go, and to every other voluntary action of a rational being divinely predicted or foreknown.

If any should dispute, whether this previous certainty of voluntary actions, be properly called *necessity;* this would be a merely *verbal* dispute, which they who choose, may agitate to their full satisfaction. It is sufficient to inform them, that it is what we mean by moral necessity.

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* Page 289.

I have already shown that Dr. West grants the mutual opposition of different propensions and volitions; it may be further observed that, though he so strenuously disputes against the distinction between natural and moral necessity, and says it is made without a difference; yet the same distinction is abundantly implied in his book, particularly in his third essay. He there holds forth, that a man may have a *physical power* to do an action, and yet *not exert* that power; that it may be *certain*, there may be *a certainty*, and it may be *certainly foreknown*, that a man will do something, which he has a *physical* power not to do;* That a bare *certainty*, that an agent will do such a thing, does not imply, that he had not a power to refrain from doing it.† Now by moral necessity we mean the previous certainty of any moral action. Therefore when Dr. West holds, "*that there may be a* CERTAINTY, *that a man will do such a thing, though he may have at the same time a physical power of not doing it;*"‡ he holds, that there may be the very thing which President Edwards, calls a *moral necessity*, that the man will do the thing, though he may have at the same time a *physical* or *natural* power not to do it. Thus Dr. West makes and abundantly insists on that very distinction, which he reprobates in President Edwards, and which he declares to be made without any difference. Indeed it is impossible for any man to write sensibly or plausibly on this subject, without going on the ground of this distinction.

It has been inquired concerning President Edwards' moral inability, whether the man, who is the subject of it, *can remove* it? I answer, yes, he has the same physical power to remove it and to do the action, which he is morally unable to do, which the man, concerning whom Dr. West supposes there is a certainty that he will not do an action, has to do the action and so to defeat or remove the said certainty. I agree with Dr. West, that he has a physical power so to do.

Perhaps after all some will insist, that natural and moral necessity are the same. It is ardently to be wished, that such persons would tell us, in what respects they are the same. We have informed them, in what respects we hold them to be different. We wish them to be equally explicit and candid. If they mean, that natural and moral necessity are the same in this respect, that they are or may be equally certain and fixed, and may equally ensure their respective consequences or effects; I grant it. Still they may be different in other respects, particularly this, that natural necessity respects those events or things only,

* Page 46. † p. 45. ‡ p. 46.

which are not of a moral nature, while moral necessity respects those only, which are of a moral nature; and there may be an entire opposition of will to the former, but not to the latter. If they mean, that they are the same as to virtue and vice, praise and blame, etc. this is not granted, and to assert it, is a mere begging of the question. If they mean, that both those kinds of necessity may arise from *nature*; meaning by this the fixed properties of beings and the established course of things and events; this is granted. Still there may be the grounds of distinction before mentioned. If they say, that moral necessity is *natural* necessity, because it is or may be *born with us*; I grant it. But this is mere quibbling on the word *natural*. Though volitions may be the effects of a bias of mind born with us, yet those volitions are moral acts, and therefore the necessity from which they proceed, is a *moral* necessity. A man born with a contracted, selfish disposition, still has a physical power to be benevolent, and it is not supposable, that his will or disposition should be entirely opposed to selfishness, whenever he is the subject of it.

CHAPTER II.

OF LIBERTY.

Dr. West says, "By liberty we mean *a power* of acting, willing or choosing; and by *a power* of acting, we mean, that when all circumstances necessary for action have taken place, the mind *can* act or *not act*."* This is not explicit. There is an ambiguity in the words *power*, *can*, *not act*. If by *power* and *can*, he mean *natural* power, as it has been explained in the preceding chapter; I agree that in any given case we have a power to act or decline the proposed action. A man possesses liberty when he possesses a natural or physical power to do an action, and is under no natural inability with respect to that action. The word liberty suggests a negative idea, and means the absence of certain obstacles, confinement or restriction. A bird not confined in a cage, but let loose in the open air, is free; a man not shut up in prison, is in that respect, free; a servant delivered from the control of his master, is free; a man, who has disengaged himself from the tie of a civil bond, is in that respect free. In all these

* Page 16.

cases liberty implies some exemption, or some negation. In a moral sense and with respect to moral conduct, a man is free or possesses liberty, when he is under no involuntary restraint or compulsion; i. e. when he is under no restraint or compulsion, to which his will does not consent, or to which it is or may be entirely opposed. An exemption from this restraint or compulsion, is liberty, moral liberty, the liberty of a moral agent: and this is an exemption from natural necessity and inability as before explained. He who is thus exempted, has a natural power of acting, just so far as this exemption extends. Even though "all circumstances necessary for action, have taken place," yet "then the mind can," in this sense, "act" in any particular manner, or decline that action. For instance, when all circumstances necessary for Judas' betraying his Lord, had taken place, still he had a natural power either to betray him or not betray him. He was under no compulsion to betray him, to which his will did not consent. He was not, nor could he possibly be, under any such compulsion to *choose* to betray him. It is a contradiction, that the mind should *choose* to do a thing *involuntarily* and with an entire opposition of will.

If this be the liberty, for which Dr. West pleads, he has no ground of controversy on this head with President Edwards, or with any who embrace his system. There is nothing in this inconsistent with the influence of motives on the will, to produce volition; or with the dependence of volition on some cause extrinsic to itself, extrinsic to the power of will, or to the mind in which it exists. What if motives do excite to volition? What if the connection between motive and volition be such, that volition never takes place without motive, and always takes place, when a proper motive appears? What if volition be the effect of a cause extrinsic to the will? Still it is true, that volition never takes place without the consent or with the entire opposition of the will. The will or mind then is still free, as it is exempted from natural necessity and has a natural or physical power to act otherwise.

If it be said, that it is not sufficient to liberty, that the mind act *with* its own consent, *in the act itself;* but it must in every free act, act *from* its own consent *previous* to the free act; I observe, that this implies, that in order to any free act, there must be an infinite series of free acts following one another. For instance, the objection supposes, that if I now freely choose to write remarks on Dr. West, this free choice must *arise from* a *previous* consent of my will, or from a previous choice, to write such remarks. Again, this previous choice, in order to be free,

must for the same reason arise from another previous free choice; and so on *infinitely*, which is absurd.

Or if it should be said, that liberty implies not only an exemption from all *natural* or *physical* necessity, but also an exemption from all *moral* necessity; then, as moral necessity is nothing but a previous certainty of the existence of any moral act, it will follow that any act, in order to be free, must come into existence without any previous certainty in the nature of things or in the divine mind, that it would exist, i. e. no act can be free, unless it come into existence by *pure contingence* and *mere chance.*

But let us proceed to consider what Dr. West says in further explanation of his idea of liberty.

"To act," says he, "to will or to choose, is to be free."* If this be liberty, surely Dr. West could not imagine, that President Edwards, or any man in his senses, ever denied that we are free. It is to be presumed, that no man ever denied, that we determine, that we will, or that we choose. However, though I allow all these things, yet I cannot allow, that this is a true account of liberty. Will Dr. West pretend, that we are never free, but when we are in action? That we have no liberty to determine, beside when we do actually determine? That we have no liberty to will or choose, but when we are in the exercise of volition or choice? Will he say, that he himself had no liberty to determine to write essays on liberty and necessity, before he actually determined to write them? Dr. West,† holds that there may be a certainty, that a man will do an action; yet that he may have a physical power of doing the contrary. He would therefore doubtless grant, that he is at liberty to do the contrary, though he actually does it not; and this whether the action be external or mental. Besides; this definition of liberty is wholly inconsistent with the other favorite one of Dr. West, viz. *a power to act or not.* If liberty be a *power*, surely it is not an *action;* but "to act, to will or to choose," is an action. Especially if liberty be a power to *not act*, it cannot be *an action.* And if a power of acting, be action; a power of willing be volition; and a power of choosing be choice; then a power of walking or writing, and actual walking and writing is the same thing; and whoever is able to write, and so long as he is able, is actually employed in writing. Does Dr. West find by experience that this is true?

I know there is a class of divines, who have holden, that God is free to good only, because he does good only; that the saints and angels in heaven are for the same reason free to good only;

* Page 16. † p. 46.

that Adam in paradise was free to both good and evil; that unregenerate sinners and devils are free to evil only; and that the regenerate in the present life are free to both good and evil. But I presume Dr. West would not choose to rank himself in this class.

Dr. S. Clarke is equally inconsistent in his definition of liberty, as Dr. West. "The whole essence of liberty," says he, "consists in the *power* of acting. *Action* and *liberty* are *identical* ideas; and the true *definition* of a free being, is one that is endued with a *power* of acting."* How true it is, that great men are not always wise! And how surprising, that Dr. Clarke, whom the advocates for self-determination, set up as unequalled in metaphysical acuteness, should contradict himself twice in four lines, in what required so much accuracy, as the definition of liberty! 1. The whole essence of liberty is here said to consist in a *power* of acting. 2. *Action* and liberty are said to be identical ideas; and therefore the *power* of action and liberty are not identical ideas, unless the *power* of action and *action* are identical ideas. 3. The true definition of a free being is said to be one that is endued with the *power* of acting. Thus the Doctor ends where he began, forgetful of the middle.

But that part of Dr. West's account of liberty, with which he seems to be most pleased, and on which he seems most to depend, remains yet to be considered. It is this, *a power to act or not act*, in all cases whatever. On this I observe, that if by *acting or not acting*, the Doctor mean choosing or refusing, I grant, that we have a *natural* power to do either of these in any case. But refusing is as real an act of the mind, as choosing, and therefore is very improperly called *not acting*. I grant, that we have a *natural* power to choose or refuse in any case; but we have no *moral* power, or power opposed to *moral necessity*: For moral necessity is previous certainty of a moral action; and a power opposed to this must imply a previous uncertainty. But no event moral or natural is or can be uncertain previously to its existence. But if by a power to act or not act, the Doctor mean a power either to choose an object proposed, or to refuse it, or to do neither; this is an impossibility. Whenever an object is proposed for our choice, if there be any medium between choosing and refusing, it is a state of perfect blockish inaction and insensibility or *torpor*; and this inaction must be *involuntary*; as a *voluntary* inaction implies an act or volition, which is inconsistent with perfect inaction. A voluntary state of inac-

* Remarks on Collins, p. 15.

tion and torpor is a contradiction in terms. It implies, that the mind is the subject of no act at all, and yet at the same time is the subject of a volition, by which it consents to inaction. Or if it should be said, that a voluntary state of inaction means a state, to which the mind is indeed reduced by an act of volition, and that the volition having accomplished a state of inaction, ceases itself to exist, and thus perfect and universal inaction follows; I observe, (1) That still this plea does not rid the matter of the contradiction. The cause of the perfect inaction is a volition. This cause must continue in existence and in operation, till the effect is accomplished; i. e. till entire and perfect inaction has actually taken place. And yet so long as this cause continues to exist, it is a contradiction, that perfect and entire inaction should take place. (2) Besides this contradiction, if the mind could by an act of volition or by other means be reduced to a state of entire inaction and torpitude, this state would be utterly inconsistent with the exercise of any liberty. The man in this state can no more exercise liberty, than if he were under ever so great *natural* necessity, or than if he were turned into a stock or stone. During this state he cannot possibly put forth any act, to arouse himself from this *torpor*. It is in the power of no man, to reduce himself to this state, with respect to any object proposed to his choice; or when he is reduced to it, to recover himself from it.

If to this it should be objected, that we are entirely indifferent with regard to many objects; we neither choose nor refuse them: I answer, be this as it may with respect to objects not proposed for our choice; it is not true with respect to those, which are proposed for our choice; and this is all that I have asserted, and all that the subject requires me to assert; for Dr. West's account of liberty is "a power of acting; and by a power of acting, we mean, that when all circumstances necessary for action have taken place, the mind can act or not act;" i. e. when an occasion for volition, choice or determination, is presented; or when an object of choice, or an object, with respect to which we are to will or determine, is exhibited.

Mr. Locke's observations on this point are very pertinent and convincing. They are as follows: "A man in respect of willing, or the act of volition, when an action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts as presently to be done, cannot be free. The reason whereof is manifest—he cannot avoid willing the existence or not existence of that action; it is absolutely necessary, that he will the one or the other, i. e. prefer the one to the other, since one of them must necessarily follow; and that which does

follow, follows by the choice and determination of his mind, that is, by his willing it. For if he did not will it, it would not be. So that in respect of the act of willing, a man in such a case is not free; liberty consisting in a power to act or not act, which in regard of volition, a man upon such a proposal has not. For it is unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an action in a man's power, which is once proposed to a man's thoughts. A man must necessarily will the one or the other of them, upon which preference or volition the action or its forbearance certainly follows and is truly voluntary. But the act of volition or preferring one of the two, being that, which he cannot avoid, a man in respect of that act of willing is under a necessity. This then is evident, that in all proposals of present action, a man is not at liberty to will or not to will; because he cannot forbear willing." "A man that is walking, to whom it is proposed to give off walking, is not at liberty, whether he *will* determine himself to walk or give off walking, or no. *He must necessarily prefer one or the other of them*, walking or not walking." "The mind in that case has not a power to forbear willing; it cannot avoid *some* determination. It is manifest, that it orders and directs one in preference to, or in the neglect of the other." Dr. West himself gives up his favorite power of *not acting*, in the following passage: "As soon as ideas are presented to the mind its active faculty is exerted, and the mind continues constantly acting, as long as it has ideas, just as the act of seeing takes place the very instant the eye is turned to the light, and continues as long as the light strikes the eye."* "The mind is always acting."† If it continue to act as long as it has ideas, as the eye continues to see as long as the light strikes it; then the mind has no power of not acting, while it has ideas. And I think it will not be pretended that the mind has a power to banish from itself, all ideas at pleasure. This would be a *torpor* indeed! a torpor of the understanding as well as of the will! And if the mind be always acting, it never exercises the power of not acting.

Doctor West thinks it strange, that his private correspondent does not know what the Doctor means by *a power to act or not act;* and the Doctor proceeds to give several instances of it, as of a man, who had been confined in prison, set at liberty to go out or still to tarry in prison; and of a husbandman, who has the offer of a farm, on certain conditions, and he is at liberty to take the farm or not. But neither of these is an instance of *a power to act or not act;* they are mere instances of a natural power to act differently, to act one way or another. If the man who has

* Part II. p. 9. † p. 10.

the offer to go out of the prison, choose to tarry in it; he as really acts as if he had chosen to go out. If the husbandman choose to decline the farm offered him, this is as real and positive an act, as if he had chosen to take it. And the Doctor, though he has attempted to give an instance of a power to act or not act, has not given one. For this reason, as well as from the nature of the case, I believe it is not in his power to give an instance of it. If it be in his power, I wish him to do it. He acknowledges this to be "the main point, on which the hinge of the whole controversy turns." A power to act or not act, is his definition of that liberty, for which he contends, and in support of which he has written his two books. And if he be not able to give a single instance of such a power, it is high time for him to give it up, and the whole controversy, of which this is the hinge. No wonder Dr. West's correspondent did not understand what the Doctor meant by this power, if the Doctor himself did not understand it so far as to be able to give an instance of it. *A power to act or not act* must either mean a power to choose or refuse; or a power to act, or to cease from all action in either choosing or refusing. If the former be the meaning, it is no more than we all grant, provided by power be meant *natural* power. But if in this case *moral* power be intended, a power opposed to moral necessity, which is the previous certainty of a moral action; this we utterly deny, because it implies, that there is a previous perfect uncertainty in the nature of things and in the divine mind, whether we shall choose or refuse the proposed object. If the last be the meaning of *a power to act or not act*, as this is a power to sink ourselves into a state of unfeeling and blockish torpor, I appeal to the reader, whether Dr. West, or Limborch, or any other man, has ever had or can have any idea of such a power; or if they have, whether it would be any desirable liberty, or would imply any qualification for moral agency.

I am sensible, that Dr. West tells us, that he has given a definition of "a power to act or not act," and that this definition is, "that there is no infallible connection between motive and volition." But this, which he calls a definition, does not at all relieve the difficulty. If it mean, that when motives are presented, the person can comply with them, or can refuse to comply, or can neither comply nor refuse; I deny it, declare it to be an impossibility, and call on Dr. West to show the possibility of it. If when he says, there is no infallible connection between motive and volition, he mean, that the mind may act, whether in choosing or refusing, without motive; this is contrary to Dr. West himself.

The Doctor, in Part II,* resumes the question of acting or not acting, and mentions several cases, which he considers as instances of not acting; e. g. when of two objects one is chosen and the other not; when of the spots on a chess-board, A is touched and B not, etc. But not one of these is a better instance of not acting, than there always is, when any one thing is chosen and not another, or in preference to another. Suppose a man to offer a beggar a shilling and a guinea, of which he may have his choice, and he take the guinea; will it be said, that his leaving the shilling is an instance of not acting? Then we never do any thing, without at the same time not acting; i. e. while we do one thing, we omit many other things, which we might do. If this be what Dr. West means by not acting, it is readily granted; but it comes to little or nothing; it is a mere power to do some things and to refuse or omit some other things. This power is consistent with the most infallible connection between motives and volitions. Whenever under the influence of motives, we do some things, we certainly have a power to do those things, and to omit other things, which in fact we do not.

Dr. Clarke in his Remarks on Collins, p. 6, says, "All power of acting essentially implies, at the same time, *a power* of not acting: Otherwise it is not *acting*, but barely a *being acted upon* by that power, which causes the action." If he mean by *power*, *natural* or *physical* power, as before explained; and if by *not acting* he mean, *refusing* or *voluntary forbearing* to act in a certain proposed manner; I agree with Dr. Clarke. But if by *power* to act, he mean something opposed to moral necessity or inability, which is a previous certainty, that the action will or will not take place, in this case power to act will be a previous uncertainty, concerning the existence of the action. And in this sense of the words, the Doctor's proposition, that a "power of acting essentially implies a power of "not acting," will amount to this merely, that a previous uncertainty concerning the existence of an action, essentially implies a previous uncertainty concerning the non-existence of the same action; which is mere trifling. If the Doctor mean by *not acting*, entire inaction, I deny that a natural power to act implies a power to fall into entire inaction and torpitude. Nor does an uncertainty whether we shall act in any particular manner, imply an uncertainty whether we shall be perfectly inactive and torpid.

Dr. West, supposes *self-determination* is essential to liberty; but his account of self-determination is equally inexplicit, as his

* Pages 86 and 87.

account of liberty. "We use self-determination," says he, "not to signify, that self acts on self and produces volition; or that the mind some how determines to will; i. e. wills to will, or chooses to choose. But the sense in which we use self-determination is simply this, that we ourselves determine; i. e that we ourselves will or choose, that we ourselves act; i. e. that we are agents and not mere passive beings; or in other words, that we are the determiners in the active voice, and not the determined in the passive voice." * Now one would expect, that in all this profusion of words, in this variety of expression, with the help of three i. e.'s we should have a most clear and explicit account of self-determination. But the account is entirely inexplicit, and equally consistent with President Edwards' scheme of necessity, as with the opposite scheme. He holds, that we ourselves determine; but he does not hold, that we are the efficient causes of our own determinations. Nor can Dr. West consistently hold this; as this would imply, that our determinations or volitions are effects, which Dr. West denies. President Edwards holds, that we ourselves will or choose; that we ourselves act and are agents: But he does not hold, that we efficiently cause our own mental acts. Nor for the reason already given, can Dr. West consistently hold this. Besides, this would imply, that "self acts on self and produces "volition," or that "the mind some how determines to will;" i. e. "wills to will, or chooses to choose," which the Doctor renounces. President Edwards does not hold, that we are *mere* passive beings, unless this expression mean, that our volitions are the effects of some cause extrinsic to our wills.† If this be the meaning of it, he does hold it, and the believers in his system are ready to join issue with Dr. West, on this point. Though we hold that our volitions are the effects of some extrinsic cause, and that we are passive, as we are the subjects of the influence of that cause; yet we hold, that we are not *merely* passive; but that volition is in its own nature an act or action, and in the exercise of it we are active, though in the causation of it we are passive so far as to be the subjects of the influence of the efficient cause. This we concede; and let our opponents make the most of it. We fear not the consequence. In this sense we hold, "that we are determiners in the active voice, and not *merely* determined in the passive voice." We hold, that we are determiners in the active voice, in every sense which does not imply, that "self acts on self and produces volition; or that the

* Page 17.

† In causes extrinsic to the will I include both original and acquired taste, bias, propension, or whatever it be called.

mind some how wills to will, and chooses to choose," which Dr. West utterly denies; and "he entirely joins with Mr. Edwards in exploding the idea, that the will determines all the present acts of the will."

Though we are determiners in the active voice, and not *merely* determined in the passive voice; yet our determination may be the consequence of sufficient motive or the effect of some other extrinsic cause. We see, hear, feel, love and hate, in the active voice; yet we are or may be caused to see, hear, etc. And when we are caused to love or hate, we are indeed the subjects of the agency or influence of some cause extrinsic to our own will, and so far are passive. Still the immediate effect of this agency is our act, and in this act we are certainly active. So that we are not *merely* in the passive voice caused to love, but we also in the active voice *love*. Dr. West will not say, that because a man is influenced or persuaded by proper motives to the love of virtue, he does not love it at all in the active voice. Yet it is often said by men of his class, that if we be influenced to will or choose an object, it is no action at all. It is indeed no action in their sense of the word, as they mean by action *self-determination*. But instead of taking it for granted, that this is the true sense of the word *action*, they ought to show the reality and possibility of such an action, and remove the absurdities, which are said to be inseparable from it. To say, that we are self-determined or self-moved, because we ourselves determine and move, is as improper and groundless, as to say, that a body is self-moved and self-determined in its motion, because the body itself moves. Extrinsic causality is no more excluded in the one case than in the other.

The Doctor puts the case of his choosing coffee, when that, tea and chocolate, were offered him, and all appeared equally eligible; and says, "I believe, that it will be impossible in this and a multitude of similar instances, to assign any accident or circumstance, which determines the mind to its choice among things, which appear equally fit and eligible. Consequently here is an undeniable proof of the liberty for which we contend." The liberty for which he here contends, is a power to choose one of several equally eligible things. If by *power* he mean *natural* or *physical* power, I grant, that we have such a power to choose not only one of several things equally eligible, if any such there be, but one of things ever so unequally eligible, and to take the least eligible. A man may be under no involuntary restraint from taking an object ever so ineligible. But if by power to choose one of several equally eligible things, he mean a power opposed to moral necessity, it is a previous uncertainty which he will choose.

But there is in this case no more previous uncertainty in the nature of things and in the divine mind, than in any case whatever.

The Doctor denies, that "any accident or circumstance," or any extrinsic cause, "determines the mind to its choice among things which appear equally eligible." If this were granted, though it is not, what would follow? Doubtless either that the choice is determined and caused by the mind itself, or that it comes into existence without cause. But Dr. West cannot with consistency hold either of these. To hold that choice or volition is caused by the mind, is to hold, that it is an effect and has a cause, which Dr. West denies, and has written an essay to disprove it. It is also to hold, that "self acts on self and produces volition; or that the mind some how determines to will, i. e. wills to will or chooses to choose," and that "the will determines the present acts of the will; all which are denied by Dr. West. On the other hand, that volition comes into existence without cause, though this is maintained by the Doctor, in that he maintains, that "volition is no effect and has no cause;" yet it is also denied and renounced by him, in that he says, "We cannot be charged with holding, that events take place without cause."*

Again he says, "All who believe there is a Deity, must grant, that he has a self-determining power. For he being the first cause, his volitions cannot be determined by any cause antecedent or extrinsic to himself."† If by self-determining power here be meant, what Dr. West says he means *simply*, That the Deity himself has a power to determine; that he himself has a power to will or choose; we grant, that not only the Deity, but all intelligent beings have a self-determining power. All self-determining power according to this definition, is nothing but a power of will, which we all grant belongs to every intelligent and moral agent. Nor does this imply anything inconsistent with the idea, that the Deity and all other intelligent beings are governed by motives, in the only sense in which we hold government by motives; which is, that the Deity does everything which he does, because there is a motive to do it, arising from his own infinite wisdom and goodness. But if by self-determining power, be meant a power by which God produces volition in himself, by which "self acts on self and produces volition," we join with Dr. West in reprobating such a power. He expressly says, "The divine volitions are no effects produced by the Deity."‡ If anything else be meant, whenever Dr. West will inform us what it is, (as we cannot imagine any beside one or other of the fore-

* Page 27. † p. 19. ‡ p. 28.

mentioned senses) we will inform him, whether we allow or deny it, and will give our reasons.

As to the argument, that "The Deity being the first cause, his volitions cannot be determined by any cause antecedent or extrinsic to himself;" it may be answered, Still he may will as he does, because of motives and reasons arising from his own infinite wisdom and goodness. It may be further said, that the same argument, which Dr. West here uses to prove, that God determines himself, will prove, that God created himself. Thus, all who believe that there is a Deity, must grant, that he has a self-creating power and did create himself. For he being the first cause, his existence cannot be caused by anything antecedent or extrinsic to himself. But it no more follows from the consideration, that God's *volitions* were not caused by anything antecedent or extrinsic to God, that they were caused by God, than from the consideration, that his *existence* was not caused by anything antecedent or extrinsic to himself, it follows, that it was caused by himself. The truth is, the divine volitions were no more caused, whether by God himself or by any other cause, than the divine existence was. The divine volitions are the divine holiness uncreated and self-existent. And one attribute of God is not more caused or created, than all his attributes, or than his existence.

An exemption from extrinsic causality, in the acts of the mind, is essential to Dr. West's idea of liberty. Suppose then, that a free volition is one that comes into existence without any dependence on a cause extrinsic to the mind, which is the subject of that volition; the consequence is, that either such a volition is caused by the mind itself, and "self acts on self and produces volition;" or it is absolutely without cause, and comes into existence by mere chance; neither of which will Dr. West avow. Indeed he has already expressly disavowed them both. And if he either expressly, or by necessary implication, avows them both, that does not help the matter; to be inconsistent relieves no difficulty.

Liberty is by some writers distinguished into external and internal. Internal or the liberty of the mind, is the principal subject of the present inquiry; and this, as is implied in what has been said already, consists in the power or faculty of will. Every intelligent being who has this power, is free, or has internal liberty, and so long as he retains this power, cannot be divested of liberty. I am sensible, that our opponents suppose, that something further, viz. a self-determining power is necessary to liberty; and to this I shall particularly attend in the next chapter. As internal liberty consists in the very faculty of the will, so that

which is external consists in opportunity externally to execute our determinations and wishes. To define internal moral liberty to be "an opportunity and capacity of choosing and acting otherwise than the subject in fact does," is nothing distinguishing between the system of those who hold, that all moral actions are morally necessary, and that of those who deny it. "Opportunity and capacity of choosing otherwise," may mean mere *natural* power, as before explained. When Pharaoh chose to retain the Israelites, he was under no natural inability of choosing to let them go. Still it was a matter of previous absolute certainty, that he would for a time refuse to let them go, and it had been divinely foretold. If "opportunity and capacity of choosing otherwise, than the subject in fact does," mean anything inconsistent with the most absolute moral necessity, it must mean a previous uncertainty how he will choose. And if this be the meaning in the aforesaid definition of moral liberty; I deny that any man has in this sense opportunity to choose otherwise than he does. Every event and consequently every act of choice, is previously foreknown by God and therefore is previously certain; and to take it for granted, that any is previously to its existence, uncertain in the divine mind and in reality, is an intolerable begging of the question.

The following account has been given of liberty, as opposed to moral necessity: "I find I can abstain from any particular good; I can defer using it; I can prefer something else to it; I can hesitate in my choice; in short, I am my own master to choose, or which is the same thing, I am *free*." Perhaps this is as popular a representation of liberty and as agreeable to the ideas of those who are the most zealous advocates for liberty as opposed to moral necessity, as can be given. But all this is talking in the dark and confounding the subject by the use of ambiguous words; particularly the word *can*. To say, "I *can* abstain from any particular good," is the very same as to say, I have *power* to abstain, etc. But there are two senses to the words power and inability already noticed and explained. In one sense Pharaoh had power to let the Israelites go; he was under no *natural* inability in the case. Still there was an absolute previous certainty, that he would not for a time let them go. Therefore there was a moral necessity, that he should not let them go, and he was morally unable to let them go; and in this sense he was not free; it was not a matter of uncertainty whether he would let them go or not. This account of liberty reminds me of the argument, by which a certain man endeavored to convince his neighbor, that there were no divine absolute decrees. The argument was, that

having a child newly born, he felt himself at liberty to call it by what name he pleased, without regard to any divine decree. As if God had decreed, that he should call his child by a particular name, whether with or without his own consent.

Liberty or freedom must mean freedom from something. If it be a freedom from coaction or natural necessity, this is what we mean by freedom. The mind in volition is in its own nature free. But our opponents mean by freedom an exemption from all extrinsic causal influence, and from all previous certainty. And when they hold, that the mind causes its own volitions, they must, to be consistent, hold that it causes them contingently and without any previous certainty that it would cause them; and they must deny that the mind's causation of them is determined, fixed or limited by any cause whatever. For that the mind should cause them according to a previous establishment, would be as inconsistent with liberty, as that it should not cause them at all, as it implies an entire limitation of the mind in its operations.

The very inquiry, whether the mind in the exercise of the will, or as possessed of the power of will, be free, is apt to lead into error. It seems to imply, that freedom is something else than the power of the will. To inquire whether the mind as possessed of will be free, is to inquire whether the mind as possessed of freedom be free; or whether freedom be freedom.

Men in general have no other idea of freedom, than a power of will, or an exemption from coaction or natural necessity, as their language on the subject implies no more than this. With them to act *freely*, and to act *voluntarily* is the same thing, and they never once think of propagating one free act by an antecedent free act, or that in order to freedom it is requisite, that the acts of their wills should come to pass without cause and by mere chance. Nor do they once imagine, that in order to freedom, there must be no previous certainty what their acts will be; or that the divine foreknowledge or prediction is inconsistent with liberty.

Liberty in the sense of our opponents, is not possible or conceivable. By liberty they mean a power to cause all our own volitions, and to cause them freely. But that we should thus cause them, is neither possible nor conceivable. If we should thus cause a volition, we should doubtless cause it by a causal act. It is impossible, that we cause anything without a causal act. And as it is supposed, that we cause it freely, the causal act must be a *free* act, i. e. an act of the will or a volition. And as the supposition is, that all our volitions are caused by ourselves, the causal volition must be caused by another, and so on infinite-

ly; which is both impossible and inconceivable. It is no more possible or conceivable, that we should cause all our own volitions, than that all men should beget themselves.

Some have said that volition or voluntary exercise is *liberty*. It is undoubtedly a *free act* and liberty is a property of that act; but it is not more proper to call it *liberty* itself, than to call the apprehension of the equality between the three angles of a triangle and two rights, *intellect*, because it is an act of intellect. The flying of a bird at large in the open air is a *free act*, but not *liberty* itself.

Our opponents say, they plead for a *liberty in men to do as they please*. By this with respect to the mind, they must mean, either that the mind causes its own volitions, or that it acts voluntarily. As to the first, it has been in part considered already, and shall be further attended to in the next chapter. The last is no more than we all allow; and for our opponents to mean this only, is to give up the dispute.

It is generally if not universally granted by our opponents, that God is *necessarily holy*; and to be sure, the scripture assures us, that "he cannot lie," and "cannot deny himself." And Dr. West grants, that he is *perfectly holy*;* and that he is *immutable*.† Therefore he is *immutably* and *necessarily* holy. Yet he Doctor supposes God to possess a self-determining power. And although his *definition* of self-determination, as observed before, is not at all inconsistent with the necessity which we hold; yet it is manifest, that he supposes self-determination to be inconsistent with that necessity. And did he mean, in ascribing self-determination to the Deity, to ascribe something to him inconsistent with *immutable* and *necessary* holiness? Does he believe, that it is not *absolutely certain*, that God will forever continue to be holy? Yet absolute *certainty*, as I have often said, is all the necessity for which we plead. The Doctor therefore has fallen into a dilemma, or rather a trilemma, and he may make his choice, whether to concede, that there is no self-determination in God, and that therefore it is not necessary to liberty; or that self determination is not at all inconsistent with absolute moral necessity, and then he will give up the dispute; or to hold that God is not necessarily holy, and that he *can lie* and *can deny himself*. I wait for the Doctor's decision or explanation.

It is well known, that Dr. S. Clarke places liberty in self-determination or self-motion; and he holds, that "liberty in the highest and completest degree is in God himself;" and "that God is a most perfectly free agent;" yet he immediately adds,

* Page 38. † Ibid.

that "he *cannot but* do always what is best and wisest in the whole. The reason is evident; because perfect wisdom and goodness are as *steady* and *certain* principles of action, as *necessity* itself." Perfect wisdom and goodness therefore imply a *certainty* of action. But *certainty* is the *necessity* in question. How then can any liberty or self-determination inconsistent with absolute moral necessity, coexist in the Deity with that necessity? Thus the most able advocates for self-determination, and Dr. Clarke as much as any of them, are necessitated by their absurd and contradictory system, perpetually to contradict themselves.

Most of our opponents hold, that we are the efficient causes of our own volitions, and that in this our liberty consists. But Dr. West expressly denies this with regard to the Deity: "The divine volitions are no effects, either produced by the Deity, or by any extrinsic cause."* Indeed that volitions are no effects of any cause, is a favorite and principal doctrine of Dr. West. Therefore the self-determination which he ascribes to both God and man, produces no volition in either. What then does it? How does it contribute at all to liberty? In the Deity it is consistent with absolute moral necessity, as we have just seen; and what reason can be given, why it is not as consistent with the like necessity in man?

Or does liberty in God consist in a contingence or previous uncertainty of his volitions? This, it is presumed, will not be pretended; as it overthrows the divine immutability, and is directly contradictory to what our opponents, particularly Dr. Clarke and Dr. West, hold, of the *necessity* of God's moral perfections. And if liberty in God do not require such contingence and uncertainty, let a reason be given why it should in man. We deny, that causing our own volitions and acting by chance are either realities or possibilities; but if they were both possible and real; since they do not belong to the liberty of God, need we wish for any more liberty or higher kind of liberty and power, than God has? Or shall we vainly imagine, that we possess it?

Liberty is no *positive* existence. Existence or being is divided into *substance* and *mode*. But liberty is certainly no *substance*. Modes are divided into absolute or positive, and relative. Liberty, as it is a power, falls into the latter class; it is a relative mode. All powers are relations or relative modes. It is then, as I said, no *positive* existence.

I have long since thought, that this controversy concerning *liberty* and necessity, so long agitated, might be easily settled to

* Page 28.

mutual general satisfaction, if the disputants would but fully explain their own ideas of the subjects of the dispute. But till this is done, what prospect or possibility is there of settling it? Our opponents accuse us of denying the liberty of moral agents. Now the truth or falsehood of this charge depends on the ideas they affix to the word *liberty*. If by *liberty* be meant what Law in his notes on King,* defines it to be, "A certain physical indifference or indeterminateness in its own exercise;" then we do deny liberty. We deny that a man is or can be indifferent in the exercise of his liberty or his will. Or if by liberty be meant, an exemption from all previous certainty, so that it is a matter of uncertainty and mere chance, what our volitions are to be; in this sense also we deny liberty. Further, if by liberty be meant, an exemption from all extrinsic causality or influence, so that our volitions are efficiently caused by ourselves; this also we deny. But if by liberty be meant a power of willing and choosing, an exemption from coaction and natural necessity, and power, opportunity and advantage to execute our own choice; in this sense we hold liberty.

We wish our opponents to tell us with the same precision, what *they* mean by liberty and in what sense they contend for it. Unless they do this, it signifies nothing for them to tell us, that we deny all liberty, and that they are contending for liberty against necessity; and as Dr. West has done, to give such general and vague definitions of liberty, of self-determination, etc. as are perfectly consistent with our ideas of liberty and free action.

CHAPTER III.

OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

Liberty and self-determination are so blended by our opponents in this controversy, that it is impossible to write a chapter on one of these subjects, with proper attention to the sentiments of our opponents, without running into the other. Therefore in the last chapter I was necessitated to say many things concerning self-determination. Yet I wish to make some further observations on the same subject.

* Page 248.

All our opponents agree, that self-determination is essential to liberty. Let us first attend to what Dr. West says on this subject; then we shall make some remarks on what Dr. Clarke and others have said.

Dr. West tells us, that "determining, when we apply it to the active faculty, is the same with volition." * And "the sense in which we use *self-determination* is simply this, that we ourselves determine; i. e. that we ourselves will or choose." Now I cannot believe, that Dr. West imagined, that President Edwards or any of his followers, would deny, that we ourselves determine, will and choose. We doubtless will and choose as really as we think, see, hear, feel, etc. But who or what is the efficient cause in either case, remains to be considered. To say, that we are determiners in the active voice, and not the determiners in the passive voice, gives no satisfaction. We grant that we are determiners in the active; and yet assert, that we are determined, or are caused to determine, by some extrinsic cause, at the same time, and with respect to the same act. As when a man hears a sound, he is the hearer in the active voice, and yet is caused to hear the same sound, by something extrinsic to himself. It will not be pretended, that a man is the efficient cause of his own hearing, in every instance in which he hears in the active voice.

Though Dr. West in general maintains, and has written an essay to prove, that volition is no effect and has no cause; yet he sometimes forgets himself and falls in with the generality of the defenders of the self-determining power, who hold, that the mind is the efficient cause of its own volitions. He everywhere maintains, that volition is not the effect of an *extrinsic* cause? Why does he express himself thus, if he do not suppose it to be the effect of an *intrinsic* cause? The expression implies this. This is not all. He puts the question whether the mind in choosing or acting, do not modify itself?" which he answers in the affirmative, and says, that this "modification is the effect of the mind willing or choosing."† The mind then in willing modifies itself, i. e. brings itself into the mode of willing. This mode then is volition; and this volition is the effect of the mind willing, or the effect of volition. So that Dr. West here, in direct contradiction to his general doctrine, asserts, agreeably to Dr. Clarke and most writers of his class, that volition is an effect and has a cause; is the effect of the mind whose volition it is, and is the effect of the mind willing or of a volition of that mind. Agreeably to this he says, "No agent can bring any effects to pass, but what are *consequent* upon his acting; i. e. that all effects are

* Pages 16, 17. † p. 24.

in consequence of the activeness or operativeness of some being."* And again, "No being can become a cause, i. e. an efficient, or that which produces an effect, but by FIRST *operating*, *acting* or *energising*:"† And in the same page, "Volition, when used intelligibly — is really an efficient cause." Volition then is an efficient cause, and an efficient cause of a modification of the mind, which is another volition, and this by *first* operating, acting or energising: And doubtless this operation, act or energising is a volition. So that here we have three volitions in train, all necessary to the existence of one volition and of every volition. The *first* volition is an efficient cause of a *second*, called by Dr. West a modification of the mind; and it produces this effect by a *third* volition, which is the *operation*, *act*, or *energising of the first*. What is this, but "self acting on self and producing volition," and this by the instrumentality of an intermediate volition. Dr. West cannot consistently deny any of these absurdities of his scheme. He cannot say, that one volition, as an efficient cause, does not produce a second; as he holds, that "the mind in willing modifies itself." But according to him volition is the mind willing. He also holds, that the said "modification is the effect of the mind willing;" i. e. by his own definition, the effect of volition; volition then is the *efficient cause* of the said modification. That this modification is volition he will not deny. Then we have one volition as an efficient cause, producing another volition as its effect. But he grants that "no being can produce an effect, but by *first*, *acting* or *energising*." This gives us the intermediate volition.

It has been long since charged on the advocates for self-determination, that their doctrine involves the absurdity of one volition before every volition, and even before the first. But Dr. West has made improvement in the scheme. He has taught us, that self-determination implies *two volitions* before every volition and before the *first*.

That volition is produced by the mind, as the efficient cause, is implied, however inconsistently with himself, in various other passages of Dr. West's books; as, "If volition or internal action be the effect of an extrinsic cause, our reflections could never afford us an example of an efficient cause." "As we are rational beings, it follows, that our volitions are not the effects of an *extrinsic* cause, but that we are *self-determined*." "Conscious, that we ourselves are the determiners and not the determined—we have the idea of our independence in willing and choosing."‡ Our volition must either be the effect of an extrin-

* Page 28. † p. 22. ‡ p. 25.

sic cause, or of an intrinsic one, or it must happen without cause. If it happen without cause, our reflections could no more afford us an example of an efficient cause, than they would on the supposition, that it is the effect of an extrinsic cause. So that the Doctor's argument necessarily implies, that volition is produced by the mind as the efficient cause. In the second quotation above, he speaks of our being self-determined, as in direct opposition to our volitions being effects of an extrinsic cause. But there is no such opposition unless by our being self-determined be meant, that our volitions are the effects of an intrinsic cause. If self-determination here mean no more than that we are the *subjects* of a determination, or that we ourselves determine, as we ourselves think, feel, etc., this may be, and yet that determination may be the effect of an extrinsic cause. So that there appears to be no meaning in this passage, unless, in direct contradiction to what Dr. West elsewhere holds, it mean, that our volitions are *effects* and have an *efficient cause;* that this cause is our own mind; and this efficient cause, as the Doctor declares all efficient causes do, produces its effect, "by *first* operating, acting or energising;" and thus self would act "on self and produce volition," by an efficient operation. Again; if we were "conscious, that we ourselves are the determiners, and not the determined," we should thence derive no "idea of our independence in willing and choosing," if our willing and choosing either were the effect of an extrinsic cause, or happened without cause; or unless we were the efficient causes of our own willing and choosing.

Though all this is abundantly denied and renounced by Dr. West, as appears by quotations already made; yet it is the real ground-work of his book, and the only ground on which he could consistently oppose the doctrine of moral necessity and extrinsic causality of volitions. And this is the common doctrine of the advocates for self-determination. Thus Dr. Clarke, in Papers between him and Leibnitz, tells us, "The true and only question concerning liberty, is, whether the immediate physical cause or principle of action be indeed in him, whom we call the agent; or whether it be some other reason sufficient, which is the real cause of the action, by operating upon the agent and making him to be, not the agent but a mere patient."* I understand the Doctor by physical cause, to mean efficient, producing cause; otherwise it is not to the purpose.

Dr. Chauncy is still more explicit. "Self-determination," he

* Page 28.

says, "*gives rise* to our volitions—and is the cause of them."* And again, "A power in man, that subjects "*his volitions to his command*, is the only bottom, upon which agency can be founded."† And in the next page he says, the same power "constitutes us agents, or beings that are *efficiently the causes* of their own volitions."

Now this self-determination, which "gives rise to our volitions," and in which we are "the efficient causes of our own volitions," is a determination or act either of the will, or of some other faculty. If it be an act of the will, it is a volition. So that here we have one volition caused by another; and as the doctrine is, that all our volitions are the effect of self-determination, they are all the effect of volition, the causing act the effect of a preceding act, and the first the effect of one before that. This absurdity attending the scheme of self-determination, has been long since pointed out; nor have the advocates of that scheme been able to show, that their scheme does not really labor under that absurdity, if by that self-determination, which is the cause of volition, they mean an act of the will.

But if this self-determination be an act of the understanding; then it seems, that the will or mind willing, is influenced to volition by a dictate of the understanding, or by a motive. Then we are at once involved in what is so hideous to Dr. West, and all other believers in self-determination, the government by motives and the moral necessity implied in it. Also, our volitions are determined by extrinsic causes and we are the passive subjects of the operation of those causes.

Or if we suppose the determining act to proceed from any other faculty, if other there be, the difficulty will remain. Dr. West holds, "that there are three essential faculties of the mind, which ought always to be considered distinctly; and these are *perception*, *propension*, and *will*;" and that "the last only is properly the active faculty." Then doubtless that self-determination, which is an *action*, and which gives rise to volition, is an act of this active faculty. In this case we have will putting forth self-determination, in order to give rise to volition; as we had before volition as an efficient cause, first operating, acting or energising, in order to produce the effect volition. As the will is, according to the Doctor, "the only active faculty," he will not pretend, that volition produced by self-determination, is the effect of either of the other two faculties, as he reckons them, perception and propension. If he should say, that it is the effect of *perception*; this it seems is a passive faculty; and then self-determination and all

* Benevolence of the Deity, p. 128. † Ibid. p. 129.

volition are the effects of a passive faculty and of passion, of which alone that faculty is by the terms capable; and therefore, it seems, self-determination and volition must themselves be passions or mere impressions, and we are passive in them. Besides, perception considered as a faculty, as Dr. West singularly considers it, appears to be nothing else, than intellect or the power of understanding. And if self-determination proceed from this, the consequence is, that the will is governed by the understanding and by the dictates and motives which it suggests; which brings us where we were before, into the midst of necessity. The same consequence will follow, if we suppose, that self-determination proceed from *perception* in the common sense of the word, meaning *an act* of the understanding. If Dr. West say, that self-determination proceeds from *propension;* then he entirely coincides with President Edwards, who ascribes a great part of our volitions to disposition, inclination, passion and habit, meaning certain biases of the mind distinct from volition and prior to it. Besides; as propension is according to the Doctor a passive faculty, if volition and self-determination proceed from this they are passions or impressions, they proceed from an extrinsic cause and we are passive in them.

The causing of one act of volition by another is attended with this absurdity also, it supposes the causing act in this case to be distinct from the act caused; when in reality they coalesce and are one and the same. For instance, to choose to have a choice of virtue, is nothing but a choice of virtue; to choose the choice of an apple, is to choose an apple; so that we have the volition before we have it, and in order that we may have it.

Some, sensible of the absurdity of supposing, that the mind determines one volition by another, as this runs into an infinite series of volitions, and implies that there is volition before the first volition, have renounced this idea of self-determination. Among these we may reckon Dr. West. But at the same time he gives up self-determination in every sense in which we dispute it, and in every sense inconsistent with the most absolute moral necessity. This has been already illustrated. Others, to avoid the same difficulty express themselves differently. They profess to mean, that volition is caused not by a preceding volition, but by *the man* or *the mind*, whose volition it is. But this gives no satisfaction. Supposing it should be said, that a certain carpenter himself was the efficient cause or builder of such a ship; and it should be thence inferred, that he built it by working, laboring or exerting himself to the end of building the ship; would not this be a natural and a necessary inference? Would not the

man, who should assert, that the carpenter did indeed himself immediately build the ship, but not by any labor or exertion, whether of body or mind, be universally considered as talking absurdly and contradictorily? And does not the man talk as absurdly and contradictorily, who asserts, that a man is the efficient cause of his own volition, yet puts forth no exertion, in order to cause it? If any other way of efficiently causing an effect, than by act or exertion previous to the effect, be possible or conceivable, let it be pointed out. Till this be done, we who conceive such a way to be impossible and inconceivable, have a right to say so, and to presume, that our opponents, who assert that there is such a way, are unable to point it out, and have no more idea of it than we have. If upon trial, they shall find, that they are unable to point out the way, let them honestly confess, that all they mean by self-determination is what we and all allow, that they are the *subjects* of volition, and as Dr. West expresses it, that *they themselves will and choose.*

I perfectly agree with Dr. West when he says, "No being can become an efficient cause, but by FIRST *operating*, *acting* or *energising*."* Operation, act or energising is as much presupposed in order to an effect, as an efficient cause is presupposed in order to it. To suppose an efficient cause to produce an effect without any act by which he produces it, is the same as to suppose the same cause produces the effect without any *efficiency*. It is as absurd, as it would be to suppose, that Dr. West wrote his essays without any exertion in order to the production of them, or that God created the world, without any creating act. If this be not true, let the falsehood of it be made to appear. Let any man show, that an effect cannot as well come to pass without an efficient cause, as without a causing act; and that the world could not as well have come into existence without a Creator, as without a creating act.

Some of the advocates for self-determination hold, that the mind is the efficient cause of its own volitions, yet not by any *act* or *exertion* of the mind, but by the *power* or *faculty* of the will. And how can this power or faculty produce volition, unless it be exerted *first* in order to the effect? The man, who is the subject of a certain volition, had the power of will long since; yet it never produced that volition, we may suppose till this moment. What is the cause or reason, that it produces it now and not before? To say, it does it, because it will, is to say either, that this volition is produced by another preceding, which runs into the infinite series; or that the power of will, or rather the

* Page 22.

man in the exercise of that power, is the subject of volition, because he is the subject of it, which is mere trifling. On the whole the existence of a power of will in a man, will no more account for any particular volition, of which he is the subject, than the existence of the *man* will account for the same volition, or the existence of a ship-carpenter will account for the building of a certain ship; or than Dr. West's having a power to write essays of Liberty and Necessity, will account for his actually writing them at the precise time, at which he did write them, or than his having an ear will account for his hearing a particular sound at a certain time.

That we have a power of will or of determining is granted on all hands; but that we should efficiently cause our power of will, to put forth a volition, without exerting any efficiency to this effect; only wants proof to make it credible, and explanation to make it intelligible or conceivable. Merely the circumstance, that we have a power to will and determine, no more proves, that without motive or any influence from without; and without any causing act within, we cause that power to exert itself; than the circumstance, that we have a power of hearing proves, that without any pulsation in the air, any causation from without or from within, we cause ourselves to hear a particular sound.

Some others, as well as Dr. West, have denied, that by self-determination they mean the causing of one act of the will by another. We have no objection to their denying this; but then we wish them to inform us explicitly, what they do mean. If they have any meaning they doubtless can express it intelligibly; and so long as they do not express a meaning different from what we mean by willing or choosing; and so long as their definitions of self-determination express, either bare volition, or the causing of one volition by another, though they insist, that they mean something different from either of these; I leave the reader to judge, whether they have any clear meaning to that word at all.

In conversation once with a gentleman of eminence among the advocates for self-determination, he told me, that President Edwards had abused those who write in favor of self-determination, in representing them as holding, that the mind causes one act of volition by another. On my inquiring of the gentleman what then they did mean; his answer was, "They mean, that in determining the mind determines." Whether this answer at all explained the matter; or whether it convey any other idea, than that *the mind does determine, and has a volition*, without touching the question concerning the cause, extrinsic or intrinsic; I submit to the reader. If a man should say, that in

walking, he walks; in writing he writes; in hearing he hears; it is presumed, that no man could certainly hence conclude, that the speaker meant, that he was not influenced to walk or write, by motive or by some extrinsic cause; or that his hearing was self-determined.

If we cause our own volitions at all, we cause them either by a previous volition, or without such volition. If we cause them by a previous volition, this is what I have been particularly considering, and shall say no more upon it. If we cause them without such volition, we cause them involuntarily, without any design, any motive or agency. Now I wish it may be inquired, whether such a causation of volition as this, if it be possible or conceivable, as I contend it is not, be at all more favorable to liberty, than that volition should proceed from the influence of motive or some other extrinsic cause; and whether it would be any advantage or privilege in any respect; and whether it would not be a great disadvantage and calamity to mankind, and an insupportable incumbrance on the influence of reason, revelation, virtue, duty and happiness both here and hereafter. For whatever any of these may dictate, and with whatever motives they enforce those dictates; whatever virtue and our own happiness may require; since the self-determining power is not influenced by these or any other motives; and since, as Dr. Clarke says, "There is no connection at all between the perception of the understanding and the exertion of the active faculty;" all those dictates and motives would be in vain; the self-determining power is a sovereign, ungovernable principle, perfectly deaf and unmoved by any motive, reason, argument or representation whether of duty or interest. It therefore destroys the very use not only of our reason, of revelation and of the motives of both; but of our affections, passions, appetites and senses, in every part of our conduct as moral agents. For so far as we are influenced by any of these, we are not self-determined, and therefore, according to our opponents, we are incapable of moral action; and especially are we not self-determined in the sense now particularly under consideration; causing our own volitions involuntarily and without a previous volition.

Self-determination uninfluenced by motive, is inconsistent with all religion and morality and with all virtue and vice. To love God without motive, principle, aim or end, is no religion. To love and do good to mankind in like manner, is no virtue. To hate God or mankind in like manner, is no irreligion or vice. Just so as to stealing, robbing, killing, etc.

The self-determining power is, as I said, an ungovernable

principle. It not only cannot be governed by reason, revelation, etc.; but not by any laws human or divine; for these are only motives. Nay, it cannot be governed by God, his providence or his grace. To be governed by either of these would be to be governed by an extrinsic cause, and under such government men would be passive. If God in his providence govern and control them and their actions, they are limited, and act only by permission, and have no power to act or not act, no liberty to either side, but are confined to one side. Where then is self-determination? On the other hand, if men determine and control all their own actions, none of their actions are controlled by God.

Dr. Reid, a late strenuous advocate for self-determination says, "The name of a cause and of an agent, is properly given to that being only, which by its active power, produces some change in itself, or in some other being. The change, whether it be of thought, of will, or of motion, is the effect. Active power therefore is a quality in the cause, which enables it to produce the effect. And the *exertion of that active power* in producing the effect, is called action, agency, efficiency. In order to the production of any effect, there must be in the cause, *not only power*, but the *exertion* of that power. For power that is not exerted produces no effect."* Therefore if we be the efficient causes of our own volitions, as Dr. Clarke, Dr. Chauncy, etc. held, we must not only have *a power* to produce them, but there must be an *exertion* of power in order to the production of volition. This exertion is doubtless an exertion of the will. Thus we run into the infinite series several times mentioned. And however others attempt to evade the absurdities of this infinite series, Dr. Reid and his followers must fall into them.

"All our power," says Dr. Reid,† "is directed by our will; we can form no conception of power, properly so called, that is not under the direction of our will." Then we have no power to direct or determine our will, unless we go round in a circle. If our will direct *all* our power, as the Doctor asserts; and our self-determining power direct and determine our will, then we go round in a circle, our will directing all our power, and our self-determining power directing our will. Glorious liberty this! And this must be an age of glorious improvement and illumination, or we should never have made such discoveries as these! Yet Dr. Reid had great reason to say, that all our power is directed by our will, otherwise some of our power might act involuntarily and our self-determining power (if we have any) might direct and govern us without our consent; with which Dr. Reid's

* Essays on the Active Powers, p. 259. † Page 299.

scheme would very ill agree. Still the Doctor in this gives up a point, which he had before positively asserted and had labored hard to establish, "that if the will be not, nothing else is, in our power."* Now if the will be in our power, it is under our direction, or is directed by our power. So that we have the circle complete; all "our power is directed by our will;" and yet our will is directed by our power. Into what glaring inconsistences will not men run, rather than give up a favorite and indefensible hypothesis! Yet they are so blinded by their attachment to that hypothesis, that they see no inconsistency attending it. The truth is, that both these principles, *that all our power is directed by our will;* and that *our will is directed by our self-determining power*, are essential to the Doctor's scheme, and to the scheme of all who hold a self-determining power. To reconcile these two principles deeply concerns them. But they have never yet been able to do it; nor, it is presumed, ever will be able.

Some of the writers in favor of self-determination seem to be sensible of the *mystery* in it; particularly Dr. Chauncy. "It is readily allowed," says he, "liberty in man, in opposition to necessity, is one of *the great wonders of God.* The power in our nature, that constitutes us free agents, is an *amazing* contrivance of infinite wisdom. The modus of its operation is *too great a deep* for us to fathom. It has *tried* and *puzzled* the greatest geniuses in all parts of the world." † No wonder then, that nobody has ever been able to give a consistent or intelligible account of this power. So long as those who believe in it, are puzzled with it, we may expect, that their accounts of it will be confused, unintelligible, and contradictory. But the account of no one of them appears to be more contradictory than that of Dr. West. He gives up the idea of Dr. Clarke and Dr. Chauncy, that the mind is the efficient cause of its own volitions; yet he falls into the same, in holding, that the mind in willing modifies itself, and that this modification is *the effect* of the mind willing;‡ and that we are independent in willing.§ He holds that volition has no cause; yet holds, that the modification made of the mind by itself in willing, is *the effect* of the mind willing. He holds that volitions have no cause; yet denies, that he can be justly charged with holding, that events take place without a cause.‖ Surely the Doctor can never expect, that his unbiased readers will receive his system, until he shall have removed these inconsistences.

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* Page 258. † Benevolence of the Deity, p. 135.

‡ Page 24. § p. 25. ‖ p. 27.

Archbishop King is grossly inconsistent with himself, in holding, that the will determines itself to choose certain objects, without the influence of motive or any cause out of the will; and yet holding, that the will is determined to choose those objects, because of the pleasure which will be in consequence of that choice.* In such a case the will is as much determined by motive, as if a man were determined to go to a debauch, in the prospect of the sensual pleasure, which he expected there.

Dr. West says, "Every effect is wholly passive with regard to the cause, which produces it."† And this equally holds, whether the cause be extrinsic or intrinsic. "Consequently, if human volition be an effect" even of an intrinsic cause, "the man must be passive in willing. But if man be passive in willing, he can be active in nothing else; i. e. he is no agent, but a mere passive machine." What then is the great advantage, which the advocates for self-determining power and the intrinsic causation of volition, would gain, could they establish their favorite doctrine? According to their own scheme, every volition would be an *effect*, a *passive* effect, and "man must be passive in willing. But if man be passive in willing, he can be active in nothing else; i. e. he is no agent, but a mere passive machine."‡ More than this cannot be said on this head, if we suppose volition to be the effect of an *extrinsic* cause. Therefore they are grossly inconsistent with themselves in rejecting one of two hypotheses, on account of supposed absurdities, which equally attend the other, and yet retaining that other.

Although Dr. Clarke and others assert, that the true and only question concerning liberty, is, whether we be the efficient causes of our own volitions; yet they themselves would not abide by this concession. For if it were previously fixed and established, what particular volitions we should efficiently cause in ourselves, this would be as inconsistent with their ideas of liberty, as the supposition, that they are produced by an extrinsic cause. Gentlemen of that class universally hold, that absolute decrees are inconsistent with liberty, because they establish the actions decreed. Therefore if God have decreed that we ourselves shall efficiently cause such and such volitions in our own minds; this as effectually establishes and secures the existence of those volitions, as if he had decreed, that they should be effected by any other cause. Therefore not only does their idea of liberty require self-determination, but it equally requires perfect previous uncertainty and chance, and an entire exemption from all rule,

* Law's edition, p. 276. † p. 23. ‡ Ibid.

limitation or confinement, so that the mind not only produces its own volitions; but produces them at random and by mere chance, without the influence of motive and without any previous certainty, what particular acts it shall produce, and whether any. Thus according to them self-determination is acting by chance and becoming the subject of volitions without any proper cause at all. For a cause that acts by chance and stupidly, without motive or design, is no proper efficient cause at all.

Dr. West says, "We have set aside the notion, that the will determines all the present acts of the will. For we entirely join with Mr. Edwards in exploding that idea."* What mystery there may be couched under the *will*, I will not pretend to say. But as he "entirely agrees with Mr. Edwards, in exploding that idea," Dr. West must hold not only, that the will as a distinct power of the mind does not determine the present acts of the will; but that the *mind* in the exercise of the power of will, does not determine those acts. For this is equally exploded by Mr. Edwards, as the other. The Doctor says, that "the will does not determine *all* the *present* acts of the will." But does it determine *any* of the acts of the will, whether *present*, *past* or *future*? As he agrees in this particular with Mr. Edwards, he must answer in the negative. All *past* acts of the will were once present; and when they were present Dr. West denies, that the will determined them; and he will not say, that the will determines them now that they are past. Also all future acts of the will erelong will be present; and when they shall be present, they will not, according to Dr. West's concession, be determined by the will. Therefore he will not say, that they are determined by the will now, before they come into existence. Doubtless by whatever they are determined, they are determined by it at the very instant of their coming into existence. No cause produces an effect, at a time before or after the existence of that effect. Therefore by this concession of Dr. West it seems he holds, that no volition, past, present or future is determined by the will, or by the mind in the exercise of the will. Yet Dr. West strenuously pleads for a self-determining power. But what good purpose does this power answer, since it determines no act of will? It seems it is a very innocent and harmless thing, because it is very inefficacious and dormant, doing neither good nor hurt.

Dr. Clarke, in papers between Leibnitz and himself, grants, that "nothing *is*, without a sufficient reason why it is, rather than not; and why it is *thus*, rather than otherwise. But" says, that "in things in their own nature indifferent, *mere will*, with-

* Page 17.

out anything external to influence it, is alone that sufficient reason."* By *will* the Doctor must mean either an *act* of volition, or the *power* of the will. If he mean that the former is the reason or ground of our acts of the will, he runs into the infinite series. If he mean the latter it is as absurd as to say, The ability of Dr. Clarke, to write his replies to Leibnitz, was *alone* the sufficient reason why he wrote them.

Dr. Price in his correspondence with Dr. Priestly, says, "It cannot be justly said, that self-determination implies an effect without a cause. Does it follow, that because I am myself the cause, there is no cause?"† To this I answer, that though it does indeed not follow, that because I am myself the cause of a volition, there is no cause; as it is taken for granted, that there is a cause, and that I am that cause; yet from the supposition, that volition is not the effect of a cause extrinsic to the mind in which it takes place, it will follow, that there is no cause of it; because it is absolutely impossible, that the mind itself should be the cause of it. The impossibility of this has been already stated in the preceding discourse, and more largely illustrated by other writers. And if any man will show the possibility of the mind's causing its own volitions, and will remove the absurdities attending that supposition; *erit mihi Magnus Apollo.* It will then and not till then, be incumbent on us to speak of self-determination in a very different strain.

In fine, those who plead for a self-determining power, either mean what Dr. West declares he means, that we ourselves determine whenever we do determine; which is no part of the subject of this controversy, is disputed by none and is nothing opposite to moral necessity, extrinsic causality of volition, etc. but amounts to this merely, that we are the subjects of volition. Or they mean, that we are the efficient causes of our own volitions. But these men seem never to have reflected so far on the subject, as to see, that this idea of self-determination runs into what has been so often charged upon them, an infinite series of volitions causing one another; and therefore when this difficulty is suggested to them, they are either silenced and have nothing to answer, or else answer in such a manner as to show, that by efficiently causing our own volitions they mean merely what Dr. West professes to mean, that we *will* or are the subjects of volition, which no more implies that we cause them, than that we cause all our own perceptions and feelings follows from our being the subjects of them.

"I take it to be an important truth," says the Doctor, "that

* Page 73. † p. 136.

wherever necessity begins, liberty ends; and that a necessary agent is a contradiction."* What a pity, that the Doctor should undertake the defence of a proposition, which he is necessitated perpetually to beg! Or if he be not necessitated to beg it, what a pity that he should do it without necessity! He knows or ought to have known, that this which he here takes for granted, is not conceded; that President Edwards and all his followers hold, that the most absolute moral necessity is consistent with perfect liberty, and that an agent acting under moral necessity, is so far from a contradiction, that neither God nor creature is or can be any other agent. If Dr. West should say, that a necessary agent is a contradiction according to *his idea* of agent, i. e. a self-determinate agent or one acting by chance, be it so; he ought to prove, and not assume, that his idea is possible and according to truth.

"When a man considers," says Dr. West, "that he is not moved by any extrinsic cause to do evil, but that his wickedness has *originated wholly from himself*, he must feel himself exceedingly vile and unworthy of any divine favor."† This is talking altogether in the clouds. What does he mean by wickedness originated from a man's self? He cannot consistently mean that "self acts on self and produces wickedness;" for this he rejects as absurd. If he mean, that a man is himself the subject of wickedness, wicked volitions or actions; this is granted; but it is not at all opposed to his being moved by an extrinsic cause to that wickedness, any more than a man's being the subject of pain is inconsistent with the pain's being effected by an extrinsic cause. If there be any sense beside these two, in which wickedness can be originated from a man's self, let it be pointed out.

"If men have an existence distinct from Deity," says the Doctor, "endowed with a consciousness distinct from Deity, then they have a self-active principle distinct from Deity; i. e. they have a self-determining power."‡ That men have an existence and consciousness distinct from Deity, is granted; but that it thence follows, that they have a self-determining power, if by that be meant anything distinct from a faculty of will influenced by extrinsic motives and causes, is not granted, and ought not to have been taken for granted, nor asserted without proof. From the same premises it would follow, that brutes have a self-determining power; which is not generally allowed by the advocates for that power. For brutes have both an existence and a consciousness distinct from the Deity.

"He that cannot govern his own mind; but is constantly de-

* Part II. p. 19. † Part II. p. 23. ‡ Part II. p. 24.

termined by an extrinsic cause, is certainly the subject of mere chance and accident."* Indeed! and is the planetary system the subject of mere chance and accident? The material world cannot govern itself, yet not a hair of our head escapes the notice or the disposal of our heavenly Father. Surely the Doctor asserted this without consideration.

"Our doctrine of self-determination implying, that when the mind acts, it always has an object in view, and that there is always a reason for acting, is as fully consistent with our being the subjects of commands and promises, prohibitions and threatenings, and establishes as sure a connection between means and ends, as he" [President Edwards] "can suppose to arise from the doctrine of Necessity."† Yet the Doctor's doctrine is, "that men are not always governed by the strongest motive," and that there is no sure connection between motives and action.‡ Now the Doctor is speaking of the means and ends of moral agents and moral actions; and particularly of commands and promises, prohibitions and threatenings, considered as motives and means of action. And does that doctrine which teaches that there is no sure connection between the strongest motive, or even any motives, whether stronger or weaker, and action, establish as sure a connection between such means and their ends, which are moral actions, as that doctrine which teaches, that there is a sure and infallible connection between such means and their ends? Is it not surprising, that the Doctor should assert such a thing?

He tells us, "That he holds no such kind of self-determination, as a power to act without and against every kind of reason or argument."§ But he does hold a power to act without and against the *strongest* reasons and arguments. Therefore he ought much more to hold a power to act without and against the weaker; and consequently a power to act without and against every kind of reason and argument. Nay, the Doctor does expressly hold a power to *resist* all motives, reasons and arguments, and a power to remain *inactive* notwithstanding the solicitations of them all. And is it not strange, that he who possesses a power to resist and remain inactive, without and against every kind of reason and argument; has not also a power to resist them in acting against them?

* Part II. p. 28. † Part II. p. 29. ‡ Part II. p. 6. § Part II. p. 29.

CHAPTER IV.

OF MOTIVES AND THEIR INFLUENCE.

Dr. West has given his definition of a motive: "It is the occasion, reason, end or design, which an agent has in view, when he acts."* And he grants, that the mind acts upon motives; i. e. when the mind acts or chooses, it always has some end, design or reason, which is the occasion of its acting or choosing. Therefore motives, in our sense of the term, are the previous circumstances, which are necessary for action."† And again, he says, "Action *cannot* take place without some object, reason or motive; and the motive or reason for acting *must be prior* to the action of the mind, and be *perceived* by it, before it *can act*."‡ "Nothing *can* become an object of choice, except it appears to be eligible."§ Yet he maintains, "that there is no infallible connection between motive and action;" and that "when motives have done all that they can do, the mind may act or not act." The reason which he assigns for this, is, "that though the mind never acts without some reason or design in acting; yet there is no need of assigning a reason for *not acting*."‖ If by *acting or not acting* he mean a voluntary acting or not acting, or a choosing or refusing of the motives presented; it is to be observed, as I have already observed, that refusing is as real an action as choosing; and a voluntary not acting is a *voluntary* refusal to act and to comply with the motives proposed, and is as real a volition as any other; and therefore by his own concession, "motive is necessary to it," equally necessary as for any other volition or action. Or if by *not acting* Dr. West mean no act of either choosing or refusing, but a perfect inaction; then what he says, will come to this, That when motives are proposed, the mind may choose to comply with them, or it may refuse to comply with them, or it may do neither. But the impossibility of this I endeavored to illustrate in the second chapter, and shall say no more on it at present.

But if it were possible, that on the proposal of motives, the mind should *not act at all;* how would it follow, as Dr. West says, that there is no infallible connection between motive and *action?* It is granted by Dr. West that motive is necessary to every action, whether of choice or refusal; and to say as the Doctor does, that it is not necessary for *not acting*, amounts to

* Page 17. † Ibid. ‡ Part II. p. 93. § Part II. p. 95. ‖ pp. 17, 18.

this merely, that it is not necessary for involuntary, blockish inaction or torpitude. By infallible connection we mean no more than constant invariable connection, so that whenever the mind acts, whether in choice or refusal, it is under the persuasive influence of some motive which, as Dr. West grants, "is the reason and occasion of its acting," and "a circumstance necessary for action." We pretend not but that the man, when motives are presented, may possibly fall into a swoon or other state of involuntary stupidity. If this should be the case, it would be nothing to the present purpose. For the question before us is, whether volition be or be not in all cases according to motive in the large sense of President Edwards, including reasons, and external objects, with the taste and bias of the mind. This is what is meant by a determination by motive. Let what will be the cause of involuntary and torpid inaction; so long as it is granted, as Dr. West does grant, that motive is necessary to volition, and that every volition, whether choice or refusal, is occasioned by motive, and never exists without it, everything is granted on this head, for which we contend.

Dr. West says, "We cannot agree with Mr. Edwards in his assertion, that motive is the *cause* of volition."* Mr. Edwards has very particularly informed us in what sense he uses the word *cause*. Thus, "I sometimes use the word cause in this *Inquiry*, to signify *any antecedent* either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an event, either a thing or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground and reason, either in whole or in part, why it is rather than not; or why it is as it is rather than otherwise. Or in other words, any antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason why the proposition, which affirms that event, is true; whether it has any positive influence or not."† Now, does Dr. West deny, that motive is an antecedent, on which volition either in whole or part depends? Or that it is a ground or reason, either in whole or part, either by positive influence or not, why it is rather than not? Surely he cannot with consistence deny this, since he does say, "By motive we understand the *occasion*, *reason*, end or design, which an agent has in view, when he acts;" and that motives are the *previous* "circumstances, which are *necessary* for action?" Surely a previous circumstance, which is necessary for action or volition, is an "antecedent on which volition depends;" and "a reason which an agent has in view, when he acts," and "a reason which is the occasion of his acting," "is a reason either in whole or part, why the ac-

* Page 17. † p. 41.

tion is." So that however desirous Dr. West may be, to be thought to differ, in this point, from President Edwards, it appears, that he most exactly agrees with him. Yet he says, "Mr. Edwards, by making motives the *cause* of acts of the will, and by declaring, that the existence of the acts of the will is the effect of their motives, appears full as unintelligible *to me*, as Chubb could possibly appear to him."* But as it appears, that President Edwards has explained himself to mean by *cause* no other than *occasion*, *reason* or *previous circumstance necessary for volition;* and that in this Dr. West entirely agrees with him; if President Edwards appear absurd to Dr. West, Dr. West must appear absurd to himself, even as absurd as Chubb could possibly appear to President Edwards.

I do not pretend, that motives are the *efficient* causes of volition. If any expression importing this, have dropped from any defender of the connection between motive and volition; either it must have happened through inadvertence, or he must have meant, that motive is an *efficient cause* in no other sense than rain and the rays of the sun are the efficient cause of the growth of vegetables, or than medicine is the efficient cause of health.

When we assert, that volition is determined by motive, we mean not that motive is the efficient cause of it; but we mean, that there is a stated connection between volition and motive, so that as Dr. West says, "Whenever the mind acts or chooses, it ALWAYS has some reason" or motive, "which is the *occasion* of its acting or choosing," and "is a previous circumstance necessary for action" or volition. This amounts to all we mean by an infallible connection between motive and volition; and therefore though Dr. West denies such a connection, he in fact holds it, as much as we do. By infallible connection between motive and volition, we mean, that volition never takes place without some motive, reason or cause of its existence, either in the views of the mind of him, who is the subject of the volition, in the disposition, bias or appetite of his mind or body, or from the influence of some extrinsic agent. In a sense large enough to comprehend all these President Edwards explains himself to use the word *motive*. His words are, "By motive I mean the whole of that which moves, excites or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly."† He then proceeds to enumerate several things which operate as motives, viz. the *views* of the mind, the *state*, *frame* and *temper*, etc. which the mind may have by nature, or which may have been introduced by education, example, custom or *other means*.

* Page 11. † p. 5.

Dr. West grants an infallible connection between motive and volition; 1. in that he grants, that motive is *necessary* to volition; 2. in that he grants, that "there is *always* a *reason* for the mind's acting or choosing, and that "when the mind acts, it always has some end, design or *reason*, which is the *occasion* of its acting; and in that he defines *motive* to be the *occasion*, *reason*, end or design, which an agent has in view, when he acts." In these concessions not only does he expressly grant that whenever there is a volition there is a motive; but he implicitly grants also, that whenever there is a motive there is a volition. He expressly grants, that motive is the reason of the mind's acting. But the reason of the mind's acting is infallibly connected with its acting. Otherwise it is not the reason of its acting. If either the mind should act without the supposed reason; or if when the supposed reason exists the action does not follow; this fact in either case shows plainly, that the supposed reason is not the real reason of the action. Again, motive is conceded to be the *occasion* of the mind's acting. But if the motive exist and the action do not follow; it is plain, that the motive is not the *occasion* of the action. As motive is allowed to be the *reason* of the action of the mind, it is as absurd, that the motive should exist without the action, as that the reason of an action should exist without the action; indeed it is the same thing. Let what will be supposed to be the reason of an action, if that supposed reason exist, and the action do not follow, this proves, the supposed reason is falsely supposed to be the reason; and that either something else is the true reason, or that the action came into existence without reason. If then motive be, as Dr. West grants, the occasion and reason of action, it is as absurd and contradictory to say, that there is not an infallible connection between action and motive, as that there is not such a connection between a thing and its cause.

Dr. West argues, that motives cannot be universally the causes of volition, as this would imply, that they are the cause of the divine volitions. But that "motives cannot be the cause of the divine volitions; for this would be to assert, that motives were the cause of the first cause." Now the same reasoning will equally confute Dr. West's scheme of motives; thus, Motives cannot be necessary occasions of volitions, as this would imply, that they are the necessary occasions of the divine volitions. But to assert this, would be to assert, that motives are the necessary occasions of the first cause.

As volition always implies and supposes a motive; so does a motive as evidently imply and infer a volition. For by the very

terms, that is no motive to a man, which does not persuade, move or excite him to volition. This is the sense in which President Edwards uses the word motive. It is not pretended by the most zealous advocate for the influence of motives, that the same objects and reasons will always alike influence a man, and in like manner *move* or *be motives* to him; unless it be supposed, that the state of the mind and everything relating to it, be the same. The mind of man is from various causes exceedingly changeable, and by no means at all times susceptible of the same impressions from the same intellectual views and from the same biases. The intellectual views may be the same, and the biases may be different; and the biases may be the same and the intellectual views may be different. It will not be denied, that there is an infallible connection between cause and effect. Yet this does not imply, that the same effect always follows from the same cause, unless by the same cause be meant, all the same things and circumstances, which related to the effect, or may have had influence to produce it. And with the like explanation of the word motive, it is true, that the same motive is always attended with the same volition.

Since then wherever there is a volition, there is a motive, and wherever there is a motive, or, which is Dr. West's explanation of motive, wherever there is the reason and occasion of volition, there is volition, and also since wherever there is the same motive in the sense just now explained, there is the same volition; what is wanting to support the proposition, that there is an infallible connection between motive and volition? A connection just as infallible as that between cause and effect?

Since our volitions are thus entirely limited, bounded and determined *according to* motives; wherein consists the impropriety of saying, that our volitions are determined *by motives?* We mean no more by the latter expression, than we do by the former.

If all our volitions be in this sense determined by motives, in what sense can it be pretended, that they are self-determined; or that we determine and cause our own volitions? And what will become of the whole doctrine of self-determination? It will not be pretended, that we cause all the objects, with which we are surrounded, and which present themselves to us as objects of choice; nor that we cause all our natural biases, tastes and appetites, which are the sources of so many volitions. If it should be said, that we determine our own motives, determine which motives we will comply with and which we will reject; still as this very determination is the act of the will, a motive is necessary to that. Thus we shall go round in a circle; motive, determining, or (in the language of Dr. West) *being previously necessary* to volition, and volition being necessary to motive.

It seems, that allowing what Dr. West does allow, no man can hold self-detemination, in any other sense than one of these two; (1) That we ourselves determine, as we ourselves think, perceive, hear, taste, etc. which is no more than we all allow; and to explain self-determination thus, is to explain it away and give it up; and, as has been shown, it is thus given up by Dr. West. (2) That we efficiently cause our own volitions but invariably according to motives, reasons or pre-established antecedents. This cannot be consistently avowed by Dr. West, both because he maintains, that volition is no effect and has no cause, therefore we cannot be the cause of it; and because to be the efficient causes of our own volitions implies, that "self acts on self and produces volition;" which is expressly renounced by him.

Dr. West, to prove, that there is no infallible connection between motive and volition says, "Though it is true, that the mind never acts without some reason or design in acting; yet there is no need of assigning a reason for *not acting*."* By *not acting*, Dr. West means, as observed before, either *refusing* and *voluntary neglect*, or *entire inaction*. If he mean the former, it is a real act of the mind and by his own concession therefore is not "without a reason and design." If he mean the latter, his argument is just as conclusive to disprove an infallible connection between motive and volition, as the same argument is to disprove the connection between cause and effect. Thus, though it be true, that an effect never comes to pass without a cause; yet there is no need of assigning a cause for *no effect*. It is undoubtedly true, that perfect nihility requires no cause. But no man in his senses would hence infer, that an effect requires no cause, or that there is not an infallible connection between cause and effect. In like manner "there is no need of assigning a reason" or motive for perfect inaction, which is pure nihility. But it cannot be hence inferred, that there is no need of a motive for action, or that there is not an infallible connection between motive and action. Dr. West denies an infallible connection between motive and action, and he endeavors to prove it by making it out that there is no connection between motive and *inaction*. And what is this to the purpose? How does it hence follow, that there is not an infallible connection between motive and *action*?

Dr. West puts the supposition, that at a gentleman's table he has the offer of tea, coffee or chocolate; that they can all be had with equal ease, and all appear equally eligible to his mind, and that he determines to take coffee. He then adds, "I believe,

* Pages 17, 18.

that it is impossible in this and a multitude of similar instances to assign any accident or circumstance, which determines the mind to its choice among things, which appear equally fit and eligible. Consequently here is an undeniable proof of the liberty for which we contend. And this instance will explain my idea, that there is always a reason for acting or choosing. But that there is not always a reason for not acting; and that things may appear eligible to us, and yet not be chosen; e. g. I accepted the coffee, because I wanted some refreshment. Coffee appeared to me properly suited to answer my desire. This was a sufficient reason for my receiving coffee. The other two appeared equally eligible. About them I exerted no acts; but this being a *mere negation*, could require no positive reason."* On this I remark:

1. If it were ever so true, that in choosing between things perfectly indifferent, (if any such there be) the mind acts without motive, how would this prove, that it acts without motive in any other case? And the instances of its choosing between things perfectly indifferent are so rare, that with respect to the main object of this dispute, they seem hardly worth mentioning. The great object of this dispute is, to investigate that liberty which is necessary to virtue and vice, praise and blame. Dr. West, if I understand him, contends, that an exemption from an infallible connection between motive and volition is essential to that liberty. Or if I do not understand him aright in this instance, he is at liberty to make his choice, whether or not to maintain, that an exemption from such a connection be essential to that liberty, without which we cannot practice virtue or vice. If he maintain, that this exemption is essential to that liberty, I ask, Do we exercise virtue or vice in those instances only, in which we choose one of things perfectly indifferent; or does it follow from the supposition, that we act without motive in those instances, in which we do choose one of things perfectly indifferent, that we also act without motive in other instances; viz. in choosing one of things perfectly different, as virtue and vice, wisdom and folly, our eternal happiness and eternal misery? If it be not true, that we exercise virtue or vice in those instances only in which we choose one of things perfectly indifferent; nor that from the supposition, that there are things perfectly indifferent, and that we act without motive when we choose one of such things, it follows that we act without motive in other cases too; what is the great advantage of a power of choosing without motive in such a rare case? And is it worth while to dispute about it? If we exercise moral agency in those instances only, in which we choose

* Page 18.

one of things perfectly indifferent; our moral agency is confined to very narrow limits indeed, not extending to one of ten thousand of our rational voluntary actions, as, I presume, our opponents themselves will grant. If we exercise moral agency in those instances, in which we choose one of things entirely different, either we are persuaded and influenced by the difference and so are governed by motive, and then the influence of motives is not inconsistent with moral agency or with liberty; or we choose and act without any regard to the difference of the proposed objects. But this must be proved, to obtain credit. If our opponents suppose that it follow from our acting without motive, when (as they say) we choose one of things indifferent, that also we act without motive, when we choose one of things not indifferent; let them show that it does follow. They have not as yet done it.

2. In the passage quoted above, Dr. West considers his choice of coffee, as a real act of his mind arising from a reason or motive; but his neglect or refusal of tea and chocolate as a mere *negation*, which requires no reason or motive. But I appeal to every candid reader, whether a voluntary refusal of any object, be not as real an act of the mind, as a choice. If so, in truth and according to Dr. West's concession, it requires a reason and motive, as much as any other act. I do not mean, that his refusal of tea and chocolate in the case put, is necessarily a distinct act from his choice of coffee; it may be no more a distinct act, than supposing coffee alone had been offered him, and he had accepted it rather than nothing, his acceptance of it and his refusal of nothing had been two entirely distinct acts. The truth is, that his choice of coffee is one complex comparative act, implying a *preference* of coffee to tea and chocolate. I am sensible, that Dr. West holds, "that choice, when used about the determination of the mind respecting the things that appear to us equally eligible, does not include in it the idea of *preference*."* But what else is meant by *preference*, than the choosing of one thing rather than another or in the neglect of that other, when both are offered? If Dr. West mean by *preference* anything different from this, he ought in all reason to inform us what it is. The reason which the Doctor gives, to show that a choice of one of two equally eligible things, is not a preference, is, that "they are both considered as equally eligible;"† i. e. they are, (if I may so say) equally *choosable* or equally worthy of choice. And if one cannot be *preferred*, because they are equally worthy of choice; let it be shown, that it is not equally impossible that one

* Page 16. † Ibid.

of them should be *chosen* when they are equally worthy of choice. If the consideration that they are equally worthy of choice, preclude the possibility of *preference*, why does it not equally preclude the possibility of *election* or *choice*?

Dr. West says, that his acceptance of coffee, as it was an act, required a reason; but about tea and chocolate he exerted no act; and this being a mere negation, could require no positive reason. Now if coffee or nothing had been offered him, and he had accepted the coffee, he might as well have said, that his acceptance of coffee, as it was an act, required a reason; but about nothing he exerted no act; and this being a mere negation, could require no positive reason. The truth is, every act of choice is a comparative act, whether one or more things be offered to our choice. When only one thing is offered, the comparison is between that and nothing. When one of several things is offered, the comparison is between those several things. And if we accept the one thing, which alone is offered, we no more refuse or decline the alternative *nothing* or the absence of that one thing, than when we accept one of several things we refuse the rest.

3. If when several things, which Dr. West calls equally eligible, are offered, and a man choose one of them, it be true, that he exerts no act about the rest; the same would hold, though the things were not equally eligible and the things refused were manifestly most eligible; and thus it would be most easy to account for an act of preference of a most inferior object, to a most superior one. It is but saying, that about the last "I exerted no act; and this being a mere negation would require no positive reason." Thus suppose a guinea and a shilling be offered to a beggar; he takes the shilling, but leaves the guinea. May not the beggar account for his conduct in the same way that Dr. West accounts for his, in taking the coffee in the neglect of the tea and the chocolate? He might say, "I accepted the shilling, because I wanted a little money; the shilling appeared properly suited to answer my desire. The guinea appeared equally" and much more "eligible; about that I exerted no act. But this being a mere negation, could require no positive reason." But the question would still remain unanswered, Why did not the beggar exert an act about the guinea, as well as about the shilling, or even in preference to it? Or, which comes to the same, why did he exert an act about the shilling in the neglect of the guinea? Just so, why did Dr. West exert an act about coffee, in the neglect of tea and chocolate? Whatever be the proper answer to the last question, will doubtless as properly answer the former. Nor need Dr. West puzzle himself and his readers about things *equal-*

ly eligible. His principles are just as applicable to any other things, and equally prove that there is no connection at all between motive and volition, as that there is not an infallible and universal connection.

4. Dr. West grants, that "when the mind chooses, it always has some *reason*, which is the occasion of its choosing." Therefore when he chose coffee in the neglect of tea or chocolate, there was some reason for it. But I appeal to the reader, whether according to the Doctor's own statement of the case, there was any reason why he should choose coffee in the neglect of tea and chocolate, and whether there was not the very same season why he should have chosen tea or chocolate in the neglect of coffee. He says, they all appeared equally eligible to him. Therefore there was no reason, according to him, why he should choose one, to the neglect of the others.

In his second part as well as in his first, the Doctor grants, that "the mind never acts without some reason for acting."* Yet he holds, that of things equally agreeable, it sometimes chooses one and leaves the rest. Now what is the reason of its acting in this case? It is not enough to assign a reason why the mind should take *some one* of several things proposed. As all those things are supposed to be equally eligible, a reason ought to be given why it finally takes one particular one in the neglect of the rest. Unless this be done, no reason is given why it acts in this manner, in this case; and therefore for aught that appears, it acts without reason, which is contrary to the Doctor's concession. Therefore let the Doctor either retract his concession, and hold that the mind sometimes acts without any reason; or renounce the idea, that it sometimes chooses one of several things equally eligible, in the neglect of the rest.

The Doctor says, "When two objects are equally fit, if one is taken and the other left, the mind had a purpose to answer."† We should have been greatly gratified, if the Doctor had pointed out, what purpose the mind had to answer in taking that one which it did take, and in leaving the rest by supposition equally fit to answer the same purpose, for which the one is taken. Until he does point out the purpose, he must excuse us in withholding our assent and denying his proposition. The Doctor in this repeats what he had said in his first part, that "about that which is not taken the mind exercises no act at all." To this I have already answered, that the mind does exercise an act about it; that the act of the mind is complex and comparative, having a respect to more objects than one, because more are supposed to

* Pages 14 and 29. † Part II. p. 28.

be offered and brought into the view of the mind; that the mind does as really exercise an act about the object left, as if it were ever so inferior or superior to the one taken; and that the Doctor's reasoning, if it prove anything, proves too much, viz., that if things ever so unequal be offered and the mind choose the basest and that which is in the lowest degree suited to answer its purpose, it may be still said to have a reason for the action. "But about the other, which is not taken, the mind exercises no act at all—no reason can be assigned for the non-existence of that which is not."

However, perhaps the Doctor will avow this last observation, though has he has not expressly done it as yet. For he "denies, that men are always governed by the strongest motive."* To avoid all dispute about words, let it be remembered, that by being *governed* by the strongest motive, is meant no more than that the mind always *follows*, or *coincides with* the strongest motive. And by *strongest* motive President Edwards has explained himself to mean, "that which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite choice;† or it is the most *persuasive* motive. Now will Dr. West say, that when several motives are proposed to a man, he sometimes passes by the most persuasive, and follows the least persuasive? If so, what is the reason and what is the motive of its action in this case? He allows, that there is a reason and a motive for every action. Let him point out the reason and the motive in this action.

The Doctor says, "If the mind never acts without some motive or reason for acting, then it follows, that the motives or reasons for a virtuous conduct, and the reasons and arguments against the practice of iniquity, ought to be set before us in the *strongest* light, to *enable* us to choose virtue and to avoid vice."‡ 1. Are we then unable to choose virtue and to avoid vice, unless the motives to the former and against the latter, "be set before us in the *strongest* light?" It seems then, that unless those motives be *thus* set before us, we are under no obligation to choose virtue and to avoid vice, because we are not *able* to do it. For it is no part of Dr. West's system, that our duty extends beyond our *ability*. He denies the distinction between natural and moral necessity and inability, and holds, that where necessity or inability begins, liberty and moral agency end.§ 2. Of what advantage can it be to set the motives to virtue and against vice in the *strongest* light," if there be no connection between the *strongest motives*, and volition? Surely none at all. It is therefore implied in the passage just quoted, as in many other passa-

* Part II. p. 6. † p. 6. ‡ Part II. p. 31. § Part II. p. 19.

ges in Dr. West's book, that there is a connection between such motives and volition, and that such connection is not inconsistent with liberty. Yet as the Doctor "denies, that we are always governed by the *strongest motives*," he must hold, that there is no *sure* connection between the strongest motive and volition. Then the question arises, What degree of connection between the strongest motive and volition does he grant to exist and to be consistent with liberty? If the highest degree of probability, reaching to the step next to certainty, be allowed in the case, what should render the only remaining step so baleful to liberty, as to be inconsistent with it? Or if it be allowed, that the probability, according to the degree of it, does indeed diminish liberty; then it diminishes moral agency too; and therefore such a representation of the motives to virtue, as "sets them in the strongest light," and makes it more or less probable, that they will influence to a certain conduct, has in reality no tendency to persuade to a *virtuous* conduct; because just so far as it has a tendency to lead to any particular conduct, it destroys moral agency and precludes the possibility of *virtue*. And such a representation is so far from "enabling us to choose virtue," that so far as it has any effect on us, it renders it impossible that we should choose it *morally*; and any other than a *moral* choice of virtue, if other there be, is no subject of exhortation.

The Doctor asserts, "that there is not an infallible connection between motives and volition."* And in the same page, "That the infallible connection between motives and volition cannot take place, till the mind has determined to examine the several motives or reasons for acting in any particular manner, in order that it may adopt the best. In that case the mind will *certainly* choose *that which appears the best*." Indeed! This is coming down wonderfully. This is acknowledging an infallible connection between motive and volition in all cases, in which the mind *examines the several motives or reasons for acting*. It is also acknowledging, that in every such case the mind is governed by the *strongest* motive, as "it *will certainly* choose that which *appears to be the best*." Of course there is an infallible connection between motives and volition in all cases, except those in which the mind acts abruptly and without due consideration. And is it indeed true, that when the mind acts abruptly, it does not choose that which *appears* to be best, but that which at the time appears to be worst, or at least less good and eligible, than something else, at the same time in view of the mind? When men

* Part II. p. 80.

act abruptly and without due consideration, no wonder if they be misled by mere appearance, which is not always well founded. But do they in such a case, act without regard to any appearance well or ill founded, and even contrary to the greatest appearance of good? That this is generally fact, needs to be confirmed by something stronger, than mere assertion or implication.

Dr. West, throughout his books in general opposes the infallible connection between motive and volition, as inconsistent with liberty and moral agency. But in the passage on which I am now remarking, grants such a connection whenever "the mind" acts with proper deliberation, and "examines the several motives and reasons for acting in a particular manner." It seems then, that on Dr. West's plan, whenever the mind acts with proper deliberation, it is under such an infallible necessity of so acting, as is inconsistent with liberty and moral agency, and consequently must be destitute of liberty and moral agency; and that it possesses liberty and moral agency then only, when it acts abruptly and without proper deliberation. Will the Doctor avow this consequence? Or if he should say, that although when "the mind has examined the motives and reasons, it will *certainly* choose that which appears to be the best," and there is an infallible connection in the case; yet that connection is not inconsistent with liberty and moral agency; why does he dispute against that connection at all? If it do not infringe liberty and moral agency, why is it so violently opposed?

The Doctor quotes these lines from President Edwards: "I suppose none will deny, that it is possible for motives to be set before the mind so powerful—as to be invincible;" and then he remarks on them, "If he means, that *arguments* may be placed before the understanding in so strong a light, as to become invincible, and such as the mind cannot but yield to, it is readily granted, and is nothing to the purpose. For the understanding is not the active, but the perceptive faculty of the mind; and liberty is placed in the will, which is the only active faculty of the mind. But if the meaning is, that motives may be so strong, as *necessarily to determine the will*, this is denied to be possible, while the mind has the free exercise of *reason*. But when the mind is so violently agitated, as to lose the free exercise of reason, as in the case of running in a fright—liberty is destroyed. Things that are not eligible in themselves nor in their consequences, cannot become objects of choice; which is to say, there can be no motive to choose them, though we may find it difficult, and in some cases impracticable to bring our propensities to submit to our choice. When one is convinced, that he has contracted a wrong habit, he finds no difficulty in *choosing* to overcome that habit;

but he will have a vast deal of difficulty in his endeavors to overcome it, because in every unguarded hour, he will be liable to be led astray by his evil habit. And therefore such a person may say with the Apostle, *To will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good, I find not; for the good that I would, I do not; but the evil that I would not, that I do.* Here we see, that we may have a power to choose, when we find it extremely difficult and in some cases impossible to do the things which we have chosen. This shows the *absolute necessity* of divine grace to *strengthen* us to do our duty."*

On this remarkable passage, I beg leave to observe:

1. That Dr. West, according to his own principles, cannot consistently maintain, that "when the mind loses the free exercise of *reason* its *liberty* is destroyed." For *reason* belongs to "the understanding, the perceptive faculty," and not "to the will, the only active faculty;" but "liberty is placed in the will." Therefore according to him liberty is not affected by what takes place in the understanding, as the free exercise of *reason* does. On this ground it is, that he pleads, that those arguments which are invincible to the understanding, are nothing to the purpose as to the question concerning liberty, which is placed in the will. The ground of the argument manifestly is, that there is no certain connection between the understanding and the will; and therefore that which overbears the understanding, does not at all, on that account, affect the will. Therefore that fear, which overbears reason, does not on that account affect the will or liberty. Otherwise if that fear which overbears reason and the right exercise of the understanding, do on that account affect and destroy liberty; why do not those arguments, which are invincible to the understanding and overbear it, also affect and destroy liberty; which is denied by Dr. West.

2. In this passage, Dr. West, however inconsistently with himself, holds, that motives necessarily determine the will. In the first place he declares, that it is impossible, that motives should be so strong as necessarily to determine the will, while reason remains. Yet in the same passage he asserts, that "when once we are convinced, that things are for our greatest good, we can easily choose them," and "things that are not eligible in themselves nor in their consequences," and of course things that we do not "*perceive*" to be in either of these respects eligible, "cannot become objects of choice." The Doctor says, "The object, *motive* or *reason* for acting must be prior to the action of the mind and *perceived* by it, before it can act."† Nothing *can* be-

* Part II. p. 85. † Part II. p. 93.

come an object, except it appears to be eligible."* "There *must appear* some fitness or pleasingness to the mind, antecedent to its choice."† Nothing then can be an object of choice or be chosen, which is not and does not *appear* to be *eligible*, *fit* and *pleasing*. Now all objects of choice are of two kinds, positive or negative, the possession or absence of the things proposed for choice. And if things which do not on the whole appear to be eligible, cannot be chosen; then the absence of them being proposed for choice, is of course chosen, and must be chosen, because it must appear eligible. The possession and the want, the presence and the absence, of the same things cannot, upon the whole, be at the same time eligible. This would imply a contradiction. To refuse an object is to choose the absence or want of it. Therefore to refuse those things which appear to be eligible is impossible. Of course such things must be chosen; there is a necessity of it, otherwise that would be chosen, which does not appear to be eligible, which Dr. West declares to be impossible.

The same thing may be more briefly and perhaps more clearly expressed thus: Dr. West grants that nothing can be chosen which does not appear to be eligible. Therefore the absence of that which appears eligible cannot be chosen, because that cannot on the whole appear eligible while the presence and possession of the object appears eligible. And as the absence of the object cannot be chosen, or, which is the same thing, the object cannot be refused; of consequence it must be chosen; and so there is an infallible connection between motive and volition, and motives necessarily determine the will.

If to this it should be answered, that though those things, which are not seen to be eligible, cannot become objects of choice, and therefore we cannot refuse or choose the absence of those things which we perceive to be eligible; yet we may not act at all with respect to them; and may neither choose nor refuse them; I reply, as I have said before, that it is an impossibility; there is no medium with respect to any thing offered as an object of choice, between choosing and refusing; neither to choose nor refuse in such a case is to be blockishly insensible. Or if it be said, that we only consider and deliberate on the offer; still we *choose* to deliberate.

3. According to this passage, a man can never choose vice or sin. For surely they are neither eligible in themselves, nor in their consequences, and therefore according to this passage, "cannot become objects of choice," i. e. cannot be chosen. But

* Part II. p. 95. † Ibid.

will Dr. West abide by this? Or if to avoid this consequence, the Dr. should say, that his meaning is, that a thing which is not *seen* or *viewed*, as eligible in either of those respects, cannot be chosen; I answer, this implies, that the will in all its acts complies with the dictates of the understanding, and is necessarily determined by motive, as I have just now endeavored to illustrate; nor, as I can conceive, is there any way to avoid this consequence, but by recurring to what is denied to be possible, a supposed power of the mind, to act or not act at all, and to be perfectly torpid, in view of whatever motives. To take this for granted is a prostrate begging of the question.

5. As this passage holds forth, that the human mind always acts upon motive and cannot act without it, and therefore as is illustrated in a preceding paragraph, is always determined by motive; so it follows, that it is always determined by the *strongest* motive, that which appears the most eligible, or has the greatest previous tendency to induce volition. Surely there can be no motive or reason to act on a weaker motive in preference to a stronger. This can never appear eligible; and Dr. West holds, that the mind never acts without some reason or motive; without the appearance of something as eligible.

6. As the will is the only active faculty, and the seat of liberty and moral agency, so there is no morality in any other faculty, actions or impressions, than those of the will; and Dr. West supposes in this very passage, as well as elsewhere, that our propensities and habits do not belong to will. Therefore, provided we *choose* things, which are for our greatest good, it is of no consequence, as to morality, whether or not "we find it difficult and impracticable to bring our propensities to submit to our choice;" of no more consequence, than whether we can bring our understandings to be as acute and comprehensive, as we may choose. And though we have contracted a wrong habit, if we "choose to overcome it," it is of no more consequence in a moral view, that we find "a vast deal of difficulty in our endeavors to overcome it;" or that we are "liable to be seduced and led astray by it;" than that we find a vast deal of difficulty in our endeavors to overcome our ignorance of astronomy, and than that we are liable to be led astray by false guides and false witnesses. For so long as our will and choice are right, all in which there is liberty and moral agency, is right, and so long we cannot possibly be led astray from our duty. And if our wrong propensities and habits, under these circumstances be not subdued, it will imply no fault in us, provided, as is supposed by Dr. West, those propensities and habits consist not in the active or moral faculty or

depend not on it. For on this supposition they are not of a moral nature and imply nothing morally wrong.

7. Nor is it true, as Dr. West here asserts, that though we easily choose that which is good, we stand in *absolute necessity* of divine grace, to strengthen us to our duty." So far as we choose that which is good, our wills are right, and our moral part is right. So far therefore we actually do our duty, and have no necessity of divine grace to strengthen us, to do that which we have done already. Does the Doctor suppose, that our duty calls us beyond our strength? And that it obliges us to act against *absolute necessity?*

8. Nor if it were to be assisted by divine power to perform anything beyond the reach of our moral faculties, would there be any *grace* in such assistance. It is *grace* to enable a man to perform his duty; but it is no grace, to enable him to perform that which is not his duty; e. g. to fly to the moon.

The Doctor supposes, that President Edwards held, that there is always *a reason for not acting*. No doubt there is always a reason for the mind's refusing an object offered. But President Edwards never held, that the mind ever sinks itself into perfect inaction and torpor; and of course he did not hold, that there is a reason for this.

The Doctor insists, that "The mind determines *upon* motives, and is not properly determined *by* motives."* This seems to be a mere dispute about words. The Doctor might as well have said, that vegetables grow *upon*, or *in consequence* of the rain, and not *by* the rain. And would it be worth while to dispute that matter with him?

> "Strange so much difference there should be
> 'Twixt *tweedle-dum* and *tweedle-dee*."

It is considered by the compilers of the *Encyclopaedia* lately printed at Philadelphia, as an invincible argument against the infallible connection between motive and volition, that if equal motives were set before a man to travel an eastern road and to travel a southern road, he would, on the supposition of such a connection, travel in a diagonal line to the south-east. But this is contrary to fact and experience. Therefore they conclude, there is no sure connection between motive and action. They might just as conclusively have proved, that there is no infallible connection between evidence and the opinions of men. Thus, on the supposition that the arguments, that the world was created in the spring and that it was created in autumn, balance each

* Page 87.

other, the conclusion must be, that it was created in neither of those seasons, but midway between them. If the arguments that Dr. West wrote the Essays on liberty and necessity, and that some other person wrote them, should be equal; we ought to believe that neither of them wrote them; but a middle man between them.

Dr. West, in his second part, insists more largely on the subject of choosing between things equally eligible, than in his first part; and puts the case of four equal lines, one of which is to be touched; and he supposes that he determines to touch one of them, and this determination he supposes to be without motive and without extrinsic cause. Now in any such case there appears to be no more difficulty in accounting for my determination to take or choose one in particular, than there is in accounting for my seeing or thinking of one in particular. Though our thoughts roam freely and apparently without control, yet Dr. West will not pretend, that they happen by mere chance and without a cause. Just so as to our volitions; they no more happen in any case without a cause, than any other events. Nor can the mind itself, in which they take place, be the efficient cause of them, without running into an infinite series of volitions, and implying volition before the first volition. Therefore let the Doctor bring as many instances as he pleases, of things apparently indifferent, so long as choice among them has a cause, and a cause extrinsic to the mind too; they make nothing to his purpose. I ask Dr. West, Is his determination to touch one of his equal lines, which he calls C, an uncaused event? He will not pretend it. Is it efficiently caused by the mind itself, in any other sense, than as the mind is the subject of it, or as it is the cause of all its own thoughts and feelings? To answer in the affirmative, and not to clear the answer of the absurdities and impossibility charged upon it, is mere dogmatizing. To all instances, in which creatures are supposed to choose one of several indifferent things, my answer is, that though we cannot point out the particular motive or accident, which is the occasion of the choice of that particular one; still this choice has a cause, and a cause extrinsic to the mind too, and it is as easy to account for our choosing one of several indifferent things, as to account for our thinking of one of them in particular.

But perhaps the Doctor meant to evade this, by saying, that in the very act of determining to touch one of his equal lines, viz. C, he "voluntarily called it to mind." What does the Doctor mean by this? That he first wished to think of C, and that in consequence of this wish, it came to his mind? If he did

mean this, it is to be presumed, that he will not undertake to defend it. And as I can imagine no other meaning of "voluntarily calling C to mind," I must be excused from further answer until I am better informed. If the Doctor mean, that he wished to think of one of his lines, and then C came to his mind; the question returns, What made *C* come to his mind?

But the Doctor argues, that the *Creator* has a self-determining power, and that he does or may exert that power in creating two or more perfectly similar bodies and in placing them in different situations, or in causing one of them to move, while the other is at rest, etc. As to all such cases I observe:

1. That every determination of God is as eternal, as unchangeable and necessary, as his existence is, and therefore none of his acts are any more self-determined, than his existence. To suppose otherwise is to suppose that the Deity is mutable. If therefore he have determined to create ever so many bodies perfectly alike, and to dispose of them in different circumstances, this is no proof of self-determination in the Deity, if by that term be meant anything opposite to the most absolute and irreversible moral necessity; I say *moral* necessity, because all necessity of moral acts, is moral necessity.

2. If God have created two bodies perfectly alike, and placed them in different situations; it will not follow, that he has done it without wise design and motive.

3. But why did he not place them in a reverse of situations, that which is on the right hand, on the left, and that which is on the left hand, on the right? And so with respect to rest and motion. The answer has been long since given by President Edwards. These bodies, though said to be numerically different, are no more different than the same sound repeated at different times. These sounds are as numerically different as the bodies, and with the same reason it may be asked, why was not the first sound made last and the last first? Or why were not these numerically different sounds interchanged? The absurdity of putting this question must appear to every one, because it implies, contrary to the very supposition, that the sounds are different in some other respect than time. So the question, why the two perfectly alike bodies were not interchanged in their situation, implies, contrary to the supposition, that those bodies differ in some other respect beside their situation.

The Doctor suggests several considerations to show, that these bodies do differ in some other respect beside their situation; as that one of them may be in motion, the other at rest. And what is motion but a change of situation? So the same sound may

move from one place to another; yet nobody would conclude from that merely, that it was a different sound from a perfectly similar sound, i. e. different from a repetition of the same sound in a different place or at a different time. Also the Doctor insists, that those similar bodies are *numerically* different; that is, they differ in number, so that you may number them, and if you please, may call that on the right hand No. 1 or A, and that on the left hand No. 2 or B. And in the same manner you may number the sounds; and you may as well ask why sound No. 2, was not made first, as why No. 2 of the bodies was not placed on the left hand. If two bodies be different numerically only, they differ in no other respect, than in situation; for if they do not differ in situation, they would become one body.

The Doctor proceeds, "That they [the bodies] are numerically different from each other, appears from this consideration, that if the globe A, on the right hand, should be removed to a far distant place, the Deity could create another just like it, and put it in the same place from which A was removed."* So if sound A should be removed from the place in which it was first made to a far distant place, the Deity could cause another sound just like it, in the same place, from which A had been removed. "It is evident, that these two globes are as really two, as though they were ever so dissimilar."† This is no more evident, than that the two sounds are as really two, as though they had been ever so dissimilar. "And they were made to answer different purposes; and yet being perfectly similar, A could have answered the purposes of B and B of A."‡ So the sound A may have been made to relieve Saul troubled by an evil spirit; and the sound B may have been made to answer the purpose of the temple worship. Yet being perfectly similar and indeed no more than the repetition of the same sound, A could have answered the purpose of B, and B of A.

Dr. West says, that President Edwards, in supposing that two globes perfectly alike, are the same in every respect except their situation, has confounded similarity with identity.§ President Edwards does indeed suppose, that two globes perfectly alike in all respects except their situation, are the same in all respects except their situation; and if they could be alike in their situation too, as they then would be in the same place, no doubt Dr. West will grant, that in that case they would become one and the same globe; if not let him point out in what respect they would not be the same.

* Page 15. † p. 16. ‡ Ibid. § Part II. p. 16.

The Doctor dwells long on the case of the two globes, and yet everything that he says to make out, that they are two in any respect beside place, may be said to make out, that perfectly similar sounds given in different times or places, are not the same sound repeated. What he says,* may be applied to the case of the sounds thus: "What superior fitness has" the sound A, to the sound B, "that makes it necessary, that it should be" given first and be continued in one place? "Or what superior fitness has" the sound B, to the sound A, "that makes it necessary, that it should be" given in the second place in point of time, and should be moved to another place in point of situation? "It is certain no reason can be assigned; for they being perfectly similar, one cannot in the nature of things be more fit than the other. So then, here are two very different effects of the divine power, without any possible reason" why sound A should not be given in the second place and be moved, and sound B, in the first place and not be moved.

The Doctor conceives, that the ideas advanced imply, "that one and the same body may be in two different places at the same time."† No doubt they do imply, that a body which is in all respects one and the same with another body, except situation, may be in a different place from that other body at the same time; and may be the subject of effects different and contrary to those, of which that other body may at the same time be the subject.

All that the Doctor says on this subject, implies, that a body different from another numerically only, differs from it in some other respect beside situation. But he will doubtless perceive, that this is an error, if he reflect, that provided the diversity of situation were removed and they were at the same time in the same place, they would no longer be numerically different. Yet Dr. West says, "If they differed only in place, then put A in the place of B, and it would become B; and B, by changing with A, would become A; which is not the case; for should we see A and B change places, still we should call each by the same name we did before."‡ If you put A in the place of B, it would become B, in the same and no other sense, than if you make the sound A, in the place and time of the sound B, it will become B. If we should see those two bodies change their places with each other, still they would be all the while in different places, as much so as two sounds would be, if we should hear the sound, which is now in this apartment, gradually move to another place, and the perfectly similar sound, which is now made in the adjoining apartment, gradually move into this apartment. Those

* Page 16. † p. 17. ‡ Ibid.

sounds being all the while thus different in place, do not become in all respects one sound; the difference of place still remains; and this is all the difference of the bodies supposed to be seen to interchange places. And if the globes should be annihilated and then be created anew, and that which is now on the right hand should be created on the left, and vice versâ; this would be as absurd a supposition, as to suppose, that if the two perfectly similar sounds now existing in this apartment, and in the adjoining apartment, should cease; that which is now in the adjoining apartment could be renewed in this apartment, and that which now exists in this apartment could be renewed in the adjoining, in the stead of the one which is now there. Every one must see, that this implies, that the sounds are different from each other, in some other respect, than their place; which is contrary to the supposition.

The Doctor proceeds, "If one of the globes should be dashed in pieces, it would not in the least affect the other, but it would be as whole as it was before."* So if one of the perfectly similar sounds made in different places, though at first entirely melodious, should become harsh and grate on the ear, it would not in the least affect the other. Yet Dr. West grants, that these before the alteration of one, are only the repetition of the same sound.

The Doctor continues, "If the two globes were one and the same in every respect, except their occupying two places at the same time, then whatever accident should take place with respect to one, would equally take place with respect to the other. That is, if A be dashed in pieces, B must share the same fate; which we see is not the case." This is said without proof or reason given for its support, and therefore a bare denial is a sufficient answer. If two sounds in every other respect one and the same, should be made in two places, whatever accident should take place with respect to one, might not in the least affect the other.

The sum of my answer concerning the two globes, is, That they are no more two, than two perfectly similar sounds made in different places or times; that the supposition of their being interchanged, is as absurd as the supposition, that the two sounds should be interchanged; that it implies, contrary to what is supposed, that they are different from each other, in some other respect beside situation; and finally, that it is no more in the power of the Deity to interchange them, than to interchange the two sounds. If Dr. West should reply to this, as he often has done in other cases, that "this is past his power to conceive;" be it

* Page 17.

so; what follows? That therefore it cannot be true? And is Dr. West's skill to conceive the standard of truth?

"To say, that no two things can have equal degrees of eligibility and fitness in the divine mind, is to confound the reason of acting, with action itself; and to make the Deity a mere passive being, or a mechanical medium of fate."* The Doctor has not told how this confounds the reason of acting with action, and he must not expect, that all his readers will receive it upon his mere assertion. It is to be presumed, that many of them will still believe, that the divine mind always acts according to the dictates of wisdom, and on account of superior fitness chooses whatever it does choose, and that this is not to confound the reason of acting with action, but to preserve them distinct. If for the Deity to act always voluntarily according to the dictates of perfect wisdom, be what the Doctor means by his being "a mere passive being," we grant it; but we appeal to the reader, whether the Doctor be not in this case guilty of a perversion of language; or at least whether he be not guilty of begging the question, in supposing, that there is no action but that which is self-determinate; as that is manifestly supposed in the proposition now under consideration. As to "the mechanical medium of fate," the reader will say, whether it be not *mere rant*, unworthy of a grave philosopher and divine.

Dr. West frequently says, and everywhere takes it for granted, that in the Divine mind there may be innumerable things, which differ in many respects, which yet may have equal degrees of eligibility and fitness to answer God's particular purposes; and among these innumerable things the Deity can choose one and not another, and with respect to any of them can act or not act. That things thus different may be equally fit to answer the purposes of God is not granted and ought not to have been asserted without proof or instance. It appears to be a mere conjecture; and if mere conjectures be admitted as truth, truth is the most uncertain thing in the world. Besides, it is very improbable, that things differing in several respects, should be equally adapted to the same purpose. As to the idea that God can in any case act or *not act*, this appears to be an impossibility, for the reasons already mentioned.

"If a man is led *by any means* or *motives* or *reasons*, to choose that which he formerly abhorred," says the Doctor, "and to abhor that which he formerly loved, *he is still as free as ever he was*; for nothing being an object of choice, but what appears eligible, it is impossible that the mind should choose that which

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Part II. p. 19.

is neither eligible in itself, nor in its consequences; i. e. nothing is an object of choice but eligible things. When then things appear to us eligible, which formerly we abhorred, and we abhor things, that formerly were eligible, we have only changed the objects of our choice, but not our freedom. We are as free now, as we were before."* The truth so naturally obtrudes itself on every man, that it is difficult for him consistently to contradict it.† The Doctor here grants, that when a man chooses an object, by "whatever means, motives or reasons he is led to the choice," "he is still free." Therefore to be led by motives in any case is not inconsistent with freedom; therefore to be led by them *always*, in an *established* and *infallible connection* between motives and choice, is not inconsistent with freedom. Why then does he dispute President Edwards for holding such a connection? Besides, Dr. West here grants, that if a man be led *by any means* to choose an object, still he is *free*. Then he is free, when he is led to choose an object, by an *extrinsic cause*. Nay, he is free, when he is led by a *divine influence*, to choose an object. It is further to be observed, that in this passage, Dr. West declares, that it is *impossible*, that the mind should choose any thing, which does *not appear to it eligible*. What then becomes of self-determination? Has the mind a power to make things appear agreeable or disagreeable at pleasure; to control all its own views, and to create its own happiness in any circumstances whatever? This indeed is the thorough scheme of self-determination advocated by Archbishop King, but which has been since given up, though inconsistently, by Dr. Clarke, and so far as I know, by all other believers in self-determination; and to be sure cannot be consistently adopted by Dr. West for many reasons; particularly this, that Dr. West holds that the will always follows motive; but this scheme is, that the will always goes before motive.

"Mr. Edwards and his followers," says Dr. West, "suppose, that there must be a particular reason why every determination of mind—is in this particular manner, rather than any other—which will imply, that there can be no two objects in the mind—equally eligible. The contrary we know to be true by OUR own experience."‡ How does Dr. West know what OUR own experience is? He may indeed claim a right to know HIS own experience; but I defy him to tell what my experience, or the experience of any other man, is, unless he have had information.

* Part II. p. 30.

† Naturam expelles furcâ, tamen usque recurret. *Hor.* Ep. I. 10.

‡ Part II. p. 14.

Who then gave him a right to speak in the *plural* number in this case? And whom does he mean, when he speaks of OUR experience? If he mean mankind in general, I call on him for proof, and wish he had been a little more reserved in this instance. Strong assertions are equally open to all; and if they be good arguments, it is easy to prove, that the experience of mankind is directly the reverse of what Dr. West asserts it to be.

As to the question, whether any two objects are, at the instant of the choice of one of them, equally eligible in the view of the mind; I answer it in the negative; and in my own experience never found them to appear any more equally eligible, than any two objects, to be equally the objects of my sight or of the attention of my mind. And as to the various instances of several eggs, guineas and spots on a chess board, one of which is proposed to be taken or touched; there is no more difficulty, as I have said already, in assigning a reason, why one of them rather than any other, is taken or touched, than why one rather than any other is more particularly seen or attended to, by the eye or the mind. The circumstance, that one of them is more directly and particularly seen or attended to, is a sufficient reason, why that rather than any of the rest should be taken or touched. And when this circumstance takes place with regard to any one of several guineas for instance, they are not all, or do not appear, equally eligible. That which is the immediate object of sight or attention is, for that reason, most eligible; and how that came to be more particularly the object of sight or attention, I am under no more obligation to account, than Dr. West or any other man.

It is a sentiment entertained by some, that we efficiently cause our own volitions, but invariably according to motives, reasons or pre-established antecedents. Dr. Clarke expresses this in various parts of his metaphysical works; as in the following: "The true, proper, immediate, physical cause of action, is the power of self-motion in men, which exerts itself *freely* in consequence of the last judgment of the understanding. But the last judgment of the understanding is not itself a physical efficient, but merely a *moral motive upon which* the physical efficient, or motive power begins to act."* And again: "The experience of a man's ever doing what he judges reasonable to do, is not at all an experience of his being under any *necessity* so to do. For *concomitancy* in this case is no evidence at all of physical connection. Upon supposition of *perfect liberty*, a reasonable being would *still constantly* do what *appeared reasonable* it should do; and

* Being and Attributes, p. 93.

its *constantly* doing so, is no proof at all of its wanting liberty or a physical power of doing otherwise."* Dr. Price entirely agrees in this sentiment with Dr. Clarke. "A self-determining power, which is *under no influence of motives*—has never been contended for or meant by any advocates for liberty. Every being who acts at all, must act for some *end* and with some *view*."† "The *influence of motives* is perfectly consistent with liberty and indeed supposes it."‡

On these passages I remark:

1. Dr. Clarke, as well as the other advocates for self-determination, abundantly contradicts these sentiments. Thus in his second letter to the gentleman at *Cambridge*, speaking of the final perception of the understanding and first operation of the active faculty he says, "I think there is no connection at all between them; and that in their not being connected lies the difference between action and passion, which difference is essential to liberty." But if a man on the supposition of perfect liberty," "constantly do what appears reasonable;" then a man may in a consistence with perfect liberty constantly act agreeably to the final perception of his understanding; i. e. the final perception of the understanding and action, or "the operation of the active faculty," may be constantly connected consistently with liberty. And is constant connection, no connection at all? And if in their not being connected lies the essence of liberty, the essence of liberty cannot be consistent with their constant connection.

2. That Dr. Clarke places liberty in a *physical power* to do an action. His words are, "A being's constantly doing what appears reasonable it should do, is no proof of its wanting liberty or a physical power of doing otherwise." He evidently uses *liberty* and *physical power*, as synonymous expressions. Many other passages might be quoted from Dr. Clarke, Dr. Price, and other principal authors of that class, in which they expressly assert or evidently suppose, that whoever has a *physical* power to do an action, is free; and that the reason why motives are not inconsistent with liberty, is, that they infer not a physical necessity or inability. But this is no more than we all grant. Peter had the same physical or natural power to confess his Lord, which he had to deny him; and Judas, the same physical power to be faithful to him, as to betray him. Nor do the most absolute decrees and predictions destroy this physical power. So

* Remarks on Collins, p. 25. † Correspondence with Priestly, p. 156.

‡ Reid on the Active Powers, p. 275.

that absolute decrees and predictions are, on this plan, perfectly consistent with liberty.

3. These passages imply, that though the mind is the efficient cause of its own volitions; yet this efficiency is limited to exert itself or to be exerted, according to motives and the dictates of the understanding. But this, on the plan of those who deny that volition can be free and yet be the effect of an extrinsic cause, is no more liberty than the slave exercises, who moves and acts at the control of his master; or than the man has, who walks in a prison and whose liberty is bounded and determined by the walls and gates of the prison, and by the consent of the gaoler. We might as well say, that a slave is in possession of his liberty and is not controlled by the will of his master, but controls himself according to the will of his master; as that we are free with the liberty of self-determination and contingence, and yet be always limited to determine ourselves according to the influence of motives. If there be a real connection between motive and volition, that connection is as inconsistent with liberty as if motives were the efficient causes of volition; provided liberty mean contingence or previous uncertainty of action; and if liberty mean self-causation of volition, and this self-causation be under the control of motives or any extrinsic cause, still where is liberty in the sense contended for by our opponents? Volition in this case is equally limited and controlled, as if it were efficiently produced by motive.

Such self-determination as this, is not at all inconsistent with efficacious grace, absolute decrees, and the most firm pre-establishment of all events and volitions. If self-determination exert itself according to motives only, let God in his providence bring the proper motives into view, and we are efficaciously determined, or if you please, it is efficaciously brought to pass, that we shall determine ourselves in a particular limited manner; and let God decree absolutely that those motives shall come into view, and he absolutely decrees and foreordains what our conduct shall be. So that this kind of self-determination does not at all answer the purpose of avoiding the dreadful doctrine of absolute decrees, the fatality implied in that doctrine, or other doctrines connected with it.

4. If a man cause his own volitions according to motives only, and this be a universal rule; doubtless this rule was established by some cause. This rule is an establishment; this establishment is an effect, and requires a cause as much as any other effect. Who or what is that cause? It is doubtless either the First Cause, or some subordinate cause appointed by him. In

either case the original cause of this establishment, by which intelligent creatures cause their own volitions according to motives, is God. Also he in the course of his providence brings all those motives into our view, on which we act. And doubtless both this establishment and the coming of the motives into our view were caused by him, in consequence of a previous determination to cause them. Therefore this scheme of self-determination not only is consistent with absolute decrees and the efficacious providence of God; but it necessarily implies both these. It necessarily implies, that God has decreed all our volitions and is either mediately or immediately the cause of them all. Therefore it is inconsistent, that those who espouse this scheme of liberty and self-determination according to motives, should oppose the doctrines of God's absolute decrees and efficacious grace.

5. Beside this, the common absurdity of self-determination equally attends this scheme of determining ourselves according to motives; I mean the absurdity of an infinite series of volitions causing one another. If all free volitions be caused by the subject, that volition in which a man complies with a motive, must have been caused by himself and by a preceding volition; and this last volition, for the same reason, must have been caused by one preceding that, and so on infinitely.

6. Nor is this all. The doctrine now under consideration is, that every volition is according to a motive, and is under the persuasive influence of it. Therefore every one of that infinite series of volitions must have been put forth in the view of some motive. So that here we have not only an infinite series of volitions producing one another; but an infinite series of motives, according to which they do produce one another.

Dr. Reid holds, that "there are innumerable actions done by a cool and calm determination of the mind, with fore-thought and will, but *without motive*."* This is directly contrary to Dr. West. He holds, as before quoted, "That the infallible connection between motives and volition cannot take place, till the mind has determined to examine the several motives or reasons for acting —In that case the mind will certainly choose that which appears the best;"† i. e. will certainly act *with* motive. It is equally contrary to Dr. Reid himself. In the next page he grants, "that an action done without any motive can neither have merit nor demerit;" and says, that this is a self-evident proposition, and that he knows of no author that ever denied it. Now an action in which there is neither merit nor demerit, is not a moral action. But is not every action done by a cool and calm determination

* Active Powers, p. 275. † Part II. p. 80.

of the mind, with fore-thought and will, a moral action? If it be, since according to Dr. Reid, such an action may be done without a motive, it follows, that, directly contrary to what Dr. Reid himself asserts, an action done without a motive, can have merit or demerit; or a moral action may have no merit or demerit in it. Or if an action done by a cool and calm determination of mind, be not a moral action, then in this controversy we have no more to do with it, than we have with the beating of the pulse or winking of the eyes; for this controversy respects moral actions only. Again, in the page last referred to, Dr. Reid tells us, "If a man could not act without motive, he would have no power at all." But if we have a power to act without motive, this power, according to Dr. Reid, does not enable us to do those actions, which have either merit or demerit; i. e. moral actions. Therefore for the purposes of morality, of virtue and vice, reward and punishment, such a power would do us no good. So that according to Dr. Reid, we have no power to perform any moral action. For according to him, power to act with motive only, is no power at all. Therefore whatever power we have, is a power to act without motive. But a power to act without motive, is a power to perform those actions only, which have neither merit nor demerit; i. e. which are no moral actions. Yet, he says, "The actions, which are done without a motive, are of moment in the question concerning *moral liberty*."* By *moral* liberty I conclude he means that liberty, in the exercise of which we act morally, or with merit or demerit. Therefore questions concerning this liberty are questions concerning *moral actions*. But how can those actions, which have no morality in them, be of moment in questions concerning *moral* actions? Can the peristaltic motion or the action of the solids on the fluids in the human constitution, be of moment in a question concerning malice or envy?

In the page last quoted, Dr. Reid says, "If we have a power of acting without motive, that power joined to a weaker motive, may counterbalance a stronger." What if it may? The action or actions, which should be the result in such a case, would not be of a moral nature. For if an action done entirely without motive be not of a moral nature, as Dr. Reid grants, that which is done against the stronger motive, being on the whole done without motive, must also be not of a moral nature. As the weaker motive is withstood and balanced by a part of the strength of the stronger, so far as a man acts against the excess of the strength of the stronger, he must act without motive. Therefore if a man be influenced by a regard to his duty, as with

* Page 277.

the force of 1, to preserve his temperance; and be influenced by his appetite, as with the force of 2, to intemperance, and then by a self-determining power determine himself to temperance against the stronger motive; there is according to Dr. Reid's own concession, no virtue and no morality in the determination. Who then would wish for such a power as this? And why did Dr. Reid think it worth his while, to dispute for it? Surely in disputing for it, he spent his time and strength in a very useless manner.

Though Dr. Reid holds, as just quoted, that "if a man could not act without motive, he would have no power at all;" yet he holds, as has been quoted also, that "the influence of motives is perfectly consistent with liberty and indeed supposes it." And he defines liberty to be "a power over the determinations of the will."* Therefore as "the influence of motives is perfectly consistent with *liberty* and supposes it;" and as "a power over the determinations of the will" is liberty; the influence of motives is perfectly consistent with "a power over the determinations of the will." And if a man could not act without motive, but always acted under the influence of it, he in the first place, "would have no power at all;" in the second place, he would have some power; viz. "a power over the determinations of his own will," which according to him, is *liberty*, and not only is consistent, with the influence of motive, but is supposed in it. But the defenders of the self-determining power are fated to inconsistency, and self-contradiction, and not one of them more so than this Dr. Reid.

He also holds, that in order to have any power at all, we must have a power to act without motive, and therefore without the influence of motive. But the influence of motive is, according to his own concession, supposed in liberty. Therefore to have any power at all, we must have a power to act without that which is supposed in liberty and therefore without liberty itself. And if we have that which is supposed in liberty, and of course have liberty itself, we have no power at all; i. e. if we have a power over the determinations of our own will, which is liberty; we have no power at all and have no liberty; or if we have power and liberty, we have no power nor liberty. But it is endless to trace the absurdities of the self-determining power and of the most acute writer that ever undertook the defence of it. It is indeed a burdensome stone, which like that of Sisyphus, will forever roll down on the heads of those who give it a place in their building.

* Page 251.

If we have a power to act without motive, we have a power to act without end or design; and such an action is as totally without morality, as the blowing of the wind, or the motion of a cannon ball. And a power to perform such an action, is not a power to perform any moral action, nor can such a power be called *moral* liberty; but it is a power to divest ourselves, in that action at least, of all moral agency.

To choose anything without motive, is really a contradiction; it is to choose it and not choose it, at the same time. Whatever is chosen, is chosen as being agreeable in some respect or other; and whatever is agreeable, is agreeable either in itself immediately, or on account of its connection with something else and its subserviency to it, which something is immediately agreeable in itself. Now whatever is agreeable on account of its connection with something else, is chosen on account of that something else, as the motive. Whatever is in itself agreeable to a man, is chosen from the motive of his appetite, taste or bias, which is included in President Edwards' sense of motive. And whatever is not agreeable to a man on one or other of these accounts, is not agreeable at all, and therefore is not chosen.

To choose an object without motive, is to choose it without any end or design, either of immediate or remote gratification of any principle in him, who makes the choice. And whether this be possible or conceivable, I wish every candid person to judge.

An act of choice without a motive, in the large sense of motive as defined by President Edwards, is an event without a cause. For every cause of volition is included in President Edwards' definition of motive. "By motive," says he, "I mean the whole of that which *moves*, excites or invites the mind to volition, whether it be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly."* Accordingly in his further explanation of his idea of motive, he mentions all agreeable objects and views, all *reasons* and arguments, and all internal biases and tempers, which have a tendency to volition; i. e. every *cause* or occasion of volition. And if an immediate divine influence or any other extrinsic influence, be the cause of volition, it may be called a *motive* in the same sense that a bias is. Now, if an act of choice be without motive in this sense, it is absolutely without a cause. The evasion of Dr. Clarke and others, that the mind itself is the cause of its own volitions, has been already considered; beside other absurdities, it has been found to lead to an infinite series of volitions causing one another; which is as great an absurdity, as an infinite series of men begetting one another. Or if it were allowed that a

* Page 5.

man does efficiently cause his own volitions without motive; still he must cause them without design or end, and therefore must cause them in the dark and by mere chance.

Archbishop King says, "The will cannot be determined to good by objects."* Then all the good and evil in the universe cannot determine one act of the will. He also says, "The more free any one is and the less liable to external motions, the more perfect he is."† Therefore the less liable a man is to be influenced by the divine law and its precepts, by the beauty of virtue, by right and wrong, by the divine glory, or by the rewards and punishments of virtue and vice here or hereafter; the more perfect he is! ! !

If motives have not influence on men they are not capable of moral government. The whole of moral government depends on influencing the subject by the motives of laws, precepts, penalties, rewards and punishments, etc.

However, the Archbishop is perhaps the most consistent advocate for self-determination, that has ever written. Clarke, Jackson, Price and Reid grant too much. They grant, though they do not hold to it throughout, that the will always acts according to motives, and allow the influence of motives; yet they hold, that the will determines itself and causes its own acts; which is just like the idea of some concerning the power of the civil magistrate, a power to govern the people, who have the entire government of the magistrate. But Archbishop King strikes a bold stroke. He holds, that there is "a faculty" in human nature "naturally inclined to exercise, and that one exercise is more agreeable than another, not from any natural fitness in one rather than another; but from the application of the faculty itself; for another would often be no less agreeable, if it had *happened* to be determined to that."‡ "It is the very nature of an *active* power, to make an object agreeable to itself, i. e. good, by its own proper act. For here the goodness of the object does not precede the act of election, so as to excite it, but election makes the goodness in the object; that is, the thing is agreeable because chosen, and not chosen because agreeable. We cannot therefore justly inquire after any other cause of election, than the power itself."§ It seems then, that it is the nature of a self-determining power to exercise itself, not in any particular manner, but in any manner and every possible manner. It presses like water in a cistern on every side alike, endeavoring to flow out in exercise.

* Law's edition, p. 394. † Ibid. p. 354. ‡ Ibid. p. 269.
§ Ibid. pp. 279, 280.

And whenever it does in fact flow out in any particular exercise, there is no cause or reason for this exercise, more than for any other possible exercise. The only cause or reason is the natural inclination of this power to flow out in any and all possible exercises. This is just as good accounting for any particular exercise of this power as it would be, to account for the Archbishop's writing his book, by saying, that he had a general power and inclination to write something or other.

In this scheme of Dr. King, we see the genuine idea of *liberty of indifference.* It is an equal inclination, previously to election, to all possible elections and volitions, and a perfect indifference to all conceivable objects; so that no particular object or situation is more suited to give pleasure or misery to a man, than another; and pleasure and pain are the consequence and depend entirely on a man's own choice and will; so that it is entirely in a man's power and depends entirely on his own will, to render Nebuchadnezzar's furnace more pleasant, than a bed of down perfumed with roses.

It is further observable, that according to this account of the self-determining power, whenever it does exercise itself, it does it by *mere chance,* or as Dr. King himself expresses it, it *happens* to be determined to that exercise. Thus we have the famous liberty of contingence or perfect uncertainty, a liberty of blind fate or chance!

Our opponents hold, that the governing influence of motive is inconsistent with liberty and moral agency; then if a man be influenced by any motive to a compliance with the gospel and its precepts, or by any temptation to the commission of any action commonly reputed ever so criminal; in reality there is no virtue in the former nor vice in the latter; because the influence of the motive destroys liberty and moral agency, the man is wrought upon by an extrinsic cause and therefore is a mere patient and not an agent. Therefore no man needs to be at all afraid of any temptation, nor according to this scheme ought *the Lord's Prayer* to remain any longer without correction. The light of this improved age requires a new edition of it *corrected* and *improved.*

If it be objected, that motives do indeed have an influence to persuade men, but not a *certain infallible* influence; I answer, just so far as they have influence, their influence *is* certain and infallible, because it is an influence that really exists. That which does exist, *certainly* exists, and it is an infallible truth, that it does exist.

Or if it be pleaded, that the mind is still free, because motives are not the efficient causes of volition; I answer, that the same

plea would prove, that a West-India slave is free, because his actions are not efficiently caused by his master or driver, and they only exhibit such motives as influence the slave himself to perform those actions. And the same plea will prove, that moral necessity is perfectly consistent with liberty. For moral necessity is a mere previous certainty of a moral action; and this is no more the efficient cause of the action, than the persuasive motive, which is the occasion of an action.

I am entirely willing, that the advocates for the self-determining power should take their choice of either Dr. Clarke's scheme of *constant concomitancy* of motives and volitions; or Archbishop King's scheme, that motives have no influence, and that previously to election all things are perfectly indifferent to the man who makes the election. If they choose to adopt the scheme of *constant concomitancy*, they at once allow an infallible connection between motives and volition; they must give up the power to act or not act, the liberty to either side, and their favorite argument from choosing one of several indifferent things; they must renounce the independence and sovereignty of the will, and allow that it is as really bounded, limited and controlled by motives, as the slave is by his driver, or as the will is by moral necessity; and there is nothing of their boasted liberty left worth contending for, nothing but the pitiful power of manufacturing volitions according to the mandates of motives; just as a West-India negro manufactures sugar under the lash of his driver.

Or if they choose Archbishop King's scheme; absurdities no less glaring will follow. If all things before election be indifferent, then every election is made without motive, reason, end, design or any consideration right or wrong; every act of choice is an act of as perfect stupidity, as the motion of a cannon ball or the falling of a stone; every man by choice or rejection makes any object either agreeable or disagreeable, good or bad, to himself; every man, in every situation has the perfect control of his own happiness and misery; and it is but for him to choose to lie on a gridiron, which he can as easily do, as choose anything else, and he converts it into a bed of roses. This is self-determination *to some purpose.*

Such exclamations as the following have been made, in relation to this subject: "If man be governed by motives, how is he free? Where is freedom? What liberty has man more than a beast? All his actions are subject to a fatal chain of causes and effects!" But such exclamations may justly be retorted, on either of the forementioned hypotheses of determining our own volitions agreeably to motives, or without motives. If we determine

them agreeably to motives only; then we are limited to motives, we can go in one track only, we can act no otherwise than according to the dictates of sovereign and all controlling motives. Then "how is man free? Where is freedom? What liberty has man more than a beast? All his actions are subject to a fatal chain of motives!"—Or if it be said, that we determine our own volitions without motives, end, design or any consideration good or bad; as in this case we act with perfect stupidity, it may with the greatest propriety be demanded, "How are we free? Where is freedom? What liberty has man more than a beast?"

If there be, as Dr. Clarke, Dr. Price, etc. allow, a constant concomitancy or connection between motives and volitions; this connection is an established law; as really such, as the connection between a certain temperature of the seasons and the growth of vegetables. Now of this establishment there is some author. It is an effect and has an efficient cause. Nor will it be pretended, that the mind, which is the subject of the volitions, is the efficient cause of this establishment. This beside other difficulties attending it, would imply a direct contradiction; as it is now granted, that the mind acts invariably according to motives; and yet in establishing the influence of motives, it must act without that influence, i. e. without motive. For a motive can have no influence, before influence is given to it; and nothing can be a motive, which has no persuasive influence or tendency. Therefore the influence of motives and the connection between them and volitions, are the effects of some cause extrinsic to the mind. And this causation of the influence and consequences of motives, or of the connection between motive and volition, is really a causation of volitions themselves, and that by an extrinsic cause. Thus the authors just mentioned and those who with them acknowledge a constant concomitancy of motives and volitions, are brought into a dilemma. If they hold that this concomitancy and constant connection is caused by the mind itself, they must grant, that it is caused without motive, and so contradict the very principle they grant, of constant concomitancy. If they allow, that this connection is caused by some other cause, than the mind itself; they must of course grant, that volitions are the effects of an extrinsic cause.

"If volition and agreeable perception," says Dr. West, "be one and the same thing, then motive and volition are one and the same thing. For nothing can be a motive, but an agreeable perception; or—motive is the perceiving of the fitness of an object to answer a particular purpose."* Hence he argues, that

* Page 12.

"if motive be agreeable perception, and agreeable perception be a volition, and motive be the cause of an act of the will, then an act of the will is the cause of an act of the will." And that "motive and volition are one and the same thing." No doubt Dr. West has a right to tell his own sense of the word *motive.* But when President Edwards has particularly given his sense of that word, and it appears to be entirely different from that of Dr. West, the Doctor has no right to argue from his sense, to confute the President. He by motive meant not only a perception of the fitness of an object to a particular purpose, but, as has been already observed, "the whole of that which moves, excites or invites the mind to volition;" and not only "the views of the mind," but "the state, frame, temper and habit of the mind," however caused. Therefore many volitions may be caused or occasioned by motive in this sense, which are not caused by any perception at all, but by appetite, bias, taste, etc. And if a man perceive ever so clearly the fitness of an object to answer a particular purpose, and in this respect its agreeableness, this is not the same as actual choice of that object, all things considered. A man may perceive, that hard and constant labor is will fitted to the increase of his property; yet he may not choose it.

Though it should be said, that every agreeable perception is a volition; it would not follow, that a volition is a motive to itself, which is what Dr. West means, if he mean to fix any absurdity, in saying, that motive and volition are one and the same. There is no absurdity in the supposition, that one volition should be a motive to another volition; that a strong wish for honor should be a motive to determine a man to generosity, hospitality, a general good treatment of his neighbors, and many services useful to the public; and charity requires us to believe, that a desire to do good, was the motive, which made Dr. West willing to write and publish his *Essays on Liberty and Necessity.* The principle from which Dr. West endeavors to fasten an absurdity on President Edwards, is that nothing can be a motive but an agreeable perception; which is both contrary to truth and contrary to President Edwards.

Archbishop King speaks abundantly of "depraved elections." What does he mean by *depraved elections?* Elections not according to truth, reason or divine revelation? But if a man were to choose according to these, he must not be persuaded to such election by *any regard* to truth, reason or divine revelation; this would imply, that all things were not perfectly indifferent to him before election, and that some things are chosen, because they are previously adapted to excite choice, and not agreeable mere-

ly because they are chosen, as he holds in places before quoted. Besides; if a man choose what is agreeable to truth, reason or revelation, *from a regard to* truth, reason or revelation, or which is the same thing, from the motive of truth, reason or revelation, he is *persuaded*, *influenced* and *wrought upon* by those motives; consequently he is *passive* in being the subject of this influence of the motives, and not free in the sense of freedom, which the Archbishop holds. Again, if a man choose what is dictated by truth, reason or revelation, from regard to anything else than truth, reason or revelation; as he is influenced by motive, which is the thing which he regards, he is in the same sense not free. Therefore to be free in that sense he must choose it from no regard to anything, but without motive, end or design. And in such a choice what there is of depravity or virtue, more than there is in the shining of the sun or in the blowing of the wind, let any man point out.

Whether there be an infallible connection between motives and volitions or not; still so far as they influence and have effect; so far the subject is wrought upon by an extrinsic cause and is passive; and therefore according to our opponents, so far his liberty and moral agency are destroyed. Why then should motives ever be used with any man? We ought not to use them, wishing that they may have no effect or influence at all. Nor ought we to use them, to destroy moral agency, and to turn men into machines. For what purpose then should we use them? We commonly use them to persuade. But to persuade is to influence a man by motive, which is an extrinsic cause; and under the influence of motive, he is passive; and in such a case our opponents say his liberty and moral agency are destroyed. But if they be not in this way destroyed; an infallible connection between motive and volition is not inconsistent with liberty; and therefore why should Dr. West or any other man dispute against it?

Most, if not all writers in favor of self-determination allow, that men *generally* act on motive; and I presume they would not deny, that whenever they do act on motive, they are *persuaded* to act *by the motive*. Therefore on their principles, men are generally deprived of liberty and moral agency, generally act as mere machines and passive instruments; and all their objections against an infallible connection between motives and volition, may be retorted, with respect to the general conduct of mankind. And as to the liberty and moral agency exercised in some rare instances, when men act without motive, as when they

are supposed to choose between things perfectly indifferent; it is a mere trifle not worth disputing about.

Dr. Price declares, "That by determining as we please," he means, "our possessing a power to make either of two motives the strongest; i. e. to make either of them the motive that shall prevail, and the motive on which we shall please to determine."* But this act, by which we make one motive the strongest, must be without motive. If it be not without, but be under the influence of motive, not we, but that prior motive makes that motive strongest, on which we please to determine. And as the compliance with that prior motive is an act in which we determine as we please, a still prior motive is necessary to that act, and we must give strength to that motive too, and so on to infinity. On the other hand, if without motive we make one motive stronger than another, we in this case at least act without motive; which is contrary to what Dr. Price abundantly professes. He says, "A self-determining power which is under *no influence from motives*, has never been meant by any advocates for liberty." But if we may and do act without motive in making one motive to prevail; why may we not immediately act without motive, as well as first without motive make one motive the strongest, that we may comply with it? Besides; to give strength to a motive, that we may comply with it, is really, in the act of giving that strength, to comply with the motive, and to choose the object which it recommends. It is like giving money to a friend, that he may procure for us a certain commodity. This certainly implies, that we choose and wish for that commodity.

In the same page Dr. Price puts the question; "Has a man urged by contrary inclinations, no controlling power over his inclinations, to make one of them preferably to the other, the inclination which he will follow?" I answer, no; there is a contradiction in it. The supposition implies, that before he "makes one of them the inclination that he will follow," it is not the inclination which he chooses to follow. But this is not true. In that he voluntarily makes it the inclination that he will follow, it is implied that he is inclined to follow it. He is willing and chooses to follow it, and therefore he voluntarily makes it the inclination, which he will follow. Thus it is previously what he makes it to be; and he is willing before he is willing. In making it the inclination, which he will follow, he does follow it. He follows it before he follows it.

Dr. Price in the same book says, "I am sensible, that it is nonsense, to deny the influence of motives, or to maintain that

* Correspondence with Priestly, p. 347.

there are no fixed principles and ends, by which the will is guided."* Then is it not nonsense, to assert, that we give strength to motives? And that we make an inclination, the inclination that we will follow? This seems to be the inevitable consequence, unless we give strength to one motive, under the influence of another, and so run into the infinite series.

Dr. Clarke in his Remarks on Collins,† supposes, that motives have *some* influence, but not a prevailing, governing one; and that over and above the persuasive influence of motives, the self-determining power must by its own force exert itself to produce volition. Thus‡ he reprobates the supposition, that if a man be not determined by motives necessarily, i. e. certainly and really; he can in no degree be influenced by them. But to be influenced by motives, is to be really and effectually influenced, just so far as the subject is influenced by them at all. And so far as he is influenced or persuaded by them, so far is he governed and determined by them. For that is what we mean by a determination by motives. On the other hand, so far as a man is not influenced or determined by motive, he acts without motive and without regard to it. So that there is no medium between no real or persuasive influence of motive, and a *determining governing* influence.

Again, he reprobates the idea, "that motives and reasons can be of no weight and no use at all to men, unless they *necessitate* them; and that if a person be not determined *irresistibly*, then he must be totally indifferent to all actions alike, and can have no regard to motives and reasons of action at all."§ By *necessitating* and *determining irresistibly*, if he mean anything to the purpose, he must mean really and actually to influence by persuasion, so as to give some bias or inclination to the will. And it is plain, that if motives do not at all bias or incline the will, the man remains in a state of total indifference, and "has no regard to motives or reasons of action at all." Nor is there any medium between an inclination of the will and total indifference; for this is the same as to say, that there is no medium between an inclination of the will and no inclination of it. And if "motives and reasons" do not incline men's wills and have no previous tendency to incline them, "they are of no weight or use at all to men;" and if a person be not really inclined by them, he is totally indifferent to them.

In the same page, the Doctor considers it as needing proof, "that a self-moving power is inconsistent with having any regard to reasons of acting." So far as a person is persuaded to act,

* Page 348. † pp. 12, 13. ‡ p. 12. § p. 14.

by reasons and motives; so far he is *influenced* by motives, in the sense, in which we hold, that any person is influenced by them; therefore so far is not self-determined or self-moved. Or if by self-determination be meant, that under the effectual persuasion of motives, we cause our own volitions; (though we deny the possibility of causing our own volitions) yet as to liberty in the sense in which I oppose it, it would come to the same. The slave, who always acts by motives exhibited by his master, is as absolutely controlled by his master, as the whip in the master's hand. Besides, to be effectually persuaded by motive to volition, and to cause our own volition independently of extrinsic influence, is a direct contradiction.

"The doing of anything *upon* or *after* or *in consequence of*, that perception" (the perception of motive) "this is the power of self-motion or action, which—in moral agents we call *liberty*." If the doing be merely in consequence of motive, without any *influence* of the motive persuading to the doing; that which in this case is called a motive, is very improperly so called. So a motive would be no reason at all for the doing. If it be a reason and properly a *motive*, it *moves* the agent to the doing; consequently the doing is not *self*-motion, unless self-motion and motion excited by an extrinsic cause are one and the same. Nor is this motion a *free action* in a sense opposed to moral necessity. It is not free from extrinsic causality, nor of course free from a dependence on an extrinsic cause. Every effect is dependent on its cause. Nor is it free with a liberty of contingence. This implies, that something happens without a cause.

If it should be said, that motive in this case is not the *efficient* of the action or doing—this is granted; but at the same time, for reasons already given, it is denied, that the man himself is the efficient cause of it. He who established the laws of nature, so called, is the primary cause of all things. What is meant by efficient cause in any case, in which an effect is produced according to established laws? For instance, what is the efficient cause of the sensation of heat from fire? If it be answered, fire is the efficient cause; I also answer, that the motive is the efficient cause of the volition and doing aforesaid. If it be said, that the Great First Cause is the efficient of the sensation of heat; the same Great Agent is the efficient cause of volition, in the same way, by a general law establishing a connection between motives and volitions; as there is a connection between fire in certain situations and the sensation of heat.

To allow, that we are free, though we always act in consequence of motives, unless by acting be meant an action not ex-

cited or influenced by motive, and of which the motive is no reason, is to plead for no other liberty, than is perfectly consistent with the most absolute moral necessity and with absolute decrees.

Doctors Clarke and Price consider the man free, who efficiently causes his own volitions according to motives, because he himself and not the motives, is the efficient cause. Yet as by the supposition he causes them according to motives, he is limited by them. And is a slave free, who manufactures a commodity under the control and lash of his master? Or is the convict free, who himself walks around the stake, to which he is chained? Yet according to the system of the said gentlemen, the slave and not the master is the efficient cause of his own volition to labor. The convict and not the stake, is the efficient cause of his own volition to walk around the stake. Nor is the master the efficient cause of the limitation of the volitions of his slave; he merely exhibits the motives to their limitation. And it will not be pretended, that the stake is the efficient cause of the limitation of the volition of the convict.

Dr. Price, in Correspondence with Priestly, says, "that no influence of motives, which is short of making them physical efficients or agents, can clash with liberty."* Now the walls, gates and bars of a prison are not *physical efficients or agents*; yet they are as inconsistent with the liberty of the prisoner, as if they were such efficients and agents, and stood around him with gun and bayonet, to confine him to the spot; or as if they had built and made themselves for the purpose of his confinement. So if man be limited to act agreeably to motives only, they are as inconsistent with his liberty, as they would be, if they were intelligent agents, had created themselves and had established the connection between themselves and volition. It is as to liberty, immaterial who or what has established the connection between motives and volitions, provided the connection be infallibly established. As it is immaterial as to the liberty of a prisoner, who or what made the walls, gates and bars of the prison, whether the walls, gates and bars themselves, any extrinsic cause, or even the prisoner himself. If he had built and made them all, had locked himself in and had flung the key through the grates, he would be as effectually deprived of his liberty, as if the same things had been done by any other agent. These observations lead to a further answer to the plea, that we give strength to the motive which determines us. What if a man should give strength to a motive? After it is thus become strong, it as effectually governs the man, and as really deprives him of his liberty, as if it had

* Page 341.

derived its strength from any other source. Suppose a man were possessed of creating power, and should create another man stronger than himself, and this other man should bind the former hand and foot. Would he not be as effectually deprived of his liberty, as if he had been in the same manner bound by any other man?

CHAPTER V.

IN WHICH IT IS INQUIRED WHETHER VOLITION BE AN EFFECT AND HAVE A CAUSE.

The title of Dr. West's second essay is, "That volition is not properly an effect, which has a cause." Whether his meaning be, that it is an effect which has no cause, or that it is not an effect at all, the words do not determine; but from the sequel I conclude, the latter is his meaning. This, as has been already noticed, is indeed contradicted by the Doctor, as in this passage, "The modification in question" (i. e. the modification which the mind gives itself in willing or acting, which the Doctor explains to be volition) "is the consequence or EFFECT of the mind willing or choosing."* Then volition is an *effect*; and an effect of a preceding volition.

I presume the Doctor has the merit of originality in this part of his system. Many things in the common scheme of self-determination do indeed imply, that volition has no cause; viz. Liberty as opposed to all necessity or certainty; the sovereignty and independence of the will; its exemption from all influence of motive or extrinsic cause, etc. Still I have not met with one writer before Dr. West, who had boldness enough expressly to avow the sentiment. Dr. Clarke and all the rest hold, that volition is the effect of the mind itself in the exercise of its self-moving or self-determining power. And Doctor Price, when charged by Dr. Priestly with holding, that volitions come to pass without a cause, rejects the imputation and takes it hardly, that ever it should have been made to him or his system.†

But let us examine the reasons, by which Dr. West endeavors to support this doctrine. They are the following:

1. That volition is an abstract term and signifies something, which cannot exist without a subject; or volition is nothing but

* Page 24. † Correspondence with Priestly, p. 349.

the mind willing or acting; and therefore is not an effect.* But suppose volition be nothing but *the mind willing* or *acting*; is that state of the mind or the mind in that state, not an effect? Dr. West will not deny, that the mind absolutely considered is an effect. If then the mind *willing* or in the exercise of volition, is not an effect; it seems, that the mind while without volition is an effect or a creature; but in the exercise of volition ceases to be an effect, and therefore ceases to be a creature. Will Dr. West avow this? Motion is an abstract term and signifies something, which cannot exist without a subject; or motion is nothing but a body moving. But will it hence follow, that motion or a body moving is not an effect? No more does it follow from the argument of Dr. West now under consideration, that volition is not an effect. The Doctor grants, that volition is the modification or mode of the mind; and is not that mode an effect? If it be not an effect, because it is a mode of the mind, then doubtless no other mode of the mind is an effect. And strip the mind of all its modes, and you will take away the mind itself; because some of those modes are *essential* modes. If all the modes of the mind, essential and accidental, taken singly and collectively, be not effects; the mind itself is not an effect. On the principle of Doctor West's argument, no mode whatever is an effect. The principle is this, That whatever cannot subsist of itself out of any subject, is not an effect. But no mode, solidity, extension, figure, color or motion, can subsist without a subject. Therefore not one of them nor any other mode is an effect. And if not one of those modes by itself, is an effect, all of them taken together are not an effect; and therefore body or matter is not an effect; yea neither matter nor spirit is an effect. And as matter and spirit with their modes, comprehend the whole creation; it will follow that no *creature* is an effect; i. e. no creature is a creature.

2. That volition or the mind willing, is not an effect, because it is an efficient cause. Dr. West believes, that a carpenter is the efficient cause of a ship; and does he therefore believe, that the carpenter in building the ship is not a creature? This would follow on the principle of this argument. The principle is, that whatever is an efficient cause, cannot be an effect. Therefore as a carpenter is the efficient cause of a ship, he is not an effect, or not a creature. Dr. West and others take it for granted, that if volition be an effect, it cannot be a cause. This is just as absurd as to hold, that unless a carpenter be uncaused, he cannot build a ship; and that a creature can be the cause of nothing.

* Page 21.

3. That if the operation or action, which is essential to the idea of a cause, be itself an effect; then its cause must operate to produce the said effect; and consequently the last mentioned operation being an effect, must have another cause to produce it, and so on *in infinitum*; and this infinite series of causes and effects entirely excludes the first cause and any efficient cause.* But it is denied, that in the case here supposed, an infinite series of causes and effects is involved. Suppose it be true, that the action which is necessary to constitute a man an efficient cause, be the effect of an extrinsic cause; how does it follow, that there must be, in this case, an infinite series of causes? We maintain that action may be the effect of a divine influence; or that it may be the effect of one or more second causes, the first of which is immediately produced by the Deity. Here then is not an infinite series of causes, but a very short series, which terminates in the Deity or first cause. I know that it is often *supposed* and *asserted* by Dr. West, that volition cannot be an effect at all; and that it is *supposed* by all others, who maintain Dr. West's general scheme, that it cannot be an effect of an extrinsic cause. But their supposing it is a mere assumption of the thing in dispute, in this part of the argument. Let them *prove* it and they will do something to the purpose. Again; the cause or series of causes, which is implied in the idea, that volition is an effect, is so far from excluding the first cause and any efficient cause, as Dr. West says, that it inevitably leads to the first cause, and implies, that there is an efficient cause of all volition in creatures, as well as of everything else short of the first cause.

4. That volition in the Deity is no effect, but is only the Deity considered as willing or causing; and therefore to assert, that volition is no effect, is not in itself an absurdity. Why then may we not assert, that volition in the creature is no effect?† On this I observe, It is granted, that volition in the Deity is not an effect; but it no more hence follows, that volition in the creature is not an effect, than that existence and knowledge in the creature, are not effects, because they are not effects in the Creator.

5. That if human volition be an effect, then man must be passive in willing, but if he be passive in willing, he can be active in nothing else; i. e. he is no agent, but a mere passive machine. But if man be active in willing, then volition cannot be the effect of an extrinsic cause, and will be nothing but the mind acting or operating.‡ No doubt if human volition be an effect, man is so far passive in willing, as to be the subject of the influence of that

* Page 22. † p. 23. ‡ Ibid.

cause which produces volition; still he is active too in volition, is still an agent and not a *mere* passive machine. In volition man is both passive and active; passive as he is the subject of the influence of the cause which excites volition, and active in the exercise of it. As the day-laborer is passive in that he is influenced by the prospect of wages, to consent to labor, and active in exerting and in consenting to exert himself in labor. Nor does it follow from a man's being active in volition, that volition cannot be the effect of an extrinsic cause. The idea, that it does follow, takes for granted the very thing in question, viz. that an action cannot be an effect, especially of an extrinsic cause. Dr. West ought to have proved this.

Besides; why does the Doctor say, "If man be active in willing, then volition cannot be the effect of any *extrinsic* cause?"* His doctrine equally implies, that it is not the effect of an *intrinsic* cause. His doctrine is, that volition is, in general terms, not an effect and has no cause. But now, it seems the Doctor recedes from this, and holds only, that volition is not the effect of an *extrinsic* cause, implicitly granting, that it is *an effect*, and an effect of an *intrinsic* cause.

The Doctor tells us, that "if man be passive in willing—he is —a *mere passive machine*."† How does this appear? A man is passive in his intellectual views; but is he in those views a mere passive *machine?* The human intellect is very different from what we commonly call a *machine*. Or if by *machine* the Doctor mean anything that is influenced by an extrinsic cause: I grant, that in this sense, both the human intellect and human will are *machines;* and in granting this, I grant no more than is implied in the moral necessity for which I plead. Yet such an application of the word *machine*, would be a gross perversion of it.

6. That the Deity has not only acted from all eternity; but is continually acting upon the whole creation, for the preservation and government of it. Yet these operations and energies of the Deity are not effects, though they take place in time. Therefore the energies or volitions of the human mind are not effects, though they also take place in time.‡ But I deny, that the operations or energies of the Deity *begin* in time, though the effects of those operations do. They no more begin in time, than the divine existence does; but human volitions all begin in time. There is no succession in the divine mind; therefore no new operations take place there. All the divine acts are equally from eternity, nor is there any *time* with God. "One day is with the Lord as a thousand years and a thousand years as one day." The *effects*

* Page 23. † Ibid. ‡ p. 24.

of those divine acts do indeed all take place in time and in a succession. If it should be said, that on this supposition the effects take place not till long after the acts, by which they are produced; I answer, they do so in our view, but not in the view of God. With him there is no time, no before nor after with respect to time; nor has time any existence either in the divine mind or in the nature of things, independently of the minds and perceptions of creatures; but it depends on the succession of those perceptions. So that from the consideration, that the divine energies and operations are no effects, it no more follows, that human volitions are no effects, than from the consideration that the divine existence and knowledge are no effects it follows, that *our* existence and knowledge are no effects.

7. That if volition were an effect, we could not be the *causes* of any effects. At the most we should be *mere passive instruments.** This wholly depends on the meaning of *words*, as most of Dr. West's arguments do. If by *cause* the Doctor mean a *self-determinate* cause, he, *as usual*, begs what he has no right to expect will be given him. But if by *cause* he mean a rational, voluntary agent, acting under the persuasive influence of light and motives; we may be such causes, though volition is an effect; and acting as such causes we may produce effects. Thus Noah built the ark; Moses hewed two tables of stone, etc. And if under the name of a *passive instrument* the Doctor mean to include such a rational, voluntary agent, as I have just described; I grant, that in this sense we are passive instruments, and it is impossible, that a rational creature should be any other than such a passive instrument. But I reprobate the calling of such an agent a mere passive instrument, as a great abuse of language.

But suppose volition were not an effect; should we then be causes of effects? or should we then be less passive instruments? If volition were no effect, we ourselves should no more be the causes of it, than any extrinsic cause. It would happen in us by mere chance. And should we in the exercise of that volition, which is without cause and is merely accidental, be any more causes of an effect, than we should be in the exercise of a volition excited by a proper motive? If any reason can be given to show, that we should, let it be given. Though it may be pleaded, that when we become the subjects of volition by mere chance, we are not the subjects of the operation of a cause in the production of volition, and in that sense are not passive; yet in this case volition takes place in our minds equally without our causation, our previous agency or consent, as if the same volition were

* Page 25.

caused by something extrinsic. So that if we be not equally *wrought upon* in these two cases, we are equally *inactive*, and therefore can no more be *causes* in the one case, than in the other. And there is nothing more favorable to liberty or self-determination in the one case than in the other.

8. That if volition were an effect, we could have no more ideas of cause and effect, than a blind man has of colors. For we being passive in our ideas of sensations, they could never suggest to us the ideas of cause and effect; and if volition or internal action be the effect of an extrinsic cause, our reflections could never afford an example of an efficient cause, and so we must forever be destitute of the ideas of cause and effect.* On this I observe:

(1) It wholly depends on the meaning of the word *cause*. If as I before observed, it mean a self-determinate cause, which "acts on itself and produces volition;" I grant, that we have no idea of such a cause, more than a blind man has of colors. Nor has Dr. West any idea of such a cause, as he reprobates it and does not believe in its existence. Neither God nor creature can be such a cause as this; it is an impossibility; it is perfectly like the animal, which President Edwards supposed the traveller professed to have seen in *Terra del Fuego*. But if cause mean a rational, voluntary agent producing effects under the influence of motives; such causes we ourselves are or may be; and the idea of such a cause we derive from every artificer, whom we see employed at his trade, from every husbandman, who in our view tills the ground, and from every external action which we perform.

(2) Though we are passive in our ideas of sensation, yet every idea of that kind, for the very reason that we are passive in it, suggests to us the ideas of both cause and effect. In that we are passive in those ideas both cause and effect are implied. If no cause operated upon us to produce the effect, sensation, we should not be passive in sensation. It is true, the becoming passively the subjects of sensation, does not suggest to us the idea of a self-determinate or self-actuating cause; for such a cause does not exist, is an impossibility, and therefore no idea of it can be conceived; as I have already endeavored to show.

(3) This argument supposes, that we get the idea of an efficient cause by the experience, that we ourselves are the efficient causes of volition. But in the first place we deny, that we ever do experience ourselves to be the efficient causes of volition. And in the second place, if we did, it would be entirely incon-

* Page 25.

sistent with Dr. West's proposition now under consideration; it would prove, that volition is an effect, and that we ourselves are the efficient causes of it.

(4) Be it so that "our reflections can never afford us an example of an efficient cause;" what absurdity follows? We avow that our reflections cannot afford us an example of such a cause. We neither efficiently cause our own volitions nor our own perceptions. Yet we are not destitute of ideas of cause and effect, as I have already shown. But certainly according to Dr. West our reflections do not afford us an example of an efficient cause of volition; for volition is, according to him, no effect and has no cause.

9. That if our volitions were the effects of an extrinsic cause, we could never have the idea of dependence and independence, and therefore could not connect our ideas together, i. e. could not be rational beings. And as we are rational beings, it follows, that our volitions are not the effects of an extrinsic cause, but that we are self-determinate, and that we get the ideas of dependence and independence, by experiencing in ourselves, that in willing and choosing we act independently of any extrinsic cause.*

This implies, that in volition we act independently, and that from such independent actions we derive the idea of independence. But this again is a sheer begging of the question. How does it appear, that we act independently? The Doctor might as well have taken it for granted, that we act self-determinately. We no more grant, that we acquire the idea of independence, by experiencing it in volition, than that we acquire the idea of an efficient cause by experiencing ourselves to be the efficient causes of our own volitions. And if any man have the idea, that any creature is in volition independent of all extrinsic causes, this idea is not allowed to be according to truth. As to the divine independence, which is indeed entire and absolute, Dr. West will not pretend, that we get the idea of this by experiencing the like independence in ourselves. We no more get that idea in this way, than we get the idea of the divine omnipotence, by experiencing omnipotence in ourselves. So that though we have the ideas of dependence and independence, can connect our ideas together and are rational beings, it by no means follows, as Dr. West infers, "that our volitions are not the effects of an *extrinsic* cause, and that we are self-determinate." And why does the Doctor continually deny volition to be the effect of an *extrinsic* cause?

* Page 25.

The proposition which he has undertaken to support, equally implies, that it is not the effect of an *intrinsic* cause.

10. That volition is only the relation of the energy of a cause in producing an effect, and therefore is not an effect, and has no proper existence of its own.* If volition be only the *relation* of the energy of a cause, it is not the *energy* itself or *action* of a cause; and how then is it a part of the subject of the present inquiry? The present inquiry and discussion relate to the voluntary *actions* of a rational being. As to the relations and external denominations of those actions, they may be and commonly are different in every action, yet the actions themselves may be the same. Besides; the Doctor will not pretend to deny, that volition is an action of the mind, or as he chooses to express it, *the mind acting*. And is the mind acting only the relation of the energy or action of that mind? And has the mind acting "no proper existence of its own?" If it have, it is an effect doubtless, because it is a creature. An action of the human mind is an event, and an event coming to pass in time, and therefore has a cause. And Dr. West says, he "cannot be charged with holding, that events take place without a cause."†

11. That no agent can bring any effect to pass, but what is consequent on his acting. Therefore it is very absurd to call the acting or activeness of a being, an effect; because it introduces the utmost absurdity into language, by confounding and blending things together, which are very different.‡ It is an undoubted truth, that no agent can bring any effect to pass, but what is consequent on his acting. But how does it thence follow, that it is very absurd to call the action of a being an effect? And how does this confound and blend things together, which are very different? It will not be denied, that the prophesying of a prophet may be the act of that prophet; yet acting by inspiration he is excited to that act by a divine agency. No doubt the Divine Being brings to pass this effect by a previous act or exertion of himself. But where is the absurdity of calling this prophesying an effect of the divine influence? How does the calling of it so, confound and blend the divine influence and the act of the prophet, which are acknowledged to be very different from each other?

12. That cause and effect are not synonymous terms; and therefore "in whatever sense anything is a cause, in that sense it is not proper to call it an effect; for this reason, that causes considered as causes, are not effects."§ This is just as conclusive reasoning as if the Doctor had said, the words *tree* and *effect* are

* Page 26. † p. 27. ‡ p. 28. § Part II. p. 90.

not synonymous terms. Therefore in whatever sense anything is a *tree*, in that sense it is not proper to call it an *effect*; for this reason, that *trees* considered as *trees* are not *effects*. Rain considered as the cause of the growing of the grass, is an effect; a medicine considered as the cause of a cure, is still an effect; and Dr. West considered as the author of several essays on liberty and necessity, is as really a creature of God, as he is when he is considered to be in the exercise of his favorite liberty or power of *not acting* and is in perfect *torpor*. The Doctor proceeds, "The mind acting is the mind causing; for I conceive, whenever the mind acts, it produces some effect."* If the Doctor mean that whenever the mind is the subject of an *internal* act or volition, it produces some *external* effect; this is manifestly a mistake, and the Doctor himself will not avow it. If he mean, that whenever it is the subject of volition, it produces that volition as an *effect*; this in the first place is giving up what he himself had written an essay to prove, viz. that volition is not an effect; and secondly it is a begging of the main point. In short, Dr. West is a most sturdy metaphysical beggar. But as charity demands no gratuities to such beggars, he is to expect none. He adds to the last quotation, it "will introduce the greatest confusion in language, to speak of the mind, considered as causing, as being an effect." But what confusion of language is it, to speak of Dr. West considered as the author of essays on liberty and necessity, as being a creature? I hope, when the Doctor shall write again, he will *show* that it confounds language, and not merely *assert* it.

The Doctor, in the page last quoted, says, "The question is, whether every act of the will is a new effect produced by the Deity or by some other extrinsic cause." I do not allow this to be the question. The Doctor asserts in general terms, that volition is not properly an effect. The question is entirely general, whether volition be an effect of any cause, *extrinsic* or *intrinsic*. When this question shall have been settled, a subsequent one may arise, whether it be an effect of *extrinsic* cause.

Thus I have considered Dr. West's arguments to prove, that volition is not an effect and has no cause. Whether they do really prove it, the reader will judge.

Dr. Price in his correspondence with Priestly, says, "An agent that does not put himself in motion, is an agent that is always acted upon, and an agent that never acts."† On this I remark, that it is not true, that every agent, who does not put himself in motion is always acted upon, by an extrinsic agent. The Deity did not at first put himself in motion, meaning by *motion* volition.

* Part II. p. 90. † p. 341.

If he did, he was before without motion or volition. And Dr. Price would not pretend, that God existed from eternity without any volition, and that when he came down within the limits of time, he put himself into volition, i. e. he created volition in his own mind. Or if by being *acted upon*, Dr. Price meant, the Deity's acting according to the most wise and holy reasons, which his infinite understanding can suggest; no doubt in this sense the Deity himself is acted upon; and if this be inconsistent with agency, instead of but one, as Dr. Price says, there is *not one* agent in the universe. God no more put himself in motion or volition at first, than he put himself into existence. Nor has he at any time put himself into any particular volition. This would imply a new thing and a change in God.

To say, that an agent that is acted upon cannot act, is as groundless, as to say that a body acted upon, cannot move; unless the main question is begged, by supposing, that action means self-determinate action.

The advocates for self-determination are in like manner guilty of begging the question, by using *active power* to mean a self-determining or self-moving power; a power which puts itself into exercise, without the agency or influence of any extrinsic cause. We deny the existence and possibility of such a power. We hold, that it is as impossible, as that an animal should beget itself, or take one step before the first step. If this be meant by *active power*, we deny that any being possesses it; and our opponents ought to be ashamed to beg it.

Dr. West holds, that volition is no effect and has no cause. He also holds, that volition is a modification of the mind. Indeed it is manifest, that the mind willing, is the mind in a different mode or differently modified, from what it was, when not willing. Now is the event of this modification taking place in the mind, not an effect? And is it uncaused? Then not only does an event come to pass without cause, which Dr. West denies; but it happens by mere blind, stupid, undesigning chance. It might as well be said, that the event of a cannon ball moving is not an effect, as that the event of the mind willing is not an effect.

It is pleaded, that if volition be the effect of an *extrinsic* cause, it is wholly passive. Dr. West joins with others in this plea.* But if volition be the effect of an *intrinsic* cause, it is equally passive. For as Dr. West himself says very rightly, "Every effect is wholly passive with regard to the cause which produces it."†

* Page 23. † Ibid.

Dr. West says, volition is "a property of a mind."* Therefore when volition exists in the mind, it is the subject of a property of which before it was destitute. Now is not this an effect? Does not some efficient cause, either the mind itself or some other cause, endue it with that property, as really as if it were endued with any other property? Or as if a body were endued with a particular color?

He further holds, that "virtue and vice are mere modes or attributes of a rational agent."† But virtue and vice are voluntary acts of the mind, or volitions. Therefore volitions are modes or attributes of a rational agent. But according to him these modes have no cause and are no effects. And if some modes be not effects, how shall we know, that other modes or any modes are effects? If no modes be effects, since we know nothing of substances but by their sensible modes and qualities; how shall we know, that substances themselves are effects?

Volitions are acts and events. And if some events be uncaused, why may not all?

Dr. West contradicts and gives up his doctrine, that volition has no cause, in all those places, in which he allows, that volition is not without motive. As when he grants, "that the mind acts upon motives;" that "when the mind acts or chooses, it always has some end, design or reason, which is the occasion of its acting or choosing;" that "motives are the previous circumstances which are necessary for action," etc. Motives then are the reasons, the occasions, the necessary previous circumstances or antecedents of volition. And what are these but *second causes?* —causes in the sense, in which President Edwards explains himself to use the word *cause* with relation to this very subject? ‡ We say, that fire is the cause of the sensation of heat; that rain and sun-shine are the causes of vegetation, etc. Yet they are no more than the stated antecedents. In the same sense motives, according to Dr. West, are causes of volitions. Besides, all second causes are the effects of the first cause. Therefore ultimately volitions are effects of the Great First Cause.

If volition be no effect, it is not the effect of the mind in which it exists. That mind has no control over it. It comes to pass without its wish or consent, as fully as if it were the effect of some extrinsic cause. How then is the mind any more, or in any more desirable sense, free, than if volition were produced by an extrinsic cause? Which would a wise man choose? to have all volitions take place by pure accident, by blind chance and fate? or to have them ordered by a wise and good cause, in the appli-

* Pages 21, 22. † pp. 6 and 7. ‡ pp. 41, 42.

cation of proper motives? And are we agents in the former of these cases, more than in the latter? On this hypothesis volitions are his, in whose mind they exist, in this sense only, that he is the subject of them. And this is true on the supposition, that they are caused by an extrinsic cause. And how on this plan, are we more accountable for our volitions and actions, than on the supposition, that they are produced in us by an extrinsic cause?

If volition be no effect and have no cause, it proceeds from no power or faculty in human nature as its cause; not from the power of will, nor even from any *self-determining power*, whether it consist in the will or in any other part of human nature. What then is the advantage of the self-determining power so strenuously advocated? It cannot produce one volition nor one free act. How then does liberty consist in it? or depend on it? Or how does it contribute any aid toward liberty? And what becomes of the boasted independence and sovereignty of the will?

That a volition is produced in me by some extrinsic cause, is not at all opposed to liberty, unless by *liberty* be intended *contingence* or an exemption from all causality. If I could cause a volition in myself, it would be as necessary, as if it were produced by some other cause. Dr. West rightly observes, that "every effect is wholly passive with regard to the cause, which produces it." As the volition then produced by myself is wholly passive, it could not be more passive, if it were produced by some extrinsic cause.

Dr. West says, "Our consciousness, that we are self-active, suggests to us the ideas of cause and effect, of dependence and independence;"* i. e. our consciousness that we are the bare subjects of volitions, which are no effects at all, whether of ourselves or of any other cause, and therefore are not dependent on any cause, suggests to us the ideas of cause and effect, dependence and independence. Whether this be rational, let the reader judge.

Dr. West explains himself to mean by *volition*, "the *relation* of energy exerted by a cause in producing an effect;" and says, "It cannot be considered as being an effect of any cause whatever, or as having any proper existence of its own."† In support of this idea he quotes President Edwards, where he says, that action and passion are sometimes used to signify the mere relations of activeness of something on another, and of passiveness or of being acted upon by another thing; and that in this case they do not signify any positive effect or cause or any real existences. Hence Dr. West infers, that according to President Edwards, he

* Page 25. † p. 26.

cannot be charged with holding that events take place without a cause. On this it may be observed:

1. President Edwards tells us, that whenever the word action is used to signify a *mere relation*, it does not signify *an action* or some motion or exercise of body or mind. But Dr. West generally uses volition to signify *an action* or exercise of the mind. And yet in the passage now under consideration, he gives an explanation of volition, in which he says it signifies "the *relation* of the energy of a cause," and therefore not the energy itself, the exercise, exertion or act of that cause. President Edwards did not suppose, that the word *action* generally and properly signifies a mere relation; but that it generally and properly signifies a positive existence,* or an event which has as real an existence, as any fact or event. As to the word *volition*, President Edwards never considers that as signifying a mere relation. Whereas Dr. West considers this to be the proper meaning of volition.

2. As to the passage, which Dr. West quotes from President Edwards, the latter had good reason to say, that when the *action* is used to express not any exertion, fact or event, but the *mere relation* of activity with respect to something as the subject; it signifies no effect or cause and no real existence. This may be illustrated by some other relation; as sonship, the relation between father and son. A father is a real existence, and every created father is an effect. So is a son. But *sonship* is no real existence; nor is it a proper effect or cause, more than the relation between the three angles of a triangle and two right ones. Now volition is not such a mere relation; it is a real positive act, motion or exercise of the mind, and Dr. West abundantly grants this.

3. If volition be a mere relation of energy, it is not "an exertion of an active principle," "an act of the will," "an exercise of the mind," etc. as Dr. West asserts it to be. Besides, if it be a mere "*relation* of the energy exerted by a cause" or mind, what is the energy, act, exercise or exertion of which volition is the relation? Surely an act or exertion, and the relation of that act; a thing and the relations of that thing, are not one and the same. The same thing may have different and opposite relations. The same man may sustain the opposite relations of a father and a son. And if such a man be the same thing with his relations, he is the same thing with his sonship, and the same thing with his fatherhood. Thus, as two things which agree with a common

§ It will be remembered, that logicians and metaphysicians divide beings into substance and mode, and consider modes as having as real and positive an existence, as substance.

measure, agree between themselves, it will follow, that sonship and fatherhood are the same thing.

4. By volition Dr. West means either an act of the mind, or not. If he do mean an act of the mind, volition with him is not a mere relation, but a proper positive event or fact; and therefore must be an effect and have a cause; or an event takes place without a cause. If he do not by volition mean an act of the mind, it is surely not a *free* act; and if we do not act freely in volition, we do not act freely at all, i. e. we are not free agents. It is generally granted, and to be sure Dr. West's whole book implies, that all the moral liberty which we have is exercised in volition. But if volition be a *mere relation*, and not an act and a free act; we have no liberty; and by holding, that volition is a mere relation and not an act, Dr. West gives up all that liberty for which he disputes.

The Doctor, in his second part, grants that "acts of the will, volition, choice and determination of the mind may with *propriety* be called effects, when they signify those determinations or conclusions, which the mind makes in consequence of its comparing two or more things together."* Therefore some acts of the will are effects. How is this consistent with what the Doctor holds both in his former book and in this, that volition cannot be properly called an effect? Besides; what the Doctor here says, is applicable to all volitions, and therefore all volitions are according to his own account, effects. For all volitions are "determinations or conclusions, which the mind makes in consequence of its comparing two or more things together." If two or more things be expressly proposed, and one of them be chosen, it is the very case here stated by Dr. West. Or if one thing only be expressly and positively proposed as the object of our choice, still there is a real competition between this thing and the absence or neglect of it; and the mind comes to a determination in consequence of its comparing these two together. Therefore according to Dr. West's own account every volition "may with propriety be called an effect;" and yet according to the same Dr. West, "volition cannot be properly called an effect." "How can these things be?"

But Dr. West endeavors to evade this consequence, by saying, "I have used the term *volition* to signify *the mind considered as acting*. In this sense and in this only, I say volition is not *an effect*." But the mind considered as acting, acts in consequence of comparing two or more things together, and such an act Dr. West allows to be an effect. Also he grants, "that the

* Page 12.

human mind and all its powers and faculties are effects."* But will he say, that the human mind with all its powers and faculties *dormant* and *inactive*, is an effect, but the same mind with its powers and faculties *acting*, is not an effect? And does it cease to be an effect or a creature, as soon as it begins to act?

"If volition be only the mind acting; and if the mind acting is properly a cause, then it is not proper to call it an effect."† But what or where is the impropriety of calling it an effect? In such a dispute as this, to assert such a novel proposition without proof or illustration, is unreasonable. By the same reasoning it may be proved, that any man who makes anything is himself not an effect or creature. Thus, If a carpenter at work be properly a cause of a ship, then it is not proper to call him an effect or creature; and if Dr. West writing be properly the cause of several essays on liberty and necessity; then it is not proper to call him a creature.

"When volition is used to signify the mind acting, in that view it is properly a cause and not an effect."‡ What if it be properly a cause? This does not prevent its being properly an effect too, any more than the Doctor's being properly the cause of several essays prevents his being, or proves that he is not, properly a creature of God. "Causes as causes, are not effects."§ Then authors as authors, are not the creatures of God.

The Doctor argues, That an action cannot be the effect of the Deity, because "an effect is most certainly passive in coming into being—but this will imply *passive action* or *inactive action*, which is absurd."‖ I grant, that an effect is in this sense passive, that it is produced by the agency of the efficient cause; and in that sense a volition caused by the Deity or other efficient cause is passive. If Dr. West mean by passive action, an action which in its production is caused by an extrinsic cause, I grant it; and however Dr. West pronounces it *absurd*, he knows, that it is as easy for another to pronounce it *not absurd*; and the one pronunciation is just as good proof as the other. Volition is action, and if the Doctor will prove to the conviction of candid inquirers, that such an action cannot be the effect of a divine agency or other extrinsic cause; he will do something more than affirm the contrary to be absurd. As to the expression *inactive action*, if by this he mean, that the action is the effect of an extrinsic cause, I grant it, and demand proof that the idea of such an action is absurd. If he mean an action, which is not voluntary; I know of no person who pleads for such an action.

* Page 13. † Ibid. ‡ p. 28. § p. 13. ‖ p. 94.

What the Doctor says here, as well as almost his whole book, may be easily retorted. Suppose volition is not from an extrinsic cause, but from the subject as the cause; still it is as really and fully passive with respect to its cause and in coming into existence, as if it were the effect of an extrinsic cause. It would as much be the subject of the operation of this intrinsic cause, in order to its existence. Therefore in this case too we have *passive action* and *inactive action*.

The Doctor says, "How can he" [man] "be an agent, if volition be the effect of an extrinsic cause?"* To which I answer by asking another question or two. How can he in volition be an agent, if it be the effect of an intrinsic cause? The volition is still as passive in this case and equally produced by the efficiency of its cause, as it is when produced by an extrinsic cause. And how can man be an agent, if as the Doctor holds, volition be the effect of no cause, extrinsic or intrinsic? In that case, it is merely casual or accidental, like the motion of one of Epicurus' atoms in the infinite void.

CHAPTER VI.

OF FOREKNOWLEDGE AND THE CERTAINTY OR NECESSITY IMPLIED IN IT.

Dr. West begins his third essay thus: "We shall endeavor to show, in this essay, that infallible foreknowledge in the Deity does not prove, that events take place in consequence of an antecedent or previous necessity."† Let foreknowledge prove or not prove what it will, unless events take place absolutely without a cause, they do take place in consequence of an antecedent or previous necessity. Unless they take place absolutely without a cause they are effects; and every effect necessarily follows its cause. Dr. West grants, "that every effect is wholly passive with regard to the cause which produces it."‡ And as it is passive, it is brought into existence by the causing or necessitating influence of its cause. Its existence therefore "takes place in consequence of an antecedent or previous necessity;" and this is true of all events, which do not happen without cause. But Dr. West denies, that any events take place without a cause.

* Part I. p. 23. † p. 29. ‡ p. 23.

Therefore he must concede, that all events "take place in consequence of an antecedent necessity.

If to this it should be said, that though all events are effects, and are necessitated by their respective causes, and in that respect take place in consequence of an antecedent necessity. Yet as volitions are the effects of the mind, in which they exist, this cause does not *produce* them or exert its producing act, in consequence of an antecedent necessity; I answer, The mind, if it do efficiently cause volitions, causes them either in consequence of an antecedent certainty, or without that certainty. If it cause them in consequence of antecedent certainty, it causes them under the influence of moral necessity; for antecedent certainty of moral actions is all we mean by moral necessity. If it cause them without that certainty, it causes them contingently and by mere chance or blind fate.

Besides, if the mind cause its own volitions, it necessitates them into existence, and therefore they came into existence under the influence of antecedent necessity; and the causing act is an event and therefore must have a cause, and *this* cause must necessitate *this* event into existence; and so it runs into an infinite series of acts causing one another, every one of which comes into existence in consequence of an antecedent necessity.

That the infallible divine foreknowledge of any event does imply all that antecedent necessity of the future existence of that event, for which we contend, may appear thus. The infallible or certain foreknowledge of any event is a knowledge of the certainty or certain truth, that the event will come into existence; and that certainty which is the object of this knowledge, is all the necessity, for which we contend. This is what President Edwards calls philosophical necessity, which with regard to moral actions is moral necessity; and it must exist at the time the knowledge of it exists, and indeed in order to be the object of knowledge. And as the knowledge is by the supposition *foreknowledge*, therefore it must exist before the event foreknown, and therefore the certainty or necessity of that event must exist before the event itself; of course it is *antecedent* necessity. To suppose otherwise is to suppose, that a certainty or certain truth may be seen and known before it exists, and that what is not, may be seen and known to be.

Dr. West argues, that because "the Deity is possessed of an underived self-existing knowledge, which is independent of any cause or medium whatever, and his knowledge can extend to all futurities, independent of the imperfect mode of inferring conclusions from their premises; consequently infallible prescience in

the Deity cannot imply any antecedent necessity of the event foreknown."* By antecedent necessity we mean antecedent certainty or antecedent certain truth. Now does Dr. West mean, that since the Deity possesses an underived and self-existent knowledge, therefore he sees and knows, that there is a certainty of the future existence of an event, when there really is no such certainty? Or that God knows that to exist, which does not exist? He does mean this, if he mean anything to the purpose. For if he mean, that God sees a certainty which exists, it does exist in order to be seen; and therefore antecedent certainty or moral necessity is implied in the divine prescience. But let the knowledge of God be ever so underived, self-existent and independent, it will not enable him to discern that which is not, to see truth or certainty, before it exists, or to see truth to be falsehood and falsehood to be truth. If by *independent* knowledge he mean a knowledge which is not dependent on the truth and has not truth for its foundation and object; he must still mean, that God can know a proposition to be true which is not true.

It is manifestly implied in what Dr. West says on this subject, that if divine foreknowledge were derived through any *medium*, or if it be founded on decrees, it would be utterly inconsistent with human liberty. But since it is, as he supposes, immediate and not dependent on decrees, it is perfectly consistent with human liberty. That there will be a general rejection of antichrist and antichristian errors, we know by the medium of divine prediction. And does the Doctor believe that this our knowledge is more inconsistent with the liberty of those, who shall reject antichrist, than the absolute and underived knowledge of God? Or than our own knowledge of the same fact, if it were intuitive and underived?

The Doctor adds, "If this definition of the divine knowledge," viz. that it is underived, self-existent and independent, "be just; then it will follow that there is no previous or antecedent *certainty in the things themselves*, upon which divine prescience is founded." This manifestly implies, that God foreknows things before they are future, and sees a certainty before it is." "By certainty," says the Doctor, "in the things themselves," previous to the divine knowledge, *must be meant* some medium distinct from the things themselves, by which they render themselves evident to the divine knowledge." He here asserts, but brings nothing to prove what he asserts. And what signify such bare assertions? Does the Doctor expect his readers will receive them as proofs? May they not justly demand evidence, that this

* Page 32.

medium which he here mentions, must be meant by certainty in things themselves? By that certainty I mean no such thing. But positively I do mean what President Edwards declares that he meant, "The firm and infallible connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition," which affirms them to be connected; or the *real truth* of the proposition. For instance it is a real truth, that I am now writing, and the certainty or reality of this truth or fact, is the ground of the divine knowledge of it; and this certainty consists in the firm and indissoluble connection of the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms, that I am writing. This certainty or truth of the thing is no "medium distinct from the thing" or fact "itself, by which it renders itself evident to the divine knowledge;" but it is the real existence of the very thing or fact. Again, it is to all Christians a real and certain futurity and truth, that Jesus Christ will judge the world in righteousness. But the truth and certainty of this future event is not a *medium* distinct from the futurity of the event itself, by which it renders itself evident to the divine mind; but it is the real and infallible futurity of the event itself and consists in the firm and infallible connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms the futurity of the event. Now will Dr. West pretend, that there is no truth or no firm and infallible connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition, that *I am now writing*, which is the foundation of the divine knowledge of that event? If this were so, real truth and fact would not be the foundation, rule or object of the divine knowledge; but God might indifferently know truth to be falsehood and falsehood truth.

Or if by "the medium by which things render themselves evident," the Doctor mean *the truth and reality of things*; I grant that what ever is known whether to God or creatures, is known by this medium; and this is true of the most self-evident propositions and of the most independent and underived knowledge. But to call this *a medium* of knowledge is a perversion of language. Surely truth is not the medium by which itself is known.

Dr. West himself, notwithstanding his abundant labor "to show, that infallible foreknowledge in the Deity does not prove, that events take place in consequence of an antecedent necessity;" fully and frequently grants all that we maintain. Thus, he says, "That the Deity does perfectly discern all connections between subjects and predicates—is readily granted."* Now this

* Page 37.

implies, that the said subjects and predicates are really and in themselves connected, and in order of nature before that connection is discerned. This real and certain connection is the certainty or certain truth of things themselves, of which we have been speaking; and which with regard to moral events and actions is moral necessity. "The future volitions of moral agents are so infallibly and indissolubly connected with the divine foreknowledge, which has had existence from all eternity, that it is impossible, that the Deity should be deceived; and therefore all these volitions will most *certainly* take place."* "There may be a *certainty*—that such a thing will take place,"† speaking of a human action. But certainty with regard to moral actions is moral necessity, and if all volitions foreknown by God will *certainly* take place, they will take place by moral necessity. "All things from eternity to eternity being present to the divine mind, *he sees all things as they are.*"‡ Therefore if he see some events as certainly future, they are certainly future; for he sees them as they are. And this certain futurity is the object of the divine knowledge, and in the order of nature is antecedent to it, as really as the existence of this paper, on which I am writing, is in the order of nature antecedent to my sight of it. But this antecedent certain futurity of any moral action, is antecedent moral necessity. Therefore as all moral actions are *foreknown* by God in consequence of an antecedent moral necessity, much more do they *come into existence* in consequence of such an antecedent necessity. "Deity would from all eternity have infallibly foreknown this proposition, *as a certain truth*,"§ viz. the proposition concerning Peter and Judas denying and betraying their Lord. It seems then that whatever proposition concerning a future event is infallibly foreknown by God, is foreknown as a certain and infallible truth; or which is the same thing, it is known, as an infallible truth, that the event will come to pass; and therefore it is a certain and infallible truth antecedently in the order of nature to the knowledge of it; and therefore the event being a moral act, was morally necessary antecedently to the foreknowledge, and much more antecedently to the event itself. "This necessity being only a consequence founded upon *the certainty of the thing* foreknown."‖ Thus notwithstanding all Dr. West's clamor against President Edwards, because he had spoken of a *certainty in things themselves*, he himself here expressly holds the very same. And will Dr. West deny, that this "certainty of the thing foreknown" is the ground of the divine foreknowledge of that thing, in the same sense, that my present existence is the

* Page 41. † p. 46. ‡ p. 52. § p. 53. ‖ p. 52.

ground of the divine knowledge, that I exist? If this be not denied, it cannot be denied, that certainty or moral necessity is in order of nature antecedent to the foreknowledge, and much more antecedent to the existence, of a moral action.

Dr. West will not deny, that any future event foreknown by God, will certainly come to pass. Then there is a certainty, or it is an infallible truth, that every such event will come to pass, and this certainty now exists antecedently to the existence of the event. But this certainty with regard to moral events, is moral necessity. Therefore there is a necessity of the existence of all events divinely foreknown, and this necessity is antecedent to the existence of the events. Thus, mere foreknowledge is an infallible proof of antecedent necessity.

"We frequently say, It is a pity such a person did so; there was no occasion for it; he might easily have omitted the doing of the thing in the time of it, if he would. Why may we not as well say, A man *will certainly* do a particular thing, though he will have power to forbear doing it? There could not be the least appearance of absurdity or contradiction in speaking in this manner about a future action, any more than about a past action, were it not for the great difficulty or supposed impossibility of conceiving how a thing can be foreknown, unless it be connected with something that now exists; that is, a thing cannot be foreknown, unless there is a medium, which has a present existence."* On this passage I remark:

1. Here again Dr. West holds that certainty in things, which he so abundantly reprobates in President Edwards. He says, "a man *will certainly* do a particular thing;" and he doubtless means, that it is a certain futurity, the event itself is certain, or it is a certain and infallible truth, that the man will do the thing; and not merely that this truth is known, whether by God or creature. Truth is truth whether known or not. And this infallible truth is the very certainty in the things themselves, of which President Edwards speaks.

2. What does Dr. West mean, when he says, "He might easily have omitted the doing of the thing, *if he would?*" Suppose the thing done was an *internal* act, a volition to go to a debauch. In what sense does Dr. West mean, that the man could have avoided this volition, *if he would?* Does he mean, that if he had not had the volition, he would not have had it? This is an undoubted truth, but does not disprove the necessity of it. If God had not always spoken the truth, he would not have spoken the truth. But it does not hence follow, that God does not

* Page 30.

always necessarily speak the truth, when he speaks at all, or that he can lie. If there had been no God, there would indeed have been no God; but does it hence follow, that the divine existence is not necessary?—To say, that if a man had chosen not to go to a debauch, he would indeed have chosen not to go to it, is too great trifling to be imputed to Dr. West. Yet to say, that the man could have avoided the *external action* of going to the debauch, if he would, would be equal trifling; for the question before us is concerning the liberty of the *will* or *mind* and not of the body. On the whole, we have before us one of Dr. West's *things hard to be understood*, and we must wait for an explanation.

3. When we say concerning any past action of a man, "There was no occasion for it; he might easily have omitted the doing of the thing in the time of it, if he would;" if we mean, that there was no antecedent certainty, that he would perform that action, we mean a falsehood. That action was as much from eternity the object of the divine omniscience, as any action which is now future; therefore the certainty of its then future existence preceded its actual existence. And this certainty was as fixed, unalterable and indefeasible, as the divine foreknowledge or the divine decree. The foreknowledge and decree of God imply no other kind or degree of necessity, than the aforesaid absolute certainty. A futurity that is absolutely certain is implied in the divine foreknowledge; and the addition of a decree cannot increase that certainty.

4. When we say, A person might easily have omitted a certain past action, in the time of it, if he would; we commonly mean, that he was under no compulsion or coaction, or no *natural* necessity; and that he had a *natural power* to omit the action. This undoubtedly every man has with regard to every voluntary action, and this however that action be foreknown or decreed by God. Though Judas betrayed his Master, "according to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God;" yet he was under no *natural* necessity to betray him, but had a full *natural power* to do otherwise. Now Dr. West reconciles foreknowledge with liberty, on the ground that we have still *a physical* or natural power to do otherwise. On the same ground we may reconcile absolute decrees with liberty.

5. In the same sense "we may as well say, Such a man will *certainly* do a particular thing, though he will have power to forbear the doing of it." He may doubtless have a *natural* power to forbear; still this does not at all diminish the *certain futurity* of the action; and that whether the action be fore-

known only, or foreknown and decreed. And a natural power is all the power, which the man will have to forbear the action. Any power opposed to moral necessity or the certain futurity of the action, would imply that it is uncertain, whether he will perform that action; which is contrary to the supposition made by Dr. West, "that the man *will certainly* do the thing."

6. As to "the great difficulty or supposed impossibility of conceiving *how* a thing can be foreknown, unless it be connected with something that now exists;" this is needlessly brought in here. In this part of the argument we are under no necessity of inquiring or showing *how* God foreknows future events, but may, so far as relates to the certain futurity of all events foreknown by God and the antecedency of that certainty to the existence of the events, allow, that God foreknows future events in the independent and underived manner, which Dr. West maintains. This would equally imply a certainty antecedent to the existence of the events foreknown, as a foreknowledge founded on a decree would imply it. Dr. West's account of the divine foreknowledge implies, as I have shown, all that certainty or necessity, for which we plead. Beside what has been already said to show this, I add, that Dr. West grants, that foreknowledge has no causal influence to bring things into existence, or to make their existence more certain, than it would be without foreknowledge. "I suppose it will be readily granted on all sides, that even the divine foreknowledge itself has no influence or causal force, with regard to the thing foreknown, either to bring it into existence or to hinder its happening; but that all things would take place just in the same manner, if they were not foreknown, as they do now;"* Dr. West also grants, that all future events are foreknown by God, and that all things which are foreknown by him, will certainly and infallibly come to pass. Now as this certainty is not caused by foreknowledge, it must exist independently of it. And as God sees all things as they are; therefore when he sees them to be certainly future, they *are* certainly future; and this certain futurity, which is the object of the divine knowledge, existed in the order of nature antecedently to the divine knowledge, and much more antecedently to the actual existence of the events themselves. Otherwise God would see events to be certainly future, while they are not certainly future.

"The obvious reason" says Dr. West, "why we cannot know things but only by intuition or proof, is because all our knowledge is entirely *ab extra*."† And does the Doctor believe, that if part of our knowledge were not *ab extra*, we should know some things

* Page 45. † p. 31.

neither by intuition nor by proof? Whatever is known by intuition is self-evident; and whatever is known by proof, is evident by the medium of something else. And whatever is known at all, is either evident by itself immediately, or is evident by something else mediately. Therefore Dr. West, in supposing, that if our knowledge were not all *ab extra*, we should know some things neither by intuition nor by proof, supposes that some things would be evident to us, neither immediately nor mediately, neither by themselves nor by anything else. And what kind of a source of knowledge we should then have, I leave the Doctor to explain.

"If previous certainty in things themselves means nothing distinct from the things themselves, then all that can be meant by this previous certainty in things themselves, upon which the divine knowledge is founded, is only this, that the Deity cannot know that things will exist, which he knows never will exist. And therefore to say, that there is a previous certainty in things themselves, upon which the divine knowledge is founded, is only saying in other words, that the divine knowledge is founded on the divine knowledge."* By certainty in things themselves I have already explained myself to mean the *truth* and *reality* of things themselves, or the truth of the proposition which asserts their existence or relation. And *previous* certainty of things themselves means nothing different from the truth of the proposition, which asserts their future existence, or its being a real truth that those things will exist. Now, whether to say, that the divine foreknowledge of an event, is founded on the truth, that the event will come into existence, be the same as to say, "that the divine foreknowledge is founded on the divine foreknowledge," I am willing any candid person should judge.

The Doctor says, "That knowledge in the Deity must mean the same thing with certainty."† No doubt knowledge in the Deity is the same thing with *subjective* certainty or certain knowledge; but it is not the same with *objective* certainty, or the truth which is the object of the divine knowledge.

The Doctor grants, "That the future volitions of moral agents are so infallibly and indissolubly connected with the divine foreknowledge, which has had existence from all eternity, that it is impossible, that the Deity should be deceived; and therefore these volitions will most *certainly* take place. For by *necessary* here he" [President Edwards] "can—mean nothing distinct from *infallible certainty*. But how does their being necessary in this sense, i. e. *infallibly certain*, prove that the volitions of moral agents are effects produced by an *extrinsic* cause."‡ Undoubt-

* Page 34. † Ibid. ‡ p. 41.

edly by necessity in this case President Edwards means nothing distinct from infallible certainty. This is the very thing which he abundantly declares himself to mean. "And as the divine foreknowledge," by Dr. West's concession, "has had existence from eternity;" and as "the volitions of moral agents are indissolubly connected with that foreknowledge," and "those volitions will most certainly take place;" of course there was an infallible eternal certainty, that all human volitions would come into existence just as they do exist, and Dr. West grants all that we hold on this head. What then becomes of liberty *to either side, to act or not act?* For instance, it is now divinely foreknown, that *Gog* and *Magog* will rise and compass the camp of the saints. Therefore when *Gog* and *Magog* shall come into existence, they will no more have a liberty *to act or not act*, as to this instance of their conduct, than they would have, on the supposition that the same conduct were decreed. It is true, there would be this difference in the cases, that the decree would *cause* the certain futurity of that conduct, but the foreknowledge would not *cause* it. Nor is it of any importance as to liberty, by whom or by what this certain futurity is caused, or whether it be without cause. If a prison when built, be no obstruction to liberty, then the agency of the mason and carpenter who built it was nothing opposed to liberty. So if *certain futurity*, when established, be not inconsistent with liberty; then the divine decree, by which it is established, is not inconsistent with liberty.

If it should be said, that God foresees, that *Gog* and *Magog* will influence themselves to the conduct just now mentioned; be it so; then it is now infallibly certain, that *Gog* and *Magog* will influence themselves to that conduct. Where then is their liberty to act or not act? It is not left loose and undetermined, whether they shall influence themselves to that conduct; but it is previously certain, that they will influence themselves to it.

The Doctor in the last quotation, asks, "How does their being infallibly certain, prove that the volitions of moral agents are effects produced by an *extrinsic* cause?" Suppose they are not effects of an *extrinsic* cause, but are effected by the subject of those volitions, if that were possible; yet if it be previously and from all eternity certain, that the subject will produce these volitions in himself; still there is no *liberty to either side, to act or not act;* but he is limited to produce in himself those very definite volitions, which are divinely foreseen, and therefore he is confined *to one side*, is confined *to act* and that definitely.

Or suppose these volitions are produced by no cause whatever, then God foresees that they are about to happen absolutely with-

out cause and by mere chance; still there is in this case no liberty to either side, but the volitions are without cause confined to one side only.

It is abundantly pleaded by Dr. West and others, that the circumstance that the divine foreknowledge is not the efficient cause of human volitions, renders that foreknowledge entirely consistent with their idea of liberty, even as the divine knowledge of a volition in present existence is consistent with the liberty of that volition. If by liberty in this case they mean self-determination or the causation of volition by the subject himself; I grant, that the most absolute foreknowledge is perfectly consistent with this idea of liberty; and so is an absolute decree as consistent with it. If God were absolutely to decree, that a particular man shall cause in himself a particular volition, the man would accordingly cause that volition in himself, and therefore according to the definition of liberty now given, he would be free. But if by liberty in this case be meant, what the writers to whom I am opposed, call *a liberty to either side*, and *a power to act or not act*, as opposed to moral necessity; the divine foreknowledge of a volition is utterly inconsistent with the liberty of that volition. For according to this definition, liberty implies, that the volition is not fixed or determined, and therefore it is uncertain what it will be, or whether it will be at all. But divine foreknowledge implies, that it is absolutely certain, that a volition foreknown will be, and what it will be, as Dr. West grants.

The circumstance, that foreknowledge does not efficiently *cause* an event to be certainly future, is nothing to the present purpose. We are not now inquiring what *causes* an event to be certainly future, but whether it *be* certainly future. If it be certainly future it is necessary, in the sense in which we use the word *necessity*, let what will be the cause of that futurity, or if the futurity be uncaused. Divine prophecy is not the cause of the futurity of the event foretold, yet no man will say, that it does not prove the certain futurity of that event. But prophecy no more implies or proves the certain futurity of the event foretold, than the divine foreknowledge implies and proves the certain futurity of the event foreknown. To say, that a divine decree is inconsistent with liberty, because it *makes* the action certainly future, when the certain futurity itself is allowed to be consistent with liberty, is very strange! What if it does make it certainly future? That certain futurity, when made, is not inconsistent with liberty. So long as this is granted, to hold that the divine decree as making or producing that certain futurity is inconsistent with liberty, is as absurd as to grant that a free cir-

culation of the fluids in the animal constitution is consistent with health; and yet to hold, that exercise *as producing* and merely because it produces that free circulation, is inconsistent with health.

I grant, that divine foreknowledge is as consistent with liberty, as the divine knowledge of a present volition is. If by liberty be meant the causation of volition by the subject, God may undoubtedly as well foresee this, as see it present. But if by liberty be meant a liberty to either side, a liberty to act or not act, as opposed to moral necessity; since this implies, with regard to an act now in existence, uncertainty whether the act does exist, and with regard to a future act, uncertainty in the nature of things and in the divine mind, whether it will exist; I say, no such uncertainty is or can be with regard either to an act seen by God to be now in existence, or an act divinely foreseen. As therefore the divine knowledge of the present existence of an act, is utterly inconsistent with this kind of liberty in that act; we need not and we do not pretend, that the divine foreknowledge of an act is more inconsistent with the same kind of liberty in the act foreknown. There is this difference however in the cases; knowledge of a present act does not imply, that the act was certain *previously* to its existence. But the foreknowledge of an act does imply this. This difference ought carefully to be noticed, or we shall run into great error. If, when it is said, that foreknowledge no more proves a necessity of the act foreknown, than the knowledge of an act at present existing, proves the necessity of this act, the meaning be, that foreknowledge no more proves, that the future act foreknown is certainly future *previously* to the existence of it, than the knowledge of a present act proves, that this act was certainly future *previously* to its existence; the truth of this proposition is by no means allowed. Foreknowledge by the very term respects a future event; of course the foreknowledge exists before the event. And as it is granted on all hands, that foreknowledge implies a certainty of the event foreknown; it follows, that there is a certainty of the future existence of every event foreknown, and this certainty is previous to the existence of the event. But the knowledge of a present event may not exist before the event itself; if it does, it is then *foreknowledge*. And as it does not, so far as it is the bare knowledge of a present event, exist before the event; it does not imply a *previous* certainty, that the event would come into existence.

My seeing a man perform an action does not prove, that it was certain beforehand, that he would perform it. But if a prophet under inspiration see, that a man will to-morrow perform a cer-

tain action, this does prove, that it is beforehand certain, that he will perform it. And surely the foresight of a prophet no more proves this, than the foreknowledge of God. Suppose the act foreknown by God, is about to be self-originated, still it is as necessary or certain beforehand, as if it were not to be self-originated; because the foreknowledge is from eternity and therefore precedes the existence of the act out of the divine mind.

For though all things are always present *in the divine mind;* yet all things are not always in present existence *out of the divine mind*, any more than all creatures existed from eternity. Be it so, that in the divine foreknowledge all things are present; then all human volitions are from eternity as fixed and certain, as if they existed from eternity not only in the divine mind, but out of the divine mind, and are as incapable of not existing, as the divine mind is incapable of delusion or error. "Bare *certainty* that an agent will do such a thing, does not imply in it, that he had not in himself a *power* to refrain from doing it."* This depends on the meaning of the word *power* to refrain. If this mean *natural* power, as it has been explained, it is granted, that ever so great certainty and even a divine absolute decree, that an agent shall do such a thing, does not imply in it, that he has not in himself a power to refrain from doing it. But if by *power* to refrain be meant *moral* power, or a power opposite to moral necessity, which is the bare certainty of a moral action, it is absurd and self-contradictory to say, that the bare certainty that an agent will do such a thing, does not imply in it, that he has not a power to refrain from doing it. It is the very same absurdity and contradiction, as to say, that a bare certainty, that an agent will do such a particular thing, does not imply in it a certainty, that he will do it.

In the same page, the Doctor tells us, "The only question is, whether supposing it to be foreknown, that an agent will conduct in such a manner, at such a time, it will be any contradiction to affirm, that the said agent will have a power, at the same time, to act in a different manner." If it be foreknown, that an agent will act in a particular manner, at a particular time; it will be granted, that there is a certainty, that he will act in that particular. But certainty of moral action is *moral necessity*, and moral inability of the contrary. And to assert, that an agent is under a moral inability to act in a different manner, and yet has a moral power to act in a different manner, is a direct contradiction."

The Doctor says, "That infallible foreknowledge in the Deity

* Page 45.

does not prove, that events take place in consequence of an antecedent or previous necessity; that it only proves a *logical* necessity or a necessity *of consequence;* i. e. it being *certain*, that a thing will take place, it follows, that to assert that it will not take place, must be false and cannot be true."* As the Doctor makes much of this, which he calls a *logical* necessity, or a necessity *of consequence*, let us examine it.

The foreknowledge of God is here said to prove a logical necessity only, or a necessity of consequence; which is said to be this, that "it being certain, that a thing will take place, it follows, that to assert that it will not take place, must be false and cannot be true." Here one thing is said to follow from another, by a logical necessity or a necessity of consequence. Let us take an example; It is a certain truth that the dead will rise; and does it hence *follow*, that it is a falsehood, that the dead will not rise? No, the latter is no more a consequence from the former, than the former is a consequence from the latter; or than that twice two are not unequal to four, is a consequence from this proposition, that twice two are equal to four; or than from its being true, that a thing *is*, it follows as a consequence that it is not true, that it *is not*. The one is no consequence from the other, but is precisely the same thing expressed in different words, which convey the very same idea. You might as well say, that if a man be *kind*, it follows as a consequence, that he is *benevolent;* or that if a man be *busy*, it follows as a consequence, that he is employed in *business*. Thus we may argue and draw consequences all day long, yet make no more progress, than the soldier who marches without gaining ground.

Dr. West says, "No necessity is implied in divine prescience, except merely a logical one; but this—is in the nature of things *subsequent* to the infallible foreknowledge of the existence of the thing foreknown."† But does Dr. West mean, that in foreknowledge God foresees an event as uncertain, and that in consequence of this foresight the event becomes certain? Surely the Doctor did not well consider the subject, if this be his meaning. To foreknow is certainly to foresee; and certainly to foresee, is to see a future event as certainly about to be. This certainty of its futurity is supposed and implied in foreknowledge, and is not the *consequence* of it. Dr. West. says, "It will be readily granted on all sides, that even the divine foreknowledge itself has no influence nor causal force, with regard to the thing foreknown, either to bring it into existence, or to hinder its happening." Therefore it has no influence to make its existence

* Page 29. † p. 32.

certain or necessary; how then is the necessity *subsequent* to foreknowledge? The certainty of its existence is *antecedent* in the order of nature to the foreknowledge, and is the ground or the object of it. This also is abundantly implied in various passages of Dr. West's book, as has been shown above. The Doctor speaks, too, of his logical necessity as "only a *consequence founded* upon the certainty of the thing foreknown."* But this certainty of moral actions is the very moral necessity, for which we plead. If the Doctor mean this by his logical necessity, it is presumed, that the reader sees the absurdity of saying, that this necessity is *consequent* on the divine foreknowledge; and also the absurdity of saying that it is *founded on* the certainty of the thing foreknown. A thing is not consequent on itself nor on that which is founded on itself, as foreknowledge is founded on the certainty of the thing foreknown. If the Doctor mean any thing else by his logical necessity, I wish to be informed how he means anything to the purpose of opposing that moral necessity of human actions, which President Edwards had advanced, and by which he explained himself to mean the certainty of moral actions. A logical necessity consequent on that certainty is a different thing from the certainty itself.

But allowing, what Dr. West holds, That foreknowledge proves a necessity consequential to foreknowledge; this necessity would be as inconsistent with liberty, as one that is antecedent to foreknowledge; because the necessity would exist antecedently to the actions of creatures, as it follows immediately from foreknowledge.

The Doctor, in his Second Part, says, "Mr. Edwards had raised a spectre, which he could not lay. With him necessity was necessity; and with him it was all one, whether the necessity was previous to the thing in question, or a consequence drawn from the supposition of its having taken place."† This is an injurious representation. The necessity for which President Edwards pleads, is "previous to the thing in question," and he never pleads for a necessity which is "a consequence drawn from the mere supposition of its having taken place." The necessity for which he pleads, is that which is implied in divine foreknowledge; and as this exists before the event foreknown, so the necessity which is implied in it and proved by it, is also previous to that event, and does not follow or begin to exist in consequence even of that foreknowledge, and much less in consequence of the supposition, that the thing foreknown has taken place. The only thing, so far as I know, which could give occasion for this representation by Dr. West is, that President Edwards calls this

* Page 53. † p. 90.

necessity *a necessity of consequence*, and says, that a thing necessary in its own nature, or one that has already come into existence, being supposed, another thing necessarily connected with either of the former, and the necessity of whose existence is in question, certainly follows; i. e. the necessity of this last thing certainly follows from the existence or supposition of the existence, of either of the former. For instance, when the divine decree or foreknowledge of an event is supposed, the existence of the event decreed or foreknown will certainly follow. But the necessity, which Dr. West injuriously imputes to President Edwards, is not the necessary existence of *one thing*, implied in the supposed existence of *another;* but the necessary existence of *one and the same thing*, so long as it is supposed to exist; and this necessary existence amounts to no more than the mere identical, trifling proposition, that *what is, is*. Of such trifling President Edwards was incapable, and the implicit imputation, that he has written an octavo volume in support of a proposition so insignificant, ought either never to have been made or to have been better supported, than by mere assertion.

In the latter part of his third esssay, the Doctor has spent a number of pages to show, that a certainty that a man will perform particular actions does not imply that he is under a necessity of performing them, or that he has no power to avoid them. But all this is labor lost, and is easily answered by making the distinction between natural and moral inability; or it all depends on the ambiguity of words and is mere logomachy.

Dr. Clarke endeavors to evade the argument for moral necessity drawn from the divine foreknowledge, by saying, that foreknowledge no more implies necessity, than the truth of a proposition asserting some future event implies necessity. This may be granted. If a proposition asserting some future event, be a real and absolute truth, there is an absolute certainty of the event; such absolute certainty is all that is implied in the divine foreknowledge; and all the moral necessity for which we plead. And though this certainty is consistent with a physical or natural ability to do otherwise, it is not consistent with the contingence or uncertainty of the event. So that there is no liberty of contingence in the case, no liberty to either side, to act or not act, no liberty inconsistent with previous certainty of moral action, which is moral necessity.

Dr. West strenuously opposes the doctrine, that the divine decrees are the foundation of God's foreknowledge. As I have already observed, this question seems to be foreign from the dispute concerning liberty; therefore I do not wish to bring it in

here; otherwise I should have no objection to entering on the discussion of it. But suppose the contrary were true, that fore knowledge is the foundation of decrees; I presume it would be granted, that decrees immediately follow foreknowledge. Therefore all events are decreed before they come to pass. And as decrees establish, or imply an establishment of the events decreed, and this antecedently to their existence; therefore on this plan there is an absolute certainty of all events and moral actions, and that antecedently to the existence of those actions; because they are all absolutely decreed by God immediately on his foreknowledge of them and before they come into existence.

"If this does not imply, that foreknowledge is not an essential attribute, I am under a great mistake."* Be it so, that Dr. West is under a great mistake; what follows? Is it impossible, that he should be under a great mistake? If foreknowledge be an essential attribute, it doubtless exists antecedently to human actions, and therefore implies a certainty of them antecedent to their existence. The truth is, that the foreknowledge of any particular event is no more an essential attribute of God, than the knowledge of any present or past event. Knowledge in general is an essential attribute; but any particular perception of the divine mind is no more an essential attribute, than any particular act of the divine will, or any one decree of God. Will in general is an essential attribute; but Dr. West will not pretend, that every act of the divine will is an essential attribute. Or if it be, doubtless every instance of foreknowledge is an essential attribute. By the same argument by which Dr. West proves, that according to our ideas of decrees and foreknowledge, knowledge is not an essential attribute; it may be proved, that according to Dr. West's ideas of those subjects, will is not an essential attribute of God. The Doctor tells us, "That the divine determinations are the Deity decreeing and willing;"† i. e. they are the will of God. But according to him the divine determinations or decrees are founded on foreknowledge. Therefore the divine will is founded on God's foreknowledge and is not an essential attribute of God, but is self-created, or a creature of the divine understanding.

The advocates for liberty to act or not act, "pretend not to be able to solve the difficulty arising from divine prescience." This is an honest confession. Yet with this acknowledged insuperable difficulty attending this favorite doctrine, they are determined to adhere to it. This confession Dr. Price in particular makes in the following words: "The foreknowledge of a contingent event carrying the appearance of a contradiction, is indeed a difficulty;

* Page 35. † p. 36.

and I do not pretend to be capable of removing it."* If this be a sufficient apology for holding a doctrine, which cannot be reconciled with an acknowledged truth, it will be easy to apologize for holding any doctrine whatever; e. g. the doctrine of transubstantiation. It is only necessary to say, "That a body should be turned into flesh, and yet retain all the sensible qualities of bread, as it carries the appearance of a contradiction, is indeed a difficulty; and we do not pretend to be capable of removing it.

Dr. West holds, that what is foreknown by God, is *eternal truth*;† yet he holds, that "there is no antecedent certainty in things themselves, on which divine prescience is founded;"‡ i. e. God knows a proposition to be a certain truth, before it is a certain truth, and after his knowledge of it, it becomes a certain and eternal truth; yet the divine knowledge has no causal influence to make it a truth. He strenuously opposes the idea, that human moral actions are certainly future antecedently to the divine foreknowledge of them; at the same time, he grants, that they are not *made* certainly future by the divine foreknowledge; and yet holds, that as foreknown by God, they are *eternal truths*. If they be eternal truths, doubtless the propositions which assert them, were certainly true from eternity, and therefore in the divine foreknowledge of them God perceived that eternal truth and certainty, and that certainty was the object and so the ground of the divine foreknowledge, and therefore there was "an antecedent certainty in things themselves, on which the divine prescience is founded." Besides, as the Doctor grants that foreknowledge has no influence to cause that certainty, I ask, By what is it caused? Is it caused by nothing? According to the Doctor the certain futurity of the things foreknown by God, does not exist antecedently to foreknowledge, and is not caused by it; yet it exists from eternity; and it is that very eternal truth which there is in all things foreknown by God.

He grants "that all things would take place just in the same manner, if they were not foreknown, as they do now."§ Then all things and all events are fixed and established independently of foreknowledge and antecedently to it, and were independently of foreknowledge certainly about to be. With what consistency then does Dr. West deny a certainty in things themselves antecedent to foreknowledge. And on what ground can he oppose the doctrine of divine decrees, which represents those decrees as antecedent in the order of nature to foreknowledge?

If God from all eternity knew events to be future, they were

* Correspondence with Priestly, p. 175. † p. 53.
‡ p. 33. § p. 45.

future, and future in the order of nature before foreknowledge, and were future by the divine agency or by the agency of some other cause, or of no cause at all. If they were future by the agency of God, that is all that the doctrine of absolute decrees implies. If they were future by the agency of any other cause, this supposes another eternal cause. If they were future by no cause, they may and will come into existence by no cause; which is absurd. To imagine, that they are from eternity future by the agency of human free will, is to suppose, that human free will either existed from eternity, or could and did produce effects eternal ages before it existed.

It is said, that there is properly no foreknowledge in God, that all his knowledge is present knowledge, and that past, present and future, are now all present in the divine mind. Still God does not view all *possible* things as present. The *existence* of some things is present to God; only the possibility of other things is present to him. Whence arises this difference? What gives some things a present existence in the divine mind, when other things have only a possible existence in the same mind? This difference is an effect; otherwise all real existences and events are necessary existences, or those which are not necessary, become future, and finally come into existence, without a cause. The difference between possible and future volitions cannot be the effect of the mind of the creature; because it existed before that mind existed.

By all things being present in the divine mind, is meant not that God now sees them to be present to creatures and in their view; but that his view of all things, so far as relates to himself, is the same as it will be, when they shall have come into existence in the view of creatures. He sees them not to be in existence as to us, but sees their existence to be as to us future. And this is all that we mean by foreknowledge. So that saying, that all knowledge in God is present knowledge, does not show, that there is no foreknowledge in him. A knowledge of things as future with respect to creatures, is foreknowledge. And the whole objection, that the divine knowledge is all present knowledge, is founded on the ambiguity of words, or of the phrase, *all things are present in the divine mind*, or this, that *all the divine knowledge is present knowledge.* If the meaning of that phrase be, that God sees now, that certain things will at some future time be in existence in the view of creatures; this is granted on all hands; and what follows from it? Surely not that there is no certainty previous to the existence of those things in the view of creatures, that they will thus be in existence; but that there is

such a certainty. Therefore in this sense of the phrase it is not at all opposed to, but implies the doctrine of previous certainty and moral necessity, which we maintain. If that phrase mean, that God now sees all events, which ever take place, to have a present existence in the view of creatures; this is not true and will not be pretended by our opponents. Yet this is the only sense of the phrase, which opposes the doctrine of previous certainty as argued from the divine foreknowledge. That all things are present in the divine mind, can mean no more, than that all things are now seen by God, and that there is no past nor future with him. Still he views some things to be past, and other things to be future, with respect to creatures. And his view of some things as future with respect to creatures, is what we mean by the divine foreknowledge; not that he views things as future with respect to himself. If therefore God now sees, that certain volitions will hereafter take place in the minds of *Gog* and *Magog*, according to prophecy, they will *certainly* take place, and there is a moral necessity of it, and a moral necessity *now existing* ages before those volitions will have an existence in the minds of those men. The consideration, that all things are present with God, does, as before observed, not at all prove, that there is not now a previous certainty or moral necessity, that those volitions will come into existence; but evidently proves that there is such certainty, and that in two respects: (1) A certainty previous in order of time to the existence of those volitions in the minds of *Gog* and *Magog*. (2) A certainty previous in the order of nature to the divine foreknowledge itself, and which is the foundation of that foreknowledge.

Most or all the objections brought against moral necessity, may be brought with equal force against divine foreknowledge. For example: "If there be an absolute moral necessity, that John go on in sin, and be finally damned, there is no possibility that he be saved. Then why should he or any other person use any endeavors toward his salvation?" If there be force in this objection, it is equally forcible against divine foreknowledge. Thus, if God foreknow, that John will go on in sin and be finally damned, there is an absolute certainty or moral necessity of it. Therefore there is no possibility of John's salvation; and why should he or any other person put forth any endeavors toward it? This and all objections of the kind imply, that all moral events are left in a state of perfect uncertainty, till they come to pass, that they come to pass by mere chance, and that they are not, and cannot possibly be, the objects of foreknowledge.

It has been already observed, that though divine foreknowledge is not the efficient cause of the certain futurity of any event;

yet it implies, that the event is certainly future, and this certainty, let it be caused by what it will, or though it be uncaused, is with respect to a moral event, moral necessity, and equally consistent or inconsistent with liberty, as if it were caused by foreknowledge. I now observe further, that this certain futurity undoubtedly is caused *by something*. It is equally absurd to imagine, that an event may become *future* without a cause, as that it may come *into existence* without a cause. Certain futurity implies, that the actual existence of the event is secured to take place in due time. And whatever is able thus to secure the event, is able to bring it into existence. If it may be secured without a cause, it may be brought into existence without a cause. This certain futurity of all events from eternity is an effect, and cannot be the effect of any creature, because no creature existed from eternity. It must therefore be the effect of the Creator, who alone existed from eternity, and who alone therefore could from eternity give futurity to any event.

Therefore however frightened Dr. West and other writers be at the idea, that moral actions should be the effect of a cause extrinsic to the subject of those actions, we seem to be necessitated to give into this idea, from the consideration, that all moral actions of creatures were from eternity foreknown and therefore were certainly future. This eternal futurity must be an effect of a cause extrinsic to all creatures. This extrinsic cause secures their existence, and in due time actually brings them into existence.

It is said, that God knows all things from eternity, as we know things presently existing before our eyes. Now the actual existence of things out of our minds is the foundation of our knowledge in the case. But it will not be said, that all things existed from eternity out of the divine mind, and that this existence of them is the foundation of the divine eternal knowledge of them or of their existence in the divine mind. If they did eternally exist out of the divine mind, they were necessarily existent in the same sense in which God is; and consequently none of our actions are caused by ourselves or by our self-determining power. They are as uncaused, as necessary and as eternal, as the divine existence.

Dr. Clarke in his remarks on Collins,* says, that "in the argument drawn against liberty from the divine prescience, or power of judging infallibly concerning free events, it must be proved, that things otherwise supposed free, will thereby unavoidably become necessary." On this I remark, (1) That if by the word

* Page 39.

free the Doctor mean anything opposite to the most absolute moral necessity, he must mean *contingent, uncertain, not certainly future.* But nothing is in this sense supposed, or allowed, to be free. (2) We do not pretend from the divine prescience to prove, that "thereby things unavoidably *become* necessary," or certainly future. But we do pretend from prescience to prove, that all events *were* certainly future, in the order of nature, antecedently to the prescience; and that they are certainly future, in the order of time, antecedently to their existence.

Dr. Clarke in his Being and Attributes,* grants, that all things are and were certain from eternity, and yet supposes,† that a universal fatality would be inconsistent with morality. But it seems, that according to the Doctor a universal and eternal certainty of all things is not inconsistent with morality; and if by fatality he meant anything different from certainty, he opposes what nobody holds. The Doctor says, "mere certainty of event does not imply necessity."‡ But mere certainty of event doubtless implies itself, and that is all the necessity, for which we plead. The Doctor's argument to prove, that certainty does not imply necessity, is, that foreknowledge implies no more certainty, than would exist without it. At the same time he grants, that there is "the same certainty of event in every one of man's actions, as if they were never so fatal and necessary." Now any other certainty or necessity than this we do not pretend to be implied in foreknowledge. And as the Doctor himself grants this necessity to exist, whether there be or be not foreknowledge; then in either case all that necessity, for which we plead, is granted to exist.

Dr. West, in Part II,§ thinks Pres. Edwards inconsistent with himself, in denying, that the divine decrees are founded on foreknowledge, and yet holding, that "the perfection of his understanding is the foundation of his decrees." The Doctor argues, that "If foreknowledge in the Deity, is part of the perfection of the divine understanding. Then is it the foundation of his wise purposes and decrees; and so his objection lies just as strong against him, as against us." Doubtless the perfection of the divine understanding; i. e. God's perfect view of the fitness of certain things to certain uses and ends, is the reason why he decrees and appoints those things to those uses and ends. But this is very different from supposing that foreknowledge is the foundation of decrees, and that God first foresees certain events about to take place, and then decrees to permit them to take place. And the inconclusiveness of Dr. West's argument just

* Page 95, etc. † p. 97. ‡ p. 98. § pp. 20, 21.

quoted, may appear thus: If after-knowledge, or a knowledge, that events have taken place, be a part of the divine understanding; then it is the foundation of his wise purposes and decrees. But it will not be pretended, that the consequent in this case justly follows from the antecedent. Yet it follows as justly as in the argument of the Doctor. Not every perception which belongs to the divine understanding is the foundation of God's decrees universally or generally. Beside the instance already mentioned, I might mention God's perfect knowledge of geometry, mechanics, etc. The divine perfect knowledge of those sciences is not the foundation of all God's decrees. No more is God's foreknowledge.

CHAPTER VII.

OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED.

1. It is argued that we are possessed of a self-determining power and a liberty to either side, because we find, that we have a power to consider and examine an action proposed to us, and to *suspend* our determination upon it, till we shall have duly considered it. But as the determination to suspend and examine is a voluntary act, it no more appears to be without motive or without moral necessity than any other voluntary act. Suspension is either a voluntary act or not. If it be a voluntary act, it no more appears to be without motive and moral necessity, than any other voluntary act. If it be not a voluntary act, it is not a *free* act, nor is any liberty exercised in it; and therefore it is nothing to the present purpose.

To argue, that we have a power of self-determination, because we have a power to suspend an action, is as groundless as to argue, that we have a power of self-determination, because we have a power to choose to act, or because we have a power of will. Suspension is a voluntary act or a volition, and the argument under consideration is this: A man has a volition, not at present to determine in a certain case; therefore he has a power efficiently to cause volition in himself. This argument is just as conclusive as the following: A man has a volition at present to determine in a certain case; therefore he has a power efficiently to cause volition in himself. Or as this: A man has a volition, therefore he has a power efficiently to cause volition in himself.

But if suspension be no voluntary act, but a total suspension of all volition, it is, if possible, still less a proof of self-determination. Self-determination is a voluntary act, and suspension is brought as an instance of self-determination. But how can that, which is no voluntary act be an instance of a voluntary act? This is as absurd as to argue self-determination from any intellectual perception, or from the perfect insensibility of a dead corpse. But this mode of arguing is familiar with Dr. West, who constantly argues a self-determining power, from a power to *not act*, a power to be perfectly torpid.

2. Self-determination is argued from our own consciousness and experience. Dr. West says, that "we experience in ourselves, that in willing and choosing we act independently of any extrinsic cause."* Others hold, that we are *conscious* of self-determination and an exemption from extrinsic causality. When gentlemen speak of experience and consciousness, they ought to confine their observations to themselves; as no man is conscious of more than passes in his own mind, and in such things a man can with certainty tell his own experience only. For my own part, I am not conscious of either self-causation of volition, or an exemption from extrinsic causality; and to be sure I am not conscious, that my volitions take place without cause and by mere chance. I am conscious of volitions of various kinds; but I never yet caught myself in the act of *making a volition*, if this mean anything more than *having* a volition or being the subject of it. If any man be conscious, that he makes his own volitions, he is doubtless conscious of two distinct acts in this, one *the act made* by himself, another *the act making* or by which he makes *the act made*. Now will any man profess to the world, that he is or ever has been conscious of these distinct acts? If not, let him tell the world what he means by being the efficient cause of his own volitions. If he mean, that he has volitions, this is no more than the advocates for moral necessity are conscious of, and to grant that this is all that is meant, is to give up the argument. If it be meant, that he causes them by *the mind itself*, or by some *power* of the mind, and not by any *act* of the mind or of those powers; I appeal to the reader, whether this be, or can be, a matter of consciousness. I take it to be universally granted, that no man can be conscious of more than the *acts* and perceptions of his own mind. The existence of the mind and of its powers, is *inferred* from the acts, and we are not properly conscious of them. Dr. Reid may be an authority with the gentlemen, with

* Page 26.

whom I am now concerned. "*Power*," says he, "is not an object of any of our external senses, nor even an object of *consciousness*. That it is not seen, nor heard, nor touched, nor tasted, nor smelt, needs no proof. That we are not conscious of it, in the proper sense of the word, will be no less evident, if we reflect, that consciousness is that power of the mind, by which it has an immediate knowledge of its own *operations*. Power is not an operation of the mind, and therefore is *no object of consciousness*. Indeed every operation of the mind is the exertion of some power of the mind; but we are conscious of the *operation only*, and the power lies behind the scene. And though we may justly *infer* the power from the operation, it must be remembered, that *inferring* is not the province of *consciousness*, but of *reason*."*

If from our consciousness of volitions, it follows, that we *efficiently cause* those volitions, let a reason be given, why it will not equally follow from our consciousness of any perception, e. g. the sound of thunder, that we efficiently cause that too.

If we be the efficient causes of our own volitions, they are effects. But an effect is produced by a previous exertion of the efficient cause, which act is as distinct from the effect, as the divine creating act was distinct from the world created. Every effect is passive with regard to its cause, and passive in this respect, that the causal act of the efficient operates upon it. Therefore the volition is and must be distinct from the act of the efficient by which it is caused. If a man be the efficient cause of his own volition and he be conscious of it, he is conscious of an act of his own mind previous to every volition caused by himself, efficiently causing that volition, and as this causing act must be a voluntary act, in order to be a free one, there must be an infinite series of voluntary acts causing one another, or one act before the first. And of this the man who is the subject, must have a conscious experience, or else he cannot be conscious of self-determination. Whether any man will profess to be conscious of all this, we must wait to see. It is to be presumed however, that no man will profess to have experienced an infinite series of acts, or one act before the first act.

As to knowing by consciousness and experience, that our volitions are not the effect of an extrinsic cause; this I conceive is an absolute impossibility, unless we know by experience and are conscious, that we ourselves efficiently cause them in the manner just now described, viz. in an infinite series, or with one act before the first. Unless we be conscious, that we cause our own first volition by a previous act, we cannot be conscious, that we

* Essays on Active Powers, page 7.

cause it at all. And if we be not conscious, that we cause that, we cannot be conscious but that it was caused extrinsically. If we do not experience that we cause our volitions by our own previous acts, we do not experience, that we cause them at all. All we experience is the volitions themselves, and we have no more evidence, that they are not the effects of an extrinsic cause, than from the experience of any of our ideas of sensation, we have evidence that those ideas are not excited by an extrinsic cause.

Let an instance be taken and I presume no man will pretend, that he is conscious, that he causes one volition by another; e. g. a volition to give to the poor. Will any man pretend, that he is conscious, that he causes in himself a volition to give to the poor, by a previous volition; and that he in the first place finds, by consciousness, that he chooses to have a volition to give to the poor before he has it, and that by this previous choice he becomes willing to give to the poor? If no man will pretend this, but every man by the bare stating of the case sees, that it implies the absurdity that he is willing before he is willing, surely it is high time to give up this argument from experience and consciousness.

It has been said, that we *perceive* no extrinsic influence producing our volitions. Nor do we perceive any extrinsic influence producing a great part of our thoughts and perceptions, which yet it will not be pretended, that we ourselves cause.

It is impossible for a man to be conscious of a negative, otherwise than as he is either not conscious of it, or is conscious of the opposite positive. Therefore when it is said, that we are conscious, that our volitions are not the effect of an extrinsic cause, the meaning must be either that we are not conscious, that they are the effect of an extrinsic cause, or that we are conscious, that we do efficiently cause them ourselves. That we are not conscious, that our volitions are the effect of an extrinsic cause, is no proof, that they are in fact not the effect of such a cause, because if they were the effect of such a cause, still we should not be conscious of it. If whether they be the effect of such a cause or not, we should not be conscious, that they are the effect of such a cause, then the circumstance that we are not conscious, that they are the effect of such a cause, is no proof either way. Nor are we conscious, that we do efficiently cause our own volitions, as it is presumed appears by what has been already said in this and former chapters.

But if we were conscious, that we do efficiently cause our own volitions, this would be no argument against the absolute previous certainty or moral necessity of all our volitions. Such efficiency

may have been from eternity the object of the divine absolute foreknowledge or decree. So that to a consciousness of liberty as opposed to moral necessity, it is requisite, that we be conscious not only, that we efficiently cause our own volitions, but that we cause them, with the circumstance, that it was previously uncertain, whether we should cause them or not. But of this circumstance it is impossible, that we should be conscious; it is no act or perception of the mind, and therefore cannot be an object of consciousness.

Archbishop King speaks of a man's being "conscious, that it was in his power, to have done otherwise than he has done." If this mean anything opposite to moral necessity, it must mean, that a man is conscious, that it was not previously certain, that he would do as he has done. But of this no man can be conscious, for the reason already given.

3. It is further argued, that we act as if we were under no necessity, but at perfect liberty; and that therefore the doctrine of moral necessity is contradicted by all our conduct, and the maxims of it. To this I answer, that our conduct does by no means show, that we are not influenced by motives, or that we act without motives, without design, without biases, tastes, appetites or any such principles, and in perfect indifference, insensibility and stupidity. On the other hand, the conduct of all mankind shows, that they are actuated by motives, biases, various passions and appetites, which have as stated and regular an effect on their minds and conduct, as second causes have in the natural world. The conduct of men does by no means show, that their conduct is previously altogether uncertain and left to mere chance. It does indeed show, that they are free agents in the proper sense; i. e. intelligent, voluntary agents, acting upon motives and various principles in human nature, natural and acquired; and therefore we use arguments and motives with one another to influence each other's conduct. All this is perfectly consistent with the scheme of moral necessity for which I plead, and is implied in it. And all government civil and domestic is not only consistent with that scheme, but is built upon it; otherwise in vain would be all the motives of rewards and punishments exhibited as the means of government, and by which government is carried into effect.

If moral necessity be inconsistent with the practice of mankind, so is that previous certainty implied in the divine foreknowledge; for that, with respect to moral actions, is moral necessity.

4. It is objected, that on this plan all agency and action are destroyed or precluded. Answer: If by agency and action be meant self-determinate or contingent agency and action, I grant

that this scheme does preclude them and means to preclude them. But it is not allowed, that such agency and action are necessary to a rational, moral being, or are at all desirable or even possible; and to take these for granted, is to beg the main points in dispute. Let it be shown that such agency and action are necessary, desirable, or possible, and something to the purpose will be done. But rational voluntary agency or action, arising from motive and principle, and directed to some end, is not precluded, but supposed and established by this scheme.

It is said, that on the hypothesis of a divine agency in all things, there is *but one agent* in the universe. But the Deity is no self-determinate agent; he is no more the efficient cause of his own volitions than he is of his own existence. If he were, his volitions would not be from eternity, nor would he be unchangeable. Therefore with as much reason, as it is said, that there is *but one* agent in the universe, it might have been said, that there is *not one*. Self-efficiency of volition is either necessary to agency and action, or it is not. If it be necessary, God is not an agent. If it be not necessary, we are agents and God too.

It is further said, that on this plan of a moral necessity established by God, all human actions are nothing but the operations of God actuating men, as the soul actuates the body. If this mean, that God is the remote and first cause of all things, and that he brings to pass all things and all human actions, either by an immediate influence, or by the intervention of second causes, motives, temptations, etc. we allow it. We firmly believe, that these are under the control and at the disposal of Providence. But because the devil tempted Eve, it will not be pretended, that she acted nothing, and was merely acted upon by the devil, as the human body is actuated by the soul; that because God sent his prophets to the Israelites, to preach to them, the prophets acted nothing; that when God affords the aids of his grace to any man, so far as he is influenced by these aids to an action, it is no action of his; that when the goodness of God leadeth a sinner to repentance, the sinner does nothing, does not repent; but this repentance is the act or exercise of the divine mind, and in it God repents.

If when it is objected that the scheme of moral necessity precludes action, action mean volition; the objection is groundless. We hold as strenuously as our opponents, that we all have action in this sense. But if by action they mean anything else, they must mean something in which there is no volition. But that any such thing should be an action is absurd and what they will not pretend. The circumstance, that a man causes his own volitions, if

it were possible, would not imply agency or action, unless the causation or causing act were a volition. For instance, if a man in a convulsion, having a sword in his hand, involuntarily thrust it into his friend's bosom, this is not agency; yet the man causes the thrust and the wound. But if the causing act of volition be a volition, it runs into the absurdity of an infinite series of volitions causing one another.

Dr. West, in Part II, says, "If the Deity is the proper efficient cause of volition, then the mind is entirely passive in all its volitions, and consequently cannot be in any *proper* sense *an agent*."* We grant, that the Deity is the primary efficient cause of all things, and that he produces volitions in the human mind by such second causes as motives, appetites, biases, etc. and the human mind, in being the subject of the divine agency whether mediate or immediate, is passive. Still we hold, that volition is *an action*, as has been already explained. Nor is there the least absurdity in the supposition, that an action should be the effect of a divine or other extrinsic agency, unless by action or volition he meant a self-caused or an uncaused action or volition. But for Dr. West in the present case to mean this *by action in the proper sense*, is to beg the question. The very question is, whether action in the proper sense of the word, be self-caused or uncaused. And if, when he says, "If the Deity is the efficient cause of volition, the mind cannot be in any *proper* sense an agent;" he mean an agent, who efficiently produces an act of will in himself, or who is the subject of a volition which is uncaused; I grant, that the mind cannot be such an agent; I believe, that such agency is an absurdity and impossibility, and call on Dr. West to clear it of the absurdity and impossibility, which has long since been pointed out to be implied in it.

Besides; the Doctor's reasoning may be retorted, thus: If the mind itself be the proper efficient cause of volition, then the mind is entirely passive in its volitions, and consequently in volition cannot be in any proper sense an agent. For every effect must be passive, seeing it cannot contribute anything towards its own existence. Volition or the mind acting is either an effect, or it existed from eternity, or it came into existence without cause. Neither of the two last will be pretended. Therefore it is an effect; and as every effect is passive, the mind in volition is, on the ground of Dr. West's argument, in no proper sense an agent in volition.

The Doctor proceeds, "Either volition is only the immediate action of the Deity on the mind, or it is distinct from it. If vo-

* Page 8.

lition is distinct from the action of the Deity on the mind, then the action of the Deity on the mind, is only to produce all the requisites for action; and consequently there is no absurdity in supposing, that when all these requisites have taken place, the mind is then only put in a capacity for acting."* On this I remark, Volition is granted to be entirely distinct from the action of the Deity, as distinct from it, as the motion of a planet is. But it is not granted to follow hence, that the action of the Deity does no more than produce all the necessary requisites for action. Dr. West will grant, that when the Deity causes a planet to move, he does more than to produce the requisites for its motion, unless in requisites for its motion be comprehended the actual production of its motion. If this be his meaning with regard to the action of the mind, there is an absurdity in supposing, that when all those requisites have taken place, the mind is only put into a capacity for acting or not acting. And whatever be his meaning in producing requisites, I do not allow they do or can put the mind into a capacity of *not acting*, i. e. of sinking itself into perfect torpitude.

What immediately follows the last quotation is, "If besides presenting to the mind the requisites for action, the Deity does produce a certain modification of the mind called volition, in which modification the mind is wholly passive, then there is no action, but only the immediate action of the Deity on the mind; and volition is nothing distinct from the immediate action of the Deity." The very same mode of reasoning will prove, that bodily motion is nothing distinct from the action of the Deity; thus, If besides producing the requisites for motion, the Deity produce a certain modification of matter, called motion, in which matter is wholly passive, then there is only the immediate action of the Deity on matter, and motion is nothing distinct from the immediate action of the Deity. Yet it is presumed, that Dr. West will not pretend, that when God causes a planet to move round in its orbit, the Deity himself and he only moves round in that orbit; or that the motion of the planet is nothing distinct from the action of the Deity. Now volition, though caused by the Deity, is as distinct from the action of the Deity, by which it is caused, as the motion of a planet is from the action of God by which that is caused.

The Doctor says, "If when the mind acts on any particular object, the Deity produces *a new act* or a new operativeness in the mind, then there must be a change in the mind."† Doubtless there is so far a change, as is implied in the new act; And

* Part II. p. 8. † p. 10.

what then? Why the Doctor "upon the closest examination cannot find any change in the *operativeness* of his mind." Be it so; yet as it is supposed, that his mind is the subject of a new *act*, he can doubtless find a change in the *act* of his mind; and if he cannot find a change in the *operativeness* of it, it must be because operativeness, which is a peculiar and favorite word with the Doctor, means something different from *act*, and therefore is nothing to the present purpose, as the subject under consideration is the production of a new act by the Deity. And we do not pretend, that when the Deity produces a new *act* in the mind, he produces a new *operativeness* too, unless act and operativeness be the same. If they be the same, whenever the Doctor can perceive a change in the *act* of his mind, he can doubtless perceive a change in the operativeness of it.

The Doctor thinks he has said something new concerning his favorite word *operativeness*. But I see nothing new or important in it, unless it be a new word used in an ambiguous manner.

"I say, that the operativeness of the mind on different objects is always uniformly one and the same thing, and not that there are as many operations, as there are objects on which the mind acts."* Here it is manifest, that the Doctor uses the word *operativeness* as synonymous with *operation*, otherwise he is guilty of the most gross equivocation. And is it indeed one and the same operation of mind to love virtue and love roast beef? To choose the service of God and choose a pine-apple? This is new indeed. In this, I presume the Doctor is an original!

5. My actions are *mine*; but in what sense can they be properly called *mine*, if I be not the efficient cause of them? Answer: my thoughts and all my perceptions and feelings are *mine*; yet it will not be pretended, that I am the efficient of them all.

6. It is said to be self-evident, that *absolute necessity* is inconsistent with *liberty*. Answer: This wholly depends on the meaning of the words *liberty* and *necessity*. Absolute *natural* necessity is allowed to be inconsistent with liberty; but the same concession is not made with regard to absolute moral necessity. All that is requisite to answer this and such like objections is to explain the words liberty and necessity. If by *liberty* be meant *uncertainty*, undoubtedly absolute moral necessity, which is the certainty of a moral event, is utterly inconsistent with liberty. But if by liberty be meant exemption from *natural* necessity, there is not the least inconsistence between the most absolute *moral* necessity and the most perfect freedom or exemption from natural necessity. The most perfect exemption from natural necessity is

* Page 13.

consistent with the most absolute previous certainty of a moral action. Judas in betraying his Lord "according to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God," was entirely exempted from natural necessity; yet his conduct was according to an absolute previous certainty.

7. That we have liberty of self-determination is argued from our *moral discernment*, or sense of right and wrong and of desert of praise and blame. And some are so confident of the sufficiency of this argument against moral necessity, that they are willing to rest the whole cause on this single point. It is therefore a very important point. It is said, that our estimating the moral character of the man, from his internal dispositions and acts, is on the supposition, that these are *within the power of* the man. But the word *power* is equivocal; if it mean *natural* power, and that the agent is under no *natural* inability, (as before explained) to other dispositions and acts; it is granted, that in this sense they are in his power. But if it mean, that there was no previous certainty, that he would have those very dispositions and acts; and that no man will or can reasonably blame himself or another but in case of a perfect previous uncertainty with respect to those dispositions and acts; this is not granted, nor is it proved.

It is said, that no man ever did commend or blame himself for what he knew to be *necessary* and *unavoidable*, not within his power, or not determined by himself. This stripped of the ambiguity of words is this merely; that no man ever did commend or blame himself for what he knew to be previously certain, and was not entirely casual. But this is manifestly false; because every man knows or may know, that all things are previously certain, as they are the objects of the infallible foreknowledge of God. And if no man can commend or blame himself for what is previously certain, no man can commend or blame himself for anything.

Will it be pretended, that we are more blamable for an action, which is previously uncertain and casual, and which we perform by chance without motive, end or design, than for that which is previously certain and future, and which we do from motive, and with an end and design? Take the instance of Judas' treachery. The fact is, that this treachery was previously certain and infallibly foreknown by God. Now, was Judas less blamable than if his conduct had been previously uncertain, and had taken place by pure chance? To say, that he was blamable, if this conduct proceeded from self-determination, affords no satisfaction, unless this self-determination were by chance. For otherwise the self-determining act was previously certain and morally necessary,

and therefore liable to all the objections, which are brought against moral necessity in any case.

Blameworthiness is nothing but moral turpitude or odiousness; praiseworthiness is nothing but moral amiableness or excellence. But the moral amiableness of an action does not depend on the circumstance, that it is efficiently caused by ourselves; because this runs into the absurdity and impossibility of an infinite series of actions causing one another. Nor does it depend on this circumstance, that the action is, as Dr. West holds, uncaused; for no actions of creatures fall under this description. Either of those hypotheses would shut moral amiableness and odiousness out of the world.

That moral necessity or previous certainty of moral conduct is consistent with moral discernment, may be argued from the case of the saints and angels in heaven. It will not be pretended, but that there is a certainty, that they will continue in their state of perfect holiness and happiness to eternity. Nor will it be pretended, but that they are the subjects of moral discernment and of that virtue and holiness which is truly amiable in the moral sense, and the proper object of approbation and reward. Therefore moral necessity is not inconsistent with praise and blame.

I need not insist on the necessary holiness of God and of our Lord Jesus Christ.

The writers in opposition to moral necessity insist much on its inconsistence with accountableness. This is really no other than to insist, that it is inconsistent with praise and blame or with moral agency; and is the same objection, which we have been considering. To be accountable is to be liable to be called to an account for an action, and to be the proper subject of reward or punishment. But this is no other than to be worthy of praise or blame, and to deserve love or hatred, complacency or disapprobation, on account of moral temper or conduct. So that what has been said concerning praise and blame, is equally applicable to accountableness.

It has been long since shown by President Edwards, that the moral amiableness and odiousness of actions, and their desert of praise or blame, or the essence of virtue and vice, depend not on the circumstance, that actions are efficiently caused by the subject; but that the acts themselves, without any consideration of their efficient cause, are amiable or odious. As otherwise virtue and vice will be thrown back from the caused act, to the causing act, till they are thrown out of the universe. If they consist not in acts of the will themselves, but in the acts by which they are caused, as these causing acts are also caused, virtue and vice

must for the same reason consist not in them, but those by which they are caused, and so on to an act which is not caused. But this being not caused by the subject, can, on the principle of our opponents, have no virtue or vice in it. Thus there would be no place found in the universe for virtue and vice. Not in the caused acts, because virtue and vice consist not in them, but in their cause. Not in any uncaused act or acts, because they, by the supposition, are not caused by their subject. There is no way to avoid this consequence, but to allow that virtue and vice, desert of praise and blame, consist, in the acts themselves and not in their cause; or if there be any virtue or vice in the cause, this is distinct from the virtue or vice, which there is in the acts themselves. If I be accountable for any volition, for the sole reason, that I cause it; then I am accountable for the act, by which I cause it, for the sole reason, that I cause that, and so on in an infinite series.

Besides; the mere circumstance, that I cause my own volition, does not on the principles of our opponents, make me accountable for it. Because that I should cause it may be a matter of previous certainty, as it may be foreknown, and even decreed, by God, that I should cause it; and therefore I cause it not freely in the sense of our opponents, but necessarily, under the influence of absolute moral necessity.

But Dr. West holds, that all our volitions are without cause. Then they take place by blind fate or chance. And how, on his principles, are we accountable for them?

The true ground of accountableness and of praise and blame, is not the circumstance, that we ourselves efficiently cause our own volitions; or the circumstance, that they take place without cause by mere chance; but the nature, moral aspect and tendency of those volitions, and of the actions which flow from them.

Our opponents observe, that we allow, that men must be the voluntary causes of their external actions, in order to be accountable for them. And then they ask, why we do not for the same reason allow, that we must be the voluntary causes of our acts of will, that we may be accountable for them? The answer is, that external actions are not volitions. The volitions of rational beings, are in their own nature moral acts, and for that reason the subjects of them are accountable for them. But external actions are not of a moral nature in themselves, and therefore the subjects of them are accountable for them then only, when they are the effects of volition. Besides; that external actions should be the effects of volition does not run into the absurdity of an infinite

series, as is implied in the supposition, that all volitions are the effects of previous volitions.

Dr. West says, "I have already shown, that necessity shuts out all sense of vileness and unworthiness."* Where he has shown this, he has not informed us. If he had, perhaps his readers, on perusal of the passage, would not have joined with him in the opinion, that he had shown it. For my part, I cannot find, that he has shown it in any part of his two books. If moral necessity, which is previous certain futurity of a moral act, "shut out all sense of vileness and unworthiness;" then it seems, that in order that a man may have any sense of vileness in sin, he must act without any previous certainty in the nature of things, or in divine foreknowledge, what his actions will be; i.e. he must act by mere chance.

8. It is objected, that this doctrine of moral necessity makes men mere machines. This objection, which is frequently made by all our opponents, depends on the sense affixed to the word *machine*. If it mean an intelligent voluntary agent, who does not act by perfect contingence or chance, and who does not take one step before his first step; but acts from such motives and pursues such objects, as appear to him most eligible; I grant, that we are machines. And in the same sense the saints and angels in heaven, and all intelligent beings, are machines. But whether it be not a great abuse of language, and whether it be not an artifice of our opponents, to excite a popular prejudice and clamor against our doctrine, to use the word *machine* in this sense; I leave the reader to judge. If by *machine* be meant, what is commonly meant by it, a mere material engine, without volition, knowledge or thought in itself; I presume, that our opponents themselves will not pretend, that on our principles, men are such machines as this.

Do those who make this objection hold, that the human understanding is a *machine*? Or that, in understanding, reasoning, judging, remembering, etc. man acts mechanically? Yet all grant, that in these things he acts necessarily.

If moral necessity imply, that we are machines, then whatever induces a moral necessity, or actually influences or persuades us to any conduct, turns us into machines. Now the opposers of moral necessity often speak of the aids of grace and of the Spirit, as necessary and influential to virtue and religion. But if any man become the subject of true virtue or piety *by the aids of God's grace*, so far he is passive, he is wrought upon and governed by an extrinsic cause, and his conduct is the effect of that

* Part II. p. 39.

cause. But every effect is *necessary* with respect to its cause. Therefore whoever is led by this cause to virtue or piety, is led necessarily, and according to the objection now before us, is turned into a mere *machine*. On the ground of this objection all sinners abandoned by God, all the damned and devils in hell, all the saints and angels in heaven, the man Christ Jesus, and even God himself, are mere *machines*. How necessary it is, that those who make an objection to any system, should consider first whether the objection be not equally forcible against doctrines which they themselves hold!

9. It is further objected, that moral necessity places men, with respect to liberty, on a level with brutes. If by liberty be meant contingence or previous uncertainty, I grant that the actions of men and brutes are in this sense equally void of liberty; a previous certainty attends them equally. Or if it could be made to appear, that the actions of men are previously uncertain; I should maintain, that those of brutes are equally uncertain, and in this sense equally free. If by liberty be meant exemption from extrinsic causality of volition; I grant, that in this sense also the actions of men and brutes are equally void of liberty. Men no more manufacture their own volitions, than brutes; and there is no more evidence, that men act without motive or design, than that brutes do. But if by liberty be meant *rational* liberty, the liberty of *a moral* agent, I hold that men are possessed of this, and brutes not. Brutes are no moral agents; but it is for the want of reason and intelligence, not of any power of will. If Sir Isaac Newton's horse had had as much reason and knowledge as his master, he no doubt would have had as much moral liberty, and would have been equally a moral agent and equally accountable. Without reason and intelligence, though a horse should have a liberty of perfect uncertainty and act by the purest chance; and though he should propagate one volition by another, or without another, with ever so great dexterity; he would be a brute still, and no more a moral agent, than he is now that he acts by motive or appetite. So that the difference between a man and a beast, as to moral agency, consists not in liberty of contingence or liberty of self-determination; but in reason and knowledge.

We might on this subject venture to turn the tables on our opponents, and hold, that if a power of self-determination be liberty, brutes are free as well as men. The ass determining to eat of one of two equally good bundles of hay, is as good an instance to prove, that she has a self-determining power, as any brought to prove it in men. So that if those instances prove it

in men, this proves it in brutes. Self-determining power then is nothing distinctive between men and brutes.

The capacity of considering and judging, of distinguishing virtue and vice, of deliberating, reasoning, reflecting, and suspending, have been mentioned as distinguishing between men and brutes. But all these, except *suspending*, are acts of the intellect, not of the will. And suspension, though an act of the will, does not appear to imply self-determination more than any other act of the will. Besides; brutes suspend, as well as men. A dog in quest of his master, will suspend proceeding in any road, till he is satisfied, in which his master has gone. And sheep, a more stupid race, on hearing a dog bark, will often suspend their flight, till they see from what quarter their enemy is approaching.

It is said, that external liberty and spontaneity belong to brutes and mad men, as well as to rational men. Be it so; yet the power and proper exercise of reason does not belong to them. It is said, that if an action's being voluntary makes it virtuous or vicious; then brutes would be the subjects of virtue or vice. But merely that an action is voluntary does not constitute it virtuous or vicious. It must besides be the action of a rational being.

Dr. Clarke, the greatest champion for the self-determining power, expressly grants that children, beasts and even every living creature possess it. "The actions of *children*, and the actions of *every living creature* are all of them *essentially free*. The mechanical and involuntary motion of their bodies, such as the pulsation of the heart and the like, are indeed all necessary; but they are none of them *actions*. Every *action*, every motion arising from the *self-moving principle*, is essentially *free*. The difference is this only, in men this physical liberty is joined with a sense or consciousness of moral good or evil, and is therefore eminently called liberty. In beasts the same physical liberty or self-moving power, is wholly separate from a sense or consciousness or capacity of judging of moral good or evil and is vulgarly called spontaneity. In *children* the same physical liberty always is from the very beginning; and in proportion as they increase in age and in capacity of judging, they grow continually *in degree* not more *free*, but more *moral*, agents."* Thus we have the Doctor's authority, that children and beasts possess a self-determining power, as well as men, and that they are not only as really free as men, but that their freedom is *in degree* equal to that of men; and that what they want to constitute them *moral* agents, is not *liberty*, but *reason* and a capacity of judging.

10. Much has been said by Dr. Clarke and others after him,

* Remarks on Collins, page 27.

concerning the *beginning of motion;* by *motion* meaning *volition*, if they mean anything to the purpose. The argument is, that if motion, i. e. volition, had a beginning, it was begun by God, and of course he had a self-moving or self-determining power, a power efficiently to cause volition in himself, and actually did thus cause it. That volition even in the Deity had a beginning, the Doctor argues thus: "Motion must either finally be resolved into a first mover, in whom consequently there is liberty of action," i. e. self-determination, "or else into an infinite chain of causes and effects without any cause at all; which is an express contradiction, except motion could be necessarily existent in its own nature; which that it is not, is evident, because the idea of rest is no contradiction; and also because there being no motion without a particular determination one certain way, and no one determination being more necessary than another, an essential and necessary tendency to motion in all determinations equally, could never have produced any motion at all."* Motion throughout this quotation means internal motion or volition, or the whole is nothing to the purpose. I grant that external motion, the motion of matter, had a beginning, and that after the creation of matter. But the whole question is concerning volition, the act or motion of the mind. That this is not necessarily existent, and therefore not from eternity, the Doctor argues first from this, that "the idea of rest," i. e. of an entire absence or non-existence of volition, "is no contradiction." It is doubtless as much and in the same sense a contradiction, as the idea of the entire non-existence of knowledge or intelligence, or of all being. And if this argument prove, that volition had a beginning, it will equally prove, that knowledge or the divine existence had a beginning. Volition is just as necessarily existent as God is; without volition he would not be God. It is impossible, that God should from eternity have intelligence and not from eternity have volition.

The Doctor goes on to argue the beginning of volition thus: "There being no motion, i. e. volition, without a particular determination one certain way, and no one determination being in nature more necessary than another, an essential and necessary tendency to volition in all determinations equally, could never have produced any volition at all." On this I observe:

(1) That by the same argument all intellectual ideas and perceptions of happiness in the divine mind have a beginning, thus: There being no intellectual idea without a particular determination one way, and no one determination being in nature more

* Remarks on Collins, pp. 11, 12.

necessary than another, an essential and necessary tendency to all determinations of idea equally, could never have produced any idea at all. And with regard to perception of happiness, thus: There being no perception of happiness or misery without a particular determination one certain way, and no one determination being in nature more necessary than another, an essential and necessary tendency to the perception of happiness or misery in all determinations equally, could never have produced any particular perception of them at all. The same argument will prove, that God's existence is not eternal and necessary, thus: There can be no being, who is not a particular, determinate being; and no particular form or kind of being is in nature more necessary than another. But an essential and necessary tendency to existence in all forms and kinds equally, could never have been the foundation of any particular being at all.

If in these cases it should be objected, that one determination of idea is in nature more necessary than another; that which is according to truth and fact, is more necessary than that which is contrary to truth; and that feeling of happiness, and that form of existence which is most complete and perfect, is more necessary, than that which is less perfect. I answer, for the same reason, it must be granted, that the volition which is most rational, wise and holy, is more necessary, than that which is less wise and holy; and therefore this particular volition or determination of will is necessarily existent in its own nature, and is without beginning.

(2) From the supposition, that the volitions of God are not eternal and as necessarily existent as the divine knowledge or divine existence, it follows, that he is very far from an unchangeable being; that from eternity he existed without any volition or choice of one thing in preference to another; that when the eternity *a parte ante*, as it is called, had run out, he began to will and choose, and from that time he has been the subject of various acts of will, but never before, and therefore has been the subject of a very great change.

That God should from eternity exist without volition, and that in time he should become the subject of volition, implies not only a very great change in God, but that from eternity he was not a voluntary agent, and therefore no agent at all. So that the very argument which Dr. Clarke uses to prove, that God is a self-determinate agent, in fact does, directly contrary to his intention, prove, that he was from eternity no agent at all.

If God began volition in himself, he began it either voluntarily or involuntarily. If he began it voluntarily, he would be the sub-

ject of an infinite series of volitions causing one another; which is an absurdity, impossibility and contradiction. If he began it involuntarily, he did not begin it freely.

In his remarks on Collins, Dr. Clarke says, "To be an agent signifies, to have a power of beginning motion."* *Motion* here, if it be at all to the purpose, must mean *volition;* and to say, "To be an agent signifies to have a power of beginning volition," is a servile begging of the question, utterly unworthy of Dr. Clarke.

In the same book, he observes, "That if motion exist necessarily of itself—with a determination one certain way; then that determination is necessary, and consequently all other determinations impossible; which is contrary to experience."† And how does it appear by experience, that any other determinations of will are, or ever were, possible in the divine mind, than that which actually exists in it? Did Dr. Clarke experience divine exercises, and find by that experience, that other volitions are possible in God than what actually exist? Surely this was written by the Doctor with great inattention! If to save the Doctor it should be said, that this observation relates not to volition, but to the motion of matter; this, if it were the meaning of the Doctor, would argue equal inattention. Would he have imagined, that because the motion of matter is not from eternity and necessarily existent; therefore the same is true of thought and volition?

11. Self-determination has been argued from the irregular conduct of mankind, and especially from the consideration, that their *moral exercises* are so irregular and out of course. But the exercises and conduct of men, are not more irregular than the blowing of the wind, or the state of man's body often is in sickness. Yet it will not be pretended, that this consideration proves, that sickness or the blowing of the wind is self-determinate.

12. Dr. West objects, that "according to Mr. Edwards, the mind must always be governed by chance or accident; i. e. by something unforeseen or not designed by the mind beforehand. Thus, let a man's mind be ever so strongly determined at present, to pursue any particular object, yet that extrinsic cause, which has the entire command of his will, may the next hour frustrate all his purposes, and determine him to a quite contrary pursuit. If this is not to be governed by blind fate and chance, I know not what is."‡ On this I observe:

(1) Whether the Doctor do or do not know, what it is to be governed by blind fate and chance, is of no importance to his readers; and what a pity, that he should consume so much of

* Page 6. † p. 44. ‡ Part II. p. 31.

his own and his readers' time, in appeals to himself as an authority.

(2) According to this account, to be under the governing influence of any extrinsic cause, is to be governed by blind fate and chance. Therefore the planetary system and all the material world are under the government of blind fate and chance; so were the prophets and apostles, so far as they were inspired and influenced by the Spirit of God. Does Dr. West acknowledge this? If not, must he not own, that when he wrote the passage above quoted, he was mistaken in his idea of being governed by blind fate and chance?

(3) Doubtless President Edwards holds, that the human mind is often governed by motives "unforeseen and not designed by the mind beforehand." And as Dr. West holds, that the mind never acts without motive, unless he hold also, that it always foresees beforehand, the motives on which it will in future act, he must join with President Edwards in the idea, that it acts on, or which is the same, is governed by motives "unforeseen and not designed by the mind beforehand." And therefore on the same ground, on which he charges President Edwards with holding principles, which imply that the mind is governed by blind fate and chance, he may be charged with the same.

He also holds, that God "regulates and governs all things and sets bounds to the actions of all rational creatures, to bring about his own purposes," and that infallibly."* "That the Deity *governs* free agents as *perfectly* and *makes* them perform his purposes as *infallibly*, as though they had no agency at all."† And that "everything is *firmly fixed* in the divine mind."‡ Now the Deity is a cause extrinsic to the human mind, and by concession, he *regulates, governs* and *overrules* all the actions of intelligent creatures, and *makes* them *infallibly* perform *his purposes.* Therefore "let a man's mind be ever so strongly determined at present to pursue any particular object, yet that extrinsic cause," the Deity, "which has the entire command of his will, may," and certainly will, "frustrate all his purposes," unless the object of his pursuit be agreeable to the purposes of the Deity. Now then I appeal to the reader, whether Dr. West do not as fully hold those principles which he says imply, that men are governed by blind fate and chance, as President Edwards.

* Part II. pp. 46, 47. † Ibid. p. 67. ‡ Ibid. p. 49.

CHAPTER VIII.

IN WHICH IS CONSIDERED THE OBJECTION, THAT MORAL NECESSITY IMPLIES THAT GOD IS THE AUTHOR OF SIN.

It is objected to the doctrine of moral necessity, that since this necessity and the connection between motives and volitions are established by God, he is the author of all the sin and wickedness in the universe; that he by the motives which he lays before creatures, tempts them to sin, and is himself answerable for all the sin committed by them. And a great deal of vehement declamation is poured out on this subject, well suited to take hold of the feelings and passions of men, but not to inform their understandings and assist their reason.

Before we proceed to a more direct and particular consideration of this objection, it is proper to show in what sense the advocates for moral necessity hold that the divine agency is concerned in the existence of sin.

1. They do hold, that all necessity and certainty or certain futurity, whether of natural or moral events, is established by God; of course that the connection between all causes and effects, and particularly the connection between motives and volitions, is established by the same supreme agent.

2. They hold, that all things, which come to pass in time, were certainly foreordained by God from eternity; that he foreordained them not in consequence of foreseeing, that the free will of man will bring them into existence; but the free will of man brings them into existence, in consequence of the divine decree, so far as that will does at all bring them into existence.

3. They hold, that whatever sin takes place among creatures, takes place not by the bare permission or non-influence of God; but under his superintending providence, and in consequence of his disposing things so, that sin certainly or with moral necessity, follows. President Edwards has explained himself fully on this head: "If by *the author of sin* be meant the *sinner*, the *agent* or *actor* of sin, or the doer of a wicked thing; so it would be a reproach and blasphemy, to suppose God to be *the author of sin.* In this sense I utterly deny God to be the author of sin; rejecting such an imputation on the Most High, as what is infinitely to be abhorred; and deny any such thing to be the consequence of what I have laid down. But if by *author of sin* is meant the permitter or not hinderer of sin, and at the same time, a *dispo-*

ser of the state of events in such a manner, for wise, holy and most excellent ends and purposes, THAT SIN, if it be permitted and not hindered, WILL MOST CERTAINLY FOLLOW, I do not deny, that God is the author of sin; it is no reproach for the Most High to be *thus* the author of sin." *

The objections against such an agency of God in the existence of sin, as has been now described, are two; (1) That such divine agency is inconsistent with human liberty, moral agency and accountableness. (2) That it is inconsistent with the perfect holiness of God. Before I answer these objections distinctly, I wish it to be observed, that they are inconsistent and mutually destroy each other.

If the divine agency in the establishment of moral necessity and the connection between motives and volitions, be inconsistent with our liberty and moral agency; then God in establishing such a necessity of any action in us which we call sin, is not the cause or author of *sin*; for his agency so far from producing sin in us, renders us *incapable* of sin. Suppose God with moral necessity influence a man to kill another with malice prepense; if this necessitating influence as really destroy his moral agency, as if it turned him into a windmill, though the man kills the other, he commits no more sin in it, than if a windmill had killed him; and consequently God is no more the author of sin in this instance, than if he had influenced the windmill to kill him, or had first turned the man into a windmill, and this windmill had in the course of providence been the instrument of his death. So that they who hold, that moral necessity is inconsistent with moral agency, must never object, that God is *the author of sin*, by establishing that necessity, and thus acts inconsistently with his perfect holiness.

On the other hand, if God do influence any man to *commit sin*, and thus act inconsistently with his perfect holiness, the man is a moral agent notwithstanding such influence, and there is no foundation to object, that the influence is inconsistent with liberty and moral agency; and they who object that such influence implies, that God is the author of *sin*, must forever be silent concerning the inconsistency of that influence with human liberty and moral agency.

If moral necessity be inconsistent with moral agency, it is absolutely impossible and contradictory for God to dispose things so, that sin will certainly or with moral necessity follow. For on this supposition whatever certainly follows such a disposal cannot be sin or any other moral act, as moral agency is in the case

* Inquiry, p. 254.

destroyed by the disposal. Therefore it is impossible, that God in this way should cause sin, and therefore it is absurd and self-contradictory in those who hold, that moral necessity is inconsistent with moral agency, to charge us with blasphemy, as they frequently do, because we avow the sentiment, that God so disposes events that sin certainly follows.

Yet so far as I know, all those who oppose moral necessity, make both the objections before mentioned, and thus pull down with one hand, what they build up with the other. This is eminently true of Dr. West.

I now proceed to consider those objections distinctly.

1. It is objected, that a divine agency establishing a moral necessity of sin, is inconsistent with human liberty, moral agency and accountableness. Answer: The divine agency in this case is no more inconsistent with human liberty, etc. than the moral necessity which it establishes. If this necessity be inconsistent with liberty, be it so; the divine agency which causes it, does not increase the inconsistency, beyond what would be, if that necessity took place without such agency. A mountain placed across the channel of a river, may be inconsistent with the river's flowing in that channel. But whether it were placed there by God, were constructed there by human art and labor, or happened there without cause, are questions immaterial as to the river's running in that channel, so long as the mountain is the very same. Therefore let our opponents prove, that moral necessity or a previous certainty of moral actions, is inconsistent with moral agency, and that moral agents must act by perfect contingence, mere chance and blind fate, and they will carry their point, without saying a word concerning the divine agency. And until they prove this, whatever they may say concerning the divine agency, will serve no good purpose to their cause, as to this part of the argument.

2. It is objected, that for God to establish a moral necessity of sin, or as President Edwards expresses it, "for God to dispose of the state of events in such a manner, for wise, holy and most excellent ends, that sin will most certainly and infallibly follow;" is inconsistent with the perfect holiness of God. But in what respects is it inconsistent with his holiness? Or for what reasons are we to conclude, that it is inconsistent with his holiness? So far as I have been able to collect the reasons from the ablest writers on that side of the question, they are these:

(1) That whatever is in the effect is in the cause, and the nature of every cause may be known by the effect. Therefore if God so order things, that sin will certainly follow, he is the cause

of sin, and therefore is sinful himself. If this argument be good, God is the subject of pain, sickness and death, since he is the cause of them. He is material and is the subject of all the properties of matter, extension, solidity, mobility, figure, color, etc. because he created matter and all its properties. Yea, he suffers the torments of hell, because he inflicts them. This argument, though urged by men of great fame, is too weak and absurd to bear inspection!

(2) If God dispose things so, that sin will certainly follow; he doubtless takes pleasure in sin, and this implies sin in God himself. If God do take a direct and immediate complacency in sin, it is granted, that this would imply sin in God. But if he choose the existence of sin as a means of good only, as pain and sickness may be the means of good; this implies no sin in God. Nor does it follow from his disposing things so, that sin certainly takes place, that he does directly delight in sin itself abstractly considered, any more than it follows from his inflicting sickness and misery on his creatures, that he takes a direct complacency in these. And we do not allow, but utterly deny, that God from a direct complacency in sin disposes things so, that it certainly follows. If our opponents believe that a direct complacency of God in sin is implied in our doctrine, it behoves them to make it out, and not to take it for granted.

Dr. West insists on this argument: "If the Deity produces sinful volitions—then sin is his own work—and then he cannot hate sin, but must love it and delight in it."* It seems the Doctor foresaw that to this argument it would be answered that God's producing sin in the manner before explained, no more implies a direct complacency in it, than his producing *misery* implies a direct complacency in that; and he replies, that "the two cases are by no means parallel—that the Deity is nowhere represented as being angry at his creatures, because they suffer pain and distress—whereas with regard to moral evil, God is always represented as hating it, and punishing the impenitent." To this I rejoin, that the want of parallelism does not appear. For though God is not represented to be angry at *pain* and *misery*, as they are not the proper objects of anger; yet he is represented to be displeased with them; and anger is only one kind of displeasure, displeasure at moral evil. And if God do produce a thing, with which he is displeased, why may he not produce a thing with which he is angry, and which he is disposed to punish as it deserves? Let a reason be given, why he may not do the latter, as well as the former.

* Part II. p. 43.

(3) God hates sin and doubtless he must hate to bring it into existence; and therefore he will not so dispose things, that it will certainly come into existence. But God hates the pain, misery and death of his creatures in the same sense, that he hates sin; yet we find in fact that, he does dispose things so, that they do take place among his creatures.

(4) That God should so dispose of events, that sin is the certain consequence, is doing evil, that good may come of it; which is contrary to scripture, as well as reason. This is merely asserting, but not proving what is asserted. How does it appear, that for God so to dispose of events, that sin is the certain consequence, and this to subserve the most wise and holy purposes, is doing evil? To do evil is to commit sin; and to say that this is to commit sin, is to beg the question. Let it be proved to imply, that God commits sin, and the point is gained. We assert, that to say, such a disposal implies, that God commits sin, is as groundless a proposition, as to say, that if God so dispose of events, that sickness is the certain consequence, this implies, that God himself is sick. I presume, it will not be denied, that God did so dispose of events, that the certain consequence would be that Joseph should be sold into Egypt, and that our Savior should be crucified. Nor will it be denied, that God made this disposition of events with a holy and wise purpose. And if God may do this in one or two instances; why may he not do the same in every instance, in which sin actually exists?

(5) That God should make an establishment whereby any creature is laid under a moral necessity of sinning is a great injury, both to the creature himself, and also to the system; as all sin is injurious to the system. Answer: What injury can be pretended to be done to the creature, who is the subject of the sin, in the case described, so long as his liberty and moral agency remain entire? And they do remain entire by the supposition; else he would be incapable of sin. A creature which is not, and so long as it remains to be, not a moral agent, cannot be influenced even by God himself to commit sin. It would imply a contradiction. So that there is no foundation for complaint, that the subject is injured, by being laid under a moral necessity, or previous certainty, of sinning. Besides; this objection implies, that every moral agent is injured, unless it be a matter of perfect uncertainty, what his future actions shall be, uncertainty not only to himself, and all creatures, but to God and in the nature of things; i. e. every moral agent is injured, unless he be left to act by pure chance.

With regard to injury to the system of intelligent beings, there

is, if possible, still less foundation for objection on this ground. For it is a part of the doctrine of moral necessity, that God never establishes it, excepting when its establishment is subservient and necessary to the general good of that system, implying the divine glory; and to be sure that God never so disposes of events, that sin certainly follows, unless such a dispensation is necessary to the general good. Nor ought the contrary to be taken for granted. If God do in any instance so dispose of events, that sin certainly follows, when the existence of that sin is not necessary to the general good, but injurious to it; I confess, I see not how in this case, the divine holiness can be vindicated. But this is nothing peculiar to the introduction of sin. It would also be inconsistent with the divine perfect holiness and wisdom to create matter, or to cause holiness, in such circumstances as to disserve the general good.

(6) It is inquired, Where is the consistence between God's laying a man under a moral necessity of sinning, and then punishing him for that sin?—I answer:

1. How can God consistently make a man sick, and then apply medicines or any remedy toward his restoration? Punishment is inflicted to prevent either the subject of the punishment, or others, from falling into the same practice. If there be no inconsistence in bringing sickness on a man, and then healing him by medicine; where is the inconsistence in bringing sin, which is moral sickness, on a man, and whereby both he and that system are so far morally diseased, and then by punishment healing him or the system?

2. There is no consistence in the case, if moral necessity be incompatible with moral agency. But if it be entirely compatible with moral agency, there is no inconsistence in the case. For in laying a man under a moral necessity of *sinning*, as he is supposed still to *sin*, nothing is done to impair his moral agency or his desert of punishment. On this supposition it is immaterial as to desert of punishment, who or what is the cause of the moral necessity, whether God or any other being, or whether it happen without cause. Therefore God may as consistently punish a sinner, whom he himself has laid under a moral necessity of sinning, as he may punish him, provided he be laid under the same moral necessity by any other being, or by mere chance. If moral necessity be entirely consistent with desert of punishment, it is as impertinent to ask how God can consistently lay a man under a moral necessity of sinning and then punish him for it, as to ask how God can consistently make a man of a dark complexion or a low stature and then punish him, for any

sins, which he may commit. For moral necessity is no more inconsistent with sin and desert of punishment, than a dark complexion or a low stature. To lay a man under a moral necessity of sinning, is to make it certain, that he will sin. And to ask how God can consistently make it certain, that he will sin, and then punish him for that sin, implies that previous certainty is inconsistent with sin, and that in order to sin a man must act by mere chance.

It is no more inconsistent, for God to forbid men to sin, and yet so dispose things, that they certainly will commit sin; than it is to forbid them to sin, and yet voluntarily to suffer other causes to lead them into sin. Nay, since liberty is out of the question, as by the very statement of the objection, it allows, that notwithstanding the divine disposal, the man who is the subject of that disposal does commit *sin*; it is no more inconsistent for God to forbid men to sin, and yet so dispose things, that sin will follow, than it is for him to forbid it, and yet voluntarily permit men to sin by self-determination. For in disposing things so that sin follows, when the disposal is supposed to be consistent with sin and moral agency, nothing can be pretended to be inconsistent with the prohibition of sin, unless it be the divine consent, that sin should come into existence; and this equally exists in the case of bare permission, as in the case of the aforesaid disposal. The law of God, which forbids all sin, does not imply, that God will prevent sin, by introducing the greater evil of destroying moral agency. Nor does it imply, that he will not consent in his own mind, that it be committed by men or other moral agents, rather than the said greater evil or other as great evil should take place. Therefore rather than that the same or as great an evil should take place, the Deity may not only consent to the existence of sin, but may consent, that second causes, motives, temptations, etc. should do whatever they can do, toward the introduction of it, consistently with the freedom of the creature. He may do all this without inconsistence and insincerity. The prohibition of sin in the law does not imply a wish or choice of the divine mind, all things considered, that sin should not be committed. It barely points out our duty, but reveals nothing of God's design, whether or not to permit it, or to dispose things so, that it will follow. Therefore there is no inconsistence between this prohibition and such a disposal in providence, as will be followed by sin. A good master may strictly forbid his servant to steal; yet convinced, that he does steal, the master may in a particular case, wish him to steal, and even leave money exposed to him, that he may steal, and

ultimately with a design that an advantage may be put into the master's hand, to convict, punish and reform his servant. There is no inconsistence in the master's thus forbidding theft, and yet from the motive before mentioned wishing to have it committed.

(7) It is said, that if God choose that the sinfulness of volitions should come into existence, and if he so dispose events, that it will certainly come into existence; there is no difference between this, and God's being himself the subject of sinful volitions. I answer, there is the same difference in this case, as there is between God's choosing that a man should be sick, and being the subject of sickness himself; as there is between creating matter, and being himself material; and as there is between willing and causing the damnation of a sinner, and being himself the subject of damnation. It will not be pretended, that if God dispose events and circumstances in such a manner, that repentance, godly sorrow, faith in a Redeemer, submission and holy fear, take place in the heart of a man, God himself is the subject of those exercises.

If, though human liberty be left entire, God cannot so dispose things, that sin will certainly follow, without being himself the subject of a disposition friendly to sin; he cannot without the same implication choose, that sin should take place, rather than a greater evil. But our opponents allow, that God did choose, that sin should take place, rather than a greater evil; they allow, that he had a perfect foreknowledge, that if he should create man with a self-determining power, and leave him to the free exercise of that power, the consequence would be, that he would commit sin. Therefore they allow, that God chose, that sin should come into existence, rather than human liberty should be destroyed, and rather than free agents should not be brought into existence. So that in the same sense, in which we hold, that God chose or was willing, that sin should come into existence, our opponents hold the same. We hold, that God chose that sin should take place, rather than a greater evil; and therefore disposed of events consistently with human liberty, so that it certainly followed. They hold, that God chose, that sin should take place, rather than a greater evil, and therefore disposed of events, consistently with human liberty, so that it certainly followed, and when God certainly foresaw, that it would follow.

In that our opponents charge us with holding principles, which imply, that God is *the author of sin*, they allow, that whatever God does according to our principles toward the introduction of sin, is consistent with free agency in the subject of sin. This must be conceded by them; else their charge is perfectly incon-

sistent and self-contradictory, as has been shown. Therefore since it is allowed, that whatever God has done toward the existence of sin, is consistent with the creature's free agency, the only question remaining, is, whether he have acted in this affair, with a holy and wise design, a design to promote the general good. And we argue from the essential perfections of God, that whatever he has done in this, as well as in every other instance, must have been done with such a design.

If it be said, that sin cannot even by the Deity, be made subservient to good; the question will arise, why then did he so dispose circumstances that it did come into existence, and this when he foresaw the consequence? To answer, that he could not, consistently with free agency, keep it out of existence, is on the present supposition groundless. It is now supposed, that God did bring it into existence, consistently with free agency; and therefore he could doubtless keep it out of existence, consistently with the same free agency.

If the existence of sin be ultimately made subservient to good, or if it be necessary to the prevention of greater evil; what reason in the world, can be given, why God should not bring it into existence, in a way consistent with human free agency? In this way it must be brought into existence, if at all. Our opponents themselves allow, as has been observed, that the existence of it was necessary to the prevention of greater evil, the evil of destroying human liberty, or of the non-existence of free agents. And for God in this view to consent to the existence of sin, as our opponents grant that he did, is as inconsistent with his moral character, as to give the same consent and to put forth any exertion toward its existence, consistent with human liberty. So long as the exertion is consistent with liberty, it cannot be pretended, that there is anything in it more opposite to the moral character of God or more friendly to sin, than there is in the consent implied in that permission of sin, which our opponents hold. Therefore their plan is in this respect equally liable to the same objection of being inconsistent with the moral character of God, as ours.

(8) Dr. West argues, that if the Deity order things so that sinful volition follow, "he must place the object in such a view before the mind, as to make it appear the greatest good under present circumstances; which implies, that he presents the object in a false point of light, and effectually deceives the mind;" and "the apostle was under a great mistake, when he said, it was impossible for God to lie;" and to lie is sin. The Doctor, as usual, tells us, "I can have no idea, that the Deity can produce

a sinful volition in the human mind, in any other way, than what I have now described."* On this I remark:

1. It is very immaterial to others, what Dr. West can, and what he cannot, have an idea of. Does the Doctor mean this as an argument, that no other person can have an idea of it, or that it cannot be true?

2. If when he speaks of God's making sin appear the greatest good, he mean, that he makes it appear so to a man's unbiased reason, this is not true, nor is it pretended by any man.

3. When sin appears to any man the greatest good, it is in consequence of the influence of his corrupt appetites, and not by the dictates of his unbiased reason. How a man becomes the subject of corrupt appetite, I do not undertake to say any further than President Edwards has said already, that God has disposed things so, that it takes place as an infallible consequence. But if God so dispose things, that an inordinate appetite for strong drink takes place in the mind of a man, and by the influence of such appetite strong drink appear to him the greatest good; does it hence follow, that God is a liar? Will Dr. West assert it? If not, the ground of his argument fails.

The Doctor further observes, that "if God is the author of men's lusts, he deceives them, by causing them to view things through the false medium of their lusts."† The expression, "God is the author of men's lusts," is the Doctor's, not President Edwards'. It tends to mislead, and cannot be admitted, without explanation and qualifying. Suppose a man by leading his neighbor frequently into the immediate use of strong drink, should produce an appetite for it in his neighbor, so that henceforward strong drink should appear to him the greatest good; is the man, who does this, a liar? Whether he be guilty of other sin, than lying, is nothing to the present purpose; for Dr. West's argument is, that God by producing lust in men, deceives the man in such a sense, as to disprove the words of the apostle, *that God cannot lie.* If the man above supposed be not guilty of lying, neither is the Deity in so disposing things, that lust infallibly follows.

(9) "If the Deity be the positive efficient cause of sin, then there can be no foundation for repentance; for how can a man repent or be sorry, that he is just such a creature, in every respect, as the Almighty has been pleased to make him?"‡ With the same objection to the expression, "positive efficient cause of *sin*," I observe, that this argument is equally good with respect to pain, sickness and calamity; and will prove that no man ought to be sorry for any calamity befalling himself or others. For "how can

* Part II. p. 41. † Ibid. pp. 42, 43. ‡ Ibid. p. 44.

a man be sorry, that he is just such a creature," just as miserable, "as God has made him?" If the Doctor say, that though calamity in itself is an evil and therefore to be regretted; yet as God sends it, he will overrule it for good, and that in that view it is not to be regretted; the same observations are applicable to the existence of sin. Sin in itself considered is infinitely vile and abominable, and proper matter of sorrow and repentance. But considering that it no more came into existence without the design and providence of God, than calamity did; and considering, that its existence will be certainly overruled for final good; its existence is no more to be regretted, than the existence of calamity and misery, especially extreme and eternal misery.

The Doctor proceeds: "What remorse of conscience can there be, when the sinner believes that every sinful volition was formed in him by the Deity?"* Sinful volitions proceed from some cause, or no cause. If they proceed from no cause, what remorse of conscience can there be, when the sinner believes and knows, that every sinful volition happened in him by pure chance? If sinful volitions proceed from some cause, that cause is either the sinner himself or some extrinsic cause. If they proceed from any other extrinsic cause, beside the Deity, the same difficulty will arise, and it may be asked with the same pertinency, as the above question is asked by Dr. West, What remorse of conscience can there be, when the sinner believes, that every sinful volition was formed in him by an extrinsic cause? If the efficient cause be the sinner himself, then "self acts on self and produces volition," which the Doctor denies. And if he did not deny it, it is absurd and impossible, as it runs into an infinite series of volitions propagating one another, and yet all this series would really amount to but one single volition, and this, as there would not then be a preceding causal volition, would not be efficiently, voluntarily and freely caused by the subject himself.

Besides; if the subject efficiently cause his own volitions, he either causes them under the influence of motives or not. If he cause them under the influence of motives, he causes them necessarily, and acts necessarily in causing them; and Dr. West says, "Where necessity begins, liberty ends."† Therefore if a man efficiently cause his own volitions so as to be free from necessity, he must cause them without motive, aim or end; i. e. he must cause them in perfect stupidity, and in the exercise of Dr. West's torpid liberty of *not acting*. And then I ask, what remorse of conscience can there be, when the sinner believes, that he him-

* Part II. p. 44. † Ibid. p. 19.

self caused every sinful volition in himself, as involuntarily as a man in a convulsion strikes his friend, and as stupidly and unmeaningly as a door turns on its hinges?

Remorse of conscience is a sense of having done wrong; and whenever a person has done wrong, there is a foundation for remorse of conscience; and to take it for granted, that there can be no remorse of conscience, unless we determine our own volitions, is to take it for granted, that without self-determination we can do no wrong and are no moral agents; which is to beg the main question in this controversy. Let it be shown, that without self-determination, we are not moral agents, and one important step will be taken toward settling this controversy. Yet even this step will not be decisive. It must be also shown, that our self-determination was not previously certain, but is exercised by mere chance. For if it be previously certain, it is morally necessary.

(10) If God have so disposed of events, that sin certainly follows, it is his work; and to be opposed to sin is "to be opposed to God's work, and to be opposed to God."* So calamity is the work of God, and to be opposed to that, is to be opposed to God's work, and to be opposed to God. And will Dr. West admit that every one who wishes to escape any calamity, is in a criminal manner opposing God?

(11) "If the Deity has formed sinful volitions in a man, because his glory could not be promoted without it; then surely the sinner, if he loves God, must love him because he has made him a sinful creature, and ought to thank him for all the sins, which he has committed."† The difficulty attending most of Dr. West's arguments is, that if they prove anything, they prove too much, and confute principles and facts, which he will not dare to deny. So with respect to this argument. The Doctor will not deny, that pain and calamity are the work of God. "And if the Deity has" sent pain and calamity "on a man, because his glory could not be promoted without them; then surely the sinner, if he loves God, must love him, because he has made him a" miserable "creature, and ought to thank him for all" the calamity and misery, which he suffers, for all his sickness and dangers, for the death of his wife, children, etc. And if a man ought to thank God for these things, no doubt, "a sinner ought to thank God for damnation." If these consequences do not inevitably follow from the principle of Dr. West's argument, let the contrary be shown, and not merely asserted. Again; "If we are to thank God for all the calamities and miseries which we do or shall suf-

* Part II. p. 19. † Ibid.

fer; "this will imply, that" calamity and misery "are blessings or favors; and consequently, if the sinner is to thank God for damnation, then damnation is a blessing and favor. Hence sinners who believe this doctrine, will be apt to conclude, that it is a matter of no consequence, whether they be saved or damned; seeing upon either supposition they are sure that whatever they receive from God will be such a blessing, that they ought to be thankful for it."* Thus may the Doctor's arguments be retorted against himself.

If the Doctor should answer, Though calamity and misery in themselves are no blessings, yet when they are overruled by God to the good of those who suffer them, or to the general good, they become blessings; I acknowledge the sufficiency of the answer. But the same answer may with equal truth and force be made to his observations concerning sin. The Doctor grants, that the wickedness of the vicious shall be overruled to the glory of God and the advancement of the happiness of the righteous.† Though wickedness is in itself no blessing and no matter of thankfulness; yet when God overrules it to good, greater good than could have been effected in any other way; in this connection it is in the same sense a blessing, and matter of thankfulness, as calamity and misery are.

(12) On the plan of moral necessity, God tempts mankind to sin. If the meaning of this be, that God establishes a connection between motives and volitions, and a previous certainty of those volitions; and in the course of his providence brings into the view of men motives which actually influence them to sin; I grant, that God does in this sense tempt mankind to sin; as he did our first parents, Judas, etc. Nor is there any ground, on which this can be denied, unless it be allowed, that this previous certainty is established by some other cause than the Deity, or that it exists without cause, or that volitions are not previously certain, but happen by chance. To hold that the previous certainty of all volitions is established by some other cause than God, is to run into the Manichean scheme of two Gods, and at the same time to hold, that the second God is an involuntary agent and is the cause of all the volitions of the voluntary God, as well as of all creatures. If we say, this previous certainty of all volitions is uncaused, we may as well say, that everything else is uncaused. If we say, that volitions are not previously certain, but happen by mere chance, we may as well say, that everything else happens by chance.

But if by *tempting* be meant soliciting or enticing to sin, as

* Part II. p. 45. † Ibid. p. 49.

the devil tempts men, we deny that this is implied in our doctrine.

Dr. West makes some remarks on James 1: 13—16, which appear to be remarkable. 1. He tells us, that "a man is tempted when he consents to the gratification of his own lust; i. e. when he commits sin."* Indeed! Is no man tempted, but he who actually commits sin in consequence of the temptation? The apostle Paul declares, Acts 20: 19, that he "served the Lord with all humility of mind, and with many tears and *temptations*, which befel him by the lying in wait of the Jews." And were all these temptations successful with the apostle? The very text implies the contrary. Gal. 4: 14, "And my temptation, which was in my flesh, ye despised not nor rejected, but received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus." James 1: 2, "Count it all joy, when ye fall into divers temptations." V. 12, "Blessed is the man that endureth temptation. For when he is tried, he shall receive the crown of life."

Or if Dr. West shall allow, that a man is or may be tempted without falling into sin, this will spoil his argument. His words immediately following those last quoted from him, are, "This proves, that when it is said, neither tempteth he any man, the sense is, God causeth no man to sin." But if a man may be tempted without committing sin, then God may tempt a man, without causing him to sin.

2. He observes from *Leigh*, that the Greek verb πειράζω, used in the passage in James now under consideration, signifies to *make trial*, i. e. *to try* a person. But because James says of God, *neither tempteth he any man*, will Dr. West adventure to say, that God never *tries* any man? and particularly that he did not try Abraham?

3. Because this text declares, that God does not *tempt*, i. e. according to the Doctor's explanation, *try* any man, he infers that God "does not cause them to sin." This consequence follows not from the principle premised. Whether God do or do not, try men, he may so dispose things that sin will be the certain consequence; and this may be done not to *try* any man.

4. He says, that "a voluntary consent to indulge or gratify lust, is sin." Yet in the next sentence he says, "the apostle makes every sin to be the *effect* of a consent to gratify some particular lust;" i. e. every sin is the effect of sin.

5. The whole force of this text, to prove, that God does not dispose things so, that sin is the certain consequence, if it prove anything to this effect, lies in these words, "Neither tempteth

* Part II. p. 75, etc.

he any man." The Doctor says, "these must mean, Neither causeth he any man to sin."* But if "the Deity infallibly and perfectly regulate, govern and set bounds to the actions of all rational creatures, and overrule all those actions to accomplish his purposes," if he *make* them perform his purposes infallibly; as Dr. West says; then everything which they in fact do, and every sin which they commit, was God's purpose and he *makes* them perform it. Is he then in no sense the cause of their sin? Does he not at least so dispose things, that sin is the certain consequence?

Dr. West abundantly asserts those things which necessarily imply both absolute decrees and such disposal of God, that sin certainly and infallibly follows. "The creature," says he, "in every moment of its existence, is subject to the divine *control;* consequently *no act can take place*, but what the Deity foresaw and *determined* from all eternity to *overrule* to his own glory and the general good. If the Deity foresaw, that a creature—would do that which could not be overruled to the divine glory and the general good—he would *restrain* him from doing that."† "He who has made all things—does *regulate* and *govern* all things, and *sets bounds to the actions of all rational creatures.* The Deity, by his permissive decree, *superintends* and *governs all the actions* of his creatures to accomplish *his own purposes in as strong a sense, as though he brought them to pass by his positive efficiency.*"‡ "We believe that the Deity *governs*, and overrules the actions of these beings" [rational creatures] "to bring about his own purposes and designs *as infallibly*—as though they were *mere passive* beings."§

Now if these things be so; no act of the creature *can* take place, but what God determined from all eternity, to overrule to his own glory. If God *restrain* the creature from the contrary; if he *overrule* all those actions to accomplish his purposes, in as strong a sense, as though he brought them to pass by his positive efficiency, and as infallibly as though they were mere passive beings; then certainly he does dispose things so, that all those actions do infallibly take place. To be subject to the *control* of our Creator in every moment of our existence, so that no act *can* take place in us, but what God from eternity *determined;* to be *regulated* and *governed* by God in *all things;* if he set bounds to *all* our actions; and if he *govern* and *overrule* all our actions in as strong a sense as if he brought them to pass by his *positive efficiency*, and as *infallibly* as though they were mere *passive beings;* surely all this implies, that God does so dispose of

* Part II. p. 75. † Ibid. p. 22. ‡ Ibid. p. 46. § Ibid. p. 47.

events, that sin certainly follows. And on this plan, where is self-determination? Where is liberty to either side? liberty to act or not act? All the actions of rational creatures are limited, bounded and restrained to certain definite objects and purposes, which God from eternity had in view. They are therefore shut up to act one way only, and cannot act otherwise. They can act in such a manner only, as God from all eternity saw would accomplish his glorious purposes, i. e. his glorious *decrees*. Therefore all the actions of creatures are decreed from eternity to be precisely what they are, and all creatures are as infallibly restrained from acting contrary to the decrees of God, as if he brought their actions to pass by his positive efficiency, and as though they were mere passive beings.

If it should be said, that though God bounds and restrains his creatures from acting in a manner which is opposite to his purposes and decrees; yet he does not necessitate them to act at all, but leaves them at liberty to act or not act; on this I observe:

1. As I have already said, whenever anything is proposed to any intelligent being, as the object of his choice, it is, as Mr. Locke has long since taught, absolutely impossible for that being not to act. He may indeed either choose or refuse the object. But to refuse it is to act, equally as to choose it. In either case the being acts and cannot avoid acting, unless he be sunk into a state of perfect unfeeling stupidity.

2. If it were possible for a creature to act or not act; still according to Dr. West he could do neither the one nor the other, unless it were subservient to the glorious purposes of God. For if God will infallibly restrain creatures from acting in all instances, in which their acting is not subservient to his purposes; will he not restrain them from *not acting*, i. e. prevent their sinking into unfeeling stupidity, and excite them to action, in all instances in which not acting would not in like manner be subservient to his purposes? If not, let a reason be given; a reason why God will not prevent creatures from counteracting his purposes by *not acting*, as well as by *acting*. Surely it will not be pretended, that to excite by rational motives and considerations, a creature to action, is more inconsistent with liberty, than infallibly to restrain, whether by motives or without motives, the same creature from action.

3. I appeal to the reader, whether the Doctor have not in the passages above quoted, given up the whole question both with respect to liberty as opposed to infallible moral necessity or certainty of moral action, and with respect to absolute decrees. If all men be limited and bounded by God, to act in all cases ac-

cording to his purposes; if they be shut up to this way of acting, and cannot voluntarily refuse to act in this way, as that would be to act contrary to God's purpose; if they cannot absolutely cease from all action when an object is proposed to their choice, but must either choose or refuse, and that according to God's purpose; if, as Dr. West expressly declares to be according to his sentiments, "Everything is as firmly fixed in the divine mind, by his permissive decree, and shall be as infallibly accomplished, as though he was the immediate author or efficient cause of all the actions of creatures."* Let the candid reader judge, whether the Doctor do not grant both absolute necessity and absolute decrees.

He, as we have seen in his Part II,† allows, that God permits and overrules sin to his own glory and the general good; but thinks this a demonstrative proof of self-determination. Let us consider what he says on this subject. "If the doctrine of necessity be true, and we are not self-determined, then it will follow, that we are constantly determined by the positive efficiency of the Deity."‡ If it be true, as the Doctor holds, that God *regulates* "and *governs* all things, and *sets bounds* to the actions of *all* rational creatures, to bring about *infallibly* his own purposes;" if he "*govern* free agents *as perfectly* and *make them perform* his purposes as infallibly, *as if they had no agency at all;*" I leave the reader to judge, whether we, in all our actions, be not, mediately or immediately, determined by the positive efficiency of the Deity. "If God make them perform his purposes *infallibly,*" it seems he must by his positive efficiency determine them to the performance; for what is it *to make* men perform a purpose, but to put forth positive exertions to this end? This is also by positive efficiency to abolish all liberty of self-determination. If these things be denied, and it be affirmed, that still the man is at liberty to act in that particular manner, which is subservient to the divine purpose, or not to act at all, and thus there is room for self-determination; I answer:

1. It is not allowed, that a man on a proposal to act, can possibly *not act at all;* and this ought not to be taken for granted.

2. Then God does not infallibly make men comply with his purpose, but leaves them to comply or not; which is directly contrary to Dr. West himself, in the quotations made above.

3. If the Deity by his positive efficiency prevent his creature from every action, but that which is agreeable to his purpose, he will prevent him by his positive efficiency from refusing to comply with that purpose, and this is by positive efficiency to deter-

* Part II. p. 49. † p. 22. ‡ Part II. p. 34.

mine him to comply with that purpose. And the Doctor grants, that all the actions of rational creatures are agreeable to God's purposes. Therefore all rational creatures in all their actions are determined by the positive efficiency of God. And all those which Dr. Samuel West mentions as absurd consequences of the sentiments of Dr. Stephen West, may be retorted on the former, thus: Since God infallibly *makes* and determines all men to perform his purposes, in all their actions, "sin is as much the work of God, as anything that he has made. But that the Deity should have an infinite aversion and an immutable hatred to his works, is inconceivable. It is sometimes said, that the tendency of sin is to dethrone the Almighty, to kill and utterly to destroy his existence. But is the Deity constantly working to destroy himself? This will make the Deity a strange contradiction to himself, and will constitute such a being, as cannot exist in the universe. If the Deity forms wicked volitions in the human mind, and then infinitely hates and abhors those very works of his, he must be infinitely miserable and wretched. God is said to rejoice in his own works. If then sin is God's work, he rejoices in it—God is the greatest lover of sin in the universe." Whatever absurdities these be, it concerns Dr. Samuel West, as much as any man, to remove them. As appears, it is presumed, by what has been said already.

Besides; most or all these objections lie with equal force against the divine efficiency of pain, misery or death. The Doctor will not deny, that these are inflicted by God. Therefore misery and death "are as much the works of God, as any that he has made." Yet "he does not willingly afflict and grieve the children of men." And "he has no pleasure in the death of" even "the wicked." Therefore "God has an infinite aversion and an irreconcilable hatred to his own works." And if this be inconceivable to Dr. West he will not deny it to be fact; and therefore that a thing is inconceivable to him, is no proof, that it is not true. And that the Deity should hate misery and death and yet cause them, would equally as in the case stated by Dr. West concerning the introduction of sin, "make the Deity a strange contradiction to himself, and would constitute such a being as cannot exist in the universe." "If the Deity forms" misery and death, "and then infinitely hates and abhors these very works of his hands, he must be infinitely miserable and wretched. God is said to rejoice in his own works. If then" misery and death "be his works, he rejoices in them, and God is the greatest lover" of all the misery and death "in the universe." Whenever Dr. West will answer these observations concerning

the divine efficiency of misery and death, he will furnish himself with an answer to his own similar observations concerning the divine agency in the introduction of moral evil. If he shall say, that God does indeed hate misery and death in themselves considered, and inflicts them, because they are necessary to greater good, and to the accomplishment of his own most benevolent purposes; the same may be said concerning moral evil.

The Doctor quotes the following passage from Dr. Hopkins: "If God be the origin or cause of moral evil this is so far from imputing moral evil to him, or supposing, that there is anything of moral evil in him, that it necessarily supposes the contrary." On which he remarks, "Consequently, if God be the origin and cause of holiness, this by the same kind of reasoning, is so far from imputing holiness to him, or supposing, that there is anything of that nature in him, that it necessarily supposes the contrary; that is to say, that the Deity has no moral character at all." In the above quotation, Dr. Hopkins evidently means, If God be the cause of *all* moral evil, or of the first which existed in the universe. This the word *origin* implies; he evidently uses it to mean *original* cause. Now whatever is in God, is uncaused. Therefore if there be moral evil in him, neither he nor any other being is the cause of that; of course whatever moral evil he causes, must all be out of himself; and if he cause all moral evil, it must all be out of himself and none of it in him. So that Dr. Hopkins' proposition on this head is manifestly true. Suppose the Doctor had said, If God be the cause of all matter, this so far from supposing matter in him, necessarily supposes the contrary; no doubt Dr. West himself would have acknowledged the truth of the proposition. And let a reason be given why the former proposition, in the sense now given of it, is not as true as the latter. As to the consequence which Dr. West draws from Dr. Hopkins' proposition, "that if God be the cause of holiness [of *all* holiness] this is so far from supposing holiness in God, that it necessarily supposes the contrary;" this is so far from an absurdity, as Dr. West imagines, that it is a manifest truth. Holiness in God is no more caused or created, than the divine essence. If then there be no other holiness, than created holiness, there is and can be none in God.

On a passage in which Dr. Hopkins asserts, that moral evil and holiness are equally the consequence of the divine disposal, but whether by the same mode of operation he could not tell; Dr. West remarks, "This makes it extremely unhappy for us; for we seem to have no way to know a true revelation from a false

one, both equally coming from the Deity."* But how this consequence follows from the assertion of Dr. Hopkins, Dr. West does not illustrate. God may so dispose things, that sin infallibly follows, and yet not be the author of a false revelation. And as the Doctor merely asserts, without attempting to prove what he asserts, he has no right to expect, that his assertion should be received as truth. If the Doctor take it for granted, that if God, in the way which I have explained, introduce sin, he is himself as real a sinner, as he would be, if he were to give a false revelation, he takes for granted the very thing in question, which is to be fairly proved, not pitifully begged.

In the same page, he says, "According to Dr. Hopkins will it not follow, that many who are led by the Spirit of God, are the children of the devil?" This implies, that whenever God, by means of motives or in any other way, so disposes of things, that sin infallibly follows, the man who is the subject of that sin, is in that sin led by the Spirit of God. The principle on which this argument is built, is, that whenever God so disposes things, that an action is the certain consequence, in that action the man is led by the Spirit of God. But Dr. West will not avow and abide by this principle; for he grants, that men always act upon some motive and never without motive. Nor will he deny, that the constitution, that men should always act upon motive and never without, is established by God. Yea, the Doctor expressly asserts, that "God overrules *all the actions of his creatures* to accomplish his own purposes in as strong a sense as though he brought them to pass by his *positive efficiency*." Yet he will not pretend, that in all those actions they are led by the Spirit of God.

The Doctor proceeds: "The Deity is called the Father of lights, from whom proceeds every good and perfect gift. But according to these principles, may he not, with as much propriety, be called the Father of darkness, from whom proceeds all malignity and wickedness?" Since the Doctor holds, that "The Deity governs free agents as perfectly and *makes* them perform his purpose as infallibly, as if they had no agency at all;" the question which the Doctor here proposes concerning the principles of Dr. Hopkins may with equal propriety be proposed on his own principles. And notwithstanding any agency which God exercises toward the production of moral evil, he may with the same truth and propriety be called *the Father of lights*, as he is called *the Father of mercies and the God of all comfort*, al-

* Part II. p. 46.

though all the pains and miseries, which his creatures suffer, whether in this world or the future, are inflicted by him.

The Doctor seems to attempt to screen himself from those, which he supposes to be absurd consequences of Dr. Hopkins' scheme, by representing, that he holds, that God barely *permits sin*. But to *superintend*, *govern* and *overrule* the actions of rational creatures "as infallibly, as if they were mere passive beings;"* and "in as strong a sense, as though he brought them to pass by his positive efficiency;"† "so to fix them, that they shall as infallibly be accomplished, as though he was the immediate author or efficient cause of them;"‡ and to *govern* free agents *as perfectly* and to *make* them perform his purposes *as infallibly*, as though they had no agency at all;"§ is more than barely to permit free agents to act of themselves. Barely to permit them to act of themselves, by which the Doctor explains himself to mean, "ordaining things contingently, i. e. avoidably, and with a possibility of not coming to pass,"‖ is not to govern them at all, but to leave them to govern themselves; it is not to overrule their actions, but to leave them to overrule their own actions; it is not to *make* them perform his purposes, but to leave them loose to perform or to omit those purposes. And much less is it to govern and overrule their actions *as infallibly as if they were mere passive beings, and in as strong a sense as though he brought them to pass by his positive efficiency;* to *fix* those actions *as infallibly as though he was the immediate author of them;* or to *govern* them as *perfectly* and to *make* them perform his purposes *as infallibly, as though they had no agency at all.*

Dr. West constantly insists, that "the Deity has communicated to man a self-moving or self-active principle." But what kind of a self-moving principle is that, which is always and in all its actions infallibly and perfectly regulated, governed and overruled by an extrinsic cause? and which is made by God as infallibly to perform his purposes, as if it were no self-moving principle at all? Such a self-moving principle as this, is so like a principle that never moves itself, but is always moved by an extrinsic cause, that I request Dr. West to point out the difference.

The Doctor grants, that "there is a sense in which God *hardens* the hearts of men," and that this is by his "taking from *them* what he had granted them, as a just punishment of their neglect and abuse of the advantages which they enjoyed."¶ He

* Part II. p. 47. † Ibid. p. 46. ‡ Ibid. p. 49.
§ Ibid. p. 67. ‖ Ibid. p. 47. ¶ Ibid. p. 52.

grants therefore, that God may consistently with his holiness harden the heart, and cause sin in men, in some cases; viz. when they deserve it as a just punishment of their sin. But the only reason, which renders it consistent with the divine perfections, to inflict this or any other just punishment, is, that the glory of God and the general good of his kingdom require it. Now no one pretends, that God ever in any sense causes sin to take place, unless its existence be subservient to the glory of God and the good of his kingdom. And if this reason will in one case justify his so disposing of things, that sin is the infallible consequence, why not in another? Until a reason is given to the contrary, we may presume, that whenever the glory of God and the general good of the creation require it, God may and does so dispose things, that sin is the infallible consequence.

"A man's becoming a vessel to honor or dishonor, is in consequence of his own conduct and behavior."* If by becoming a vessel to dishonor the Doctor mean, *being punished*, no doubt it is in consequence of a man's own misconduct, and to assert this is to assert nothing very great or pertinent to the question concerning the cause of sin. But if he mean by it committing sin; this is not, nor can be always in consequence of the sinner's own misconduct; because this like the self-determining power, implies the absurdity of an infinite series of actions, in consequence of each other; and that a man is doomed to commit sin in the first instance, in consequence of a prior sin committed by him.

"God does not harden the hearts of men, by any positive efficiency in forming or infusing any wickedness into their heart, but only taking from them those things, which were designed to restrain them from the committing of sin, and by permitting them to walk in their own wicked ways."† Of all men Dr. West so long as he holds, that God as perfectly and infallibly regulates, governs and overrules all the actions of free agents, and makes them conform to his purposes, as perfectly as if they had no agency at all, should be the last to object to the idea of God's positive efficiency of sin; as has been already illustrated. But aside from this, if God by taking from men what is necessary to restrain them from sin, lay them under an infallible certainty or absolute moral necessity of sinning; what advantage is gained by this mode of representing the matter? Is it at all more favorable either to the liberty of men, or to the holiness of God? To be sure this representation implies all that necessity, for which President Edwards pleads in the case. It is so to dispose things, that sin is the infallible consequence. Or if this taking away of re-

* Part II. p. 54. † Ibid. p. 55.

straints be attended with no certain consequence of sin, how does God by it harden the sinner? It seems, that after all he is left in a state of uncertainty, i. e. Dr. West's perfect liberty, whether he will sin or not. Where then is hardness of heart? Does it consist in perfect liberty? It is further to be observed, that if sin, for instance, an act of malice, envy or inordinate self-love, should come into existence, without any positive causation, whether by motive or in some other way; why may not any other positive thing, either substance or mode, and even the whole material universe, come into existence in the same way?

Dr. West remarks on Isa. 63: 17, *O Lord, why hast thou made us to err from thy ways, and hardened our hearts from thy fear?* "Now it is certain from the texts that have been already examined, that nothing more is intended, than that God leaves men to err, and to harden their own hearts."* This positive assertion led me to review the Doctor's remarks on those texts, and I am very willing the candid should judge concerning the Doctor's exhibition of certainty, that nothing more is intended, by God's hardening the hearts of men, than that God leaves them to harden their own hearts. He says,† in what sense God hardens the heart, our Savior will inform us, Matt. 13: 14, 15, "This people's heart is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes *they* have closed." In answer to this it may be said with equal force, In what sense God hardens the heart, we are informed in John 12: 40, "*He* hath blinded their minds, and hardened their hearts, that they should not see with their eyes," etc. Whatever right the Doctor has to suppose, and without a reason to deliver the *opinion* as truth, that John 12: 40, is to be explained by Matt. 13: 15; any other person has the same right to *suppose* and to deliver the opinion as truth, that Matt. 13: 15, is to be explained by John 12: 40.

The Doctor constantly insists, that "God never hardens any man or withdraws his spirit and grace,"‡ but in consequence of his abuse of them. If this were ever so true, it would not settle the question concerning the origin of moral evil. For the question is not what is the cause or source of sin in some particular cases, as in hardening the heart, in consequence of a former sin or sins; but what is the cause of all sin, and particularly of the *first* sin, whether in man or in the universe. Now to answer this question by saying, that when a man has "abused God's spirit and grace," God delivers him up to sin, is as absurd as to answer the question

* Part II. p. 51. † Ibid. p. 52. ‡ Ibid.

concerning the origin of the human race, by saying, that after Adam had lived a while, he begat a son.

Although the Doctor thinks it certain from the texts, which he had examined, that Isa. 63: 17, "intends nothing more than that God leaves men to err and to harden their own hearts;" he does not choose to rest the matter on that foundation; but observes, that "Hebrew verbs in Hiphil often signify only permission." If this were ever so true, it would decide nothing concerning Isa. 63: 17. If verbs in Hiphil do often signify only permission, this implies, that they often do not signify that only. Then the question would be, what does the word signify in this text? Neither Dr. West nor any other Hebraist, will pretend, that a verb in Hiphil *naturally* signifies permission only. If therefore any verb in that conjugation do signify that only, it must be for some other reason, than merely because it is in that conjugation. If there be any such reason in this case, the Doctor has not informed us of it. Nor can I conceive of any, unless it be the supposed absurdity of understanding the text as it is translated. But the Doctor must on reflection be sensible of the impropriety of taking that supposed absurdity for granted. Let him prove it, and he will oblige us to believe him.

On 1 Sam. 16: 14, "The spirit of the Lord departed from Saul, and an evil spirit from God troubled him," the Doctor remarks, "i. e. he was left of God to his own gloomy and frightful imaginations."* But who was the efficient cause of his own gloomy imaginations? Surely they did not happen out of nothing, like the atheist's world. Nor will the Doctor pretend, that Saul designedly produced them in his own mind. So that he gives no account of the cause of those imaginations, and no explanation of the text.

"If then the Deity creates sin, in the sense in which he creates darkness, it will follow, that as darkness is the consequence of God's withdrawing light, so the consequence of God's withdrawing his spirit and grace from any person, is sin; which will fall in exactly with our sense of God's hardening the heart." If sin in no instance take place, but in consequence of God's withdrawing his spirit and grace from a person; then God's spirit and grace are sometimes withdrawn from a person, antecedently to his sinning. And in those cases they are not withdrawn in righteous judgment, and as a just punishment of sin; because the person, by the supposition, has been guilty of no antecedent sin. Yet the Doctor everywhere considers the withdrawment of God's spirit and grace as a just punishment of the sin of those from

* Part II. p. 57.

whom they are drawn; as a just punishment of the neglect and abuse of the advantages, which they enjoyed, etc. And on this ground only he attempts to justify the withdrawment. If on the other hand, sin in any instance, do take place when there has been no withdrawment of the divine spirit and grace; then the Doctor has here given no account of the existence of sin in that instance; and such an instance there was, when sin first came into existence; it took place without a withdrawment of grace, in the way of righteous judgment.

It may here be added, that though darkness, a mere nonentity, will take place in consequence of the withdrawment of light; yet malice, envy and inordinate self-love, positive acts of the mind, will no more take place in consequence of mere withdrawment of influence, than benevolence or supreme love to God, or the whole material creation, would come into existence in consequence of a mere withdrawment of the influence of God.

"We see in what sense God is said to move, stir up or incline men to evil actions; viz. by permitting Satan to tempt men to evil, or by permitting things to take place, which *occasion* men to become perverse."* If the Doctor by "*permitting* things to take place," mean that God so disposes things that certain definite events will infallibly follow; this is all for which I plead, and which President Edwards held on this head. And surely the Doctor does not mean, that things are of their own accord and by their own native power, independently of the divine agency, endeavoring to take place, and will effect the object of their endeavor, if they be permitted by the Deity; as a high mettled steed, when permitted by his rider, leaps into a race. This would savor too much of atheism, to be holden by a Christian divine. As to the human mind's making one volition by another or without another, I have nothing more to say; nor do I wish to say any more concerning it, till an answer is given to what has been already said.

This text, "I will send him against an hypocritical nation, and against the people of my wrath will I give him a charge, Isa. 10: 6; Dr. West says, "implies no more than that the Deity meant to punish the Jews, by *letting loose* the king of Assyria upon them."† Yet in the same page he says, that the king of Assyria "was as much under the control of the Deity, as the axe and the saw are under the control of the workman." Yet this control over that king implies no more, it seems, then that God let him loose on the Jews. And is no more implied in the control which the workman has over the axe and the saw, than that he *lets*

* Part II. p. 64. † Ibid. p. 67.

them loose on the timber? I appeal to the reader, whether if the king of Assyria "was as much under the control of the Deity, as the axe and the saw are under the control of the workman;" a positive and efficacious influence, and not a *bare permission*, be not implied in such control.

On Rev. 17: 17, "For God hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God shall be fulfilled;" the Doctor remarks, "These ten kings are to agree—in giving their kingdom to the beast, that by his protection and assistance, they may be able—entirely to destroy the whore, by whom they have been long oppressed."* Thus the Doctor supposes, that the end, for which these ten kings gave their power to the beast, is that by his assistance they may destroy the great whore. But this is a mere *supposition*, unsupported by anything in the text or context; nor does the Doctor give any reason towards its support. Besides, what advantage is there in this supposition? Is the beast mentioned a friend to virtue and religion? And did those kings do their duty in giving their power into his hands? If they did not; of course they did wrong; and then the difficulty of God's putting it into their hearts to do this wrong still remains.

On quoting Isa. 5: 4, "What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked, that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?" the Doctor adds, "according to the scheme I am opposing, all that the Deity has done to his vineyard, was to make it bring forth wild grapes. How could he then appeal to the men of Judah and the inhabitants of Jerusalem, to judge between him and his vineyard?"† Now this and all the rest that the Doctor adds in his remarks on that text, lies equally against the scheme of a permissive decree "perfectly and infallibly bounding," "restraining," "marking out" and "fixing bounds to the actions of men, beyond which they cannot pass." For "according to this scheme" of the Doctor, "all that the Deity has done to his vineyard was" by restraining them from all other actions, by bounding them to those very actions which they have performed, and by fixing such bounds as they could not pass, "to make them bring forth wild grapes. How then could he appeal to the men of Judah and Jerusalem to judge between him and his vineyard? Will it be said, that the means used with them were such, that if they had been rightly improved they would have enabled them to have brought forth good grapes? The answer—is very easy; these means could have no effect but such

* Part. II. p. 68. † Ibid. p. 71, etc.

as the Deity designed them to have;" because "the Deity fixed their bounds, beyond which they could not pass," "and they must produce either good or bad grapes, according to the" bounds fixed by the Deity. And so on through the same and following page. But I need not republish Dr. West's book by way of retortion.

The Doctor in his 4th essay, Part II, (and in his postscript) on 1 King 22: 23, "Now therefore, behold, the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets;" says, "The word translated *put* ought to have been translated, The Lord hath *permitted* or *suffered* a lying spirit, etc. for the verb here translated *put*, frequently signifies to *permit* or *suffer*. For the truth of this I appeal to every good Hebrician. Thus in Ezek. 20: 25, instead of, I *gave* them statutes that were not good, it should be, I *suffered* them to have statutes that were not good."* It is always a sufficient answer to a mere confident assertion, as confidently to deny it. Therefore my answer is, "The verb here translated *put* which is נָתַן does not "frequently signify *permit* or *suffer*; and in Ezek. 20: 25, "Instead of I *gave* them statutes that were not good, it should" not "be, I *suffered* them to have statutes that were not good." Dr. West for the confirmation of his criticism "appeals to every good Hebrician." Whom he would acknowledge as a good Hebrician, is very uncertain. Therefore, instead of appealing to so uncertain a judge, I call on the Doctor himself, or any other Hebrician, good or bad, to point out the instances, whether frequent or unfrequent, in which נָתַן signifies merely to *permit* or *suffer*. Beside this, sufficient reasons must be given to convince the candid and judicious, that it is used in this sense, in the text now under consideration, and reasons which do not beg the main point, that God can do nothing towards the existence of sin, but barely to permit it. When these things shall have been done, we shall have better ground, on which to believe the Doctor's criticism, than his mere round assertion.

* Page 66.

CONCLUSION.

I have now finished my remarks on Dr. West's *Essays on Liberty and Necessity*. If he shall think proper to write again on those subjects and to reply to these remarks, I request him to attend to those points only, which are material and affect the merits of the cause. If I have exposed myself by ever so many inadvertencies, which do not affect the merits of the cause, to take up his own time and that of his readers, to exhibit them, seems not worth while. In disputes of this kind such inadvertencies are frequent. Also such disputes are apt to degenerate into misrepresentations, personal reflections and logomachy. How far I have fallen into any of these, it is not proper for me to say. However, I may say, that I have endeavored to avoid them. I hope the Doctor will be successful in the same endeavor.

If he shall write again, I request him to inform us more clearly, what he means by self-determination. If he mean no more than he hitherto professes to mean, "that we ourselves determine;" he will inform us, wherein on that head he differs from President Edwards or any other man; and whether it be his opinion, that we determine our own volitions in any other sense, than we determine all our perceptions and feelings. If he shall be of the opinion, that we efficiently cause our own volitions; I request him to inform us, how we do or can do this otherwise than by antecedent volitions. If he shall grant, that this is the way, in which we cause them; he will please to remove the absurdities supposed to attend that supposition; and also decide whether or not we cause them without any restraint by previous certainty, i. e. whether we cause them by mere chance, and at hap-hazard.

If he shall still be of the opinion, that volition is no effect; he will please to inform us how to reconcile that with the idea, that it proceeds from an intrinsic cause and is originated by him who is the subject of it. If volition have a cause, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, it is of course an effect. He will also be so kind as to inform us, whether every human volition existed from eternity, or whether it came into existence without cause.

If he still maintain, that with respect to praise and blame, there is no difference between natural and moral necessity; I wish him to inform us, whether Judas were as blameless in betraying his Lord, because it was previously certain, and certainly foretold,

that he would do it, as he was for being attached to the surface of the earth, and not ascending to heaven as Elijah did.

I hope the Doctor will explain himself concerning antecedent and consequent necessity. If he mean, that before the existence of any human action, there was no certainty, that it would exist; he will please to reconcile this both with divine foreknowledge, and with the prophecies of scripture. If by antecedent necessity, he mean anything else than antecedent certainty, he will please to show how it is to the purpose, or how it opposes what we mean by antecedent necessity.

I request him to show the consistency between these two propositions, that motive is necessary to every volition; and that men do not always act on the strongest motive. He will of course show, what the motive is which persuades a man to pass by the strongest motive, and to act on a weaker.

It is to be wished, that the Doctor would explain his favorite power *to act or not act.* If he shall own, that he means a power to choose or refuse merely, it is presumed, that his candor will lead him to own also, that he means nothing on this head different from President Edwards, unless by *power* he mean previous *uncertainty*, and by a man's power to choose or refuse, he mean, that it is in itself and in the divine view *uncertain*, whether he will choose or refuse. And if he mean this, I wish him to avow it.

I hope he will not spend time in discussing questions, which are merely verbal, such as whether motive be the *cause* or the *occasion* of volition. All that President Edwards means by *cause* in this case, is *stated occasion* or *antecedent.*

Perhaps the Doctor will find his book to be no less useful, if he shall confine himself more to *argument*, and indulge himself less in *history.* Narratives, however true and accurate, of his own opinion without his reasons, and of his ability or inability whether to do or to conceive, are very uninteresting to those who think for themselves, and do not depend on the Doctor as an authority. If he had hitherto spared all such narratives, his books had been considerably shorter and no less demonstrative.

I hope the Doctor will be very explicit in communicating his idea of liberty. I presume he will join with me in the opinion, that the whole controversy turns on this. If the liberty necessary to moral action be an exemption from all extrinsic influence, we hold that the certain consequence is that either we cause one volition by another; or that our volitions come into existence without cause and by mere chance. Therefore the Doctor will please to show, that neither of these consequences follows; or he will avow whichever he believes does follow.

He supposes self-determination is free action. Now I wish him to inform us, whether self-determination, that is limited, bounded, governed and overruled, to a conformity to the divine purpose, as he asserts all the actions of rational creatures to be, is free action. If it be, I request him to inform us, why an action decreed to be conformed to the same divine purpose, is not also free.

I rejoice, that this important subject has been taken up by so able an advocate as Dr. West. From his high character we have a right to expect, that if the cause which he has undertaken, be capable of support, it will be supported by the Doctor. I wish the other side of the question had an advocate able to do it justice. However, since I have embarked in the cause, I shall, so long as important matter is brought forward, do as well as I can, till I shall either be convinced that the cause is a bad one, or find myself unable to reply. And I doubt not, that my failure will draw forth to the support of the truth, some more able advocate, who now through modesty or some other cause, does not appear for its defence.

I think it is but fair, that Dr. West, and all others who write against moral necessity, should take the explanations, which we give of moral and natural necessity and inability, and all other important terms in this disquisition. And so far as they oppose any doctrine which we hold, they ought to oppose it in the sense in which we hold it, and not in a sense which they may find it convenient to impute to us, because they can more easily confute it. Such a management of any question as the last mentioned, will never bring it to an issue, and besides is exceedingly disingenuous, and gives reason to suspect the goodness of the cause, in favor of which it is employed.

As this question concerning liberty and necessity affects the most important subjects of morality and religion ; it is to be wished, that the discussion of it may finally conduce to the more clear understanding and the more sincere and cheerful practice of virtue and piety, and to the glory of our God and Redeemer.

OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

LANGUAGE OF THE MUHHEKANEEW INDIANS;

IN WHICH THE

EXTENT OF THAT LANGUAGE IN NORTH AMERICA IS SHOWN; ITS GENIUS GRAMMATICALLY TRACED; AND SOME OF ITS PECULIARITIES, AND SOME INSTANCES OF ANALOGY BETWEEN THAT AND THE HEBREW ARE POINTED OUT.*

THAT the following observations may obtain credit, it may be proper to inform the reader, with what advantages they have been made.

When I was but six years of age, my father removed with his family to Stockbridge, which at that time, was inhabited by Indians almost solely; as there were in the town but twelve families of whites or Anglo-Americans, and perhaps one hundred and fifty families of Indians. The Indians being the nearest neighbors, I constantly associated with them; their boys were my daily school-mates and play-fellows. Out of my father's house, I seldom heard any language spoken, beside the Indian. By these means I acquired the knowledge of that language, and a great facility in speaking it. It became more familiar to me than my mother tongue. I knew the names of some things in Indian, which I did not know in English; even all my thoughts ran in Indian; and though the true pronunciation of the language is extremely difficult to all but themselves, they acknowledged, that I had acquired it perfectly; which as they said, never had been acquired before by any Anglo-American. On account of this acquisition, as well as on account of my skill in their language in

* Communicated to the Connecticut Society of Arts and Sciences, and published at the request of the Society.

general, I received from them many compliments applauding my superior wisdom. This skill in their language I have in a good measure retained to this day.

After I had drawn up these observations, lest there should be some mistakes in them, I carried them to Stockbridge, and read them to Capt. Yoghum, a principal Indian of the tribe, who is well versed in his own language, and tolerably informed concerning the English; and I availed myself of his remarks and corrections.

From these facts, the reader will form his own opinion of the truth and accuracy of what is now offered him.

When I was in my tenth year, my father sent me among the Six Nations, with a design that I should learn their language, and thus become qualified to be a missionary among them. But on account of the war with France, which then existed, I continued among them but about six months. Therefore the knowledge which I acquired of that language was but imperfect; and at this time I retain so little of it, that I will not hazard any particular critical remarks on it. I may observe however, that though the words of the two languages are totally different, yet their structure is in some respects analogous, particularly in the use of prefixes and suffixes.

THE language which is now the subject of observation is that of the *Muhhekaneew* or Stockbridge Indians. They, as well as the tribe at New London, are by the Anglo-Americans, called *Mohegans*, which is a corruption of *Muhhekaneew*,* in the singular, or *Muhhekaneok* in the plural. This language is spoken by all the Indians throughout New England. Every tribe, as that of Stockbridge, that of Farmington, that of New London, etc. has a different dialect; but the language is radically the same. Mr. Elliot's translation of the Bible is in a particular dialect of this language. The dialect followed in these observations, is that of Stockbridge. This language appears to be much more extensive than any other language in North America. The languages of the Delawares in Pennsylvania, of the Penobscots bordering on Nova Scotia, of the Indians of St. Francis in Canada, of the Shawanese on the Ohio, and of the Chippewaus at the westward of lake Huron, are all radically the same with the Mohegan. The same is said concerning the languages of the Ottowaus,

* Wherever *w* occurs in an Indian word, it is a mere consonant, as in *work*, *world*, etc.

Nanticooks, Munsees, Menomonees, Messisaugas, Saukies, Ottagaumies, Killistinoes, Nipegons, Algonkins, Winnebagoes, etc. That the languages of the several tribes in New England, of the Delawares, and of Mr. Elliot's Bible, are radically the same with the Mohegan, I assert from my own knowledge. What I assert concerning the language of the Penobscots, I have from a gentleman in Massachusetts, who has been much conversant among the Indians. That the languages of the Shawanese and Chippewaus is radically the same with the Mohegan, I shall endeavor to show. My authorities for what I say of the languages of the other nations are Capt. Yoghum, before mentioned, and Carver's Travels.

To illustrate the analogy between the Mohegan, the Shawanee, and the Chippewau languages, I shall exhibit a short list of words of those three languages. For the list of Mohegan words I myself am accountable. That of the Shawanee words was communicated to me by general Parsons, who has had opportunity to make a partial vocabulary of that language. For the words of the Chippewau language I am dependent on Carver's Travels.

English.	*Mohegan.*	*Shawanee.*
A Bear	Mquoh	Mauquah
A beaver	Amisque*	Amaquah
Eye	Hkeesque	Skeesacoo
Ear	Towohque	Towacah
Fetch	Pautoh	Peatoloo
My Grandfather	Nemoghhome†	Nemasompethau
My Grandmother	Nohhum	Nocumthau
My Grandchild	Naughees	Noosthethau
He goes	Pumissoo	Pomthalo
A girl	Peesquausoo	Squauthauthau
House	Weekumuhm	Weecuah
He (that man)	Uwoh	Welah
His head	Weensis	Weeseh (I imagine misspelt, for weenseh.)
His heart	Utoh	Otaheh
Hair	Weghaukun	Welathoh
Her husband	Waughecheh	Wasecheh
His teeth	Wepeeton	Wepeetalee
I thank you	Wneeweh	Neauweh
My uncle	Nsees	Neeseethau
I	Neah	Nelah
Thou	Keah	Kelah

* *e* final is never sounded in any Indian word, which I write, except monosyllables.

† *gh* in any Indian word has the strong guttural sound, which is given by the Scots to the same letters in the words *tough*, *enough*, etc.

English.	*Mohegan.*	*Shawanee.*
We	Neaunuh	Nelauweh
Ye	Keauwuh	Kélauweh
Water	Nbey	Nippee
Elder sister	Nmees	Nemeethau
River	Sepoo	Thepee

The following is a specimen of analogy between the Mohegan and Chippewau languages:

English.	*Mohegan.*	*Chippewau.*
A bear	Mquoh	Mackwah
A beaver	Amisque	Amik
To die (I die)	Nip	Nip
Dead (he is dead)	Nboo or nepoo*	Neepoo
Devil	Mtandou, or Mannito†	Manitou
Dress the kettle (make a fire)	Pootouwah	Poutwah
His eyes	Ukeesquan	Wiskinkhie
Fire	Stauw	Scutta
Give it him	Meenuh	Millaw
A spirit (a spectre)	Mannito	Manitou
How	Tuneh‡	Tawnè
House	Weekumuhm	Wigwaum
An impostor (he is an impostor or bad man)	Mtissoo	Mawlawtissie
Go	Pumisseh	Pimmoussie
Marry	Weeween	Weewin
Good for nought	Mtit	Malatat
River	Sepoo	Sippim
Shoe	Mkissin	Maukissin
The sun	Keesogh	Kissis
Sit down	Mattipeh	Mintipin
Water	Nbey	Nebbi
Where	Tehah	Tah
Winter	Hpoon	Pepoun
Wood	Metooque	Mittic

Almost every man who writes Indian words, spells them in a peculiar manner; and I dare say, if the same person had taken down all the words above, from the mouths of the Indians, he would have spelt them more alike, and the coincidence would have appeared more striking. Most of those who write and

* The first syllable scarcely sounded.

† The last of these words properly signifies a spectre or anything frightful.

‡ Wherever *u* occurs, it has not the long sound of the English *u* as in *commune;* but the sound of *u* in *uncle*, though much protracted. The other vowels are to be pronounced, as in English.

print Indian words, use the letter *a* where the sound is that of *oh* or *au*. Hence the reader will observe, that in some of the Mohegan words above, *o* or *oh* is used, when *a* or *ah* is used in the correspondent words of the other languages; as *Mquoh*, *Mauquah*. I doubt not the sound of those two syllables is exactly the same, as pronounced by the Indians of the different tribes.

It is not to be supposed, that the like coincidence is extended to all the words of those languages. Very many words are totally different. Still the analogy is such as is sufficient to show, that they are mere dialects of the same original language.

I could not throughout, give words of the same signification in the three languages, as the two vocabularies, from which I extracted the Shawanee and Chippewau words, did not contain words of the same signification, excepting in some instances.

The Mohauk, which is the language of the six nations is entirely different from that of the Mohegans. There is no more appearance of a derivation of one of these last mentioned languages from the other, than there is of a derivation of either of them from the English. One obvious diversity, and in which the Mohauk is perhaps different from every other language, is, that it is wholly destitute of labials; whereas the Mohegan abounds with labials. I shall here give the numerals, as far as ten, and the *Pater noster*, in both languages.

Mohegan.	*Mohauk.*
Ngwittoh	Uskot
Neesoh	Teggeneh
Noghhoh	Ohs
Nauwoh	Kialeh
Nunon	Wisk
Ngwittus	Yoiyok
Tupouwus	Chautok
Ghusooh	Sottago
Nauneeweh	Teuhtoh
Mtannit	Wialeh

The Pater noster in the Mohegan language, is as follows:

Noghnuh, ne spummuck oieon, taugh mauweh wneh wtukoseauk neanne annuwoieon. Taugh ne aunchuwutammun wawehtuseek maweh noh pummeh. Ne annoihitteech mauweh awauneek noh hkey oiecheek, ne aunchuwutammun, ne aunoihitteet neek spummuk oiecheek. Menenaunuh noonooh wuhkamauk tquogh nuh uhhuyutamauk ngummauweh. Ohquutamouwenaunuh auneh mumachoieaukeh, ne anneh ohquutamouwoieauk numpeh neek mumacheh annehoquaukeek. Cheen hquukquaucheh siukeh annehenaunuh. Panneeweh htouwenaunuh neen maumtehkeh. Keah ngwehcheh kwiouwanweh mauweh noh pum-

meh; ktanwoi; estah awaun wtinnoiyuwun ne aunoieyon; hanweeweh ne ktinnoieen. Amen.

The Pater noster, in the language of the Six Nations, taken from Smith's history of New York, is this:

Soungwauneha caurounkyawga tehseetaroan sauhsoneyousta esa sawaneyou okettauhsela ehneauwoung na caurounkyawga nughwonshauga neatewehnesalauga taugwaunautoronoantoughsick toantaugweleewheyoustaung cheneeyeut chaquataulehwheyoustaunna toughsou taugwaussareneh tawautottenaugaloughtoungga nasawne sacheautaugwass coantehsalohaunzaickaw esa sawauneyou esa sashoutzta esa soungwasoung chenneauhaungwa; auwen.

The reader will observe, that there is not a single labial either in the numerals or Pater noster of this language; and that when they come to *amen*, from an aversion to shutting the lips, they change the *m* to *w*.

In no part of these languages does there appear to be a greater coincidence, than in this specimen. I have never noticed one word in either of them, which has any analogy to the correspondent word in the other language.

Concerning the Mohegan language, it is observable, that there is no diversity of gender, either in nouns or pronouns. The very same words express *he* and *she*, *him* and *her*. Hence when the Mohegans speak English, they generally in this respect follow strictly their own idiom: A man will say concerning his wife, *he sick*, *he gone away*, etc.

With regard to *cases*, they have but one variation from the nominative, which is formed by the addition of the syllable *an* as *wnechun*, his child, *wnechunan*. This varied case seems to suit indifferently any case, except the nominative.

The plural is formed by adding a letter or syllable to the singular; as *nemannauw*, a man, *nemannauk*, men; *penumpausoo*, a boy, *penumpausoouk*, boys.

The Mohegans more carefully distinguish the natural relations of men to each other, than we do, or perhaps any other nation. They have one word to express an elder brother, *netochon*; another to express a younger brother, *ngheesum*. One to express an elder sister, *nmase*; another to express a younger sister, *ngheesum*. But the word for younger brother and younger sister is the same,—*Nsase* is my uncle by my mother's side; *nuchehque* is my uncle by the father's side.

The Mohegans have no adjectives in all their language; unless we reckon numerals and such words as *all*, *many*, etc. adjectives. Of adjectives which express the qualities of substances, I do not

find that they have any. They express those qualities by verbs neuter; as *wnissoo*, he is beautiful; *mtissoo*, he is homely; *pehtuhquissoo*, he is tall; *nsconmoo*, he is malicious, etc. Thus in Latin many qualities are expressed by verbs neuter, as valeo, caleo, frigeo, etc. Although it may at first, seem not only singular, and curious, but impossible, that a language should exist without adjectives; yet it is an indubitable fact. Nor do they seem to suffer any inconvenience by it. They as readily express any quality by a neuter verb, as we do by an adjective.

If it should be inquired, how it appears that the words above mentioned are not adjectives; I answer it appears, as they have all the same variations and declensions of other verbs. *To walk* will be acknowledged to be a verb. This verb is declined thus: npumseh, I walk; kpumseh, thou walkest; pumissoo, he walketh; npumsehnuh, we walk; kpumsehmuh, ye walk; pumissoouk, they walk. In the same manner are the words in question declined; npehtuhquisseh, I am tall; kpehtuhquisseh, thou art tall; pehtuhquissoo, he is tall; npehtuhquissehnuh, we are tall; kpehtuhquissehmuh, ye are tall; pehtuhquessoouk, they are tall.

Though the Mohegans have no proper adjectives, they have participles to all their verbs; as pehtuhquisseet, the man who is tall; paumseet, the man who walks; waunseet, the man who is beautiful; oieet, the man who lives or dwells in a place; oioteet, the man who fights. So in the plural, pehtuhquisseecheek, the tall men; paumseecheek, they who walk, etc.

It is observable of the participles of this language, that they are declined through the persons and numbers, in the same manner as verbs; thus, paumse-uh, I walking; paumse-an, thou walking; paumseet, he walking; paumseauk, we walking; paumseauque, ye walking; paumsecheek, they walking.

They have no relative corresponding to our *who* or *which*. Instead of *the man who walks*, they say, the walking man, or the walker.

As they have no adjectives, of course they have no comparison of adjectives; yet they are put to no difficulty to express the comparative excellence or baseness of any two things. With a neuter verb expressive of the quality, they use an adverb to point out the degree; as annuweeweh wnissoo, he is more beautiful; kahnuh wnissoo, he is very beautiful. Nemannauwoo, he is a man; annuweeweh nemannauwoo, he is a man of superior excellence or courage; kahnuh nemannauwoo, he is a man of extraordinary excellence or courage.

Beside the pronouns common in other languages, they express

the pronouns both substantive and adjective, by *affixes*, or by letters or syllables added at the beginnings, or ends, or both, of their nouns. In this particular the structure of the language coincides with that of the Hebrew, in an instance in which the Hebrew differs from all the languages of Europe, ancient or modern. However, the use of the affixed pronouns in the Mohegan language, is not perfectly similar to the use of them in the Hebrew. As in the Hebrew they are joined to the ends of words only, but in the Mohegan, they are sometimes joined to the ends, sometimes to the beginnings, and sometimes to both. Thus, *tmohhecan* is a hatchet or axe; *ndumhecan* is my hatchet; *ktumhecan*, thy hatchet; *utumhecan*, his hatchet; *ndumhecannuh*, our hatchet; *ktumhecanoowuh*, your hatchet; *utumhecannoowuh*, their hatchet. It is observable, that the pronouns for the singular number are prefixed, and for the plural, the prefixed pronouns for the singular being retained, there are others added as suffixes.

It is further to be observed, that by the increase of the word the vowels are changed and transposed; as tmohecan, ndumhecan; the *o* is changed into *u* and transposed, in a manner analogous to what is often done in the Hebrew. The *t* is changed into *d euphoniae gratia.*

A considerable part of the appellatives are never used without a pronoun affixed. The Mohegans can say, my father, *nogh*, thy father, *kogh*, etc. but they cannot say absolutely *father*. There is no such word in all their language. If you were to say *ogh*, which the word would be, if stripped of all affixes, you would make a Mohegan both stare and smile. The same observation is applicable to *mother*, *brother*, *sister*, *son*, *head*, *hand*, *foot*, etc. in short to those things in general which necessarily in their natural state belong to some person. A hatchet is sometimes found without an owner, and therefore they sometimes have occasion to speak of it absolutely, or without referring it to an owner. But as a *head*, *hand*, etc. naturally belong to some person, and they have no occasion to speak of them without referring to the person to whom they belong; so they have no words to express them absolutely. This I presume is a peculiarity in which this language differs from all languages, which have ever yet come to the knowledge of the learned world.

The pronouns are in like manner prefixed and suffixed to verbs. The Mohegans never use a verb in the infinitive mood, or without a nominative or agent; and never use a verb transitive without expressing, both the agent and the object, correspondent to the nominative and accusative cases in Latin. Thus

they can neither say, *to love*, nor *I love, thou givest*, etc. But they can say, *I love thee, thou givest him*, etc. viz. *Nduhwhunuw*, I love him or her; *nduhwhuntammin*, I love it; *ktuhwhunin*, I love thee; *ktuhwhunoohmuh*, I love you, (in the plural) *nduhwhununk*, I love them. This, I think, is another peculiarity of this language.

Another peculiarity is, that the nominative and accusative pronouns prefixed and suffixed, are always used, even though other nominatives and accusatives be expressed. Thus they cannot say, *John loves Peter;* they always say, *John he loves him Peter; John uduhwhunuw Peteran.* Hence when the Indians begin to talk English, they universally express themselves according to this idiom.

It is further observable, that the pronoun in the accusative case is sometimes in the same instance expressed by both a prefix and a suffix; as *kthuwhunin*, I love thee. The *k* prefixed and the syllable *in* suffixed, both unite to express, and are both necessary to express the accusative case *thee.*

They have no verb substantive in all the language. Therefore they cannot say, *he is a man, he is a coward*, etc. They express the same by one word, which is a verb neuter, viz. *nemannauwoo*, he is a man. *Nemannauw* is the noun substantive, *man;* that turned into a verb neuter of the third person singular, becomes *nemannauwoo*, as in Latin it is said, græcor, græcatur, etc. Thus they turn any substantive whatever into a verb neuter; as *kmattannissauteuh*, you are a coward, from *matansautee*, a coward; *kpeesquausooeh*, you are a girl, from *peesquausoo*, a girl.*

Hence also we see the *reason*, why they have no verb substantive. As they have no adjectives, and as they turn their substantives into verbs on any occasion; they have no use for the substantive or auxiliary verb.

The third person singular seems to be the radix, or most simple form of the several persons of their verbs in the indicative mood; but the second person singular of the imperative, seems to be the most simple of any of the forms of their verbs; as *meetseh*, eat thou; *meetsoo*, he eateth; *nmeetseh*, I eat; *kmeetseh*, thou eatest, etc.

They have a past and future tense to their verbs; but often, if not generally, they use the form of the present tense, to express

* The circumstance that they have no verb substantive, accounts for their not using that verb, when they speak English. They say, *I man, I sick*, etc.

both past and future event. As *wnukuwoh ndiotuwohpoh*, yesterday I fought; or *wnukuwoh ndiotuwoh*, yesterday I fight; *ndiotuwauch wupkoh*, I shall fight to-morrow, or *wupkauch ndiotuwoh*, to-morrow I fight. In this last case the variation of *wupkoh* to *wupkauch* denotes the future tense; and this variation is in the word *to-morrow*, not in the verb *fight*.

They have very few prepositions, and those are rarely used, but in composition. *Anneh* is to, *ocheh* is from. But to, from, etc. are almost always expressed by an alteration of the verb. Thus, *ndoghpeh* is I ride, and *Wnoghquetookoke* is Stockbridge. But if I would say in Indian *I ride to Stockbridge*, I must say, not *anneh Wnoghquetookoke ndoghpeh*, but *Wnoghquetookoke ndinnetoghpeh*. If I would say, *I ride from Stockbridge*, it must be, not *ocheh Wnoghquetookoke ndoghpeh*; but *Wnoghquetookoke nochetoghpeh*. Thus *ndinnoghoh* is, I walk to a place; *notoghoh*, I walk from a place; *ndinnehnuh*, I run to a place; *nochehnuh*, I run from a place. And any verb may be compounded, with the prepositions, *anneh* and *ocheh*, to and from.

It has been said, that savages have no parts of speech beside the substantive and the verb. This is not true concerning the Mohegans, nor concerning any other tribe of Indians, of whose language I have any knowledge. The Mohegans have all the eight parts of speech, to be found in other languages, though prepositions are so rarely used, except in composition, that I once determined that part of speech to be wanting. It has been said also, that savages never abstract, and have no abstract terms, which with regard to the Mohegans is another mistake. They have *uhwhundowukon*, love; *sekeenundowukon*, hatred; *nsconmowukon*, malice; *peyuhtommauwukon*, religion, etc. I doubt not but that there is in this language the full proportion of abstract, to concrete terms, which is commonly to be found in other languages.

Besides what has been observed concerning prefixes and suffixes, there is a remarkable analogy, between some words in the Mohegan language, and the correspondent words in the Hebrew, —In Mohegan *Neah* is I; the Hebrew of which is *Ani*. *Keah* is thou or thee; the Hebrews use *ka* the suffix. *Uwoh* is this man, or this thing; very analogous to the Hebrew *hu* or *hua*, ipse. *Neaunuh* is we; in the Hebrew *nachnu* and *anachnu*.

In Hebrew *ni* is the suffix for *me*, or the first person. In the Mohegan *n* or *ne* is prefixed to denote the first person. As *nmeetseh* or *nemeetseh*, I eat. In Hebrew *k* or *ka* is the suffix

for the second person, and is indifferently either a pronoun substantive or adjective. K or ka has the same use in the Mohegan language; as kmeetseh or kameetseh, thou eatest; knisk, thy hand. In Hebrew the *vau*, the letter *u* and *hu* are the suffixes for he or him. In Mohegan the same is expressed by *u* or *uw*, and by *oo*; as *nduhwhunuw*, I love him, *pumissoo*, he walketh. The suffix to express *our* or *us* in Hebrew is *nu*, in Mohegan the suffix of the same signification is *nuh*; as *noghnuh*, our father; *nmeetsehnuh*, we eat, etc.

How far the use of prefixes and suffixes, together with these instances of analogy, and perhaps other instances, which may be traced out by those who have more leisure, go towards proving, that the North American Indians are of Hebrew, or at least Asiatic extraction, is submitted to the judgment of the learned. The facts are demonstrable; concerning the proper inferences every one will judge for himself. In the modern Armenian language, the pronouns are affixed.* How far affixes are in use among the other modern Asiatics, I have not had opportunity to obtain information. It is to be desired, that those who are informed, would communicate to the public what information they may possess, relating to this matter. Perhaps by such communication, and by a comparison of the languages of the North American Indians with the languages of Asia, it may appear, not only from what quarter of the world, but from what particular nations, these Indians are derived.

It is to be wished, that every one who makes a vocabulary of any Indian language, would be careful to notice the prefixes and suffixes, and to distinguish accordingly. One man may ask an Indian, what he calls *hand* in his language, holding out his own hand to him. The Indian will naturally answer *knisk*, i. e. *thy* hand. Another man will ask the same question, pointing to the Indian's hand. In this case, he will as naturally answer *nnisk*, *my* hand. Another may ask the same question, pointing to the hand of a third person. In this case, the answer will naturally be *unisk*, *his* hand. This would make a very considerable diversity in the corresponding words of different vocabularies; when if due attention were rendered to the personal prefixes and suffixes, the words would be the very same, or much more similar.

The like attention to the modes and personal affixes of the verb is necessary. If you ask an Indian how he expresses, in his language, to *go* or walk, and to illustrate your meaning, point to a person who is walking; he will tell you *pumissoo*, he walks.

* Vide Schroederi thesaurum Linguae Armenicae.

If, to make him understand, you walk yourself, his answer will be *kpumseh*, thou walkest. If you illustrate your meaning by pointing to the walk of the Indian, the answer will be *npumseh*, I walk. If he take you to mean *go* or *walk*, in the imperative mood, he will answer *pumisseh*, walk thou.

REMARKS

ON THE

IMPROVEMENTS MADE IN THEOLOGY

BY HIS FATHER,

PRESIDENT EDWARDS.

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1. THE important question, concerning the *ultimate end of the creation*, is a question, upon which Mr. Edwards has shed much light. For ages it had been disputed, whether the end of creation was *the happiness of creatures* themselves, or *the declarative glory of the Creator*. Nor did it appear that the dispute was likely to be brought to an issue. On the one hand, it was urged, that reason declared in favor of the former hypothesis. It was said that, as God is a benevolent being, he doubtless acted under the influence of his own infinite benevolence in the creation; and that he could not but form creatures for the purpose of making them happy. Many passages of Scripture also were quoted in support of this opinion. On the other hand, numerous and very explicit declarations of Scripture were produced to prove that God made all things for his own glory. Mr. Edwards was the first, who clearly showed, that both these were the ultimate end of the creation, that they are only one end, and that they are really one and the same thing. According to him, the declarative glory of God *is* the creation, taken, not distributively, but collectively, as a system raised to a high degree of happiness. The creation, thus raised and preserved, is the *declarative* glory of God. In other words, it is the exhibition of his *essential* glory.

2. On the great subject of *Liberty and Necessity*, Mr. Edwards made very important improvements. Before him, the *Calvinists* were nearly driven out of the field, by the *Arminians, Pelagians, and Socinians*. The Calvinists, it is true, appealed

to Scripture, the best of all authority, in support of their peculiar tenets. But how was the Scripture to be understood? They were pressed and embarrassed by the objection,—*That the sense, in which they interpreted the sacred writings, was inconsistent with human liberty, moral agency, accountableness, praise and blame.* It was consequently inconsistent with all command and exhortation, with all reward and punishment. Their interpretation must of course be erroneous, and an entire perversion of Scripture. How absurd, it was urged, that a man totally dead, should be called upon to arise and perform the duties of the living and sound—that we should need a divine influence to give us a new heart, and yet be commanded to make us a new heart, and a right spirit—that a man has no power to come to Christ, and yet be commanded to come to him on pain of damnation! The Calvinists themselves began to be ashamed of their own cause and to give it up, so far at least as relates to liberty and necessity. This was true especially of Dr. Watts and Doddridge, who, in their day, were accounted leaders of the Calvinists. They must needs bow in the house of Rimmon, and admit the *self-determining power;* which, once admitted and pursued to its ultimate results, entirely overthrows the doctrines of regeneration, of our dependence for renewing, and sanctifying grace, of absolute decrees, of the saints' perseverance, and the whole system of doctrines, usually denominated the *doctrines of grace.* But Mr. Edwards put an end to this seeming triumph of those, who were thus hostile to that system of doctrines. This he accomplished, by pointing out the difference between *natural* and *moral* necessity and inability, by showing the absurdity, the manifold contradictions, the inconceivableness, and the impossibility of a *self-determining power*, and by proving that *the essence* of the virtue and vice, existing in the disposition of the heart and the acts of the will, lies not in their *cause*, but in their *nature.* Therefore, though we are *not* the efficient causes of our own acts of will, yet they may be either virtuous or vicious; and also that *liberty of contingence*, as it is an exemption from all previous certainty, implies that free actions have no cause, and come into existence by mere chance. But if we admit that any event may come into existence by chance, and without a cause, the existence of the world may be accounted for in this same way; and atheism is established. Mr. Edwards and his followers have further illustrated this subject by showing, that *free action* consists in *volition* itself, and that *liberty* consists in *spontaneity.* Wherever, therefore, there is volition, there is free action; wherever there is spontaneity there is liberty; how-

ever and by whomsoever that liberty and spontaneity are caused. *Beasts*, therefore, according to their measure of intelligence, are as free as *men*. *Intelligence*, therefore, and not *liberty*, is the only thing wanting, to constitute them moral agents. The power of self-determination, alone, cannot answer the purpose of them who undertake its defence; for self-determination must be free from all control and previous certainty, as to its operations, otherwise it must be subject to what its advocates denominate a fatal necessity, and therefore must act by contingence and mere chance. But even the defenders of self-determination themselves, are not willing to allow the principle, that our actions, in order to be free, must happen *by chance*. Thus Mr. Edwards and his followers understand, that the whole controversy concerning liberty and necessity, depends on the explanation of the word *liberty*, or the sense in which that word is used. They find that all the senses in which the word has been used, with respect to the mind and its acts, may be reduced to these two: 1. Either *an entire exemption from previous certainty*, or the certain futurity of the acts which it will perform; or, 2. *Spontaneity*. Those, who use it in the former sense, cannot avoid the consequence, that, in order to act freely, we must act by chance, which is absurd, and what no man will dare to avow. If then liberty means an exemption from an influence, to which the will is or can be opposed, every *volition* is free, whatever may be the manner of its coming into existence. If, furthermore, God, by his grace, create in man a clean heart and holy volitions, such volitions being, by the very signification of the term itself, *voluntary*, and in no sense opposed to the divine influence which causes them, they are evidently as free as they could have been, if they had come into existence by mere chance and without cause. We have, of course, no need of being the efficient causes of those acts, which our wills perform, to render them either virtuous or vicious. As to the liberty, then, of self-determination or contingence, it implies, as already observed, that actions, in order to be free, must have no cause; but are brought into existence by chance. Thus have they illustrated the real and wide difference between *natural* and *moral* necessity. They have proved that this difference consists, not *in the degree of previous certainty* that an action will be performed—but in the fact, that *natural necessity* admits an entire *opposition* of the will, while *moral necessity* implies, and, in all cases, secures the *consent* of the will. It follows that all necessity of the will, and of its acts, is of the *moral* kind; and that *natural* necessity cannot possibly affect the will or any of its exercises. It likewise follows, that if liberty, as applied to a

moral agent, mean an exemption from all *previous certainty* that an action will be performed, then no action of man or any other creature can be free; for on this supposition, every action must come to pass without divine prescience, by mere chance, and consequently without a cause. Now, therefore, the Calvinists find themselves placed upon firm and high ground. They fear not the attacks of their opponents. They face them on the ground of reason, as well as of Scripture. They act not merely on the defensive. Rather they have carried the war into Italy, and to the very gates of Rome. But all this is peculiar to America; except that a few European writers have adopted, from American authors, the sentiments here stated. Even the famous Assembly of Divines had very imperfect views of this subject. This they prove, when they say, "Our first parents, *being left to the freedom of their own will*, fell from the state wherein they were created;"—and "God foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, so as *the contingency* of second causes is not taken away, but rather established." These divines unquestionably meant, that our first parents, in the instance, at least, of their fall, acted from self-determination, and by mere contingence or chance. But there is no more reason to believe or even suppose this, than there is to suppose it true of every sinner, in every sin which he commits.

3. Mr. Edwards very happily illustrated and explained *The nature of True Virtue, or Holiness.* What is the nature of true virtue, or holiness?—In what does it consist?—and, Whence arises our obligation to be truly virtuous or holy?—are questions which moral writers have agitated in all past ages. Some have placed virtue in *self-love*;—some in *acting agreeable to the fitness of things*;—some in *following conscience*, or *moral sense*; some in *following truth*;—and some in *acting agreeably to the will of God.* Those who place or found virtue in *fitness*, and those who found it in *truth*, do but use one synonymous word for another. For they doubtless mean *moral* fitness, and *moral* truth; these are no other than *virtuous* fitness and *virtuous* truth. No one would pretend that it is a virtuous action to give a man poison, because it is a *fit* or direct mode of destroying his life. No person will pretend that the crucifying of Christ was virtuous, because it was *true*, compared with the ancient prophecies. To found virtue *in acting agreeably to conscience*, or *moral sense*, justifies the persecutions of Christians by Saul of Tarsus, as well as a great proportion of heathenish idolatry. If we found virtue in the *will of God*, the question arises, Whether the will of God be our rule, because it is in fact what it is, *wise, good, and benevo-*

lent; or whether it be our rule, merely *because it is his will,* without any consideration of its nature and tendency; and whether it would be a rule equally binding, as to observance, if it were foolish and malicious?—Mr. Edwards teaches, that virtue consists in *benevolence.* He proves that every *voluntary action,* which, in its general tendency and ultimate consequences, leads to *happiness,* is virtuous; and that every such action, which has not this tendency, and does not lead to this consequence, is vicious. By happiness, in this case, he does not mean the happiness of *the agent* only or principally, but happiness *in general,* happiness *on the large scale.* Virtuous or holy benevolence embraces both the agent himself and others—all intelligences, wherever found, who are capable of a rational and moral blessedness. All actions, proceeding from such a principle, he holds to be *fit,* or *agreeable to the fitness of things*—agreeable equally to *reason,* and, *to a well-informed conscience,* or *moral sense,* and to *moral truth;*—and agreeable especially to *the will of God,* who "is love," or benevolence. In this scheme of virtue or holiness, Mr. Edwards appears to have been original. Much indeed has been said, by most moral writers, in favor of benevolence. Many things they had published, which imply, in their consequences, Mr. Edwards' scheme of virtue. But no one before him had traced these consequences to their proper issue. No one had formed a system of virtue, and of morals, built on that foundation.

4. Mr. Edwards has thrown much light on the inquiry concerning *The Origin of Moral Evil.* This question, comprehending the influence which the Deity had in the event of moral evil, has always been esteemed most difficult and intricate. That God is *the author of sin,* has been constantly objected to the Calvinists, as the consequence of their principles, by their opponents. To avoid this objection, some have holden that God is the author of the sinful *act,* which the sinner commits, but that the sinner himself is the author of its *sinfulness.* But how we shall abstract the sinfulness of a malicious act from the malicious act itself; and how God can be the author of a malicious *act,* and not be the author of the *malice,* which is the sinfulness of that act; is hard to be conceived. Mr. Edwards rejects, with abhorrence, the idea that God either is, or can be, the agent, or actor, of sin. He illustrates and explains this difficult subject, by showing that God may dispose things in such a manner, that sin will certainly take place in consequence of such a disposal. In maintaining this, he only adheres to his own important doctrine of *moral necessity.* The divine disposal, by which sin certainly comes into existence, is only establishing a certainty of its future existence.

If that *certainty*, which is no other than moral necessity, be not inconsistent with human liberty; then surely the *cause* of that certainty, which is no other than *the divine disposal*, cannot be inconsistent with such liberty.

5. The followers of Mr. Edwards have thrown new and important light upon *The Doctrine of Atonement*. It has been commonly represented, that the atonement which Christ made was *the payment of a debt* due from his people. By this payment, they were purchased from slavery and condemnation. Hence arose this question, If the sinner's *debt* be paid, how does it appear that there is any *pardon* or *grace* in his deliverance? The followers of Mr. Edwards have proved, that the atonement does not consist in the payment of a debt, properly so called. It consists rather in doing that, which, for the purpose of establishing the authority of the divine law, and of supporting in due tone the divine government, is equivalent to the punishment of the sinner according to the letter of the law. Now, therefore, God, without the prostration of his authority and government, can pardon and save those who believe. As what was done to support the divine government, was not done *by the sinner*, so it does not at all diminish the free grace of his pardon and salvation.

6. With respect to *The Imputation of Adam's Sin*, and *The Imputation of Christ's Righteousness*, their statements also have been more accurate. The common doctrine had been, that *Adam's* sin is so *transferred* to his posterity, that it properly becomes *their* sin. The righteousness *of Christ*, likewise, is so *transferred* or *made over* to the believer, that it properly becomes *his* righteousness. To the believer it is reckoned in the divine account. On this the question arises, How can the righteousness or good conduct of one person be the righteousness or good conduct of another? If, in truth, it cannot be the conduct of that other; how can God, who is omniscient, and cannot mistake, reckon, judge, or think it to be the conduct of that other? The followers of Mr. Edwards find relief from this difficulty, by proving that *to impute righteousness*, is, in the language of Scripture, *to justify*; and that, *to impute the righteousness of Christ*, is to justify *on account of* Christ's righteousness. The *imputation* of righteousness can, therefore, be no *transfer* of righteousness. They are *the beneficial consequences* of righteousness, which are transferred. Not therefore *the righteousness* of Christ *itself*, but its beneficial consequences and advantages, are transferred to the believer. In the same manner they reason with respect to the imputation of *Adam's sin*. The baneful consequences of Adam's sin, which came upon *himself*, came also upon *his posterity*.

These consequences were, that, after his first transgression, God left him *to an habitual disposition to sin*, to *a series of actual transgressions*, and to *a liableness to the curse of the law, denounced against such transgression.* The same consequences took place with regard to Adam's *posterity.* By divine constitution, they, as descending from Adam, become, like himself, the subjects of an habitual disposition to sin. This disposition is commonly called *original depravity.* Under its influence they sin, as soon as, in a moral point of view, they act at all. This depravity, this disposition to sin, leads them naturally to a series of actual transgressions, and exposes them to the whole curse of the law. On this subject two questions have been much agitated in the christian world: 1. Do the posterity of Adam, unless saved by Christ, suffer final damnation on account of Adam's sin? and, if this be asserted, how can it be reconciled with justice? 2. How shall we reconcile it with justice, that Adam's posterity should be doomed, in consequence of his sin, to come into the world, with an habitual disposition themselves to sin? On the former of these questions, the common doctrine has been, that Adam's posterity, unless saved by Christ, are damned on account of Adam's sin, and that this is just, because his sin is imputed or transferred to them. By imputation, *his* sin becomes *their* sin. When the justice of such a transfer is demanded, it is said that the constitution, which God has established, makes the transfer just. To this it may be replied, that in the same way it may be proved to be just, to damn a man without any sin at all, either personal or imputed. We need only resolve it into a sovereign constitution of God. From this difficulty the followers of Mr. Edwards relieve themselves, by holding that, though Adam was so constituted the federal head of his posterity, that in consequence of his sin they all sin or become sinners, yet they are damned on account of *their own personal sin merely*, and not on account of *Adam's sin*, as though they were individually guilty of his identical transgression. This leads us to the second question stated above, viz. How shall we reconcile it with perfect justice, that Adam's posterity should, by a divine constitution, be depraved and sinful, or become sinners, in consequence of Adam's apostacy? But this question involves no difficulty, beside that, which attends the doctrine of divine decrees. And this is satisfactory; because for God to decree that an event shall take place, is, in other words, the same thing as if he make a constitution, under the operation of which that event shall take place. If God has decreed whatever comes to pass, he decreed the fall of Adam. It is obvious that, in equal con-

sistency with justice, he may decree any other sin. Consequently he may decree that every man shall sin; and this too, as soon as he shall become capable of moral action. Now if God could, consistently with justice, establish, decree, or make a constitution, according to which this depravity, this sinfulness of disposition, should exist, *without* any respect to Adam's sin, he might evidently, with the same justice, decree that it should take place *in consequence* of Adam's sin. If God might consistently with justice decree, that the Jews should crucify Christ, without the treachery of Judas preceding, he might with the same justice decree, that they should do the same evil deed, in consequence of that treachery. Thus the whole difficulty, attending the connexion between Adam and his posterity, is resolved into the doctrine of the divine decrees; and the followers of Mr. Edwards feel themselves placed upon strong ground, ground upon which they are willing, at any time, to meet their opponents. They conceive, furthermore, that, by resolving several complicated difficulties into one simple vindicable principle, a very considerable improvement is made in the representations of theological truth. Since the discovery and elucidation of the distinction, between natural and moral necessity, and inability; and since the effectual confutation of that doctrine, which founds moral liberty on self-determination; they do not feel themselves pressed with the objections, which are made to divine and absolute decrees.

7. With respect to *The State of the Unregenerate, The Use of Means*, and *The Exhortations, which ought to be addressed to the Impenitent*, the disciples of Mr. Edwards, founding themselves on the great principles of moral agency, established in the Freedom of the Will, have since his day made considerable improvement upon former views. This improvement was chiefly occasioned by the writings of Robert Sandeman, a Scotchman, which were published after the death of Mr. Edwards. Sandeman, in the most striking colors, pointed out the inconsistency of the *popular preachers*, as he called them; by whom he meant Calvinistic divines in general. He proved them inconsistent, in teaching that the unregenerate are, by total depravity, 'dead in trespasses and sins,' and yet supposing that such sinners do often attain those sincere desires, make those sincere resolutions, and offer those sincere prayers, which are well pleasing in the sight of God, and which are the sure presages of renewing grace and salvation. He argued, that, if the unregenerate be dead in sin, then all that they do must be sin; and that sin can never be pleasing and acceptable to God. Hence he taught, not only that all the exercises and strivings of the unregenerate are abominable in the

Divine view, but that there is no more likelihood, in consequence of their strictest attendance on the means of grace, that they will become partakers of salvation, than there would be in the total neglect of those means. These sentiments were entirely new. As soon as they were published, they gave a prodigious shock to all serious men, both ministers and others. The addresses to the unregenerate, which had hitherto consisted chiefly in exhortations to attend on the outward means of grace, and to form such resolutions, and put forth such desires, as all supposed consistent with unregeneracy, were examined. It appearing that such exhortations were addresses to no real spiritual good; many ministers refrained from all exhortations to the unregenerate. The perplexing inquiry with such sinners consequently was, '*What then have we to do? All we do is sin. To sin is certainly wrong. We ought therefore to remain still, doing nothing, until God bestow upon us renewing grace.*' In this state of things, Dr. Hopkins took up the subject. He inquired particularly into the exhortations delivered by the inspired writers. He published several pieces on *The character of the Unregenerate*; on *Using the Means of Grace*; and on *The Exhortations, which ought to be addressed to the Unregenerate.* He clearly showed that, although they are dead in depravity and sin, yet, as this lays them under a mere *moral inability* to the exercise and practice of true holiness,—and as such exercise and practice are their unquestionable duty,—to *this* duty they are to be exhorted. To this duty only, and to those things which imply it, the inspired writers constantly exhort the unregenerate. Every thing short of this duty is sin. Nevertheless, 'as faith cometh by hearing,' those who 'hear,' and attend on the means of grace, even in their unregeneracy, and from natural principles, are more likely than others to become the subjects of divine grace. The Scriptures sufficiently prove, that this is the constitution which Christ has established. It likewise accords perfectly with experience and observation, both in apostolic and subsequent ages.

8. Mr. Edwards greatly illustrated *The Nature of Experimental Religion.* He pointed out, more clearly than had been done before, the distinguishing marks of genuine christian experience, and those religious affections and exercises, which are peculiar to the true Christian. The accounts of christian affection and experience, which had before been given, both by American and European writers, were general, indiscriminate, and confused. They seldom, if ever, distinguished the exercises of *self-love, natural conscience and other natural principles of the human mind under conviction of divine truth,* from *those of the new nature*

given in regeneration. In other words, they seldom distinguished the exercises of the sinner under the law-work, and the joys afterwards often derived from a groundless persuasion of his forgiveness, from those sincere and evangelical affections, which are peculiar to the real convert. They did not show *how far* the unregenerate sinner can proceed in religious exercises, and yet fall short of saving grace. But this whole subject, and the necessary distinctions with respect to it, are set in a striking light by Mr. Edwards, in his Treatise concerning Religious Affections.

9. Mr. Edwards has thrown much light upon the subject of affection as disinterested. The word *disinterested,* is, indeed, capable of such a sense, as affords a ground of argument against disinterested affections; and scarcely perhaps is an instance of its use to be found, in which it does not admit of an equivocation. It seems to be a mere equivocation to say, that disinterested affection is an impossibility; and that, if we are not interested in favor of religion, we are indifferent with respect to it, and do not love it at all. But who ever thought that, when a person professes a disinterested regard for another, he has no regard for him at all. The plain meaning is, that his regard for him is *direct* and benevolent *not selfish,* nor arising from selfish motives. In this sense, Mr. Edwards maintained that our religious affections, if genuine, are disinterested; that our love to God arises chiefly—not from the motive that God has bestowed, or is about to bestow, on us favors, whether temporal or eternal, but—from his own infinite excellence and glory. The same explanation applies to the love which every truly pious person feels for the Lord Jesus Christ, for every truth of divine revelation, and for the whole scheme of the gospel. Very different from this is the representation given by most theological writers before Mr. Edwards. The motives presented by them, to persuade men to love and serve God, to come unto Christ, to repent of their sins, and to embrace and practise religion, are chiefly of the selfish kind. There is, in their works, no careful and exact discrimination upon this subject.

10. He has thrown great light on the important doctrine of *Regeneration.* Most writers before him treat this subject very loosely. They do indeed describe a variety of awakenings and convictions, fears and distresses, comforts and joys, as implied in it; and they call the whole *regeneration.* They represent the man before regeneration as dead, and no more capable of spiritual action, than a man naturally dead is capable of performing those deeds, which require natural life and strength. From their description, a person is led to conceive, that the former is as ex-

cusable, in his omission of those holy exercises, which constitute the christian character and life, as the latter is, in the neglect of those labors, which cannot be performed without natural life. From their account, no one can determine *in what* the change, effected by regeneration, consists. They do not show the inquirer, whether every awakened and convinced sinner, who afterwards has lively gratitude and joy, is regenerated; or whether a gracious change of heart implies joys of a peculiar kind; neither, if the renewed have joys peculiar to themselves, do the teachers, now referred to, describe that peculiarity; nor do they tell from what motives the joys, that are evidence of regeneration, arise. They represent the whole man, his understanding, and his sensitive faculties, as renewed, no less than his heart and affections. According to them generally, this change is effected by *light*. As to this indeed they are not perfectly agreed. Some of them hold, that the change is produced by the bare light and and motives exhibited in the gospel. Others pretend, that a man is persuaded to become a christian, as he is persuaded to become a friend to republican government. Yet others there are, who hold that regeneration is caused by a supernatural and divine light immediately communicated. Their representation of this seems to imply, and their readers understand it as implying, an immediate and new revelation. But according to Mr. Edwards, and those who adopt his views of the subject, regeneration consists in *the communication of a new spiritual sense or taste.* In other words, a new heart is given. This communication is made, this work is accomplished, by the Spirit of God. It is their opinion, that *the intellect*, and *the sensitive faculties*, are not the *immediate* subject of any change in regeneration. They believe, however, that, in consequence of the change which the renewed heart experiences, and of its reconciliation to God, light breaks in upon the understanding. The subject of regeneration sees, therefore, the glory of God's character, and the glory of all divine truth. This may be an illustration. A man becomes cordially reconciled to his neighbor, against whom he had previously felt a strong enmity. He now sees the real excellencies of his neighbor's character, to which he was blinded before by enmity and prejudice. These new views of his neighbor, and these different feelings towards him, are the *consequence* of the change; its *evidence*, but not *the change itself*. At the same time, Mr. Edwards and others believe, that in saving experience, the sensitive faculties are brought under the due regulation by the new heart or holy temper. None of the *awakenings*, *fears*, and *convictions*, which precede the new heart, are, according to this

scheme, any part of regeneration; though they are, in some sense, a preparation for it, as all doctrinal knowledge is. The sinner, before regeneration, is allowed to be totally dead to the exercises and duties of the spiritual life. He is nevertheless accounted a moral agent. He is therefore entirely blamable in his impenitence, his unbelief, and his alienation from God. He is therefore, with perfect propriety, exhorted to repent, to become reconciled to God in Christ, and to arise from his spiritual death, that "Christ may give him light." According to this system, regeneration is produced, neither by moral suasion, i. e. by the arguments and motives of the gospel, nor by any supernatural, spiritual light; but by the immediate agency of the Holy Spirit. Yet the light and knowledge of the gospel are, by divine constitution, usually necessary to regeneration, as the blowing of the rams' horns was necessary to the falling of the walls of Jericho; and the moving of the stone from the mouth of the sepulchre, was necessary to the raising of Lazarus."

THOUGHTS ON THE ATONEMENT.

By atonement, I mean something done or suffered, which, to the purpose of supporting the honor and dignity of the divine law and government, shall be equivalent to the punishment of the sinner according to law. Therefore, the atonement made by Christ implies his substitution in the stead of the sinner, who is to be saved by him; or that he suffered that in the sinner's stead, which as effectually tended to discourage, or prevent transgression, and excite to obedience, as the punishment of the transgressor himself, according to the letter of the law would have done.

That Christ did suffer as a substitute, I thus argue from the scriptures:—

1. He is abundantly said to die as a sacrifice for us, and a sacrifice for sin. As Eph. 5: 2, "Christ also hath loved us, and given himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God, of a sweet smelling savor." Heb. 7: 27, "Who needed not daily to offer sacrifices, first for his own sins, and then for the people's: for this he did once, when he offered up himself." Chap. 9: 22, "And without the shedding of blood, there is no remission." Now as the sacrifices under the Mosaic dispensation, were offered to make atonement for sin, and were slain in the stead of those who brought them; so, in that Christ is said to die a sacrifice for us, it is implied, that he died as a substitute, to make an atonement for the sins of his people. That the ancient sacrifices under the law were offered in the stead of those who brought them, is manifest, as by other texts, so by Lev. 1: 2—5: "If any man of you bring an offering unto the Lord, ye shall bring your offering of the cattle, even of the herd, and of the flock. If his offering be a burnt sacrifice of the herd, let him offer a male without blemish: he shall offer it of his own voluntary will, at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation before the Lord. And he shall put his hand upon the head of the burnt offering; and it shall be accepted *for* him, *to make atonement for him.*" It is not said, that it shall be accepted of him, as a generous gift to the Lord, or as a token of his piety; but "it shall be accepted *for* him, *to make atonement for him.*" And as in this case, the man

who brought the sacrifice was to lay his hand on the head of the beast to be sacrificed; so, in the case of the scape-goat, the priest, in behalf of the whole people, was to lay his hands on the head of the goat, and to confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel. This transaction seems naturally, if not necessarily, to imply, that these sacrifices were substitutes of those who brought them; and that when the beast was killed, the suffering and death, which the former deserved, were transferred to the latter, and thus an atonement was made, the substitute being accepted instead of the transgressor.

Therefore, when Christ is said to be *sacrificed for us*, it must mean, that he was substituted and died in our stead, to make atonement for us *really*, as the ancient sacrifices did *typically*.

It was expressly declared, that it was the *blood* of those ancient sacrifices, which made the atonement, so far as they did make atonement. Lev. 17: 11, "For the life of the flesh is in *the blood*, and I have given it to you upon the altar, *to make an atonement for your souls;* for it is *the blood that maketh an atonement* for the soul." Therefore we are said, to be redeemed by *the blood* of Christ, as a lamb without blemish and without spot. And Heb. 9: 11—15, "But Christ being come an high priest of good things to come, by a greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands, that is to say, not of this building; neither by the blood of goats and calves, but *by his own blood*, he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us. For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of a heifer, sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh; how much more shall *the blood of Christ*, who through the eternal spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works, to serve the living God?" And Christ is called "the lamb slain from the foundation of the world." Now if we consider Christ as the substitute of sinners, as dying in their stead, and thus making atonement; all this is plain and intelligible. But if we deny this to be the design of Christ's death, how can these representations of his death be at all understood?

I know it is said, that Christ in his death is represented as a sacrifice, because the great object of his death was the establishment of that religion, by which the world is reformed, in consequence of which, the divine being is rendered propitious to men; and that the death of Christ is compared to a sacrifice, because he gave up his life in the cause of virtue and of God; and more especially a sacrifice for sin, because his death and resurrection were necessary to the confirmation of that gospel, by which sin-

ners are brought to repentance, and thereby reconciled to God. But was this the object of the ancient sacrifices? Was the lamb literally slain from the foundation of the world—slain to confirm and give evidence of the divine original of some form of religion? The sacrifice of the lamb was indeed a rite of religion; but what proof was it, that the religion of which it was a rite, was instituted by God? And how, on the supposition, that Christ was a mere man, did the death of Christ establish, prove, or confirm the christian religion, in any other sense, than the deaths of the apostles; or than the deaths of the prophets under the Old Testament, confirmed the religion instituted by Moses? Christ did indeed die a martyr to his own doctrine; so did both the apostles and ancient prophets. But are they ever said to die a sacrifice for us, and to redeem and save us? Are they called the saviors and redeemers of mankind? Are they said to have come to seek and to save that which was lost? Yet if Christ was a Savior in no other sense, than that he preached repentance, and a religion, which happily tended to reform mankind, and has in part reformed them; why may not the apostles and prophets as properly be called saviors and redeemers as Christ?

As to Christ's resurrection, this was indeed a confirmation of the gospel, as it was a miraculous and divine attestation in favor of Christ and his religion. But so was the resurrection of Dorcas a miraculous and divine attestation in favor of Peter and the religion which he preached; and the resurrection of Eutychus was a miraculous and divine attestation in favor of Paul and the religion which he preached. But we are never said to be saved or redeemed by the death, or blood of Dorcas, or Eutychus; nor is either Dorcas or Eutychus, either Peter or Paul, said to be the savior or redeemer of sinners.

2. Christ is said to be the propitiation for our sins, 1 John 2: 1, "And he is the propitiation for our sins." Rom. 3: 25, "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood." A propitiation is an offering made to render a person propitious or favorably inclined to some other person. Such was Christ, as he offered himself to God a sacrifice to render him propitious to men. This plainly teaches the substitution and atonement of Christ. But according to those who oppose the doctrine of the atonement, Christ was a propitiation for our sins in this sense only, that he taught and exhibited the most excellent motives to repentance and reformation; and by these leading sinners to repentance, he brought it to pass, that God became propitious to them. But in the same sense it may be said, that the apostle Paul, and the prophet Isaiah, made a propitiation for our sins.

3. Christ is said to be made sin for us. 2 Cor. 5: 21, "He hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him." If this mean that he was made *a sin offering*, it confirms the doctrine, that Christ was substituted for us, a sacrifice, and so made atonement. If it mean, as I apprehend, that Christ was made sin, in the same sense that believers are made righteousness, as seems to be implied in the text itself; that he was for us treated, and made to suffer in the same manner, as if he had been a sinner; that we might be treated through him, as if we had been righteous; it seems more directly to establish the doctrine for which we plead. But according to the scheme of those who oppose the doctrine of atonement, this text must mean merely, that Christ fell a sacrifice in the cause of God and virtue, as most, or all his apostles did, and as many excellent men in all ages have done; and so were made sin for us in the same manner that Christ was.

4. Christ is abundantly said to redeem us, to be our Redeemer, and to have obtained eternal redemption for us. He is also said to have given his life a ransom for many, and a ransom for all, etc. This naturally means, that some satisfaction was made for us, in consequence of which we are delivered from bondage. But if, as the opposers of atonement hold, the redemption of Christ mean his delivering men from sin by leading them to repentance by his precepts, example and precious promises, which he exhibited as a mere man, in what other sense hath he redeemed us than the prophets and apostles did? And if his giving his life a ransom for us mean, that he laid down his life by way of example, and for our instruction, and to persuade to the like performance in virtue; in this sense every martyr has given his life a ransom for us.

It is pleaded, that Moses is called a *deliverer*, or *redeemer*, Acts 7: 35, and that God is said to have *redeemed* Israel from the hand of the Egyptians; and yet he did not pay a price or make satisfaction in order to procure their deliverance; but he redeemed them by the mere exertion of power and wisdom. To this I answer, types do not in all particulars represent the things typified. It is sufficient, if the former represent the latter in some important particulars. As Moses was a remarkable type of Christ, he is properly enough called the *Deliverer*, or, if you please, a *Redeemer*. He remarkably represented Christ in many particulars of his redemption, though not in making atonement. And the deliverance of the Israelites out of Egypt was a remarkable type of the deliverance and salvation of the church—the spiritual Israel; and therefore it may be called a redemption, though

it does not represent it in every particular, or in this, that an atonement was made in order to the redemption of the true church.

5. Christ is said *to bear the sins* of mankind. Isa. 53: 11, "He shall bear their iniquities." 1 Pet. 2: 24, "Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree." Heb. 9: 28, "So Christ was once offered, to bear the sins of many." Supposing, as our adversaries contend, that the word *bear* means to *remove*, yet how was Christ offered to remove the iniquities of men, in any other sense than all martyrs are, unless it be this, that, he was offered to remove the guilt of their sins, or their liableness to punishment, by making a proper atonement? And in what sense did he agreeably to Peter's declaration, bear our sins in his own body on the tree, unless we say, that Peter himself too bare our sins in his own body on the tree when he was crucified? If Christ bare our sins in his body on the tree in this sense only, that in his death on the cross he exhibited motives to repentance; this was done by Peter in his death on the cross, and by every other crucified martyr.

6. Christ was made *a curse* for us. Gal. 3: 10, "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." This betokens his suffering the curse of the divine law, or what was equivalent to it, in our stead. To say that Christ was made a curse, because the manner of his death was similar to that which those died who were under the law deemed cursed, viz. by hanging on a tree, is to say, that Christ was made a curse for us in no other sense than Peter, or any other martyr who has ever been crucified.

7. We are said to be forgiven and justified *for the sake of Christ*, and *in his name*. 1 John 2: 12, "Because your sins are forgiven you *for his name's sake*." 1 Cor. 6: 4, "But ye are justified *in the name* of the Lord Jesus." These texts most obviously import, that for the sake of the atonement and merit of Christ, we are forgiven and justified. As to the objection to this construction of these texts taken from Gen. 26: 24, "Fear not, I am with thee and will bless thee and multiply thy seed *for my servant Abraham's sake*," and from Deut. 9: 27, in which God was entreated to remember Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and to forgive the sin of their posterity; it is to be observed, that God bound himself by covenant with those patriarchs to bless them and their posterity. And when God, in Gen. 26: 24, says to Isaac, "I will bless thee for my servant Abraham's sake," the meaning doubtless is, that he would bless Isaac, on account of the covenant which he had made with Abraham, and in the fulfilment of

the promises of that covenant. And when, in Deut. 9: 27, Moses pleads that God would "remember Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and not look on the sin of that people," he doubtless had respect to the same covenant which was first made with Abraham, and afterward with Isaac and Jacob. That this was the real meaning of Moses is manifest, from Ex. 32: 13, where the transaction is recorded, to which he refers, in Deut. 9: 27, "Remember Abraham, Isaac and Israel, thy servants, to whom thou *swarest* by thine own self, and saidest unto them, I will multiply your seed as the stars of heaven, and all this land that I have spoken of, will I give to your seed, and they shall enjoy it forever;" in which, you see, Moses pleads not the personal merit of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, as the ground of divine favor to their posterity; but the covenant which God had made with them, and the oath and promises of that covenant.

It is further to be observed, that the Israelites are never said to be forgiven *for the name's sake*, or to be justified *in the name* of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. The reason doubtless is, that this means something different from pardoning them agreeably to the promises made to those their ancestors.

To justify *in the name of Christ*, or *in the name of the Lord Jesus*, means, as is conceded by those who most violently oppose the doctrine of the atonement, to justify "as *Christ*, or *in the place of Christ*." Thus our Lord says, "Many shall come in my name," that is "in *my place* or *character*," and "pretending to be what I am, the Messiah." And again, he says, "the Comforter, whom the Father shall send in my name," that is, "*in my place*." Now, this concession contains all that we plead for. Believers are justified "as Christ, or in the place of Christ;" or as if they were Christ, and were possessed of his merit; or, as some choose to speak, as viewed and considered as in Christ, and one with him. They are justified in the place or stead of Christ, and as if they had personally wrought out the same righteousness and satisfaction which Christ has wrought out for them; even as he suffered and died in their place and stead, and as if he had been guilty of all their sins.

So that it seems, the opposers themselves of this doctrine can put no construction on this scriptural phrase, but what fully implies the substitution and atonement of Christ.

If then Christ did die, not as a martyr, and to establish and confirm the gospel, but as a substitute to atone for the sins of his people; let us now inquire, whether this measure were necessary, and for what reason it was necessary.

1. We may argue the necessity of it from the very fact itself.

We cannot imagine, that either God the Father or his Son Jesus Christ, would ever have consented to the death of Christ, for the end before mentioned, unless it had been of absolute necessity. God never does anything in vain; and as Christ was his only begotten and well beloved Son, so we may be sure, that he did not delight in his misery, and would never have permitted, and much less himself have inflicted it, unless it had been necessary. With equal strength we may argue from the wisdom of Christ, that he himself would never have consented to endure the misery of the cross, if it had not been necessary.

2. We argue the necessity of Christ's death and atonement from several declarations of scripture. "Other foundation can no man lay, than that is laid; which is Jesus Christ." "There is no other name under heaven, given among men, whereby we must be saved; neither is there salvation in any other." "Thus it behoved Christ to suffer," Luke 24: 46. "If there had been a law given, which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law," Gal. 3: 12. "If righteousness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain," Chap. 2: 21. With the same force may we argue, that if righteousness come by the mere sovereign goodness of God, without an atonement, then Christ is dead in vain. For Christ's death was no more necessary to establish the christian religion, and by that to lead sinners to repentance and acceptance with God, than it was to establish and to lead them to obey the moral law, that they might obtain acceptance by that. If then the apostle mean, that if righteousness come by the *moral* law, Christ is dead in vain, he is dead in vain if righteousness come by repentance and reformation; for these are a conformity to the moral law. And he is truly dead in vain, unless he died to make atonement for sin; because obedience to the law, repentance and reformation might have been obtained without Christ's death.

Again, if acceptance and pardon be by repentance and reformation, they are by the moral law, and in the same sense in which they are by repentance and reformation; for these are works of the law, and a conformity to it. But the moral law had been given; therefore there had been a law given, which could have given life; and of consequence, by the authority of an inspired apostle, Christ is dead in vain; which is absurd. From the whole, is it not manifest, that pardon and life cannot be by repentance and reformation only, but must be by the death, substitution and atonement of Christ?

3. The necessity of Christ's death and atonement may be argued from rational considerations. If repentance, including re-

formation, be all that is necessary to pardon and acceptance with God, then the glory of God, and the good and prosperity of his kingdom require no more. Whatever these require, and nothing more, is necessary in order to pardon. But the kingdom of God is the universe taken as a system; and the declarative glory of God is the highest perfection, good or prosperity of this system.

If, therefore, the good of the universal system require no more, in order to the pardon of the sinner, than his bare repentance and reformation, then the glory of God requires no more. Again, if the good of the universe require no more, then justice requires no more. For, whenever a crime is committed against any community, and the government of it, if there be no substitution or atonement, the crime deserves just such a punishment as the public good requires. The requirement of the public good is the exact measure of justice in this case. Now, therefore, if the public good of the universe require no more of the sinner, in order to pardon, than that he repent and reform, this is all that justice requires of him, and he justly deserves no other punishment than this. Now, this is no punishment at all, no evil, but an invaluable good. Therefore sin, by which he deserves no more, is no moral evil, no crime at all; which is absurd, and consequently the principle from which it follows, viz. that repentance and reformation are all that is necessary to pardon and acceptance with God, is absurd also.

But if we allow that sin is a crime or moral evil, it deserves punishment, and the general good of the universe requires that punishment, and consequently does not admit, that the sinner be acquitted from it, but in consequence of something done or suffered, which, to the purpose of supporting the dignity of law and government, and so, of securing the general good, is equivalent to the punishment of the sinner according to law; and this is the very atonement for which we plead.

The great plea of the opposers of the atonement is, that God's infinite goodness secures pardon to the penitent, in consequence of his repentance only. But the infinite goodness of God seeks invariably what the general good of the universe requires, and that only. Therefore, if the goodness of God require the penitent to be pardoned in consequence of his repentance only, the general good requires the same, and of course does not admit of his punishment. But if the general good do not admit that the penitent be punished, justice does not admit of it; for, as before observed, the measure of justice, when no atonement is made, is the general good. And if justice do not admit of his punishment, he *deserves* no punishment, sin is no crime, and there is

no grace in his acquittal. Yet the opposers of the atonement are great advocates for free grace in pardon; and it is truly surprising that they do not see their own perfect inconsistence. Certainly there is no free grace in pardoning that which is no crime. That is no crime which deserves no punishment. That deserves no punishment, which, if there be no atonement, the general good does not require to be punished, frowned upon, or restrained by some penalty.

It is further to be observed, that this scheme of forgiveness on bare repentance and reformation, overthrows all moral government. It does so, as it enervates and overthrows the moral law. The moral law is the law, by which God requires of us a certain course of moral conduct, on a certain penalty. But, if this threaten no penalty besides repentance and reformation, it threatens no penalty at all, no evil, but a blessing. Consequently it is no law, no authoritative injunction, nor is any moral government to be maintained by it.

Besides, certainly that is no rule of moral government, the violation of which is no moral evil, and exposes to no punishment.

Any human government in the world would be dissolved, and all authority in it abolished, if it were to proceed on the maxim of pardoning all crimes on bare repentance. And as we have no other way to form an idea of God, but to ascribe to him in an infinite degree, all the perfections of a human spirit, abstracting all imperfection; so we have no way to form an idea of the divine government, but by ascribing to it everything most excellent in human governments, abstracting all imperfections.

Thus we see, not only the necessity of an atonement, in order to forgiveness, but the reason why it is necessary, which is, that the law and government of God would without it be weakened, dishonored, and, in a degree at least, dissolved; just as any human law and government would be weakened, by suffering the lawless and disobedient to pass with impunity, and without measures taken to support that law and government.

The principal objections to the doctrine of atonement, so far as I know, are the following:

1. That it is incredible, that Christ, a divine person, should die for sinners. *Answer.* If this be incredible, it must be so, either because it is incredible, that we should be guilty of so great sin, as to make so great an atonement necessary; or because it is incredible, that God should have so much goodness as to be willing to give his Son, and his Son have so much goodness as to be willing to give himself to die for us. As to the first supposed ground of incredibility, that our demerit cannot be so great as to

require so great an atonement, it is to be observed, that we are very improper judges of our own demerit, both because of our ignorance and incapacity to determine in the case, and because we are prepossessed in our own favor. Still clear light may be obtained on the subject, if we candidly attend to the voice of reason and revelation.

Either all men are to be finally saved, or they are not. If all are not to be saved, some will suffer an endless punishment; for that very failure of final salvation is an endless punishment, as they doubtless are excluded from salvation on account of their sins. If some suffer an endless punishment, doubtless endless punishment is just, and deserved by both those who suffer it, and the rest of mankind; for that which is inflicted on the damned, is the curse of the law, and is threatened to all sinners, by a just law and a just God. But an endless punishment is an infinite evil, and that sin, by which all men deserve an infinite natural evil, is doubtless an infinite moral evil. And no wonder, that an infinite sin, or moral evil should require an atonement of infinite value. Thus, on the supposition, that all are not finally to be saved, it appears, that sin is an infinite evil, and requires an infinite atonement. It is not incredible then, that such an atonement is provided.

Let us take the other supposition, that all men are to be finally saved. On this supposition, all are to be saved from some punishment. This punishment is either temporary or endless. If it be endless, it is just and deserved, because threatened by a just God, and we become liable to it by his threatenings. But if we deserve an endless punishment, sin is an infinite evil, and so requires an infinite atonement.

If the punishment from which all are saved, be temporary, it must be a temporary punishment of longer duration than that which the damned suffer in hell. Because, as the damned actually do suffer that punishment, all men are not saved from *that*. But there is no longer punishment threatened in scripture, than that which is endured by the damned, and which is in the language of scripture said to be forever and ever; and therefore no man is, or ever was exposed to such longer punishment, and of course no man is capable of salvation from it. This then is not the punishment from which all men are saved. So that we are necessitated to come to the conclusion, that if all men shall be saved, they shall be saved from an endless punishment; and therefore were exposed by the law of a just and holy God to such a punishment; and this shows, that sin is an infinite evil, and requires an infinite atonement. Therefore the substitution and vi-

carious death of Christ are not incredible on account of the smallness of our demerit.

If, then, the vicarious death of Christ is incredible at all, it must be incredible that God had so much goodness as to give his Son, and that his Son had so much goodness as to give himself to die for sinners. But I presume, that all who allow, that the goodness of God is infinite, will allow, that it is adequate to the expression of goodness made in the gift of his Son; and so, as to the goodness of Christ. But few, if any, will deny that the goodness of God is infinite. Especially those who declaim so vehemently on the free and infinite grace of God, as all those do who oppose the doctrine of Christ's atonement, cannot pretend that God's goodness is not such as to afford the unspeakable gift of his Son.

2. It is objected, that the atonement of Christ, if it were ever so real, would not answer the end which it is proposed to answer; viz. the same end as was designed to be answered by the threatening and punishment of the sinner. This end is the restraining others from sin. Others, by seeing the sinner punished, may naturally be supposed to be restrained from that conduct which brought him to that punishment. And if their substitute must suffer in future, they might from compassion to him avoid sin. But when he has suffered already, what motive is there to restrain any from sin? This is the objection; to which I answer, that though the motive of compassion to our substitute cannot now operate to restrain men from sin, since he has already suffered all that he ever was to suffer; yet in his death there are other very powerful motives exhibited, to restrain men from sin. In his death we see God's hatred of trangression, and his determination to punish it, as clearly as in the damnation of the wicked. Therefore, if the consideration of the latter tends to restrain men from sin, why not the former?

Though Christ has already died, yet no man will escape the curse of the law on that account, unless he repent and forsake sin and walk in newness of life. And if any man presume on that account, that he shall not be punished, and thence take occasion to be remiss in his duty and to indulge himself in sin; he may be sure, that he is deluding himself, and is going fast in the road which leads to destruction.

3. It is also objected, that the atonement of Christ is inconsistent with the free grace of God in the pardon of the sinner. This objection seems to arise from a mistaken idea of the doctrine. To make satisfaction for another by a literal payment of a debt, is indeed inconsistent with grace in the forgiveness of the debt.

But to make satisfaction for a crime by the vicarious suffering of another person, is not at all inconsistent with grace in the pardon of the criminal. As long as he deserves not impunity, whatever may be the merit or demerit of his friend or substitute, so long his impunity is the fruit of grace. The sufferings and obedience of his substitute make no alteration in the personal character of the criminal.

4. Another objection is, that it is unjust that the innocent should suffer the punishment due to the guilty. If either must suffer for the other, it seems that the guilty ought rather to suffer for the innocent, than the innocent for the guilty. *Answer.* If it would have been ever so unjust, provided the innocent had not consented; yet his consent entirely removes the ground of the objection. Suppose a parent were by authority, without his consent, punished in a fine for the crime of his son; he would doubtless have reason to complain of injustice.

But if the parent consent to pay the very same fine in behalf of his son, no pretence of injustice to the parent can be made. So, if Christ, without his consent, had been compelled to suffer in the stead of sinners, it might have been matter of wonder, and complaint. But as he has consented and voluntarily offered himself to do and suffer agreeably to the will of God, yea, even chosen it, there is no foundation for the objection.

5. It is objected, that if it was necessary, that the justice of God be satisfied before any sin could be pardoned, and Christ be God as well as the Father; the justice of Christ ought to have been satisfied in the first place. If so, what other infinite being has made satisfaction to him? And if the divine nature of Christ required no satisfaction, why should the divine nature of the Father require any? This is answered by explaining what is meant by satisfying the justice of God. The justice of God here means, justice to himself as a sovereign and supreme head and guardian of the universe; and justice to himself in this view, is justice to the universe as a system; and justice to the universe is that which secures the interest and prosperity of the universe. So that to satisfy divine justice is to satisfy the demands of the universal system and secure the interests of it. Therefore, whatever secures the general good, satisfies divine justice. And when once divine justice is thus satisfied, the satisfaction extends, not only to the divine nature of the Father, but equally to the divine nature of the Son; and there is no need, that another satisfaction be made to the divine nature of the Son in particular.

6. Some say, that the doctrine of Christ's substitution and atonement represents God as implacable and unmerciful; as in-

sisting on all that justice demands; as unwilling to recede at all from the rigor of justice, but exacting it to the uttermost farthing. This also depends on the meaning of the word *justice*. If the objector mean, that God insists on all that *distributive justice*, or justice to the sinner considered in his own person admits, this is not true; for then he would insist on his eternal damnation, notwithstanding all that Christ has done and suffered. But if he mean, that God insists on all which *public justice* requires, this is undoubtedly true. But then the objection comes to this only, that God insists on all which the general good, the good of his kingdom, or the good of the creation requires, and will not pardon sinners, but in a way which is consistent with the general good of the creation. And is this made a matter of objection? Will any man pretend, that it is required by the divine perfection, or that it is consistent with those perfections, to pardon sinners in a way which is inconsistent with the general good? This can never be, till goodness is turned into malice, and malice into goodness.

Therefore, so far is the doctrine of atonement, properly understood, from representing the Deity as implacable and unmerciful, that since the atonement is no more than a measure taken by infinite wisdom, to prepare the way for pardon, consistently with the general good and happiness, it represents God to be as ready to show mercy as is consistent with the general good; and more ready to show mercy than this, it cannot be pretended to be desirable that he should be.

The doctrine of the atonement, by the blood of Jesus Christ, as our substitute, is the essence of the gospel. Without this doctrine, the gospel would not be essentially distinguished from any other religion. Those who reject the atonement, reject the divinity of Christ and the Trinity; and they suppose that Christ is a mere man, who came to preach repentance and reformation, as necessary and preparatory to future eternal happiness. What then was there peculiar in the character of Christ? The apostles preached repentance and reformation as necessary to the same end, and enforced them with the same motives and arguments. Christ is said to be a *Savior*, and to have come to seek and *to save* those who were lost. But in what sense is he, on this plan, a Savior, different from the apostles? As he preached repentance and reformation, so did they; as he enforced these duties by the motives of a future state of rewards and punishments, so did they; as he was successful in his preachings, so were they

still more successful; as they were mere men, so was he. If it should be said, that Christ, though a mere man, and a mere preacher of repentance and reformation, is entitled to the high and distinguishing appellation of *the Savior*, because he was a better preacher, and preached the gospel more fully and completely than they,—I ask, how this appears? What is a better proof of the goodness of preaching, than the success of it? Yet, as before observed, it is undeniable, that the preaching of the apostles was more successful, than that of Christ. Nor does it appear by the records of the New Testament, that Christ preached repentance and reformation, or any other evangelical doctrines, more fully and plainly, or enforced them with stronger motives than the apostles. Why then are not they as properly to be denominated *Saviors, Redeemers, the Savior of the world*, etc. as Jesus Christ? What gives him, in preference to them, a right to these distinguishing titles?

Some say, it is of no consequence what we deny, so long as we hold *salvation by Christ;* and by *salvation by Christ*, they mean salvation by repentance and reformation, as preached by Christ. But salvation by repentance and reformation was the very same, as preached by Christ, and as preached by the apostles. Therefore it is of no consequence, according to this scheme, what we deny, so long as we hold salvation by repentance and reformation, whether they be preached by Christ or the apostles; and it is a matter of indifference, whether we hold salvation by Christ, or salvation by Paul; whether we hold, that Christ or Paul is the Savior or Redeemer of mankind. The essence of the gospel is *salvation to the penitent;* and by whom it is preached, is a matter of indifference.

This is the gospel as some understand it; and when once we have gone so far, why may we not proceed a step further, and hold salvation by *Seneca* and *Cicero*? They taught the necessity of good morals and reformation, and therefore the necessity of repentance. Thus, according to the scheme now under consideration, they preached the gospel, or that which entitles any man to future eternal happiness. Why therefore were not Seneca and Cicero, as really, and in the same sense, *Saviors of the world*, as Jesus of Nazareth?

So that to preach the gospel according to this scheme, is to give up the whole of it, as a peculiar scheme of religion, and to return to the law of nature, and the religion of the pagans.

Those who hold the scheme of the gospel now under consideration, are anxious to remove the objections of Jews and Mohammedans, and to make the way easy for them to embrace and

profess christianity. Therefore the divinity of Christ, the Trinity and the atonement are, in condescension to the incredulity of those unbelievers, to be given up by the christian world. And why should we not proceed a step further in our liberality, and take all *pagans* also into the pale of the church? They hold the necessity of repentance and reformation of morals, which, according to the scheme now before us, are the essence of christianity; and since they hold all that is *essential* to our religion, why should we be so narrow and bigoted, as to reject them on account of mere *circumstantials*? As to their polytheism, this is a mere error of judgment, for which true liberality forbids that they should be rejected. Indeed, the advocates for the liberal scheme, which rejects the divinity of Christ, the atonement, etc. cannot consistently, on account of polytheism, reject the pagans from their charity and communion. They profess to have charity for those who hold, that there are three persons in the godhead, though, in their view, they are tritheists; therefore they may and must, to be consistent, have charity for pagans and polytheists, and admit them into the church as *true christians*, in reality, whatever seeming impropriety there may be in the application of the name.

APPENDIX.

THE PERFECT AND UPRIGHT MAN.

A Discourse on occasion of the death of the REV. JONATHAN EDWARDS, D. D. *President of Union College, delivered August* 3, 1801, *in the Reformed Dutch Church at Schenectady, by Robert Smith, A. M. pastor of the Presbyterian church in Savannah.*

MEN AND BRETHREN,—What mean those tolling bells, and sable signs? Why that melancholy gloom which rests upon your countenances? Alas! alas! a golden pillar in the temple of God is fallen—a radiant lamp in the seat of science is extinguished—a star of the first magnitude is set—THE GREAT EDWARDS IS NO MORE; therefore we mourn.

Doleful in the extreme, is the occasion of our meeting. "A day of darkness and of gloominess" is the present: yea, "a day of clouds and of thick darkness." Zion, city of our God! well may shades of deep distress thicken around your walls. "A burning and a shining light" is taken down. Lovers of virtue and science, in general! Union College! Relatives of the DEAR DECEASED in *particular!* well may you weep. Your loss is great. Your friend, your father is taken from you. His precious remains, cold and lifeless, are laid in the dust; there to abide "Till the heavens shall be no more."

Mournful event indeed! Where, exclaims the bleeding heart, shall consolation be found? My troubled soul, tell me where. In submission to the sovereign will of Heaven, "all nature cries aloud." Yea, proclaims the voice of eternal truth, "The Lord God omnipotent reigneth." In his government, "let the earth rejoice." Righteous Ruler of the universe! King supreme! Sovereign Disposer of the destinies of man! God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ! we bow before thy throne. Thou hast taken our father from us. We submit—we adore thy bereaving hand.

While we thus repair to God for consolation, we would also contemplate his work. The life and character of this eminent servant of the Lord, we would review. In order to this, the following scripture is chosen, as peculiarly adapted to instruct and console us on the mournful occasion:

PSALM 37: 37.—*Mark the perfect man, and behold the upright; for the end of that man is peace.*

An excellent means of improvement and comfort, under a bereavement like the present, is here prescribed. Engaged as directed, the energy of motive to christian duty is felt, while the healing balm is applied. For such is the constitution of human nature, that example stimulates most

forcibly: yea, such is its constitution, that the bursting heart, by giving vent to its sorrows, feels relieved. It takes a melancholy pleasure in speaking its woes, in telling its loss, in recollecting and recounting the excellencies of an object torn for ever from its embrace.

And while, with a trembling hand, we endeavor to draw some of the outlines of the character of this great and good man, we feel sanctioned in the attempt by usage the most ancient and universal. Shall heathen poets, in exalted verse, celebrate the praises of their heroes and rank them with their gods? Or, to use a much higher authority, does a poet divinely inspired, depict the character of Saul and Jonathan, and "call forth the sympathetic tear" on occasion of their death? And shall a character incomparably more illustrious—shall an EDWARDS be forgotten? Shall we bury his memory with his body? No; "The righteous shall be in everlasting remembrance."

From sincere respect to his memory, and with special reference to our improvement, let us, agreeably to the method which our text suggests,

I. Recount some of the leading circumstances in the life and character of this *perfect and upright man.* And,

II. Consider the manner in which we ought to *behold and mark* him.

I. *We are to recount some of the leading circumstances in the life and character of this perfect man.*

In order to guard against misconstruction, permit me to observe, that the epithet *perfect*, as here used by the Psalmist, and applied at present, is by no means to be understood as conveying the idea of sinless perfection. In this life, such a state is utterly unattainable. If we say that we are thus perfect, we deceive ourselves. Such a thought was far from the mind of the inspired penman, when he wrote this passage; and far be it from us, while meditating on it, with reference to the character before us. Precious man of God! Though eminently sanctified, yet not exempt was he, during his abode on earth, from the remains of sin. With the people of God in every age he doubtless had his failings; though what they were we cannot tell. Never have we known, among men, a character more blameless and harmless, more exemplary and unexceptionably fair. Few more holy men, perhaps, have ever sojourned on earth. Rarely, perhaps, has a purer spirit ascended to the mansions of bliss.

A character so distinguished, demands minute and circumstantial observation. To afford you much aid in this respect, the preacher feels his insufficiency. His youth, his inexperience, with scarcely any other source of information, than a short personal intimacy and observation, will, it is presumed, plead his apology. Unqualified for correct detail, let us attend to some obvious points of light, in which the life and character of this perfect and upright man may be viewed. And accordingly let us,

1. Mark him *in his parentage.** Highly distinguished was he in this respect. The name of his venerable father, is in all the churches, both in

* He was born at Northampton, in Massachusetts, on the 26th of May, O. S. 1745. And in point of family extraction and connection, few, if any, in these United States, are more distinguished. In the illustrious catalogue of his kindred, we behold the names of some of the most learned divines and profound civilians that our country has ever produced; and all of them, with but few exceptions, eminent for their vital piety.

Europe and America; and will, it is presumed, never be forgotten, while science and religion have a friend on earth. To be descended from such a parent is, indeed, a higher honor than to claim kindred with the most illustrious earthly potentate. Not that we suppose that ancestors, however distinguished, necessarily attach real dignity to a character, and ensure intrinsic worth. No; the observation is as true as it is trite—"Divine grace descends not, like a worldly possession, from parent to child." Natural endowments of body and mind may be, and often are, thus conveyed. By the mysterious disposal of the God of nature, the son not unfrequently inherits the constitution and genius of his father.* But gracious attainments admit not of lineal descent. This conceded, still it may be maintained, that a religious and reputable ancestry is far from being a privilege of little consequence; as thus means of improvement are offered, advantages conferred, and motives to propriety of conduct presented, which would, otherwise, not have been enjoyed. Those who are thus blessed, have special promises to plead. For thus saith the Lord, "I will pour my spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon thine offspring: and they shall spring up as among the grass, as willows by the water-courses." Accordingly if we look around, and observe those who are distinguished for piety and integrity of character, we shall find them in general descended, not from parents vicious and degraded, but from ancestors reputable and exemplary. Peculiarly favored in this respect was the servant of the Lord, whose death we lament. And the advantages he thus enjoyed, were blessed. His character was worthy the dignity of his family. This will appear, if

2. We mark him *in his holy temper and conduct.* He dated his conversion to God at an early period of his life. While pursuing the course of his collegial studies, it would seem that he was first brought to a saving acquaintance with the God of his father.† And thus we find that the most of those who are savingly and effectually called, generally, as in the present instance, date the important event in early life. More commonly is the renewing energy of the Holy Spirit exerted on the young and tender mind, than on the heart, which has been rendered callous in the extreme, by long continuance in sin. Agreeably, therefore, to the usual procedure of divine

* Rarely, perhaps, have so many and remarkable circumstances of resemblance to the *father* been found united in the *son*, as we discover in the character under consideration. Was the father's mind peculiarly formed for metaphysical research, and principally employed in elucidating objects the most abstruse? In like manner was the son's. Did the father, on his first settlement in the ministry, succeed his grandfather in his pastoral charge? So did the son. Was the father obliged to retire from the congregation with which he was first connected, to another less eminent, but more affectionate? In like manner was the son. Was the father called from his peaceful retreat to the presidency of a college? So was the son. Was the father, shortly after assuming the functions of his new relation, in the meridian of life, removed by death? In like manner was the son.

† He became a student in Nassau Hall, at Princeton, in the state of New Jersey, A. D. 1761, and graduated in 1765. In the intermediate period, it would appear that he first obtained the hope of reconciliation to God. Among several documents of this, found among his manuscripts, there is *one* as we learn through a very direct and authentic channel, which contains a formal and solemn dedication of himself unto God. This paper is dated September the 17th, 1763. And in it he writes, that he expected, on the next day, to receive for the first time, the sacrament of the Lord's supper.

grace, it was the happy lot of this excellent man of God, to experience a change of heart in the morning of his life. And the holy affections of soul he then obtained, "grew with his growth, and strengthened with his strength." His views of divine objects, like the morning light, became brighter and brighter. Abiding and increasing they have been. His piety was of the solid and scriptural kind; far removed from enthusiastic rapture on the one hand, or frigid apathy on the other.* It had for its foundation a most intimate acquaintance with the perfections of God, the character of Christ, and the innate depravity of the heart, accompanied with correspondent affections of soul. The glory of his God lay near his heart. To advance it was his leading aim. To submit to the divine sovereignty, to have his will absorbed in the will of his God, content that Jehovah should reign and rule, was his fervent desire and constant endeavor. If ever there be a heaven on earth, it is in such an exercise of soul; and this we have every reason to believe entered largely into the experience of this eminent saint. The Savior of men was dear to his heart. The interests of his cross were most precious in his sight. His blood was his only ground of hope. Let the Lord our righteousness be exalted; but let sinful man be humbled; was the abiding sentiment of his soul. Of the awful malignity of sin, as rebellion against the government of God, he possessed the most impressive views; and none, perhaps, ever had a deeper and more humbling sense of the depravity and moral inability of man in his present imperfect state.

The divine image thus stamped on his heart, shone forth in all his life. In his habitual deportment, we behold a bright constellation of virtues, which cannot but arrest our highest admiration and most profound respect. Having imbibed the spirit, he carefully followed the example of him "who is holy, harmless, undefiled and separate from sinners." Those who knew him best, esteemed him most. How humble and self-denied; how meek and unassuming; how cautious of giving offence; how willing to take counsel; yea, solicitous to obtain it, from those who were far inferior to him in age, station and wisdom! How simple in his manners, but manly in his feelings; magnanimous without being proud; just without being harsh; prudent without cunning; serious without austerity. How benevolent to all; how full of affection to his children and the dear partners of his soul. How compassionate to the distressed; how true to his friends; how discreet in the management of his affairs; how faithful in his various relations; how sincere in his professions; how deliberate in resolving; how firm to his resolutions; to the liberty and independence of his country, and the true rights of man in general, how decided a friend! That all men are born equally free, was his firm belief; and by this maxim of eternal justice, he regulated his practice.† Let us,

* As he was in the habit of viewing every object, however tender and affecting, with the composed eye of the devout philosopher and profound divine, he, consequently discovered, on most occasions, a peculiar calmness of temper and resignation and evenness of soul; which, by a superficial observer, might have been mistaken for a want of feeling. Whereas he was, in fact, far from being a stranger to the tender charities of the heart. Few possessed them in a higher degree, and few felt more tenderly than he did. Accordingly, he has sometimes been known to have been melted into tears even by a plaintive tune sung by a worshipping assembly.

† See his Sermon on Slavery.

3. Mark him *as a scholar and a divine.* In both these respects, he shone with distinguished lustre. The God of nature had endowed him with a mind strong and penetrating, eminently qualified for deep research. Perhaps there is not left behind him a genius more profound and energetic, in all this western world. To these uncommon endowments, application more than ordinary was added; consequently, his attainments in science, particularly in the philosophy of the mind, and the more abstruse points in theology, were such as to do honor to his character, honor to the institution over which he presided, honor to his country. As a polemic writer, his performances will long endear his memory. We behold in him that same depth of penetration, precision of thought, logical deduction, and correctness of expression, which have rendered the name of his father so famous in the learned world. "Great," indeed, "is the truth, as exhibited by his masterly pen, and it will prevail." It cannot but flash conviction on the mind.* While his mental energies were more immediately directed toward objects which lie beyond the reach of common minds, he failed not to cultivate an acquaintance with the circle of science in general. Accordingly, as a verbal and sentimental critic, both in ancient and modern erudition, he was far above mediocrity.† To observe beauties, and particularly to discover defects in polite literature, few possessed a more discerning eye. And whatever were his powers of execution in this respect, it is evident that his greatness principally consisted in acquirements, which though less specious to the superficial mind, were yet incomparably more solid in themselves. Grammatical precision and classical correctness distinguish his style, with but little of the tinsel of ornament or glitter of expression. A scholar so accomplished, a writer so distinguished, must necessarily attract general notice. The learned in Europe were not unacquainted with his character.‡ America knew his worth. The rising Seminary of learning, in this city, bewails its loss. During the short period that he presided over it, the highest expectations of its most sanguine friends were more than fulfilled. Long will the patrons of the institution lament the death of this able instructor of youth.

As a minister of the gospel he is, also, justly entitled to our highest consideration and respect. At an early period of his life, he entered on the arduous and important duties of this sacred calling; and with the most persevering diligence and increasing ardor, he ever pursued its objects. With theology in its various relations, and the history of the Church in its different periods, he was intimately acquainted. The *doctrines of grace*, as explained by his venerable father, and those who have adopted and pur-

* See his admirable work on *Universal Salvation*, intended to refute the reasoning of Dr. Chauncy on that subject; and also his learned dissertation on *Liberty and Necessity*, designed to explain and support the sentiments of his father on the *Will*, in opposition to Dr. West and other writers.

† His indefatigable industry in literary pursuits, and his acquaintance with language, particularly the Hebrew, appear to no small advantage in his tract pointing out the analogy between the language of the Muhhekaneew Indians and the Hebrew. This was prepared and published at the request of the Connecticut Society of Arts and Sciences.

‡ Not only with the learned in general, in his own country, but with several gentlemen beyond the Atlantic, distinguished for their piety and erudition, he was in the habit of maintaining a literary correspondence.

sued a similar mode of thinking, he cordially embraced, as the great articles of his faith.* These sacred peculiarities of the gospel, most commonly in all their native simplicity, constituted the theme of his preaching. And we, brethren, we who have so often been favored with his labors of love, are witnesses of the clearness with which he illustrated and enforced these doctrines, of the facility with which he solved difficulties connected with them, and of his fervent zeal to advance the interests and glory of his Master's cross. Though not gifted with the highest powers of elocution, yet his presence and speech were such as commanded high respect and attention. In the outward expressions of christian piety and ministerial duty, he was sober but animated, solemn without gloom, regular without ostentation; "By manifestation of the truth," commending himself "to every man's conscience" in the sight of God. Let us, once more,

4. Mark him *in his sickness and death*. His end was peace. Whatever anxiety he discovered with respect to his recovery, in the first stage of his disease, yet from the time it assumed a dangerous aspect, never was there a person more composed and resigned. Though he was generally, it would seem, during his illness, in possession of his mind; yet, unhappily for us, the violence of his disorder was such as, in a great measure, to deprive him of the power of utterance.* Had it been otherwise with him, his family and friends would, doubtless, have been highly edified and deeply impressed by what they would have ever held most sacred—his dying counsel and last observations with respect to the realities of the invisible world. From the little, however, which occasionally dropped from his lips it was easy to collect the leading subject of his thoughts, the great burden of his soul—ETERNITY—THE BLOOD OF CHRIST—SUBMISSION to the WILL OF GOD. Said he, a few days before his death, "From my uneasy feelings in this burning fever, during the last night, my mind has been led to reflect on the miseries of those wretched souls who are doomed, for ever, to devouring fire and everlasting burnings; if I feel so restless under this malady of body, what must be their sufferings!" On its being intimated that he, doubtless, enjoyed the supports of that religion which he had loved, and which he had long professed; "Yes," rejoined he, "the blood of Christ is my only ground of hope." At another time, with resignation depicted in his countenance, and with a voice almost lost in death, he said, "It becomes us cheerfully to submit to the will of God. He is wise and gracious. He orders everything for the best." Lo! brethren, the metaphysician most profound, the genius most acute, the scholar most accomplished, agrees with the weakest believer in making the blood of Jesus his only refuge! Christians! behold, and be confirmed! Behold, ye infidels, and be abashed! Cease to cast reproach upon the cross! it alone affords

* The points, more immediately the subject of the explanation intimated above, are the following: The distinguishing marks of experimental religion; disinterested affection; regeneration; the human will; the origin of moral evil; virtue or true holiness; the ultimate end of creation; the character of the unregenerate, with the use of the means, and the exhortations proper to be addressed to them; the atonement; the imputation of Adam's sin. Those who would wish to be informed with respect to the manner in which these points have been explained, will have recourse to the publications of President Edwards, senior; of Drs. Hopkins, of Newport, and West, of Stockbridge; and of the deceased.

* His disorder was a nervous fever; which, in the course of a few days, brought his useful life to a close on the 1st of August, 1801.

solid consolation in the hour of death. It revived the heart and supported the spirit of this departed saint. It scattered a cheering light before him, to illumine the vale of death, to brighten the dismal prospect, to direct his steps along the thorny path, and finally to usher his immortal spirit into the world of eternal day.

Having thus glanced at some of the leading circumstances in the life and character of *this perfect and upright man*—we hasten,

II. *To consider the manner in which we ought to behold and mark him.*

In various particulars, this might be shown. To mention only a few, we should,

1. Mark him *with fervent gratitude to God.* It is at once the dictate of reason and revelation, that "Every good, and every perfect gift, is from above, and cometh down from the Father of Lights." From this source, all the endowments and attainments of man proceed. Is he possessed of a mind clear as the sun, strong and penetrating as the eagle's eye? The endowment is of God. It is the "Inspiration of the Almighty," that "giveth understanding." Is he highly distinguished for his acquirements in science and religion? To God he is indebted for these attainments. Is he eminently useful in society, and does he rise into superior greatness of character? We must acknowledge the divine operation. It is the hand of the Lord that maketh great. Under these impressions, let us, with glowing hearts, bless the God of wisdom and grace, for raising up a character so illustrious as our departed friend, and for favoring us so long with his talents, his labors, his prayers, his highly useful and exemplary life. Let us,

2. Mark him *as an example for our imitation.* Religion displayed in the holy life, and triumphant death of the saint, is calculated to make a deeper impression on the mind, than when exhibited merely in a doctrinal or preceptive manner. To the energy of truth, is thus added the shining path, and the powerful attractions of example, to guide our feet, to kindle our ardor, and awaken our emulation. With reference, doubtless, to its excellence in these respects, we are commanded to "Go forth by the footsteps of the flock"—to be "followers of them who, through faith and patience, inherit the promises." Under these sacred sanctions, let us direct our admiring views toward the character before us; let us behold its excellencies; let us mark its finished traits; let us follow the distinguished example of piety, and every virtue which it presents. Let us,

3. Mark him *with serious inquiry, and deep consideration.* God in his adorable providence, is taking his faithful watchmen from off the walls of our Zion; it becomes us, therefore, to inquire, whether their removal may not be in "sore displeasure" to us, while in tender mercy to them. It may, perhaps, be an awful presage of approaching judgments from the Almighty. For thus saith the Lord, "The righteous perisheth, and no man layeth it to heart; and merciful men are taken away, none considering, that the righteous is taken away from the evil to come." Under such apprehensions, let us inquire into the reasons of the present bereavement —let us regard the work of the Lord, and consider the operation of his hands. Let us, once more,

4. Mark this eminent servant of the Lord, *with humble submission to the will of Heaven.* Jehovah is a sovereign on his throne. "He doeth accord-

ing to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?" Though many things, in his procedure, may be dark and mysterious to us; yet we know that the Judge of all the earth will do right. In his adorable wisdom he hath removed his servant from this vale of tears. It becomes us, therefore, humbly to submit, saying, "It is the Lord; let him do what seemeth him good."

Thus let us all behold and mark this perfect and upright man.

Disconsolate relatives! You need not be exhorted to mark him. You will ever cherish his memory; ever will his name remain, written on the tablet of your hearts. Alas! your wound is deep! your grief is great! We tenderly sympathize with you! We give you our tears! The best of husbands and fathers is no more! Of his counsel, his prayers, his tender affection, his paternal care, and unwearied diligence for your good, you stand bereft; yet sorrow not, as those who have no hope. Blessed be God! We have abundant hope. Yes, dear departed shade! We do most assuredly believe, that thou art in heaven, contemplating with extatic joy, the glories of thy Savior Jesus—"mixing thine incense, with that which angels and the spirits of the just incessantly burn before the throne of God and the Lamb." Disconsolate mourners! Why then these rising sobs, these flowing tears? He whom your souls loved is gone to his heavenly father. He rests from his labors—His conflict is past—His victory is complete. And were his immortal spirit, from the height of heaven, now permitted to address you on the subject of your sorrows, may we not suppose, that it would be in the language of our Lord, "Weep not for me," it is infinitely better for me to be here than with you, in a world of sin and sorrow; therefore, "Weep not for me, but weep for yourselves." Be resigned then to the will of heaven. Seek for grace, to say with holy Job, "The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord." Prepare to follow the dead. Imbibe his spirit. Walk in his steps. And may the compassionate Savior, who bedewed the grave of Lazarus with his tears, support you under your affliction! May he grant you the sanctified use of it—that it may yield the peaceable fruits of righteousness, you being duly exercised under it. May the widow's God, the orphan's shield, have you in his holy keeping! May he guide you with his counsel, and afterward receive you to glory.

Union College! Seminary of learning over which he presided, behold and mark this perfect and upright man!

Patrons of the Institution, mark him! We sincerely condole with you. We feel most tenderly for this infant seminary. During the short period of two years, twice has it bewailed the loss of its father and head. A little while ago, it wept for the removal and death of the venerable SMITH,* and now it renews it tears, over the no less venerable EDWARDS. Patrons of science! gloomy as are appearances, be not discouraged. Give not way to despondency. View the *bright* as well as the *dark* side of the cloud. Amid your fears, receive it as a token for good, that you have hitherto been

* Rev. John Blair Smith, D. D. who, after a residence of about three years in Schenectady, resigned the Presidency of the College, in compliance with the solicitations of an affectionate congregation in Philadelphia, which had previously enjoyed his highly esteemed ministry.

enabled to obtain men of such distinguished eminence, to give celebrity to the rising seminary. Decline not, therefore, in your zeal. Remit not in your exertions. Be not weary in well doing.

Faculty of the College! We give you also the tear of sympathy! Accept our condolence. The spring, which directed your movements, is no more! Your excellent counsellor, your wise director, your head, is laid in the dust! Thus, your hands are weakened, your spirits depressed, your burden increased, your responsibility enlarged. On you alone, at present, devolves the more immediate management of the institution. We doubt not but that it will be conducted with becoming propriety—that the mildness and strictness, the energy and decision, which have distinguished the faculty in time past, will still be maintained. May the God of wisdom direct and assist you in the discharge of your arduous and important duties!

Students of the College! Behold and mark the character of your able instructor—your dear departed father! For you he ever cherished all the tender sensibilities of the parent. Your best interests lay near his heart. For you he studied—for you he labored—for you he prayed. Your improvement, next to the glory of his God, was the burden of his thoughts, the object of his exertions. And can you ever forget a benefactor thus endeared? Though dead, let him ever live in your glowing recollection. Let his virtues be written on your hearts, and transcribed in your lives. And when at any time tempted to forsake the path of rectitude, call to mind that you have been the pupils of an Edwards. Let not his spotless memory and deathless fame ever be sullied by any unworthy conduct of yours. "Beware lest any man spoil you through" infidel "philosophy and vain deceit." Mark such a man, and have no fellowship with him. Flee the company of the profane, as you would the snares of death. Turn a deaf ear to the voice of pleasure. Listen to the calls of mercy. "Be sober minded." "Search the scriptures." Improve the means of grace. "Remember your Creator, in the days of your youth." Repair to the Son of God, that you may obtain that knowledge which is eternal life. If you be wise and good, you cannot live too long, nor die too soon. God, from his throne, is addressing you by the voice of his providence. He hath taken your father from you—and a brother also, in the pursuit of literature. A promising youth, with whom you but the other day conversed, is also numbered with the dead.* Alas! the stately cedar is fallen, while the rising germ is chilled by the damp of death! And do not these events, in a voice loud as thunder, inculcate the neglected, but very important admonition, "Therefore be ye also ready?"

To conclude. Ministers of the sanctuary, fathers, men and brethren! Let us mark this doleful providence, and be excited to diligent preparation for eternity—and animated with more fervent zeal in the cause of our Savior and Master—knowing that our time is short—that our opportunities of service shall soon be over and gone. Churches of Christ in this city! It becomes you, in particular, to observe the signs of the present time. It is related, that before the destruction of Jerusalem, a voice was heard from the temple, saying, "Let us depart hence." And does not a similar voice

* Referring to a student in the senior class, who died of a similar fever, and was interred on the same day with the President of the College.

seem to echo from the temples of the Lord in this place? We have been committing to the tomb a faithful minister of Christ. Another venerable servant of the cross is, by bodily infirmity, disqualified for the present, for active service. A *third* is gone in quest of health.* While he who now addresses you is shortly to repair to a church far distant from this city. Would it not, therefore, seem as though the lamp of the gospel were about to be taken down in this place—the ark of the testimony about to be removed? Under these alarming symptoms, can you feel careless and unimpressed? Awake, we beseech you, and stir up yourselves to take hold of a departing God, and a departing glory! "Did the citizens of Tyre fasten their god Apollo in chains of gold, when they apprehended that he intended to forsake and leave them to be destroyed by their enemies; and may you not sanctify the conceit, superstitious as it was, by learning from it your duty under present circumstances?" "Doth it appear, as though the blessed Savior were about to leave you? And ought you not, as it were, to hold him in chains of love? Ought you not to cast around him the arms of faith—to weep in his bosom—and to use a better example than that of the Tyrians, constrain him by your fervent supplications, as did the disciples at Emmaus, saying, abide with us; for it is towards evening, and the day is far spent?"

* Referring to the pastors of the Reformed Dutch and Episcopal churches.

The following is a copy of the inscription on the monument of Dr. Edwards, at Schenectady, N. Y.

JONATHAN EDWARDS, S. T. D.

NORTHAMP. REIP. MASS. NATUS, A. D. MDCCXLV.

COLL. NASSOV. A. B. MDCCLXV,

ET EODEM TUTOR, MDCCLXVII.

ORDINIBUS ECCLESIÆ SACRIS NOV. PORT. CONNECT. REIP

INITIATUS, MDCCLXIX.

IISDEMQ. COLUNI, MDCCXCVI.

ATQUE COLL. CONCORD. SCHENECT. N. EBOR. PRÆSES, MDCCXCIX.

VIR

INGENIO ACRI,

JUSTI TENAX PROPOSITI

DOCTRINA VERE EXIMIA MAXIME

IMBUTUS ATQUE PRÆDITUS,

CHRISTIANÆ FIDEI INTEMERATÆ

DEFENSOR TUM FERVIDUS, TUM PRÆVALIDUS,

ET IN MORIBUS INTAMINATIS ENITUIT.

MAGNUM SUI DESIDERIUM

BONIS OMNIBUS RELIQUIT

DIE 1MO. AUG.

ANNO SALUTIS HUMANÆ, MDCCCI.

3 2044 010 055 093